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President's Speech
Speech to the Silicon Valley
Leadership Group
Santa Clara, California
By Janet L. Yellen, President and CEO, Federal Reserve
Bank of
San Francisco
For delivery February 21, 2007, 12:25 PM Pacific, 3:25
PM Eastern
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PDF Version (42KB)
The U.S. Economy in 2007
Good afternoon, everyone. It’s a pleasure to have
the opportunity to speak to the Silicon Valley Leadership
Group today. I owe a debt of gratitude to Ken Wilcox for
facilitating the invitation. As you may know, Ken serves
on the San Francisco Fed’s Head Office Board of Directors,
having recently been elected to a second term. He and the
other Directors, not only at the Head Office, but also at
our Branch offices, play an important role in the formulation
of monetary policy. Of course, the emphasis of our policy
analysis and our policy decisions must be on what serves
the best interests of the nation as a whole. But the Directors’ independent
assessment of conditions in specific regions and specific
industries often gives us insights into developing trends
that the national data may not reflect for weeks or months.
Our Directors also play a key role in communicating with
the public about the Fed and its mission—and that includes
hearing the public’s views on the economy and bringing
that information back to the Boardroom. This kind of give-and-take
with the public is a high priority for me, as well, so I
am looking forward very much to hearing your comments and
observations during the question and answer session.
My remarks today will center on recent developments affecting
the U.S. economy and what they may portend for the future
and especially for the conduct of monetary
policy. I will spend some time focusing on housing markets, since they may
play a key role in determining which direction economic activity
and inflation will
head over the rest of this year. Before I begin, let me note that my comments
represent my own views and not necessarily those of my colleagues in the Federal
Reserve System.
As you no doubt remember, the Federal Open Market Committee
began to remove monetary stimulus in mid-2004, after a long
stretch of keeping the federal funds rate—our
main policy tool—at a very low level. Altogether, there were 17 consecutive
quarter-point increases in the funds rate over about two years. During much of
that time, the economy averaged solid growth, absorbing a good deal of the slack
in labor and product markets. The object of the policy tightening was to slow
the economy’s growth to a more sustainable pace and to foster a gradual
decline in inflation, promoting price stability. In August of last year, the
Committee voted to “pause,” that is, not to raise the funds rate
another quarter point, but to leave it at 5¼ percent. By then, some of
the effects of the earlier increases were being felt, as the economy showed signs
of slowing, and this gave some sense of reassurance that inflation was likely
to moderate from an elevated level. These moves held the promise of setting the
economy on a glide path for the proverbial “soft landing”—an
orderly slowing of growth that avoids the risk of a severe downturn while producing
enough slack in labor and goods markets to relieve inflationary pressures and,
indeed, to bring inflation down gradually to a more acceptable level than it
has registered over the prior year or so.
In large measure, the economy has moved within range of
this outcome. And at the last meeting of the Committee, the
members voted to keep the funds rate at
5¼ percent. But as always, there are risks to this forecast that need
to be watched closely. At this stage, the predominant risks center on whether
inflation will continue to move down gradually. This concern was expressed in
the statement following our last meeting, and I’d like to elaborate on
that point in the remainder of my remarks.
Let me begin with where inflation is right now. Based on
our main measure—the
price index for personal consumption expenditures excluding food and energy,
or the core PCE price index—consumer inflation was 2.2 percent over the
past year, which, as I indicated, is higher than I would like to see. However,
it is encouraging that we have seen some easing recently: in the last three months,
this index has registered a more acceptable 1.7 percent annual rate of increase.
The core CPI, which came out this morning, was on the high side of expectations
in January. However, this followed three straight months of low core CPI inflation;
after smoothing through the volatility, this measure of inflation also has eased
in recent months.
One explanation for this decline in inflation involves
the impact of stabilizing, and now falling, oil prices. As
I mentioned, core inflation, by definition, excludes
energy prices, but they still may affect core inflation to the extent that
they affect the prices of other goods and services. For example,
transport companies
might raise their prices to pass along the higher costs of filling their trucks'
gas tanks. This is known as "pass-through," and it is likely that it
has played at least some role in recent movements in core inflation. Now that
oil prices have fallen a fair bit from recent highs and are expected by futures
markets to remain at those lower levels, this upward pressure on core inflation
is likely to dissipate and may even be turning into modest downward pressure.
However, it’s important to remember that the effects of oil price changes
on inflation are by their very nature temporary. So at some point, the fall in
oil prices will no longer have a favorable effect. Abnormally rapid rent increases,
likely reflecting an increase in the demand for rental units by would-be owners
who have been priced out of the housing market, have also elevated core inflation
over the past year. As the housing market adjusts over time, however, this source
of inflationary pressure is also apt to dissipate.
Beyond these temporary effects, the stability of inflation
expectations is another reason to take a positive view and
project a gradual diminution of inflation. Expected future
inflation is one of the factors that businesses consider
in setting their prices and that workers consider when they
bargain for compensation. These expectations appear to have
been well anchored over the past ten years or so as the Fed
has established its credibility with the public about both
its commitment to and its competence in keeping inflation
at low and stable rates. One piece of evidence supporting
this credibility is that, in the face of the recent large
oil price increases, we’ve seen stability in survey
and market measures of inflation expectations looking ten
years ahead.
By now you are probably asking yourselves, if the inflation
rate has been falling and if inflation expectations are well
anchored, why the concern about risks
to the forecast of gradually lower inflation? Part of the answer is to be
found in the strength of labor markets. The latest data show
payroll employment growing
at a rather robust pace for all of last year. Moreover, the unemployment
rate has declined by half a percentage point over the past
year and now stands at
just over 4½ percent; that rate suggests a degree of tightness in the
labor market, because it is somewhat below common estimates of the rate that
can be sustained in the long run without generating rising inflation.
I say “suggests” a degree of tightening in labor markets because
there is uncertainty about it. For example, if labor markets are tight, one
would expect that labor compensation—including both wages and benefits—would
be rising rapidly. However, the available information on this provides a mixed
picture. We have two broad measures of labor compensation. One, the employment
cost index, is showing remarkably restrained increases of only 3¼ percent
over the past year, up only slightly from the prior year, and this development
would seem to belie tight labor markets. The other measure, compensation per
hour, gives a higher reading of about 5 percent. However, this measure includes
compensation methods like stock options that are more akin to profits than
wages. So part of the strength in this measure may not actually indicate a
tight labor market.
Still, given the probability of some tightness, we would
need to see real GDP growth remain moderately below its long-run
trend for a time to have confidence
that the economy is heading for a soft landing with inflation continuing
to move lower. The impetus for the needed moderate growth
is likely already in
train, given the cumulative effects of the 17 stepwise increases in the funds
rate that began a couple of years ago. Since then, short- and intermediate-term
interest rates have risen substantially. For example, Treasury bill rates
are up by more than 3½ percentage points from mid-2004. It’s true
that corporate long-term rates are actually down by around ½ percentage
point over this period, while conventional fixed mortgage rates are essentially
unchanged. However, variable mortgage rates have risen along with short-term
rates. The overall effect of such rate changes has been to reduce demand. Not
surprisingly, the housing sector has been at the leading edge of the overall
economic slowdown, and I’d like to turn my attention to that important
sector now.
Nationally, growth in spending on residential structures—after adjusting
for inflation—was quite strong during 2002 through 2005. The decline
started toward the end of 2005 and residential investment has fallen—in
absolute terms—by a total of 13 percent, with especially steep drops
over the last two quarters. In fact, during both of those quarters, this sector
alone—which represents only a small fraction of U.S. real GDP—subtracted
a hefty 1¼ percentage points from real GDP growth. Housing starts have
followed a similar pattern, reaching a peak in January 2006 and then falling
by roughly 40 percent through January of this year. That, of course, includes
the headline-grabbing plunge for January announced last week.
Despite the continued weakness in housing construction,
which as I said enters directly into the calculation of real
GDP, there are some signs of stabilization
in other aspects of housing markets, suggesting that construction activity
may level out before too long. For example, home sales have steadied somewhat
after falling sharply for a year or so. Considering this in combination with
the continued drop in housing starts that I mentioned earlier, it is not
surprising to find that inventories of unsold homes have
begun to shrink. This development
suggests that the process of resolving the imbalances between demand and
supply in the housing market may be underway, and, as a result,
we could very well
see the drag on real GDP from housing construction wane later this year.
Of course, such a turn of events is by no means a given,
because the improvements we’ve seen may just be temporary.
For example, it is possible that they were related to a decline
in fixed mortgage rates since the middle of last
year, a development that probably supported home sales, at least to some
extent. However, the decline in mortgage rates came as a
bit of a surprise to me in
a period when the FOMC maintained the funds rate target at 5¼ percent,
especially in view of the widely discussed “conundrum” about
why long-term interest rates were already so low. Therefore, we can’t
count on further declines in mortgage rates to bring the housing market back.
In addition to concerns about weakness in housing construction,
there has been worry that difficulties related to housing
markets could spread to consumer
spending more generally. Since consumption expenditures represent two-thirds
of real GDP, even a relatively modest impact from housing markets on this
big sector could put a noticeable dent in overall economic
activity.
Up to this point, we haven’t seen signs of such spillovers. Consumption
spending has been well maintained, showing a robust growth rate for all of
2006. However, going forward, there are at least a couple of ways that spillovers
from weakness in housing could depress consumer spending, and these channels
bear watching. First, housing makes up a significant fraction of many people’s
wealth, so a significant change in house values can affect consumer wealth
and therefore consumer spending. As you know, there have been fears about plummeting
house prices. But so far, at least, house prices at the national level either
have continued to appreciate, though at a much more moderate rate, or have
fallen moderately, depending on the price index you look at. Looking ahead,
futures markets are expecting small declines in a number of metropolitan areas
this year. While these modest movements are undoubtedly imparting less impetus
to consumer spending now than during the years of rapid run-ups, their effects
are not likely to be dramatic.
As a homeowner in the Bay Area myself, I’ve naturally taken a close look
at the housing market here, so let me digress a moment to give you my reading
on the situation. In the fourth quarter, sales of existing homes were down
about 15 to 20 percent, and after several years of rapid appreciation, house
prices barely budged in 2006. Builders responded to the demand slowdown accordingly,
pulling fewer permits for new homes last year. However, here in Silicon Valley,
some encouraging evidence of stabilization in the rate of homebuilding emerged
late in the year.
I mentioned fears about plummeting house prices, and in
this area, you don’t
need a long memory to understand why people have harbored them. In the first
half of the 1990s, area home prices fell more than 10 percent. However, a key
difference between then and now is the overall health of the local economy.
For example, despite the slowdown in residential construction activity, conditions
on the nonresidential side have improved, helping to keep overall Bay Area
construction employment growing in 2006. And for employment overall, the pace
of growth actually picked up a bit last year. Continued growth of this sort
should help the adjustment in local housing markets proceed in an orderly fashion.
Returning to the national economy, housing market developments
also could spread to consumer spending if enough homeowners
experienced financial distress. For
example, rising variable mortgage rates could strain some consumers’ cash
flow. What we find, however, is that, because of the rapid appreciation of
home prices in prior years, most homeowners are sitting on a substantial amount
of equity, a financial resource that they can fall back on. In particular,
adjustable-rate borrowers with equity can avoid a rate reset by refinancing.
Moreover, only a small fraction of outstanding variable rate mortgages are
scheduled to be reset in each of the next few years.
Of course, financial distress could be a bigger problem
for some borrowers who used so-called exotic financing—like interest-only loans, piggy-back
loans, and loans with the possibility of negative amortization. These instruments
are often designed to allow subprime borrowers into the market. In fact, there
are signs of trouble for some households. Delinquencies on variable-rate mortgages
to subprime borrowers have risen sharply since the middle of last year and
now exceed 10 percent. But fortunately, delinquency rates for other types of
mortgages—including all prime borrowers and even subprime borrowers with
fixed-rate loans—have edged up only very modestly. I know that it’s
common to see newspaper stories about homeowners who have run into trouble,
and those situations are, indeed, regrettable. From a national perspective,
however, the group with rising delinquencies still represents only a small
fraction of the total market, with little impact on the behavior of overall
consumption.
A forward-looking view of the credit risks associated with
subprime mortgages can be obtained from a new financial instrument
related to these mortgages. These
instruments suggest a big increase in the risk associated
with loans made to the lowest-rated borrowers, but little
change in risk for other higher-rated
borrowers. Based on these results, it appears that investors in these instruments
expect the losses to be fairly well contained. Of course, a shift in market
sentiment about the risk of some of these securities is always possible.
Such a shift would have ramifications for mortgage financing
and housing, likely
through tighter credit standards and higher mortgage rates for certain borrowers.
In fact, we already have seen some tightening among commercial banks in recent
months.
The bottom line for housing is that the concerns we used
to hear about the possibility of a devastating collapse—one that might be big enough to
cause a recession in the U.S. economy—while not fully allayed have diminished.
Moreover, while the future for housing activity remains uncertain, I think
there is a reasonable chance that housing is in the process of stabilizing,
which would mean that it would put a considerably smaller drag on the economy
going forward.
In addition to housing, weakness in auto production has
slowed the economy during the past few quarters. The auto
industry has felt the effects of high
oil prices and people’s growing demand for more fuel-efficient vehicles.
That has been good news for some of the foreign automakers, but not such good
news for U.S. automakers, for which SUVs and trucks have been a key source
of strength. As the demand for these vehicles dropped, producers found themselves
holding unsustainably high inventories. It's little wonder that they slashed
production. These production cuts slowed overall real GDP growth in the U.S.
last year. However, once the adjustment to a lower level of production is reached,
probably in the not too distant future, this factor will cease to hold down
growth in the U.S. economy.
Outside of housing and domestic autos, the rest of the
economy has been doing quite well; that’s why it might be called a “bi-modal” economy.
I’ve already mentioned that consumer spending has been robust. Business
demand also has been solid, fueled by high profits and relatively favorable
financing conditions, leading to healthy growth in spending on business investment
in structures as well as equipment and software. Growth in investment in high-tech
goods has been especially strong and the outlook is favorable, as telecommunications
companies expand their fiber-optics networks and businesses continue to improve
their productivity by upgrading their IT equipment.
This growing demand for high-tech products has especially
important implications for Silicon Valley and the whole Bay
Area. The IT sector accounts for about
20 percent of total salary payments in the Bay Area, which is more than twice
the nationwide share. Following extensive retrenchment in the wake of the “tech
wreck” in 2000, the Bay Area IT sector has rebounded smartly, with substantial
gains in company earnings, employment, and venture capital spending realized
over the past year. This reflects not only the success of local companies at
capitalizing on growing worldwide demand for IT products, but also their talents
for developing innovative new products that create sales opportunities. This
success has been especially evident on the software and services side of the
industry, where solid employment gains and rapid wealth creation have been
primary contributors to the area’s economic revitalization.
For the national economy, the net impact of both the weak
and healthy sectors I’ve described has produced moderate real GDP growth rates of 2½ and
2 percent in the second and third quarters of last year. The advance estimate
of fourth-quarter growth showed a surge to a strong 3½ percent rate.
However, recent monthly data have been on the weaker side. After smoothing
out the volatility, my overall assessment is that economic activity has proceeded
at a moderate underlying pace for close to a year now.
In other words, it looks as if the economy is pretty close
to the “glide
path” I mentioned before—since the first quarter of last year,
growth has slowed to a bit below most estimates of the economy’s long-run
potential, and more recently the risk of an outright downturn has receded along
with the early signs of stabilization of housing markets. At the same time,
while core inflation remains on the high side of what I would like to see,
it has begun to ebb modestly in recent months.
A key question for inflation going forward —and therefore, for monetary
policy—is what happens if the drag from housing and autos disappears
later this year? As I’ve stressed, with labor markets apparently somewhat
tight, something else will need to slow to keep growth below potential.
One possibility is consumer spending. Growth in that sector
seems likely to slow because of a diminishing impetus from
household wealth, as house prices
increase less rapidly and as past increases in interest rates impose a greater
drag. In general, it wouldn’t be surprising to see a slowdown in consumer
spending given that the personal saving rate—the fraction of income not spent—has fallen to very low levels in recent years and even into negative
territory! There are good reasons for much of the drop in the saving rate over
the past decade, including the rapid growth in household wealth from housing
and the stock market. Given the extremely low recent level of saving, it wouldn’t
be shocking to see some rebound in the saving rate. That said, the saving rate
has been falling for more than a decade, so it’s obviously risky to put
too much reliance on an upswing this year.
In summary, I believe that a soft landing is the most likely
outcome over the next year or two. However, I hope my remarks
so far make it abundantly clear
that there are sizeable risks to this forecast and that I am especially concerned
about the upside risks to our inflation forecast.
These considerations play a key role in my views on monetary
policy. I have supported the decision to hold policy steady
at the current rate despite inflation
remaining higher than I would like it to be. Let me be clear that I do want
inflation to move down, but as I just indicated with my forecast, I believe
policy may now be well-positioned to foster exactly such an outcome. Moreover,
I continue to support the bias in policy toward tightening precisely because
it gives due consideration to the upside risks to inflation.
I’m casting my statements about the outlook in very conditional terms
because of the great uncertainty that surrounds any economic forecast. This
uncertainty argues for policy to be responsive to the data as it emerges. The
decision to keep policy on hold allows us more time to observe the data so
that appropriate adjustments can be made to achieve our goals of maximum stainable
employment and price stability.
1. See Bharat Trehan and Jason
Tjosvold, “Inflation
Targets and Inflation Expectations: Some Evidence from the
Recent Oil Shocks,” FRBSF
Economic Letter, 2006-22, September 1, 2006. For a discussion of related
issues, see John Williams, “Inflation
in an Era of Well-Anchored Inflation Expectations,” FRBSF Economic
Letter, 2006-27, October 13, 2006.
2. See Tao Wu, “The
Long-Term Interest Rate Conundrum: Not Unraveled Yet?” FRBSF Economic
Letter, 2005-08, April 29, 2005, and Glenn Rudebusch, Eric
Swanson, and Tao Wu (2006), “The Bond Yield ‘Conundrum’ from
a Macro-Finance Perspective,” Monetary and Economic
Studies 24 (S-1), 83-128.
3. Credit default swaps (CDS) on securities
related to subprime mortgages.
4. January 2007, Federal Reserve Board,
Senior
Loan Officer Opinion Survey.
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