FRBSF Economic Letter
2004-02; January 23, 2004
U.S. Monetary Policy: An Introduction
Part 2: What are the goals of U.S. monetary policy?
This
is the second of four consecutive
issues devoted to our updated
and expanded Q&A on monetary policy: (1) "How is the Federal
Reserve structured?" and "What are the tools of U.S.
monetary policy?" (2) "What are the goals of U.S. monetary
policy?" (3) "How does monetary policy affect the U.S.
economy?" and (4) "How does the Fed decide the appropriate
setting for the policy instrument?" The revised text will
appear in a pamphlet soon.
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Monetary policy has two basic goals: to promote "maximum" sustainable
output and employment and to promote "stable" prices.
These goals are prescribed in a 1977 amendment to the Federal Reserve
Act.
What do maximum sustainable output and employment mean?
In the
long run, the amount of goods and services the economy produces
(output) and the number of jobs it generates (employment) both
depend on factors other than monetary policy. These factors include
technology and people's preferences for saving, risk, and work
effort. So, maximum sustainable output and employment mean the
levels consistent with these factors in the long run.
But the economy
goes through business cycles in which output and employment are
above or below their long-run levels. Even though
monetary policy can't affect either output or employment in the
long run, it can affect them in the short run. For example, when
demand weakens and there's a recession, the Fed can stimulate the
economy—temporarily—and help push it back toward its long-run
level of output by lowering interest rates. That's why stabilizing
the economy—that is, smoothing out the peaks and valleys in output
and employment around their long-run growth paths—is a key short-run
objective for the Fed and many other central banks.
If the Fed can
stimulate the economy out of a recession, why doesn't it stimulate
the economy all the time?
Persistent attempts to expand the economy
beyond its long-run growth path will press capacity constraints
and lead to higher and higher
inflation, without producing lower unemployment or higher output
in the long run. In other words, not only are there no long-term
gains from persistently pursuing expansionary policies, but there's
also a price—higher inflation.
What's so bad about higher inflation? High inflation is bad because
it can hinder economic growth, and for a lot of reasons. For one
thing, it makes it harder to tell
what a change in the price of a particular product means. For example,
a firm that is offered higher prices for its products can have
trouble telling how much of the price change is due to stronger
demand for its products and how much reflects the economy-wide
rise in prices.
Moreover, when inflation is high, it also tends
to vary a lot, and that makes people uncertain about what inflation
will be in
the future. That uncertainty can hinder economic growth in a couple
of ways—it adds an inflation risk premium to long-term interest
rates, and it complicates further the planning and contracting
by businesses and households that are so essential to capital formation.
That's not all. Because many aspects of the tax system are not
indexed to inflation, high inflation distorts economic decisions
by arbitrarily increasing or decreasing after-tax rates of return
to different kinds of economic activities. In addition, it leads
people to spend time and resources hedging against inflation instead
of pursuing more productive activities.
Another problem is that
a surprise inflation tends to redistribute wealth. For example,
when loans have fixed rates, a surprise inflation
redistributes wealth from lenders to borrowers, because inflation
lowers the real burden of making a stream of payments whose nominal
value is fixed.
So should the Fed try to get the inflation rate
to zero?
Actually, there's a lot of debate about that. While some
economists have suggested zero inflation as a target, others argue
that an
inflation rate that's too low can be a problem. For example, if
inflation is very low or close to zero, then short-term interest
rates also are likely to be very close to zero. In that case, the
Fed might not have enough room to lower short-term interest rates
if it needed to stimulate the economy. Of course, the Fed could
conduct policy using more unconventional methods (such as trying
to reduce long-term interest rates), but it's not clear that those
methods would be as easy to use or as effective. Another problem
is that, when inflation is very close to zero, there's a bigger
risk of deflation.
What's so bad about deflation?
First, let's talk about the difference
between disinflation and deflation. Disinflation just means that
the rate of inflation is
slowing—say, from 3% a year to 2% a year. Deflation, in contrast,
means that there's a fall in prices; and it's not just a fall in
prices in some sectors—like the familiar falling prices of a lot
of computer equipment. Rather, in a deflation, prices are falling
throughout the economy, so the inflation rate is negative. That
may sound good, if you're a consumer.
But, in fact, deflation can
be as bad as too much inflation. And the reasons are pretty similar.
For example, to go back to the
case of the fixed-rate loan, a surprise deflation also redistributes
wealth, but in the opposite direction from inflation, that is,
from borrowers to lenders. The reason is that deflation raises
the real burden of making a stream of payments whose nominal value
is fixed.
A substantial, prolonged deflation, like the one during
the Great Depression, can be associated with severe problems in
the financial
system. It can lead to significant declines in the value of collateral
owned by households and firms, making it more difficult to borrow.
And falling collateral values may force lenders to call in outstanding
loans, which would force firms to cut back their scale of operations
and force households to cut back consumption.
Finally, in a deflationary
episode, interest rates are likely to be lower than they are during
periods of low inflation, which means
that the Fed's ability to stimulate the economy will be even more
limited.
So that's why the other goal is "stable prices"?
Yes.
Price "stability" is basically a low-inflation environment
where people and firms can make financial decisions without worrying
about where prices are headed. Moreover, this is all the Fed can
achieve in the long run.
If low inflation is the only thing the
Fed can achieve in the long run, why isn't it the sole focus of
monetary policy?
Because the Fed can determine the economy's average
rate of inflation, some commentators—and some members of Congress
as well—have emphasized
the need to define the goals of monetary policy in terms of price
stability, which is achievable.
But the Fed, of course, also can
affect output and employment in the short run. And big swings in
output and employment are costly
to people, too. So, in practice, the Fed, like most central banks,
cares about both inflation and measures of the short-run performance
of the economy.
Are the two goals ever in conflict?
Yes, sometimes they are. One
kind of conflict involves deciding which goal should take precedence
at any point in time. For example,
suppose there's a recession and the Fed works to prevent employment
losses from being too severe; this short-run success could turn
into a long-run problem if monetary policy remains expansionary
too long, because that could trigger inflationary pressures. So
it's important for the Fed to find the balance between its short-run
goal of stabilization and its longer-run goal of maintaining low
inflation.
Another kind of conflict involves the potential for pressure
from the political arena. For example, in the day-to-day course
of governing
the country and making economic policy, politicians may be tempted
to put the emphasis on short-run results rather than on the longer-run
health of the economy. The Fed is somewhat insulated from such
pressure, however, by its independence, which allows it to strive
for a more appropriate balance between short-run and long-run objectives.
Why
don't the goals include helping a region of the country that's
in recession?
Often, some state or region is going through a recession
of its own while the national economy is humming along. But the
Fed can't
concentrate its efforts on expanding the weak region for two reasons.
First, monetary policy works through credit markets, and since
credit markets are linked nationally, the Fed simply has no way
to direct stimulus only to a particular part of the country that
needs help. Second, if the Fed stimulated whenever any state had
economic hard times, it would be stimulating much of the time,
and this would result in excessive stimulation for the overall
country and higher inflation.
But this focus on the well-being of
the national economy doesn't mean that the Fed ignores regional
economic conditions. It relies
on extensive regional data and anecdotal information, along with
statistics that directly measure developments in regional economies,
to fit together a picture of the national economy's performance.
This is one advantage to having regional Federal Reserve Bank Presidents
sit on the FOMC: They're in close contact with economic developments
in their regions of the country.
Why don't the goals include trying
to prevent stock market "bubbles" like
the one at the end of the 1990s?
In theory, stock prices should
reflect the value of firms' "fundamentals," such
as their expected future earnings. So it's hard to come up with
logical explanations for why they would get out of line, that is,
why a bubble would form. After all, U.S. stock markets are among
the most efficient in the world—there's a lot of information available
and the trading mechanisms function very smoothly. And stock market
analysts and others devote huge amounts of resources to figuring
out what the appropriate price of a stock is at any point in time.
Even
so, it's hard to deny the evidence of mispricing from episodes
like the rise and fall of the Nasdaq over the last decade or so:
it went from a monthly
average of a little more than 750 in January 1995 to a peak of just over 4,800
in March 2000, before falling back to roughly 1,350 in March 2003. Unfortunately,
evidence of a bubble is easy to find after it has burst, but it's much harder
to find as the bubble is forming. The reason is that policymakers—and other
observers—can find it hard to tell whether stock prices are moving up because
fundamentals are changing or because prices are out of line with fundamentals.
Even
if the Fed suspected that a bubble had developed, it's not clear
how monetary policy should respond. Raising the funds rate by a
quarter, a half, or even a
full percentage point probably wouldn't make people slow down their investments
in the stock market when individual stock prices are doubling or tripling and
even broad stock market indexes are going up by 20% or 30% a year. It's likely
that raising the funds rate enough to burst the bubble would do significant harm
to the economy. For instance, some have argued that the Fed may have worsened
the Great Depression by trying to deflate the stock market bubble of the late
1920s.
Should the Fed ignore the stock market then?
Not at all. Stock
markets provide information about the future course of the economy
that the Fed may find useful in conducting
policy. For instance, a sustained
increase in the stock market is likely to make households feel wealthier, which
tends to make them increase their consumption. And if the economy were already
at full capacity, this would cause inflationary pressures. So a sustained increase
in the stock market could lead the Fed to modify its inflation and output forecasts
and adjust its policy response accordingly.
Beyond concerns about the economy,
the Fed also pays attention to the stock market because of its
concerns about financial market stability. A good example of this
is what happened after the stock market crash of 1987. At that time, the Fed
cut interest rates and stated that it was ready to supply the liquidity needs
of the market because it wanted to ensure that markets would continue to function.
Suggested reading
For further discussion of the topics in this
article, see the following issues of the FRBSF Economic Letter.
93-21 "Federal Reserve Independence and the Accord of 1951," by
Carl
Walsh.
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/1993/el93-21.pdf
93-44 "Inflation and Growth," by Brian Motley.
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/1993/el93-44.pdf
94-05 "Is There a Cost to Having an Independent Central Bank?" by Carl
Walsh.
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/1994/el94-05.pdf
94-25 "Should the Central Bank Be Responsible for Regional Stabilization?" by
Timothy Cogley and Desiree Schaan.
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/1994/el94-25.pdf
95-16 "Central Bank Independence and Inflation," by Robert T. Parry.
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/1995/el1995-16.pdf
97-01 "Nobel Views on Inflation and Unemployment," by
Carl Walsh.
http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/el97-01.html
97-27 "What Is the Optimal Rate of Inflation?" by Timothy
Cogley.
http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/el97-27.html
98-04 "The New Output-Inflation Trade-off," by Carl Walsh.
http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/wklyltr98/el98-04.html
99-04 "The Goals of U.S. Monetary Policy," by John Judd
and Glenn Rudebusch.
http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/wklyltr99/el99-04.html
2000-24 "Should Central Banks Stabilize Prices?" by Carl Walsh.
http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/2000/el2000-24.html
2001-03 "Inflation: The 2% Solution," by Milton Marquis.
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2001/el2001-03.html
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