#### Sunspot Equilibrium

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## Early History of Sunspots at Penn

- Dave Cass
- Karl Shell
- Costas Azariadis
- Roger Farmer
- Yves Balasko

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- Excess Volatility (Shiller)



$$\begin{array}{ll} \mathsf{Gain} & = & \frac{\mathsf{Volatility\ of\ Outcome}}{\mathsf{Volatility\ of\ Fundamentals}} \\ & = & \frac{+}{0} \\ & \mathsf{in\ SSE} \end{array}$$

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- ▶ Game theorists : SSE treatment of expectations is natural.
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- ▶ SSE combines ideas from micro, macro, and game theory

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- Not merely randomizations over certainty equilibria (more later)

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  - ► Choice between money taxation and commodity taxation

## Money Taxation: Example of Source of SSE

- ▶ 1 commodity, I = 1, chocolates
- ▶ 3 guys, h = 1, 2, 3
- money taxes  $\tau = (\tau_1, \tau_2, \tau_3)$ , dollars
- $au_1 + au_2 + au_3 = 0$ , dollars
- endowments  $\omega = (\omega_1, \omega_2, \omega_3) > 0$ , chocolates
- ▶ allocations  $x = (x_1, x_2, x_3) > 0$ , chocolates

## Certainty Economy

$$\text{max } u_h(x_h)$$
 s.t. 
$$x_h = \omega_h - P^m \tau_h = \tilde{\omega}_h$$

where  $P^m$  is the chocolate price of money

• 
$$x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = \omega_1 + \omega_2 + \omega_3$$
, or


$$ightharpoonup 0 \le P^m < \bar{P}^m$$

# Certainty Economy: Example

- $\omega = (20, 10, 5)$
- $\tau = (5, 0, -5)$
- ▶  $0 \le P^m < 4 = \bar{P}^m$
- ► Equilibrium:

$$\{x = (x_1, x_2, x_3) \in \mathbb{R}^3_{++} | x_1 = 20 - 5P^m, x_2 = 10, x_3 = 5 + 5P^m, P^m \ge 0\}$$

## Sunspots Economy



- ► Extrinsic random variable:  $s \in \{\alpha, \beta\}, \quad \pi(\alpha) + \pi(\beta) = 1$
- ► Information:

$$\begin{array}{cccc}
Mr & 1 & \alpha & \beta \\
Mr & 2 & \alpha & \beta \\
Mr & 3 & \alpha & \beta
\end{array}$$

- $au_h(\alpha) = \tau_h(\beta) = \tau_h$ , incomplete instruments
- $\omega_h(\alpha) = \omega_h(\beta) = \omega_h$ , extrinsic uncertainty



## Sunspots Economy: Example

- $\omega = (20, 10, 5)$
- $\tau = (5, 0, -5)$
- $ightharpoonup u_h = \log$
- $\pi(\alpha) = 3/4, \pi(\beta) = 1/4$
- $P^m(\alpha) = 1, P^m(\beta) = 2$
- ightharpoonup lpha is inflationary state, eta is deflationary
- ▶ Mr 1 is taxed. He fears deflation. Mr 3 fears inflation. Mr 2 is a banker. He can only gain from volatility.

## Sunspots Economy: Example

- $(\widetilde{\omega}_1(\alpha),\widetilde{\omega}_1(\beta)) = (15,10)$
- $(\widetilde{\omega}_2(\alpha),\widetilde{\omega}_2(\beta)) = (10,10)$
- $(\widetilde{\omega}_3(\alpha),\widetilde{\omega}_3(\beta)) = (10,15)$
- $\widetilde{x}_3(\alpha) = \widetilde{\omega}_3(\alpha) = 10$
- $\widetilde{x}_3(\beta) = \widetilde{\omega}_3(\beta) = 15$
- ▶ Therefore,


$$\widetilde{x}_1(\alpha) + \widetilde{x}_2(\alpha) = 35 - 10 = 25$$

$$\widetilde{x}_1(\beta) + \widetilde{x}_2(\beta) = 35 - 15 = 20$$

► TA-EB is a proper rectangle, 25 × 20.



#### Tax-Adjusted Edgeworth Box



The 25  $\times$  20 Tax-Adjusted Edgeworth Box

Not mere randomization over CE

$$x_2(\alpha) = 10\frac{5}{8} > 10$$
  
 $x_2(\beta) = 20 - 11\frac{1}{2} = 8\frac{1}{2} < 10$ 

- Mr 2 ("banker") gains from volatility
- Mr 3 ("passive") loses from volatility
- Mr 1 and Mr 2 in aggregate lose
- Hence Mr 1 is a loser