FRBSF Economic Letter
2005-03; February 4, 2005
Emerging Markets and Macroeconomic Volatility: Conference
Summary
Pacific Basin Notes. This
series appears on an occasional basis. It is prepared under
the auspices of the Center
for Pacific Basin Studies within the FRBSF's Economic
Research Department.
| This
Economic Letter summarizes the papers
presented at the conference on "Emerging Markets
and Macroeconomic Volatility: Lessons from a Decade
of Financial Debacles" held at the Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco on June 4-5, 2004, under the
joint sponsorship of the Bank's Center for Pacific
Basin Studies and the University of Maryland's Center
for International Economics. The papers are listed
at the end and are available at http://www.frbsf.org/economics/conferences/0406/index.html |
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The last decade has witnessed a series of major
macroeconomic crises in emerging market economies. Typically these
crises have
been characterized by the sudden stop of capital inflows, the collapse
of fixed exchange rate regimes, falls in asset prices, and sharp
declines in output. The papers presented at this conference analyze
the causes and consequences of these volatile events.
Sudden stops and currency depreciations
Calvo, Izquierdo, and
Mejía argue that most recent financial
crises experienced by emerging market economies cannot be explained
by traditional economic models that emphasize excessive fiscal
deficits and/or overly expansionary monetary policy as their underlying
cause. Rather, they attribute the crises to weaknesses in the domestic
financial sector and to an excessive degree of liability dollarization,
that is, the denomination of domestic liabilities in foreign currency,
typically dollars. With liability dollarization, depreciation of
the domestic currency raises the cost of servicing debt and increases
the possibility of failure by domestic firms and banks as well
as sudden stops in foreign lending. Moreover, because emerging
market economies that are highly dollarized also tend to depend
on foreign financing to import goods used in domestic production,
they are particularly vulnerable to the effects of sudden stops
that require a large contraction of domestic demand to offset the
loss of foreign financing.
One especially puzzling element of these
crises is the failure of the very large exchange rate depreciations
that typically accompany
them to lead to an export boom and hence an economic expansion.
For example, in the countries hardest hit in the East Asian crisis
of 1997-1998, exports either fell or stagnated, despite real depreciations
of 60% or more. These countries did see a rapid turnaround in their
current accounts, but it was primarily accounted for by a huge
collapse in imports, not a rise in exports. Cook and Devereux develop
a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model of the East Asian
crisis for South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand to explain this
phenomenon. They argue that depreciations did not immediately lower
those countries' export prices abroad because their export prices
were temporarily fixed in terms of U.S. dollars; in contrast, because
the depreciations were immediately passed through to higher prices
for imported goods, import demand fell sharply. Consequently, trade
within the East Asian region dropped precipitously.
Cavallo, Kisselev,
Perri, and Roubini provide an alternative analysis of why the depreciations
during recent currency crises did not
stimulate demand and output through their effects on competitiveness,
but instead were associated with sharp output contractions. Their
model points to the combined role of liability dollarization and
financial frictions in the form of a margin constraint on foreign
borrowing that is tied to the value of a country's assets. Because
depreciations reduce the value of domestic assets relative to foreign
liabilities, they make a country with a high foreign debt level
more likely to hit its constraint, forcing it to sell off domestic
assets. This "fire sale" of assets leads to further currency
depreciation and a decline in stock prices, creating a significant
negative wealth effect that depresses spending and output. Cavallo
et al. suggest that, in the presence of margin constraints and
dollarized liabilities, maintaining a currency peg could avoid
exchange rate overshooting and mitigate the negative wealth effect.
Chang
and Velasco argue that this prescription ignores what determines
the size of the dollarized debt portion of a country's portfolio
to begin with. In their model, portfolio choices about what shares
of debt to hold in domestic currency vis-á-vis dollars depend
on the risk-return characteristics of these securities and expected
monetary and exchange rate policies. They identify conditions under
which either fixing or floating may be preferred policies.
Capital
flows and default
Banks play an important role in the allocation
of capital and, hence, in stimulating growth in a country. Oviedo
develops a model
with two-sided debt contracts in which domestic banks intermediate
loans from foreign lenders to domestic firms. Because domestic
firms may default on their debt if negative productivity shocks
are severe enough, bank loans are risky. Thus, if a large enough
number of firms default, the banks may fail, creating a banking
crisis. Oviedo finds that the model is able to replicate several
common features in emerging market economies, including the association
of banking crises with bad aggregate fundamentals and the countercyclical
rise of domestic interest rates above foreign rates when output
declines.
Aguiar and Gopinath study the behavior of capital flows
when a country can renege on sovereign debt. They develop a model
of a
small open economy where domestic consumers borrow internationally
to smooth consumption declines in the face of adverse business
cycle shocks. In their model, as is commonly found in emerging
market economies, international borrowing is countercyclical; that
is, on average these countries borrow more and at lower interest
rates in good times than in slumps. A key ingredient of the model
is that foreign lenders account for the possibility of a government
default by charging an interest rate premium. Consequently, even
though domestic consumers have a larger demand for foreign funds
during economic downturns, the probability of default and, thus,
the interest rate premium increase. The higher interest rate premium
is enough to offset the increased demand for foreign funds, implying
consumers borrow less during economic downturns than during upturns.
Contagion
and external factors
Currency and banking crises in emerging market
economies have tended to be bunched together over the last decade.
Consequently, substantial
research has focused on answering how financial crises spread across
countries. Broner, Gelos, and Reinhart use microeconomic data on
individual emerging market mutual funds to analyze how portfolio
adjustments by global investors may spread financial shocks across
countries. In their theoretical portfolio model, investors affected
by a crisis in one country transmit the crisis by selling off assets
in other countries in which they are exposed. Their empirical analysis
finds that when the returns of a fund are low relative to the returns
of other funds, the fund managers tend to reduce their investments
in countries in which the fund is overexposed and increase investments
in countries in which it is underexposed. They then construct a
measure of financial interdependence, based on the extent to which
countries "share" overexposed funds. They find that during
the Thai, Russian, and Brazilian crises, those countries that shared
overexposed funds with the crisis countries experienced the largest
stock price declines.
Uribe and Yue analyze the extent to which
output in emerging market economies and interest rate spreads
(the difference between domestic
and U.S. interest rates) have responded to changes in the U.S.
interest rate as well as to domestic economic shocks. They find
that U.S. interest rate shocks explain about 20% of the output
fluctuations in emerging countries, working primarily through
their effects on country spreads; for example, an increase in U.S.
interest
rates raises domestic interest rates by more than one-for-one,
depressing local output. They also find that local business conditions
affect these interest rate spreads, which, in turn, significantly
exacerbate macro volatility in these countries. In addition,
they calibrate a simple theoretical model of a small open economy
to
show that the associated impulse responses to country-spread
shocks and to U.S. interest rate shocks are broadly consistent
with those
implied by their empirical analysis.
There is a general consensus
that openness to trade and financial flows stimulates domestic
growth. This raises the question whether
openness also increases vulnerability to external shocks. Kose,
Prasad, and Terrones examine this question and find that higher
growth is indeed associated with greater volatility for developing
countries. They also find, however, that this positive association
is greater for countries with relatively low levels of trade
and financial integration; countries that are more open to
trade and
finance appear to face a less severe tradeoff between growth
and volatility.
Government policies
Insofar as financial crises in emerging market
economies arise from imperfections in international capital markets,
such as
collateral constraints and trading costs, how can government
policies address the problem? One proposed policy approach
is to create explicit price-floor guarantees by international financial
organizations for investments in emerging market economies.
Mendoza
and Durdu introduce price-floor guarantees into a model that
features sudden stops caused by collateral constraints and
trading costs. They show that guarantees to buy assets when they
fall
to a set level can prevent or at least mute sudden stops, asset
fire sales, and crises. However, an important drawback of this
approach is that it creates moral hazard incentives among global
investors: because global investors essentially receive free
insurance against extreme asset fluctuations, they will tend
to overinvest, leading to the overvaluation of domestic assets.
Wright studies whether government intervention in international
capital markets in the form of capital controls can make the
economy better off. He shows that the desirability of such
intervention
depends crucially on the kind of default risk foreign lenders
face. When the government and legal systems of a developing
country enforce
private contracts between domestic resident borrowers and foreign
lenders, but can declare a national default on the country's
aggregate borrowing, lenders will extend credit to individual
borrowers just
to the point where the government finds it preferable not to
default. In this case, capital controls will not improve
welfare. However,
when private contracts with foreigners are not enforced, exposing
foreign investors also to resident default risk, foreign lending
will be too low. In this case, government intervention in the
form of a borrowing subsidy reduces the residents' incentives
to default
and thus can raise foreign lending and welfare. In neither
case, Wright argues, is there a justification for capital controls.
Reuven Glick
Group Vice President |
Diego Valderrama
Economist |
Conference papers
Aguiar, Mark, and Gita Gopinath. "Defaultable
Debt, Interest Rates, and the Current Account."
Broner, Fernando A., R. Gaston Gelos, and
Carmen Reinhart. "When
in Peril, Retrench: Testing the Portfolio Channel of Contagion."
Calvo,
Guillermo A., Alejandro Izquierdo, and Luis-Fernando Mejía. "On
the Empirics of Sudden Stops: The Relevance of Balance-Sheet Effects."
Cavallo,
Michele, Kate Kisselev, Fabrizio Perri, and Nouriel Roubini. "Exchange
Rate Overshooting and the Costs of Floating."
Chang, Roberto,
and Andrés Velasco. "Endogenous
Dollarization, Expectations, and Equilibrium Monetary Policy."
Cook, David,
and Michael B. Devereux. "Dollar
Bloc or Dollar Block: External Currency Pricing and the East Asian
Crisis."
Kose,
M. Ayhan, Eswar S. Prasad, and Marco E. Terrones. "How
Do Trade and Financial Integration Affect the Relationship between
Growth and Volatility?"
Mendoza, Enrique G., and Ceyhun Bora
Durdu. "Putting
the Brakes on Sudden Stops: The Financial Frictions-Moral Hazard
Tradeoff
of Asset Price Guarantees."
Oviedo, P. Marcelo. "Macroeconomic
Risk and Banking Crises in Emerging Market Countries: Business
Fluctuations with Financial
Crashes."
Uribe, Martín, and Vivian Z. Yue. "Country
Spreads and Emerging Countries: Who Drives Whom?"
Wright, Mark
L. J. "Private
Capital Flows, Capital Controls, and Default Risk."
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