2015-13 | With McKenna | September 2015
Despite the general consensus that stress testing has been useful in financial and macro-prudential regulation, test techniques are still being debated. This paper proposes using robust forecasting analysis to construct adverse scenarios using a benchmark model that includes a modified worst-case distribution. These scenarios give regulators a way to identify vulnerabilities, while acknowledging that models may be misspecified in unknown ways.
2014-16 | With Dew-Becker | April 2015
We study an investor who is unsure of the dynamics of the economy. Not only are parameters unknown, but the investor does not even know what order model to estimate. She estimates her consumption process non-parametrically and prices assets using a pessimistic model that minimizes lifetime utility subject to a constraint on statistical plausibility. The equilibrium is exactly solvable and we show that the pricing model always includes long-run risks. With risk aversion of 4.8, the model matches major facts about asset prices, consumption, and investor expectations. The paper provides a novel link between ambiguity aversion and non-parametric estimation.
2013-29 | September 2013
What determines the frequency domain properties of a stochastic process? How much risk comes from high frequencies, business cycle frequencies or low frequency swings? If these properties are under the influence of an agent, who is compensated by a principal according to the distribution of risk across frequencies, then the nature of this contracting problem will affect the spectral properties of the endogenous outcome. We imagine two thought experiments: in the first, the principal (or `regulator’) is myopic with regard to certain frequencies – he is characterized by a filter – and the agent (`bank’) chooses to hide risk by shifting power from frequencies to which the regulator is attuned to those to which he is not. Thus, the regulator is fooled into thinking there has been an overall reduction in risk when, in fact, there has simply been a frequency shift. In the second thought experiment, the regulator is not myopic, but simply cares more about risk from certain frequencies, perhaps due to the preferences of the constituents he represents or because certain types of market incompleteness make certain frequencies of risk more damaging. We model this intuition by positing a filter design problem for the agent and also by a particular type of portfolio selection problem, in which the agent chooses among investment projects with different spectral properties. We discuss implications of these models for macroprudential policy and regulatory arbitrage.
2013-28 | With Smith | September 2015
Consumption-based asset-pricing models have experienced success in recent years by augmenting the consumption process in ‘exotic’ ways. Two notable examples are the Long-Run Risk and rare disaster frameworks. Such models are difficult to characterize from consumption data alone. Accordingly, concerns have been raised regarding their specification. Acknowledging that both phenomena are naturally subject to ambiguity, we show that an ambiguity-averse agent may behave as if Long-Run Risk and disasters exist even if they do not or exaggerate them if they do. Consequently, prices may be misleading in characterizing these phenomena since they encode a pessimistic perspective of the data-generating process.