## Empirical and Policy Performance of a Forward-Looking Monetary Model

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FRB San Francisco Conference on "Interest Rates and Monetary Policy" March 19-20, 2004

> Comments by Jeff Fuhrer FRB Boston

#### The authors are to be applauded and I mean that

- For moving beyond "toy" models
  - Incorporating recent advances in consumption, investment for monetary models
- For taking the data seriously
  - Empirical performance is a success criterion in this paper
- For using rigorous empirical standards
  - Serious estimation
  - Serious diagnostics (Impulse responses, covariance functions, etc.)

## The result: A Sophisticated Model-About-Town


Start with canonical model

$$\boldsymbol{p}_{t} = E_{t}\boldsymbol{p}_{t+1} + \boldsymbol{g}y_{t} + \boldsymbol{e}_{t}^{p}$$

$$c_{t} = E_{t}c_{t+1} + \boldsymbol{e}_{t}^{b}$$

$$i_{t} = \boldsymbol{r}i_{t-1} + (1-\boldsymbol{r})[a(\boldsymbol{p}_{t} - \boldsymbol{\bar{p}}_{t}) + b(y_{t} - y_{t}^{*})] + \boldsymbol{e}_{t}^{r}$$


- Add habits, indexing in wages and prices, higher-order adjustment costs in investment
- Add autocorrelated errors ( $\rho$ =.9,.95,.98)
- And voila! The model really works!




# But what are the relative contributions of shocks, frictions, and deep structure to dynamics?

- Run impulse responses with
  - Full model
  - Model with all  $\rho\s$  set to zero
  - Model with all  $\rho$ 's set to zero, "frictions" set to zero: habits, indexing, policy smoothing (*h*=0,  $\gamma_w=0, \gamma_p=0, \rho=0$ )
  - Nice accounting of where the action is coming from in the model

#### This model really works: ALMOST Response to preference shock, with and without AC errors, frictions



#### This model really works: ALMOST Response to inflation target, with and without AC errors, frictions



## Why am I whining about shocks?

- I AM NOT OPPOSED TO AUTOCORRELATED SHOCKS
- But the shocks and *ad hoc* frictions shouldn't explain too much!
- Because if they do, then what does the welfare function mean?
  - Applies only to steady-state or unconditional welfare
  - But then we're choosing optimal inflation rates, not transition paths (i.e. monetary policies)
- And what about the Lucas critique?
  - We may have found deep behavioral parameters, but
  - Much of the dynamics come from  $\rho_a$ ,  $\rho_b$ , etc.
  - Why would these be "deep?"

#### That said, the estimated contribution from "frictions" in O-W is somewhat small

- Habits
  - Note that with h=.4, the weight on past consumption (h/(1+h)) is 0.29
  - This is well below other estimates that often place weight on past consumption well above 0.5
  - Micro concerns: Little evidence of habits in micro data

#### • Indexing

- Similarly, weight on lagged inflation from indexing  $(\gamma_p/(1+\beta\gamma_p))$  is 0.24
- Again, well below many estimates which are often well above 0.5
- For wage indexing, preferred estimate has lagged inflation contribution at zero

#### Stronger frictions might imply a smaller role for shocks

• Like difference between autocorrelated errors

$$y_t = \boldsymbol{b} x_t + \frac{\boldsymbol{e}_t}{1 - \boldsymbol{r}L} \rightarrow y_t = \boldsymbol{r} y_{t-1} + \boldsymbol{b} x_t - \boldsymbol{r} \boldsymbol{b} x_{t-1} + \boldsymbol{e}_t$$

• And lagged dependent variables (habits, adj. costs, indexing)

$$y_t = \mathbf{r} y_{t-1} + \mathbf{b} x_t + \mathbf{e}_t$$

- Common factor restriction, but for small  $\beta$ , as is typical in these models, may not be important
- How "deep" are adjustment costs?
  - "Higher-order" adj. costs smacks of adding lags without much restriction (FRB-US?)

#### For example, my parameter estimates on Smets-Wouters (detrended) data:


Parameter	<b>O-W Estimate</b>	My estimate	
h	0.4	0.99	<pre>     "Frictions"     more     prominent     Shocks     less     correlated </pre>
$\gamma_{ m p}$	0.32	0.99	
$\gamma_{\rm w}$	0	0.99	
$ ho_{b}$	0.88	0.001	
ρ <sub>I</sub>	0.94	0.07	
ρ <sub>π</sub>	0.58	0.88	
ξ <sub>p</sub>	0.93	0.985	
ξ <sub>w</sub>	0.704	0.918	
Likelihood: 1.57e03			
Likelihood, O-W parameters: 22.07			

## A Larger Concern


- Are we adding "epicycles" to a dead model?
  - Habits help, but no compelling evidence that they're present in micro data
  - Indexing in wages and prices (basically adding lags) is a bit ad hoc, no?
  - Higher-order adjustment costs are also subject to suspicion
  - Big "rho's" on shocks make me nervous
- In a way, this takes us back to the very old models
  - With decent long-run, theory-grounded properties
  - But dynamics from a-theoretic sources
- If so, don't push the model's implications too far
  "Optimal" policy may be more than we can ask

# **On Optimal Policy**

- O-W Results
  - Optimal utility-based policy reduces loss by a factor of 50 relative to estimated rule
  - Rule which implements optimal policy looks like figure 16, with lagged interest rate coefficients like:



#### In the rule which implements optimal policy, inflation gets essentially no weight (from figures 17-18)



### **Robustness: With Smets and Wouters' parameters, the rule looks somewhat different**

- Although many of the qualitative properties are preserved
- Lagged interest rate coefficients about the same
- Output coefficients still much larger than inflation
- This latter result holds for the "simple rule" that approximates the optimal

## Simple Rules in the O-W model

- They find a nice simple rule that captures most of the 50x reduction in losses:  $i_t = i_{t-1} + 0.4(Y_t - Y_t^*)$
- Now *that's* something the Fed can really work with!
- No response to inflation necessary; difference specification
- The "nominal anchor" is lagged inflation?
  - This really shouldn't work
  - Does it work in other models?

## Look at the nominal anchor issue in a simple model

• "Hybrid" model, similar to O-W but simpler

$$p_{t} = wp_{t-1} + (1 - w)E_{t}p_{t+1} + gy_{t}$$
  

$$y_{t} = wy_{t-1} + (1 - w)E_{t}y_{t+1} - s(i_{t} - E_{t}p_{t+1})$$
  

$$i_{t} = i_{t-1} + ap_{t} + by_{t}$$

- For all values of 0≤ω≤1, if a=0, no value of b will stabilize the system
- System requires a true nominal anchor
  - Anchor works because CB moves  $i_t$  to attain its inflation target
  - Nothing else in system pins down long-run value of inflation.
  - CB attains inflation goal by moving real rates to influence *y*
  - It can move real rates because it can move *i* faster than  $\pi$
- Another non-robust result

## What to take away from the paper

- Big models are complicated and hard to understand!
- Optimal policy conclusions from these models can be quite counter-intuitive, seldom robust, not practical (O-W would agree)—super-inertia, nominal anchors
- The dependence on many *ad hoc* "frictions" and time series shock processes is worrisome
- But to match the data for this class of models, we need these epicycles
- Could other avenues be explored to improve models?
  - Heterogeneity: not hard to document, may be important
  - Aggregation: disaggregated time series often don't look like aggregates—micro foundations?
  - Learning: as some others at this conference are exploring
  - "Behavioral" explanations