Community Investments
Volume 9; No. 3; Summer 1997
The Lenders' "Other Regulator": Fair Lending Enforcement
by the Department of Justice
By Robert E. Cook, Senior Fair Lending Specialist, Federal Reserve
Board
Over the past several years, the bank regulatory agencies have substantially
expanded the effort and the expertise devoted to ensuring lender compliance
with the nation's fair lending laws.1
Concurrent with this activity, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) has also devoted increased resources to fair lending
enforcement resulting in the filing and settlement of twelve lawsuits.
These lawsuits have attracted both the attention and deep concern of lenders
nationwide. This article discusses the scope of enforcement powers available
to the DOJ under the fair lending statutes and summarizes the cases DOJ
has brought under those laws. To help lenders manage their own exposure,
this article highlights those aspects of the lending process that are
presently the primary focus of DOJ investigations.
DOJ's Role in Fair Lending Enforcement
Congress placed primary responsibility for enforcement of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA) upon the banking regulatory agencies and the Federal
Trade Commission which already had existing supervisory responsibilities
for the various types of credit-granting entities covered by the Act.
In addition, however, the ECOA provides for enforcement by the DOJ in
two specific circumstances: (i) whenever an agency having administrative
enforcement powers pursuant to the ECOA refers an enforcement matter to
the DOJ2, and (ii) more broadly,
whenever the Attorney General, on his or her own initiative, develops
facts which support a "reason to believe that one or more creditors
are engaged in a pattern or practice in violation of (the ECOA)."3
The enforcement tool available to the Attorney General in either of the
foregoing instances is the filing of a civil action in "any appropriate
United States district court for such relief as may be appropriate, including
actual and punitive damages and injunctive relief."4
DOJ's authority to file suit under the Fair Housing Act (FHAct) is
similar to the "pattern or practice" basis provided under the
ECOA. The relief available to the DOJ under the FHAct includes injunctive
relief, monetary damages to aggrieved individuals and civil penalties
of up to $100,000.
In short, the DOJ has authority to initiate its own investigations of
suspected fair lending violations by lenders, both regulated and not,
and to seek broad forms of monetary and other relief, without relying
either on complaints from members of the public or referrals from bank
regulatory agencies.
DOJ Fair Lending Cases - a Summary
Since 1992, DOJ has filed and reached settlement agreements in twelve
fair lending cases in which the defendant lending institutions agreed
to pay an aggregate total of approximately $24 million dollars for compensation
of individual applicants or borrowers and for civil penalties. Over $10
million of this compensation went directly to persons alleged by DOJ to
have been victims of discriminatory treatment. Several agreements also
included the establishment of special loan funds intended to correct the
effects of their alleged discrimination.
With respect to the nature of the discriminatory conduct alleged by DOJ
in these twelve suits, seven were predicated primarily on claims that
the defendant lenders had charged minority borrowers higher interest rates,
points, fees or other loan price components than were charged to similarly
situated non-minority borrowers. In United States v. Fleet Mortgage
Corp., for example, a case based in large part on statistical and
other information developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and
Board staff, DOJ alleged a pattern or practice of discrimination as evidenced
by statistically significant racial disparities in both the frequency
and amounts of premium pricing, or "overages" charged on mortgage
loans, coupled with an apparent absence of any credible, non-discriminatory
explanations for those disparities. Fleet agreed to payments of $3.8 million
in "monetary compensation" for alleged victims of discrimination,
together with $200,000 to be used for public education programs regarding
loan pricing and other aspects of the mortgage process.
DOJ's 1996 suit against Long Beach Mortgage Company (Long Beach)
was its most controversial pricing case to date. Long Beach, an independent
mortgage company, operated the "B & C" sub-prime market
through both a "retail" lending operation employing its own
loan officer employees and a significant "wholesale" operation
involving various mortgage brokerage firms. DOJ charged that Long Beach,
which authorized both its employee loan officers and its brokers at their
own discretion to propose premium prices on loans, was itself liable when
either a loan officer or a broker discriminated on a prohibited basis
in exercising that pricing discretion.
Lenders objected that the lesson of the Long Beach case was that DOJ
would unfairly seek to hold them responsible for the acts of independent
brokers over whose pricing behavior they had no real control. DOJ, however,
took the position that, in the Long Beach case at least, the brokers were
not truly independent operators from whom that lender simply purchased
loans. Rather, DOJ alleged that these brokered loans (similar to loans
submitted by its own employees) were routinely re-underwritten and funded
by Long Beach in its own name and that Long Beach had retained the authority
to approve or disapprove applicants and to set loan terms and conditions
for any approved loan. Under these circumstances, DOJ regarded Long Beach
as the legally responsible creditor, rather than a simple purchaser of
loans. It seems likely that DOJ will continue to bring such cases whenever
they detect fact patterns indicative of substantial control by a lender
over an otherwise independent broker's authority to set prices. In agreeing
to the settlement, Long Beach undertook, inter alia, to pay $3
million to some 1,200 minority borrowers identified as victims by DOJ
and to establish a $1 million fund for educating consumers on how mortgage
loans are priced and the need to shop wisely for mortgage credit.
Besides pricing, the other predominant focus of the loan decision process
reflected in DOJ's lawsuits is on loan processing and underwriting. The
earliest of the twelve fair lending cases summarized here, United
States v. Decatur Federal S&L, filed in September, 1992, alleged
that the lender had applied stricter underwriting criteria to minority
applicants than to others. In June, 1995, DOJ settled a case against Northern
Trust Company in Chicago, where the principal allegation was that the
lender's loan personnel had not provided African American applicants with
the same level of assistance in overcoming credit problems or
meeting other qualification criteria, as were accorded white applicants.
As more recent cases demonstrate, discriminatory disparities in levels
of assistance to applicants, together with pricing discrimination, become
a central element in DOJ's fair lending focus.
Important Lessons From DOJ Investigations
It is the rare loan applicant whose qualifications as a borrower match
perfectly all of the underwriting standards of the typical lending institution.
The vast majority of applicants will have some flaw in their credit history,
or perhaps a loan to value or debt to income ratio that exceeds FNMA's
or the lender's own guidelines, or a shortage of cash needed to pay
closing costs. Loan officers, processors and underwriters are called upon
constantly to assist at least some of these applicants to overcome one
or more such imperfections and thereby qualify for a loan. Fair lending
laws require that these everyday acts of assistance be provided on a consistent
basis to all applicants and without regard to race, gender, age or other
prohibited basis. Moreover, it is the lack of such consistency, perhaps
reflected initially in HMDA data showing disparities in loan approval
rates for white applicants compared to minorities, that both bank examiners
and DOJ investigators regard as a significant "red flag", calling
for more intensive scrutiny. The allegations against a relatively small
New Mexico lender set forth in the complaint filed earlier this year by
the DOJ in United States v. First National Bank of Dona Ana County
are compellingly instructive about the kinds of issues to which every
lender must pay close attention on an on-going basis. That complaint alleged,
in abbreviated part, as follows:
- First National provided loan officers with vague, non-specific processing
and underwriting guidelines and instructions such that loan officers
were left with de facto authority to establish their own minimum
standards;
- No official at First National reviewed decisions by loan officers
to ensure that all persons were treated fairly;
- First National failed to adequately train its loan officers and other
employees regarding fair lending obligations;
- Loan files revealed that in processing applications, loan officers
made greater efforts to obtain information from non-minority applicants
to demonstrate their eligibility than was expended on behalf of minority
applicants, including failures to make comparable efforts (a) to allow
minorities to explain adverse credit report items; (b) to verify credit
sources listed on minority loan applications; and (c) to elicit from
minority applicants possible "offsetting" qualifications that might
compensate for deficiencies;
- Loan files also revealed that loan officers applied more stringent,
less flexible underwriting standards on minority loan applications than
on applications from similarly situated white applicants.
As these allegations demonstrate, consistency is the most important
principle behind any effective fair lending compliance program. This includes
consistency of behavior in the level of assistance given to applicants,
as well as consistency in the making of exceptions to established bank
underwriting guidelines or other policies. Perhaps even more difficult
is ensuring consistency on the part of those who exercise discretion when
pricing loans to applicants. It is widely understood that most of us hold
certain stereotypes, often subconscious, about people we perceive as "different."
In the lending context, these perceptions may be about differences in
susceptibility to being overcharged, perhaps even as to their relative
"worthiness" as borrowers. To the extent that these stereotypes
are related to race, to gender or to some other basis that is prohibited
under the fair lending laws, only an on-going insistence by a lender's
managers on fair and consistent treatment of all applicants, supported
through training and self-evaluation, will provide an adequate assurance
that such stereotypes do not become part of the loan making or pricing
decision.
Mr. Cook has been with the Federal Reserve Board since March 1994. He
serves as an in-house consultant on fair lending policy and enforcement
issues. Prior to his current position, Mr. Cook served as a trial attorney
in the House and Credit Section of the Civil Rights Division, Department
of Justice and thereafter as a fair lending section chief at the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation. Mr. Cook received his Juris Doctor degree
from Boston College Law School.
1 These are (a) the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. 1691a, et seq), which prohibits discrimination
against an applicant by any creditor, with respect to any aspect of a credit
transaction, on the basis of, inter alia, race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, marital status, or age and (b) the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C.
3601 et seq.), which, inter alia, makes it unlawful to discriminate in any
lending-related activity affecting residential real estate on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.
Obviously, in housing-related cases, there is substantial overlap in coverage
between the two acts.
2 Under Section 706(g)
of ECOA, the bank regulatory agencies, including the National Credit Union
Administration, are required to make such referrals whenever they have
"reason to believe that 1 or more creditors has engaged in a pattern
or practice of discouraging or denying applications for credit in violation
of (this Act)." (Referrals to the DOJ under certain other circumstances
are permissive, rather than mandatory.)
3 ECOA, Section 706(h).
4 It bears noting that
the limitation of $10,000 on punitive damage awards to individual private
claimants provided for in Section 706(b) of the Act is not applicable
to cases brought by DOJ.
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