FRBSF Economic Letter
2005-23;
September 9, 2005
A Look at China's New Exchange Rate Regime
Pacific Basin Notes. This series appears on an occasional basis.
It is prepared under the auspices of the Center
for Pacific Basin Studies within the FRBSF's Economic Research Department.
On July 21, 2005, after more than
a decade of strictly pegging the renminbi to the U.S. dollar
at an exchange rate of 8.28, the People's Bank of China
(PBOC 2005a) announced a revaluation of the currency and a reform of the exchange
rate regime. The revaluation puts the renminbi at 8.11 against the dollar,
which amounts to an appreciation of 2.1%. Under the reform, the PBOC will incorporate
a "reference basket" of currencies when choosing its target for the
renminbi.
The announcement stated that the changes were made "[w]ith
a view to establish and improve the socialist market economic
system in China, enable the market to fully play its role
in resource allocation as well as to put in place and further
strengthen the managed floating exchange rate regime based
on market supply and demand." However, the announcement
and subsequent clarifications leave the PBOC with considerable
discretion over its renminbi target.
In this Economic Letter, I review several characteristics
of the new renminbi regime. I also examine how the renminbi
might have moved in the past if this regime had been in
place. Because the PBOC provided only guidelines, and not
specifics, about the composition and trade weights of the
reference basket, I construct three likely indexes and
compare their movements with each other and with the bilateral
renminbi-U.S. dollar exchange rate. I find that movements
in China's trade-weighted exchange rate indexes over the
long term are relatively insensitive to currency composition;
moreover, when viewed over the previous four to five years,
all three indexes exhibit appreciation against the dollar
far exceeding the initial 2.1% renminbi revaluation.
The new renminbi regime
According to the July 21 announcement, each day the PBOC
will announce its target for the following working day
based on that day's renminbi closing price in terms of
a "central parity." For example, the target may
be expressed in terms of the value of the renminbi against
the dollar. The following day, the renminbi exchange rate
will be allowed to fluctuate against the dollar within
a band of plus or minus 0.3% around the announced central
parity.
Figure 1 shows the market reaction to the announcement
by graphing the daily closing values of the renminbi-dollar
exchange rate and the two-month renminbi non-deliverable
forward (NDF) rates around the time of the revaluation.
Although these forward contracts constitute a relatively
thin market, they can be considered the best indicator
available of the market's beliefs about the future path
of the renminbi-dollar exchange rate. At the end of July
21, the market anticipated further renminbi appreciation,
as the two-month NDF renminbi-dollar exchange rates stood
below 8 renminbi per dollar.
The apparent market anticipation of additional appreciation
of the renminbi prompted the PBOC to issue a series of
clarifications stating that the initial revaluation did
not imply further action. The market responded again, as
shown by the upward movement in the two-month NDF rate
on July 22, but still stood below the current stated peg
of 8.11.
Trade-weighted renminbi reference indexes
In a speech on August 10 (PBOC 2005b), the Governor of
the PBOC clarified the new exchange rate regime and the
components of China's "reference basket." He
stated that assigned index weights will be selected "…in
line with the real situation of China's external sector
development," and that "…the basket should
be composed of currencies of the countries to which China
has a prominent exposure in terms of foreign trade, external
debt, and foreign direct investment." Clearly, then,
the PBOC has not made any commitment to follow rigidly
a trade-weighted currency index peg. However, the Governor
did give some guidelines on the country composition of
China's currency basket. Specifically, he suggested that
countries whose bilateral trade with China exceeded $10
billion would receive non-negligible weights, and those
exceeding $5 billion in total weight would also be considered.
Because the PBOC has not announced the relative weights
to be placed on the components of the basket, nor has it
made any commitment to keep these weights constant over
time, it is impossible to track movements in an official
Chinese trade-weighted currency index. However, using the
guidelines, I can construct hypothetical but likely indexes
and examine what the path of the renminbi-dollar exchange
rate would have been since January 2001, if the exchange
rate had been rigidly pegged to one of these indexes. According
to the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, 15 economies
(excluding Hong Kong) had total trade (exports plus imports)
exceeding $10 billion for the year in 2004, which accounted
for 66% of China's total trade; 22 countries (again, excluding
Hong Kong) had total trade exceeding $5 billion for the
year in 2004, which accounted for 69% of China's total
trade. I therefore construct a "narrow" trade-weighted
index for China based on trade shares of the 15 countries
with trade exceeding $10 billion annually, and a "broad" trade-weighted
index based on trade shares of the 22 countries with total
trade levels exceeding $5 billion in total trade with China.
This number is similar to the 23 countries in the European
Central Bank's calculation of the euro area nominal effective
exchange rate index.
The Governor's speech did not discuss the inclusion or
exclusion of Hong Kong in the currency index, probably
because of Hong Kong's unique political relationship with
the rest of China. However, the inclusion or exclusion
of Hong Kong in a trade-weighted currency index for China
could have important implications for two reasons: First,
Hong Kong is an important trade partner for China, accounting
for 11.7% of total Chinese trade in 2004; second, Hong
Kong's exchange rate is closely pegged to the U.S. dollar,
implying that adding the Hong Kong dollar to a trade-weighted
currency index would diminish the volatility of the index
relative to the U.S. dollar. Based on these considerations,
I construct a third index composed of the 15 countries
in the narrow index plus Hong Kong.
Trade shares for the third index are shown in Figure 2;
by construction China's main trading partners, the United
States, the euro area, Japan, Korea and Hong Kong, feature
prominently. In addition, 10% of the index is composed
of "other Asian" countries, including India,
the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, and
11% of the index is composed of "other non-Asian" countries,
including Brazil, Canada, the U.K., Russia, and Australia.
Movements in trade-weighted reference indexes since 2001
One can use the trade weights and currency baskets in
the previous section to answer the following hypothetical
question: If China had been rigidly pegging to a trade-weighted
currency index instead of maintaining its dollar peg over
the last four years, how would the renminbi have moved?
The performance of the three indexes is shown in Figure
3. It is clear that while the indexes differ somewhat,
over longer time horizons their values are relatively insensitive
to country composition. All of the indexes show marked
appreciation against the dollar since January 2001, largely
attributable to the recent appreciation of the euro against
the dollar: the narrow currency index has appreciated approximately
11%, the broad currency index has appreciated 10%, and
the narrow index with Hong Kong added has appreciated 9%.
(We ignore the March 2002 revaluation of the Iranian dinar,
which has a 0.7% weight in the broad index, because most
Iranian trade took place at market rates.)
Note that adding either Hong Kong or the countries that
are only in the broad index results in a reduction in appreciation
for the reference currency index. The reason is that Hong
Kong follows the dollar closely, as do many of the countries
that are only in the broad currency index, including, Mexico,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. The latter
two nations were pegged to the dollar over the period.
Although the Mexican peso was not formally pegged to the
dollar, the variance of the peso-dollar exchange rate was
small relative to the other countries in the broad index.
As a result, these countries' currency values did not move
much during the period when the euro appreciated markedly
against the dollar.
Caveats
First, the indexes generated are, at best, guesses about
the reference trade-weighted currency index China may use.
The PBOC has made no commitment to follow such a trade-weighted
index peg rigidly, stating that other current account considerations,
such as the share of major currencies in foreign debt and
foreign direct investment will also be considered. As such,
the movements in the currency index would not necessarily
be representative of the desired path for the renminbi
under China's new exchange rate regime, even if the country
weights assigned to the index were appropriate.
Second, it would be inaccurate to argue that the historical
movements in the trade-weighted currency index are representative
of how the renminbi would have moved over its fixed exchange
rate period were it following such an index. The reason
is that, while China's Asian trading partners are weighted
significantly in China's trade-weighted index, China is
also an important trade partner for them. Therefore, Chinese
exchange rate policy is likely to influence the path of
many Asian exchange rates. Indeed, McKinnon (2005) has
recently argued that a number of China's main Asian trading
partners have smoothed their dollar exchange rates in an
effort to retain competitiveness against China.
Finally, while it is clear that all of the indexes exhibited
appreciation over the sample period far exceeding the 2.1%
appreciation of the renminbi on July 21, this study does
not imply anything about whether or not the renminbi is "undervalued." In
particular, the study is silent on the relative under- or
over-valuation of the renminbi on the sample starting date
in 2001.
Mark M. Spiegel
Vice President
References
McKinnon, Ronald I. 2005. Exchange Rates under the
East Asian Dollar Standard. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
People's Bank of China. 2005a. "Public Announcement
of the People's Bank of China on Reforming the RMB Exchange
Rate Regime," July 21.
People's Bank of China. 2005b. "Speech of Governor Zhou
Xiaochuan at the Inauguration Ceremony of the People's Bank
of China Shanghai Head Office," August 10.
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/detail.asp?col=6500&id=82
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