## The Price of Variance Risk

Ian Dew-Becker, Stefano Giglio, Anh Le & Marcus Rodriguez

discussed by Nick Bloom, with help from Stephen Terry



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## Very careful paper with a fascinating result

They got hold of two detailed datasets on variance swaps

Within this they discovered a new stylized fact which changed the way I think about uncertainty

## What they find: zero-coupon variance claim prices are flat from about 3+ months



## So no return to extra maturity in variance swaps from 3+ months

• Returns to each of these constant-maturity strategies are:

$$R_{t+1}^{n} = \frac{Z_{t+1}^{n-1} - Z_{t}^{n}}{Z_{t}^{n}}$$

• Sharpe ratios:



### To summarize in their words...

- Investors are willing to pay huge sums to insure against  $RV_{t+1}$
- Not willing to pay anything to insure against  $(E_{t+1} E_t)RV_{t+j}$
- News about future volatility doesn't matter to investors

### Puzzle

Two explanations

Excluded uncertainty?



Source: Industrial production monthly data from Federal Reserve Board data from 1970 onwards (VIX from 1990 onwards)

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## One explanation is disaster risk with time varying recovery (bad disasters and really bad disasters...)

Builds on Gabaix (2012) to exploit the idea of asset resilience

Recovery rates  $(L_t)$  varies over time – some disasters cause massive drops in dividends while others do not

$$L_t = (1 - \rho_L) \,\overline{L} + \rho_L L_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{L,t}$$

But this recovery rate is independent of current consumption, breaking the connection between the real and financial side

Possible, but I would like to see empirical evidence for this

## Another explanation is stock-market jumps are short lived, so are unpredictable 3+ months out



Source: Monthly volatility of the daily returns on the S&P500 at an annualized level. Grey bars are NBER recessions. Data spans 1950Q1-2013Q4.

### They show this in Figure 13: vol spikes are rapid



Figure 13: Average behavior of RV during consumption disasters and financial crises

Note: We calculate realized variance in each month of a crisis and scale it by the maximum realized variance in each crisis. The figure plots the average of that scaled series for each country and crisis in terms of months relative to the one with the highest realized variance.

## Roughly matches auto-regressive forecasts for the VIX and VOL – from 4+ months no power

. reg vol l.vol l2.vol l3.vol l4.vol ,rob										
Line	ar regress	sion				Number of obs F( 4, 759) Prob > F R-squared Root MSE	$= 764 \\ = 60.35 \\ = 0.0000 \\ = 0.5001 \\ = 6.1714$			
	vol	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]			
	vol L1. L2. L3.	.5682728 .0569803 .1482992	.087333 .0550807 .0518266	6.51 1.03 2.86	0.000 0.301 0.004	.3968298 0511484 .0465587	.7397157 .165109 .2500397			
	L4.	.0021637	.0519585	0.04	0.967	0998358	.1041631			
	_cons	3.464136	.7841733	4.42	0.000	1.92473	5.003542			

Use monthly data on daily S&P500 volatility from 1950:1 to 2013:12

## Roughly matches auto-regressive forecasts for the VIX and VOL – from 4+ months no power

. reg vol l.vo	ol 12.vol 13.v	vol 14.vol 1	5. <b>v</b> ol 16.	.vol 17.	vol 18.vol 19.	vol 110.vol	111. <b>v</b> ol 1	12. <b>v</b> ol,ro
Linear regress	ion				Number of obs F( 12, 743) Prob > F R-squared Root MSE	= 756 = 24.17 = 0.0000 = 0.5140 = 6.1326		
vol	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]		
vol								
L1.	.5568854	.0883991	6.30	0.000	.3833437	.7304272		
L2.	.0511136	.054791	0.93	0.351	0564499	.1586772		
L3.	.1287981	.0530928	2.43	0.016	.0245684	.2330279		
L4.	0506038	.0549505	-0.92	0.357	1584805	.057273		
L5.	.041176	.0505953	0.81	0.416	0581507	.1405028		
L6.	.035369	.0552899	0.64	0.523	0731741	.1439121		
L7.	0253249	.0586329	-0.43	0.666	1404308	.089781		
L8.	.044142	.0499264	0.88	0.377	0538715	.1421556		
L9.	.0048471	.0452229	0.11	0.915	0839328	.093627		
L10.	0144364	.0514377	-0.28	0.779	115417	.0865443		
L11.	.0046521	.0537511	0.09	0.931	1008701	.1101742		
L12.	.0692814	.0511537	1.35	0.176	0311415	.1697043		
_cons	2.362213	.8053663	2.93	0.003	.7811483	3.943277		

Use monthly data on daily S&P500 volatility from 1950:1 to 2013:12

## Roughly matches auto-regressive forecasts for the VIX and VOL – from 4+ months no power

. reg vix 1.vix 12.vix 13.vix 14.vix										
	Source	SS	df		MS		Number of obs	= 283		
	Model Residual	13963.8481 3446.47893	<b>4</b> 278	3490 12.3	.96204 974062		F(4, 278) Prob > F R-squared	$= 281.59 \\ = 0.0000 \\ = 0.8020 \\ = 0.7992$		
	Total	17410.3271	282	61.7	387485		Root MSE	= 3.521		
	vix	Coef.	Std.	Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf.	Interval]		
	vix									
	L1.	1.09618	.0600	253	18.26	0.000	.978018	1.214342		
	L2.	3716817	.088	419	-4.20	0.000	5457375	197626		
	L3.	.1625566	.0883	569	1.84	0.067	011377	.3364902		
	L4.	.0025341	.0600	081	0.04	0.966	115594	.1206621		
	_cons	2.201615	.6326	393	3.48	0.001	.9562433	3.446987		

Use monthly data on daily VIX 1990:1 to 2013:12

## I think of this as the "weather model"



Stock-market jumps initiate recessions – hence the negative correlation with GDP growth (and leading indicator property)

But stock-market jumps hard to predict 3+ months out – hence the flatish variance swap slope 3+ months ahead

Similar to extreme weather (or earthquakes) – damaging (possibly for many years) but very predict 3+ months out



### 25 Years Later: The legacy of the Loma Prieta quake at Stanford

When the Loma Prieta earthquake shook campus 25 years ago it damaged campus structures and forced students and classes to relocate. Once they'd cleared the rubble, faculty and students took up the challenge of devising better methods for understanding the physics of earthquakes, and designing buildings that could withstand the powerful forces.



#### AT THE EPICENTER OF LOMA PRIETA

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On a recent fall morning, Stanford geophysicist Greg Beroza hiked through the Forest of Nisene Marks State Park to arrive at a brown signpost on which the word "Epicenter" was printed in all caps. Today, the marker is the only indication that this tranquil redwood forest, located about 10 miles from Santa Cruz, Calif., was the source of the largest earthquake to strike the Bay Area in more than 80 years. But in 1989, the 6.9-magnitude Loma Prieta quake that originated approximately 10 miles beneath this signpost triggered landslides throughout the forest and violently shook and even toppled trees. "These tall redwoods like the one to my left were here in 1989, and they would have shaken like crazy," Beroza said. "It would have been quite a ride for anything that was up in the treetops."

ernzal a nrofessor in the School of Earth Sciences is

### Puzzle

Two explanations

**Excluded uncertainty?** 

## Two other types of uncertainty also appear to rise and good to think how these fit in

Micro uncertainty (industries, firms, plants and products)

<u>Knightian uncertainty</u> (more diffuse Bayesian priors rather than increased stochastic volatility)

## Empirics suggest the economy is 'fractal' - micro uncertainty also rises at every level in recessions



### Industry growth dispersion (by month)



Note: 1<sup>st</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, 25<sup>th</sup>, 50<sup>th</sup>, 75<sup>th</sup>, 90<sup>th</sup>, 95<sup>th</sup> and 99<sup>th</sup> percentiles of 3-month growth rates of industrial production within each quarter. All 196 manufacturing NAICS sectors in the Federal Reserve Board database. Source: Bloom, Floetotto and Jaimovich (2009)

### Firm growth dispersion (by quarter)



Year Note: Interquartile range of sales growth (Compustat firms). Only firms with 25+ years of accounts, and quarters with 500+ observations. SIC2 only cells with 25+ obs. SIC2 is used as the level of industry definition to maintain sample size. The grey shaded columns are recessions according to the NBER. Source: Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta and Terry (2011)

### **Plant** growth dispersion pre & during great recession



Source: "Really Uncertain Business Cycles" by Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta and Terry (2012) Notes: Constructed from the Census of Manufactures and the Annual Survey of Manufactures using a balanced panel of 15,752 establishments active in 2005-06 and 2008-09. Moments of the distribution for non-recession (recession) years are: mean 0.026 (-0.191), variance 0.052 (0.131), coefficient of skewness 0.164 (-0.330) and kurtosis 13.07 (7.66). The year 2007 is omitted because according to the NBER the recession began in December 2007, so 2007 is not a clean "before" or "during" recession year.

## **Product** level price dispersion (by quarter)

Figure 1: Price Changes Across Time



Data is seasonally adjusted using 12 monthly dummies and smoothed with a 6 month moving average. Frequency is the Median Frequency of Adjustment.

Source: Joe Vavra (2014, QJE) "Inflation dynamics and time varying volatility"

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<u>Micro uncertainty</u> (industries, firms, plants and products)

Knightian uncertainty (more diffuse Bayesian priors rather than increased stochastic volatility)

# Policy uncertainty somewhat 'Knightian', so may not show in raised stock-market volatility



Source: "Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty" by Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom and Steven J. Davis, all data at <u>www.policyuncertainty.com</u>. Data normalized to 100 prior to 2010.

## So a really fantastic paper which uses a unique dataset to introduce a new stylized fact

The empirics were very careful and I believe the stylized fact

It poses a challenge for models with time varying uncertainty

They suggest one explanation – time varying recovery – which is possible, but I can see alternatives like "weather" model story

So the "what" seems well shown, but less clear on the "why"

## **The Price of Variance Risk**

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