A Theory of Housing Demand Shocks

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A THEORY OF HOUSING DEMAND SHOCKS

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Abstract. Housing demand shocks in standard macroeconomic models are a primary source of house price fluctuations, but those models have difficulties in generating the observed large volatility of house prices relative to rents. We provide a microeconomic foundation for the reduced-form housing demand shocks with a tractable heterogenous-agent framework. In our model with heterogeneous beliefs, an expansion of credit supply raises housing demand of optimistic buyers and boosts house prices without affecting rents. A credit supply shock also leads to a positive correlation between house trading volumes and house prices. The theoretical mechanism and model predictions are supported by empirical evidence, and the results are robust to alternative specifications of heterogeneity.

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In the standard business cycle models, housing demand shocks are a primary driving force behind the fluctuation of the house price and, through the collateral channel, they drive a large fraction of the business cycle fluctuation (Iacoviello and Neri, 2010; Liu et al., 2013, for example). These important shocks, however, are modeled as shifts in the representative agent’s tastes for housing, which are of the reduced form without an explicit microeconomic foundation. Since a taste shock to housing services impinges on both house prices and rents, it is challenging to account for the observed large fluctuations in the house price-to-rent ratio.

In this paper, we develop a tractable heterogeneous-agent framework that provides a microeconomic foundation for housing demand shocks. The tractability leads to a closed-form solution that allows us to uncover the underlying forces that drive fluctuations in aggregate housing demand. It also enables us to demonstrate that our theory can overcome the difficulty of the standard representative-agent model in explaining the observed large volatility of house prices relative that of rents.

I.1. The model mechanism. The baseline model features a household family, consisting of a large number of members with heterogeneous beliefs about the future value of housing services. All members receive an endowment of net worth from the family and they trade houses in a decentralized market. Optimistic traders choose to purchase houses with both internal net worth and external debt, subject to a credit constraint. Pessimistic traders sell houses subject to a no-short-sale restriction. For a given loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, there exists a unique cutoff point in the support of the idiosyncratic belief distribution, such that the marginal agent with the cutoff belief is indifferent between purchasing and selling a house. The cutoff point is endogenous. It varies with changes in macroeconomic conditions and in particular, with changes in credit supply conditions measured by the LTV ratio.

We show that the marginal agent’s belief increases with the LTV ratio, such that a credit supply shock that raises the LTV ratio also raises the marginal agent’s perceived value of future housing services, boosting aggregate housing demand. Belief heterogeneity drives a wedge in the aggregate housing Euler equation, resembling a shift in the aggregate value of housing services, which can be mapped to the reduced-form housing demand shock in the representative-agent model. A positive shock to credit supply boosts aggregate housing demand and the house price through its impact on the marginal agent’s belief, whereas the shock has no effect on the equilibrium rent. As a result, credit supply shocks can generate an arbitrarily large volatility of the
house price relative to the volatility of the rent. Through the heterogeneous-belief channel, a credit supply shock can also generate positive correlations between the house price and the trading volume, consistent with the prediction of the model of Stein (1995) and with the empirical evidence documented by Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) and Mian and Sufi (2021).

I.2. Empirical evidence. Belief heterogeneity is a key ingredient for the model’s main mechanism. The model implies that, following a credit supply expansion, the marginal house buyers become more optimistic about future house value and they can also borrow more, boosting aggregate housing demand and house prices without changing rents. The model’s mechanism is motivated by empirical evidence and its key predictions are consistent with such evidence.

In a recent study, Mian and Sufi (2021) document evidence that belief heterogeneity is important in driving the 2003-06 housing boom in the United States. They show that the 2003 surge in private-label mortgage securitization led to a large expansion in mortgage credit supply by lenders financed with noncore deposits (i.e., noncore liability (NCL) lenders). The mortgage credit supply expansion fueled speculative house trading and amplified house price fluctuations. Areas more exposed to NCL lenders experienced larger house price booms and simultaneously a larger increase in housing transaction volume, both driven by a small group of speculators who bought multiple houses in a short time period or bought and sold a given house within a year. Speculators in areas more exposed to NCL lenders had a large effect on local housing markets despite their small size. In contrast, traditional homebuyers in areas exposed to high NCL lenders experienced a relatively small decline in home purchase activity.

The divergence of beliefs about future house value is also consistent with survey data. For example, in the University of Michigan Survey of Consumers, the 2003-06 housing boom was not accompanied by widespread optimism about house buying conditions. During the boom years, the share of pessimists stating that it was a bad time to buy for price reasons increased steadily. At the same time, there was an increasing cluster of optimistic households stating that it was a good time to buy because prices would increase. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) made a similar observation. They argue that this pattern of belief divergence suggests that the 2003-06 housing boom was driven by a small cluster of optimists who believed that house prices would rise. There was a similar pattern of beliefs after the Great Recession, from late 2012 to 2018, as we discuss in Section V. Using the survey data of actual home buyers constructed by Case et al. (2012), moreover, Mian and Sufi (2021) show
that there was a similar divergence of beliefs about house buying conditions among actual home buyers during the boom years 2003-06. All this evidence lends empirical support to our model’s main mechanism.

The theoretical predictions from our heterogeneous-agent model are also consistent with empirical evidence, as we show in Section V. The model predicts that a positive credit supply shock boosts house prices and the price-to-rent ratio without affecting rents. These predictions are supported by both the cross-country and U.S. regional evidence. For the cross-country data, we use an unbalanced panel of 25 advanced economies covering the period from 1965 to 2013. Following the approach of Mian et al. (2017), we construct a credit supply shock based on accelerations in household credit growth in periods when the mortgage spread was small (the mortgage spread is the difference between the mortgage interest rate and the 10-year sovereign bond yield). Consistent with the model predictions, we find that an increase in credit supply is followed by significant and persistent increases in both the house price and the price-to-rent ratio, while the impact on the rent is small and statistically insignificant. For the U.S. regional data, we use an unbalanced panel of 21 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). We find that a credit supply shock generates dynamic responses of the house price, the rent, and the price-to-rent ratio similar to those obtained from the cross-country data.

I.3. Robustness of our model’s mechanism. Our baseline model focuses on changes in the loan-to-value ratio as a measure of credit supply shocks. In reality, credit supply shocks can originate from relaxations of credit standards or declines in mortgage interest rates (Landvoigt et al., 2015; Greenwald and Guren, 2021). Our model’s heterogeneous-belief mechanism is robust to those alternative sources of credit supply shocks. We show that a relaxation of credit standards that allows households with lower net worth to obtain mortgage loans would boost house prices without affecting rents. We also show that, in a variation of the baseline model that introduces an exogenous wedge between the risk-free rate and the mortgage rate (i.e., a credit spread), a decline in the interest-rate wedge—as a result of an expansionary monetary policy shock, for example—also raises house prices without affecting rents. Furthermore, the model’s predicted responses of house prices and rents to an interest-rate shock are in line with local projections of house prices and rents following a monetary policy shock measured by Romer and Romer (2004).

\footnote{For more empirical studies on the importance of credit supply shocks for the boom-bust cycle in the housing market, see the survey by Mian and Sufi (2018) and the references therein.}
Our model’s theoretical implications are robust to alternative specifications of belief heterogeneity. We show that the same qualitative results can be obtained in an environment with heterogeneous beliefs about future income growth (instead of about the future value of housing services). Heterogeneous beliefs about income growth give rise to an intertemporal wedge in the housing Euler equation for the marginal agent. Our closed-form solution reveals that the intertemporal wedge resembles the growth rate in the dividend-discount model of [Gordon (1959)] and the effective discount rate depends on this wedge. The key difference is that the effective discount factor in our model is endogenous and, in particular, it increases with the LTV ratio. Through its impact on the discount factor, a positive credit supply shock raises the marginal agent’s perceived income growth rate, boosting aggregate housing demand and the house price. Since the rent is independent of beliefs, this model can also generate an arbitrarily large volatility of the house price relative to the rent volatility.

II. Related Literature

Several recent studies examine the potential driving forces of large fluctuations in house prices relative to rents within the representative agent framework. [Garriga et al. (2019)] study a representative-agent framework with segmented financial markets that drive a wedge between mortgage interest rates and capital returns. They show that a short-run decline in mortgage interest rates and an increase in the loan-to-value ratio can induce large movements in house prices with relatively small changes in non-housing consumption and housing rents. [He et al. (2015)] argue that house price booms can be partly driven by a liquidity premium stemming from collateralized home equity lending. In their model, liquidity depends on beliefs, giving rise to self-fulfilling equilibria and potentially large fluctuations in house prices.

Our study deviates from the representative-agent framework to highlight the importance of belief heterogeneity for driving changes in house prices relative to rents.\textsuperscript{2} Empirical studies show that belief heterogeneity is important for understanding financial markets. Based on surveys of a large panel of retail investors, [Giglio et al. (2015)] for example, use the micro-level data in the San Diego housing market to show that an increased credit availability for poor households with low-end homes was a major driver of the house price boom in the early 2000s. In a related study, [Rekkas et al. (2020)] argue that the observed house price dispersion can be explained by a model with heterogeneity in buyer preferences and search frictions, consistent with the evidence from Vancouver’s housing market.

\textsuperscript{2}The importance of heterogeneity is supported by empirical evidence. [Landvoigt et al. (2015)], for example, use the micro-level data in the San Diego housing market to show that an increased credit availability for poor households with low-end homes was a major driver of the house price boom in the early 2000s. In a related study, [Rekkas et al. (2020)] argue that the observed house price dispersion can be explained by a model with heterogeneity in buyer preferences and search frictions, consistent with the evidence from Vancouver’s housing market.
show that belief heterogeneity helps account for the direction and the magnitude of financial trades. Using personal home transaction data, Cheng et al. (2014) argue that beliefs of midlevel managers in securitized finance might be important for understanding the causes of the housing crisis. Bailey et al. (2019) study the relation between beliefs about future house price changes and mortgage leverage choices.

Our paper focuses on the role of changes in housing finance conditions in explaining the movements in house prices relative to rents. Related to our work, Favilukis et al. (2016) find that a credit supply expansion is important to account for the observed fluctuations in house prices. They do not model rental markets explicitly and focus on bequest heterogeneity. We reach a similar conclusion with a different mechanism. In our model, heterogeneous beliefs about future economic conditions (either the future value of housing or future income growth) are important for explaining the observed connection between credit supply expansions in the United States and the subsequent house price boom in the early 2000s, in line with the evidence of Mian and Sufi (2021).

Our model of belief heterogeneity is motivated by the empirical evidence in Mian and Sufi (2021), and the model mechanism is supported by their evidence. By incorporating individual heterogeneity, our model can also explain the observed correlations between house prices and trading volumes. The belief channel in our model complements the study of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), who show that belief heterogeneity (investor disagreements) helps explain the observed large asset price volatility and the positive correlations between equity prices and trading volume.

III. A REPRESENTATIVE-AGENT BENCHMARK MODEL

This section presents a stylized representative-agent model to illustrate the role of housing demand shocks in driving the house price. The model is intentionally kept simple to sharpen the exposition. In particular, we focus on an endowment economy such that house prices do not interact with consumption and production.

Kaplan et al. (2021) argue that a shift in beliefs about future housing demand was a main driver of house price movements and the price-to-rent ratio around the Great Recession. A credit supply shock (e.g., an increase in LTV) in their model, however, would change both the house price and the rent, because it is a materialized shock instead of a news shock.

For other studies that emphasize the importance of credit supply shocks for house prices, see Greenwald and Guren (2021) and the references therein.

The main insight about the importance of housing demand shocks for housing price fluctuations carries over to a more general environment with collateral constraints, as shown by Liu et al. (2013), provided that both constrained and unconstrained agents participate in the housing market. In the more general setup considered by Liu et al. (2013), the house price needs to satisfy the housing Euler...
The economy has one unit of housing supply (think about land) and an exogenous endowment of $y_t$ units of consumption goods. With a fixed supply of housing (or land), house price fluctuations are driven by shifts in housing demand \cite{Liuetal2013} \footnote{Empirical evidence shows that changes in house prices are primarily driven by changes in land prices, whereas the relative prices of structures are fairly stable \cite{DavisHeathcote2007} \cite{Knolletal2017}.} The representative household has the expected utility function

$$
\mathbb{E} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ \log c_t + \varphi_t \frac{h_{t+1}^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} \right\},
$$

where $c_t$ denotes consumption, $h_t$ denotes the flow services from the beginning-of-period holdings of housing, $\varphi_t$ denotes a housing demand shock. The parameter $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is the subjective discount factor and $\theta > 0$ is a parameter that measures the curvature of the utility function with respect to housing. The term $\mathbb{E}$ is an expectation operator.

The household chooses consumption, new housing purchases ($h_{t+1}$), and holdings of a risk-free bond denoted by $b_{t+1}$ to maximize the utility function \footnote{equations of both types of agents, and the Euler equation for the unconstrained agent (the saver) in that model is qualitatively identical to that of the representative agent in the model presented in this section.} subject to the flow of funds constraint

$$
c_t + Q_t(h_{t+1} - h_t) \leq y_t + \frac{b_{t+1}}{R_t} - b_t,
$$

where $Q_t$ denotes the house price and $R_t$ denotes the risk free interest rate, both are taken as given by the household. The initial bond holdings $b_0$ and initial housing $h_0$ are also taken as given.

The optimizing decisions lead to the Euler equation for housing

$$
\frac{Q_t}{c_t} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \frac{Q_{t+1}}{c_{t+1}} + \varphi_{t+1} \frac{h_{t+1}^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} \right\},
$$

and for bond holdings

$$
1 = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \frac{c_t}{c_{t+1}}.
$$

A competitive equilibrium consists of sequences of allocations \{$c_t, b_t, h_t$\} and prices \{$Q_t, R_t$\} that satisfy the Euler equations \footnote{Empirical evidence shows that changes in house prices are primarily driven by changes in land prices, whereas the relative prices of structures are fairly stable \cite{DavisHeathcote2007} \cite{Knolletal2017}.} and clear the markets for goods,
bond, and housing. In particular, these market clearing conditions are given by

\[ c_t = y_t, \]
\[ b_{t+1} = 0, \]
\[ h_{t+1} = 1. \]

The equilibrium house price is pinned down by iterating the housing Euler equation \(^2\) forward. With the goods and housing market clearing conditions imposed, the housing Euler equation \(^2\) implies that

\[
\frac{Q_t}{y_t} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{Q_{t+1}}{y_{t+1}} + \varphi_{t+1} \right].
\]

Iterating forward, we obtain the equilibrium house price

\[
Q_t = y_t \left[ \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \varphi_{t+j} \right].
\]

The implicit (or shadow) rent is given by the household’s marginal rate of substitution between housing and non-housing consumption, and it is given by

\[
r_{ht} = \varphi_t y_t. \tag{4}
\]

Thus, the price-to-rent ratio is given by

\[
\frac{Q_t}{r_{ht}} = \frac{1}{\varphi_t} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \varphi_{t+j}.
\]

Since we observe much larger fluctuations in house prices than in consumption or aggregate output, the house price solution \(^3\) reveals that the large volatility of house prices stems primarily from shocks to housing demand \((\varphi_t)\). In this model, housing demand shocks drive not just the house price fluctuations, but also rent fluctuations as is clear from Eq. \(^4\). Thus, this representative agent model has difficulties in generating large volatilities in the price-to-rent ratio.

To see this more clearly, consider the stationary process for the housing demand shock

\[
\hat{\varphi}_t = \rho \hat{\varphi}_{t-1} + e_t, \tag{5}
\]

where \(\hat{\varphi}_t \equiv \ln \frac{\varphi_t}{\varphi_s}\) denotes the log-deviations of the housing demand shock from steady state, \(\rho \in (-1, 1)\) is the persistence parameter, and \(e_t\) is a white noise innovation to the shock.
Log-linearizing the solution to the house price in Eq. (III) around the deterministic steady state and imposing the shock process in Eq. (5), we obtain

\[ \hat{Q}_t = \hat{y}_t + \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta}E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \hat{\varphi}_{t+j} \right] = \hat{y}_t + \frac{(1 - \beta)\rho}{1 - \beta\rho} \hat{\varphi}_t, \]  

(6)

where \( \hat{y}_t \) is an exogenous endowment process.

The log-linearized solution to the rent is given by

\[ \hat{r}_{ht} = \hat{y}_t + \hat{\varphi}_t. \]  

(7)

The log-linearized price-to-rent ratio is thus given by

\[ \hat{Q}_t - \hat{r}_{ht} = -\frac{1 - \rho}{1 - \beta\rho} \hat{\varphi}_t. \]  

(8)

There are two counter-factual implications of this representative agent model. First, the model implies that the price-to-rent ratio falls when house price rises, as shown by Eq. (8). In the data, the price-rent ratio are highly positively correlated with house prices both in U.S. time series (Figure 1) and in international and U.S. regional data (Figure 2).\footnote{Consistent with our figures here, Jordà et al. (2019) document evidence that changes in house prices are much more volatile than changes in rents using a long historical sample from 1870 to 2015 covering 16 advanced economies.}

Second, the model cannot generate larger volatility of house prices relative to rents. To see this, assume that the endowment is constant so that \( \hat{y}_t = 0 \). The model implies that

\[ \frac{\text{STD}(\hat{Q}_t)}{\text{STD}(\hat{r}_{ht})} = \frac{(1 - \beta)\rho}{1 - \beta\rho} < 1, \]

where the last inequality follows from \( \rho < 1 \). Thus, the model predicts that the house price is less volatile than the rent, while the opposite is true in the data.

The representative agent model generates counterfactual dynamics of the house price and the rent not only conditional on contemporaneous shocks to housing demand, but also conditional on news shocks. Consider the shock process

\[ \hat{\varphi}_t = \rho \hat{\varphi}_{t-1} + e_t + z_{t-1}, \]  

(9)

which contains the contemporaneous shock \( e_t \) and the news shock \( z_t \), both are i.i.d. innovations.

In this case, we have

\[ \hat{Q}_t = \hat{y}_t + \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta}E_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \hat{\varphi}_{t+j} \right] = \hat{y}_t + \frac{(1 - \beta)\rho}{1 - \beta\rho} \hat{\varphi}_t + \frac{(1 - \beta)\beta\rho}{1 - \beta\rho} z_t, \]
and

\[ \hat{r}_{ht} = \hat{y}_t + \hat{\varphi}_t. \]

The log-linearized price-to-rent ratio is thus given by

\[ \hat{Q}_t - \hat{r}_{ht} = -\frac{1 - \rho}{1 - \beta \rho} \hat{\varphi}_t + \frac{(1 - \beta)\beta}{1 - \beta \rho} z_t. \]

Clearly, a positive news shock \( z_t \) would raise the house price, with no effect on the rent since it does not change the contemporaneous housing taste \( \hat{\varphi}_t \). In this sense, the model can potential explain the relative volatility of house prices and rents conditional on news shocks (Kaplan et al., 2021).

However, even with news shocks, the model fails to generate the observed unconditional volatilities of the house price vs. the rent. To see this, consider the case without income shocks such that \( \hat{y}_t = 0 \). Under the shock process of \( \hat{\varphi}_t \) specified in Eq. (9), the ratio of the unconditional volatility of the house price to that of the rent is given by

\[ \frac{\text{STD}(\hat{Q}_t)}{\text{STD}(\hat{r}_{ht})} = \frac{(1 - \beta)\rho}{1 - \beta \rho} \sqrt{1 + \beta^2(1 - \rho^2) \frac{\sigma_e^2}{\sigma_e^2 + \sigma_z^2}} < 1, \tag{10} \]

where the last inequality obtains because \( \rho < 1 \) and \( \sigma_e \geq 0 \).
In the data, however, the relative volatility is much larger than one. To get a sense of the magnitude of the relative volatility implied by the representative agent model,
we calibrate $\beta = 0.99$ at the quarterly frequency following the real business cycle literature and we set $\rho = 0.99$ based on the empirical estimation of the housing demand shock process by [Liu et al. (2013)]. These parameter values imply that $\frac{(1-\beta)\rho}{1-\beta^2} \approx 0.497$. Thus, absent news shock (i.e, $\sigma_z = 0$), the upper bound of the relative volatility is about 0.497, much smaller than that observed in the data. Introducing news shock amplifies the relative volatility, but the quantitative magnitude remains much smaller than that in the data. In particular, Eq (10) implies that, under the assumed parameter values, the upper bound of the relative volatility in the case with news shocks is $\frac{(1-\beta)\rho}{1-\beta^2} \sqrt{1+\beta^2(1-\rho^2)} \approx 0.502$. In contrast, in the U.S. data, the relative volatility is about 3.88.

The failure of the representative agent framework in generating a large volatility of the house price relative to that of the rent emerges under very general assumptions about the agent’s information set and the housing demand shock process. This result is formally stated in Proposition III.1 below.

**Proposition III.1.** Assume that $\hat{y}_t = 0, \forall t$. For any arbitrary covariance-stationary process of the housing demand shock $\hat{\phi}_t$ and any arbitrary information structure, the representative agent model implies that $\frac{\text{STD}(\hat{Q}_t)}{\text{STD}(\hat{r}_{ht})} < 1$.

**Proof.** Regardless of the agent’s information set and the shock processes, the equilibrium house price and the rent are given by

$$\hat{Q}_t = \hat{y}_t + \frac{1-\beta}{\beta} \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \hat{\phi}_{t+j} \right],$$

$$\hat{r}_{ht} = \hat{y}_t + \hat{\phi}_t.$$

For simplicity, assume that $\hat{y}_t = 0$. Then we have

$$\hat{Q}_t = \frac{1-\beta}{\beta} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \hat{\phi}_{t+j} - \frac{1-\beta}{\beta} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \hat{\phi}_{t+j} \equiv Q^*_t - \text{err}_t,$$

\[8\] We measure the house price by the CoreLogic National House Price Index, excluding distressed sales, deflated by the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) chained price index. We measure the rent by the housing component of PCE, including rent of tenant-occupied non-farm housing and imputed rent of owner-occupied non-farm housing, deflated by the PCE price index. We compute standard deviations of the year-over-year growth rates of the real house price and the real rent in the monthly sample from 1977 to 2019. In our sample, the standard deviation of the house price growth is 4.931 and that of the rent growth is 1.297, implying a relative volatility of $4.931/1.297 \approx 3.80$. 

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where \( Q_t^* = \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \hat{\phi}_{t+j} \) and \( \text{err}_t \) denotes the present value of the expectation errors. Under rational expectations, \( \mathbb{E}_t \hat{\phi}_{t+j} \) and \( \hat{\phi}_{t+j} - \mathbb{E}_t \hat{\phi}_{t+j} \) are independent, implying that \( \hat{Q}_t \) and \( \text{err}_t \) are independent. Thus, we have \( \text{var}(Q_t^*) = \text{var}(Q_t) + \text{var}(\text{err}_t) \), implying that

\[
\text{var}(Q_t) < \text{var}(Q_t^*)
\]

The unconditional variance of \( Q_t^* \) is given by

\[
\text{var}(Q_t^*) = \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \hat{\phi}_{t+j} - 0 \right]^2
\]

\[
= \left( \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} \right)^2 \mathbb{E} \left( \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \hat{\phi}_{t+j} \right)^2
\]

\[
= \left( \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} \right)^2 \mathbb{E} \left( \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \hat{\phi}_{t+j} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \hat{\phi}_{t+j} \right)
\]

\[
= \left( \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} \right)^2 \frac{\beta^2}{1 - \beta^2} \left[ \text{cov}(\hat{\phi}_t, \hat{\phi}_t) + 2\beta \text{cov}(\hat{\phi}_t, \hat{\phi}_{t-1}) + 2\beta^2 \text{cov}(\hat{\phi}_t, \hat{\phi}_{t-2}) + ... \right],
\]

where we have used the stationarity property of \( \hat{\phi}_t \) such that \( \text{cov}(\hat{\phi}_{t+j}, \hat{\phi}_{t+k}) = \text{cov}(\hat{\phi}_t, \hat{\phi}_{t+j+k}) \).

The Cauchy-Schwartz inequality implies that \( \text{cov}(\hat{\phi}_t, \hat{\phi}_{t-j}) < \text{cov}(\hat{\phi}_t, \hat{\phi}_t) \). Thus, we have

\[
\text{var}(Q_t^*) < (1 - \beta)^2 \frac{1}{1 - \beta^2} \left[ 1 + \frac{2\beta}{1 - \beta} \right] \text{cov}(\hat{\phi}_t, \hat{\phi}_t) = \text{var}(\hat{\phi}_t).
\]

Since \( \text{var}(\hat{r}_{ht}) = \text{var}(\hat{\phi}_t) \), it follows that \( \text{var}(\hat{Q}_t) < \text{var}(\hat{r}_{ht}) \).

\[\square\]

The baseline representative agent model assumes that the rental prices are flexible. However, rents can be stickier than house prices, which may be an alternative mechanism that drives the large volatility of house prices relative to that of rents. Sticky rents can be a result of infrequent rent adjustments as in the standard New Keynesian models (Jeske and Liu, 2013), or they can be a consequence of implicit insurance between landlords and renters in the spirit of Lagakos and Ordonez (2011) applying to the housing market.

We now consider an extension of the representative agent model with rent rigidities. We assume that the market rent in period \( t \) stays the same as in the previous period with the probability \( \theta \) and it adjusts to the desired, flexible-rent level specified in Eq. (7) with the complementary probability. Under these assumptions, the
log-linearized average rent is given by
\[ \hat{r}_{ht} = \theta \hat{r}_{h,t-1} + (1 - \theta) \hat{\phi}_t, \]
where, for simplicity, we have imposed the assumption that the income is constant such that \( \hat{y}_t = 0 \).

For illustrative purposes, we assume that the markets for rental housing and for owner-occupied housing are segmented. Under the AR(1) process of the housing demand shock specified in Eq. (5), the house price \( \hat{Q}_t \) is given by Eq (6). With \( \hat{y}_t = 0 \), the relative volatility of the house price is given by
\[ \frac{\text{STD}(\hat{Q}_t)}{\text{STD}(\hat{r}_{ht})} = \sqrt{\frac{1 + \theta (1 - \beta) \rho}{1 - \theta (1 - \beta) \rho}}. \]

For any given values of \( \beta \) and \( \rho \), one can obtain an arbitrarily large relative volatility of the house price if \( \theta \) is sufficiently close to one. There exists a value of \( \theta \) that enables the model to match the observed relative volatility. For an illustration, we consider the calibrated parameters \( \beta = 0.99 \) and \( \rho = 0.99 \). To match the observed relative volatility of 3.8 in U.S. data requires that \( \theta = 0.97 \), which implies that only 3% of the rental contracts are reset within a quarter and on average, a rental contract lasts for 33 quarters or over 8 years. Rental contracts of such a long duration, which is necessary for the representative-agent model to match the observed relative volatility of house prices, is at odds with the empirical evidence that about one-third of apartment rents do not change within a year, implying an average duration of rental contracts of about three years (Genesove, 2003).

IV. A HETEROGENEOUS-AGENT MODEL OF HOUSING DEMAND

The representative-agent model has difficulties to generate the observed large volatilities of the house price relative to that of housing rent. We depart from the representative-agent framework to obtain a better understanding of the forces behind the reduced-form housing demand shock. Motivated by the empirical evidence of Mian and Sufi (2021), we present a tractable heterogeneous-agent framework featuring heterogeneous beliefs about the growth rate of future house value. The model allows us to establish

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9 Our simple approach here to modeling real rent rigidities is similar to the approach to modeling real wage rigidities in the labor search literature [e.g., Hall (2005)].

10 If the rental market and the owner-occupied housing market are fully integrated, then the house price would be closely linked to the rent and thus, it would inherit some of the rent rigidities. This would make it more difficult for the sticky-rent model to generate the observed large relative volatility of the house price. We illustrate this point in the online appendix.
a microeconomic foundation for the reduced-form housing demand shock. We show that the model with belief heterogeneity is capable of generating arbitrarily large volatilities of the house price relative to that of the rent conditional on fundamental shocks such as credit supply shocks. Belief heterogeneity also gives rise to equilibrium trading in the housing markets. The model implies a positive correlation between the trading volume and the house price, in line with empirical evidence.

IV.1. Model environment. Consider a large household family with a continuum of members. The family has the utility function

\[ \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \log c_t + \tilde{\varphi}_t s_{ht}^{1-\theta} \right], \]

where \( c_t \) and \( s_{ht} \) denote consumption of goods and housing services, respectively, \( \tilde{\varphi}_t \) denotes a shock to the utility value of housing services, the parameter \( \beta \in (0, 1) \) is a subjective discount factor, and \( \mathbb{E} \) is an expectation operator. Suppose that the shock to the value of housing services (i.e., \( \tilde{\varphi}_t \)) follows a random walk process, and its growth rate \( \tilde{\varphi}_{t+1} = g_{t+1} \) is randomly drawn from the i.i.d. distribution \( \tilde{F} \).

In the beginning of period \( t \), all members of the family enjoy the same consumption of goods \( c_t \) and of housing services \( s_{ht} \). Afterwards family members are dispersed to decentralized housing markets where they trade houses. Individual traders hold heterogeneous beliefs about the growth rate of the future value of housing services.

In particular, an individual \( j \)'s perceived marginal utility of housing services is given by \( \tilde{\varphi}_{t+1} = \tilde{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t^{j} \), where the belief \( \varepsilon_t^{j} \) is i.i.d. and is drawn from the distribution \( F(\cdot) \).

Note that \( \tilde{F} \) and \( F \) need not to be the same. Since the only source of heterogeneity is belief shocks, we can index an individual trader’s house purchases and bond holdings in the decentralized markets by the belief \( \varepsilon_t \), without the \( j \) index.\(^{11}\)

A trader with the belief \( \varepsilon_t \) finances spending on houses \( Q_t h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) \) using internal funds \( a_t \) received from the family before the decentralized markets open, along with external debt \( b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) \) at the market interest rate \( R_t \).

\(^{11}\)Our setup requires some departures from perfect rationality. Under rational expectations, all agents would form the same expectations of future housing value, resulting in a degenerate belief distribution. This implication is in line with the literature. For example, Aumann (1976) shows that, if agents were perfectly rational with a common prior and common knowledge, then their posterior beliefs would be identical through learning even if they are endowed with different information about the fundamental shocks. Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Tirole (1982) generalized Aumann’s insight to establish the no trade theorem under rational expectations.
The trader $\varepsilon_t$ in the decentralized housing market faces the flow-of-funds constraint

$$Q_t h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) \leq a_t + \frac{b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)}{R_t}. \quad (11)$$

As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), imperfect contract enforcement implies that the external debt cannot exceed a fraction of the collateral value. Thus, the trader faces the collateral constraint

$$\frac{b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)}{R_t} \leq \kappa_t Q_t h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t), \quad (12)$$

where the loan-to-value ratio $\kappa_t \in [0, 1]$ is exogenous and potentially time varying, representing an aggregate shock to credit conditions.

The trader also faces a short-selling constraint such that

$$h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) \geq 0. \quad (13)$$

The family’s optimizing decisions are subject to the budget constraint

$$c_t + r_{ht}s_{ht} + a_t = y_t + (Q_t + r_{ht}) \int h_t(\varepsilon_{t-1})dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) - \int b_t(\varepsilon_{t-1})dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}), \quad (14)$$

where $r_{ht}$ denotes the rental rate of housing services and $Q_t$ denotes the house price.

Denote by $\eta_t(\varepsilon_t)$, $\pi_t(\varepsilon_t)$, and $\lambda_t$ the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the constraints (11), (12), (13), and (14), respectively. The first order conditions with respect to $c_t$ and $s_{ht}$ are given by

$$\frac{1}{c_t} = \lambda_t,$$

$$\lambda_t r_{ht} = \bar{\varphi}_t s_{ht}^{-\theta}. \quad (15)$$

The first order condition with respect to $a_t$ implies that

$$\lambda_t = \int \eta_t(\varepsilon_t)dF(\varepsilon_t). \quad (16)$$

A marginal unit of goods transferred to individual members for housing purchases reduces family consumption by one unit and hence the utility cost is $\lambda_t$. The utility gain from this transfer is the shadow value of newly purchased housing (i.e., $\eta_t(\varepsilon_t)$) averaged across all members.

The first order condition with respect to $h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)$ is given by

$$\eta_t(\varepsilon_t) Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t [\lambda_{t+1} (Q_{t+1} + r_{h,t+1}) | \bar{\varphi}_{t+1} = \bar{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t] = \bar{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t + \kappa_t Q_t \pi_t (\varepsilon_t) + \mu_t (\varepsilon_t). \quad (17)$$

If a household member with belief shock $\varepsilon_t$ purchases an additional unit of housing, the utility cost is $Q_t \eta_t(\varepsilon_t)$. The extra unit of housing yields rental value $r_{h,t+1}$ and resale value $Q_{t+1}$ in the next period. In addition, having the extra unit of housing
helps relax the collateral constraint and the short-selling constraint, with the shadow utility gains of \( \kappa_t Q_t \pi_t(\varepsilon_t) + \mu_t(\varepsilon_t) \).

The first order condition with respect to \( b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) \) is given by

\[
\eta_t(\varepsilon_t) = \beta R_t E_t [\lambda_{t+1} | \tilde{\varphi}_{t+1} = \tilde{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t] + \pi_t(\varepsilon_t). \tag{18}
\]

Borrowing an extra unit of goods has the utility value of \( \eta_t(\varepsilon_t) \) for the member with belief shock \( \varepsilon_t \). The family needs to repay the debt next period at the interest rate \( R_t \), with the utility cost of \( \beta R_t E_t \lambda_{t+1} \). The increase in borrowing also tightens the collateral constraint, with the utility cost of \( \pi_t(\varepsilon_t) \). The optimal choice of \( b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) \) equates the marginal gains to the marginal costs.

A competitive equilibrium is a collection of allocations \( \{c_t, s_{ht}, a_t, h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t), b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)\} \) and prices \( \{Q_t, R_t\} \) such that

1. Taking the prices as given, the allocations solve the household’s utility maximizing problem.
2. Markets for goods, housing, and credit all clear, such that

\[
c_t = y_t, \tag{19}
\]
\[
s_{ht} = \int h_t(\varepsilon_{t-1})dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) = 1, \tag{20}
\]
\[
\int b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)dF(\varepsilon_t) = 0, \tag{21}
\]

where we assume that the aggregate supply of housing is fixed at one and the aggregate net supply of debt is zero.\textsuperscript{12}

IV.2. Equilibrium characterization. We now characterize the equilibrium. Intuitively, a trader with a more optimistic belief about future house value would like to purchase more housing. Since such purchases are partly financed by external debt, traders with a sufficiently high \( \varepsilon_t \) would face binding borrowing constraints. Thus, we conjecture that there exists a cutoff level of the belief shock \( \varepsilon_t^* \), such that traders with beliefs above the cutoff are optimistic about future house value and are house buyers; those with beliefs below the cutoff are pessimists and are sellers. The key step to find an equilibrium is to determine the identity of the marginal trader with the belief \( \varepsilon_t^* \), which is established in Lemma IV.1 below.

\textsuperscript{12}The housing market clearing condition (20) reflects our assumption that housing services are derived from the beginning-of-period housing stock, consistent with the timing in the representative-agent model in Section III.
Lemma IV.1. There exists a unique cutoff point $\varepsilon^*_t$ in the support of the distribution $F(\varepsilon)$ and it is given by

$$F(\varepsilon^*_t) = \kappa_t.$$  \hfill (22)

Proof. For traders with $\varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon^*_t$, the flow-of-funds constraint (11) and the collateral constraint (12) are both binding, implying that

$$Q_t h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) \leq \frac{a_t}{1 - \kappa_t}.$$  

Using Eq (11) and imposing the market clearing conditions (19)-(21), we obtain $a_t = Q_t$. It follows that, for all $\varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon^*_t$, the equilibrium quantity of housing is given by

$$h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) = \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t}.$$  

Thus, traders with $\varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon^*_t$ are house buyers and they all buy the same quantity. Traders with $\varepsilon_t < \varepsilon^*_t$ are sellers with $h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) = 0$.

The house market clearing condition then implies that

$$\frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} \int_{\varepsilon^*_t}^\infty dF(\varepsilon) = 1,$$

which gives the solution to $\varepsilon^*_t$ in Eq. (22). \hfill $\square$

From Eq. (22), it is clear that $\varepsilon^*_t$ increases with $\kappa_t$. Thus, a credit supply expansion that raises $\kappa_t$ also makes the marginal trader more optimistic about the future value of housing ($\varepsilon^*_t$), boosting housing demand and the house price. The effective housing demand can be expressed as an implicit function of the LTV $\kappa_t$, as we show in the proposition below.

Proposition IV.2. The equilibrium house price satisfies the aggregate Euler equation

$$\lambda_t Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{\varphi}_t \xi(\kappa_t),$$  \hfill (23)

where

$$\xi(\kappa_t) \equiv \frac{1}{1 - F(\varepsilon^*_t)} \int_{\varepsilon^*_t}^\infty \varepsilon dF(\varepsilon),$$

which is a function of $\kappa_t$ since $\varepsilon^*_t$ is related to $\kappa_t$ through $F(\varepsilon^*_t) = \kappa_t$.

Proof. Consider an optimistic trader with the belief $\varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon^*_t$. The trader’s housing Euler equation (17) can be written as

$$\eta_t(\varepsilon_t) Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t + \kappa_t Q_t \pi_t(\varepsilon_t), \quad \forall \varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon^*_t$$  \hfill (24)

where we have used the first-order condition (15) for housing services and imposed the housing market clearing condition that $s_{ht} = 1$. In addition, we have imposed
the equilibrium condition that \( \mu(\varepsilon_t) = 0 \) since the trader is a house buyer and the short-sale constraint \([13]\) is not binding.

The optimistic trader’s bond Euler equation \([18]\) can be written as

\[
\eta_t(\varepsilon_t) = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} + \pi_t(\varepsilon_t), \quad \forall \varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon_t^*.
\]

These conditions imply that

\[
\pi_t(\varepsilon_t) = \frac{\beta}{1 - \kappa_t} \left[ \bar{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t + \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} - R_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} \right], \quad \forall \varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon_t^*.
\]

Evaluating \( \pi(\varepsilon_t) \) at \( \varepsilon_t^* \) and subtracting it from equation \([26]\), we obtain

\[
\pi_t(\varepsilon_t) - \pi_t(\varepsilon_t^*) = \frac{\beta \bar{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t - \varepsilon_t^*}{1 - \kappa_t} Q_t, \quad \forall \varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon_t^*.
\]

Since \( \pi(\varepsilon_t) = 0 \) for \( \varepsilon_t \leq \varepsilon_t^* \), we have the solution for \( \pi(\varepsilon_t) \)

\[
\pi_t(\varepsilon_t) = \frac{\beta \bar{\varphi}_t}{1 - \kappa_t} \max \left\{ 0, \frac{\varepsilon_t - \varepsilon_t^*}{Q_t} \right\}.
\]

We can then solve for \( \eta(\varepsilon_t) \) using Eq. \([25]\), which yields

\[
\eta_t(\varepsilon_t) = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} + \frac{\beta \bar{\varphi}_t}{1 - \kappa_t} \max \left\{ 0, \frac{\varepsilon_t - \varepsilon_t^*}{Q_t} \right\}
\]

Given the solution for \( \eta(\varepsilon_t) \), the first-order condition \([16]\) then implies that

\[
\lambda_t = \int \eta_t(\varepsilon_t) dF(\varepsilon_t) = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} + \frac{\beta \bar{\varphi}_t}{1 - \kappa_t} \left( \varepsilon_t - \varepsilon_t^* \right) dF(\varepsilon_t)
\]

Since \( \pi(\varepsilon_t^*) = 0 \), Equations \([24]\) and \([25]\) imply that

\[
\eta_t(\varepsilon_t^*) Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \bar{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t^*
\]

\[
\eta_t(\varepsilon_t^*) = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1}
\]

Substituting these relations into Eq. \([IV.2]\) yields

\[
\lambda_t Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \bar{\varphi}_t \left[ \varepsilon_t^* + \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} \int \left[ \varepsilon - \varepsilon_t^* \right] dF(\varepsilon) \right]
\]

\[
= \beta \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \bar{\varphi}_t \left( \frac{1}{1 - F(\varepsilon_t^*)} \right) \int \varepsilon dF(\varepsilon),
\]

\[
\equiv \beta \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \bar{\varphi}_t \xi(\kappa_t),
\]

where \( \xi(\kappa_t) \equiv \frac{1}{1 - F(\varepsilon_t^*)} \int \varepsilon dF(\varepsilon) \) is a function of \( \kappa_t \) since Lemma \([IV.1]\) implies that \( F(\varepsilon_t^*) = \kappa_t \).

The next proposition draws an explicit mapping between the housing demand shock \( \varphi_t \) in the representative agent model and the housing demand shifter \( \xi(\kappa_t) \) in the model with heterogeneous beliefs.
Proposition IV.3. If $\bar{\varphi}_t \xi(\kappa_t) = \mathbb{E}_t \varphi_{t+1}$, then the equilibrium house price in the heterogeneous agent model coincides with that in the representative agent model.

Proof. From Proposition IV.2, the aggregate housing Euler equation in the heterogeneous-agent economy is given by

$$\frac{Q_t}{c_t} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \frac{Q_{t+1}}{c_{t+1}} + \beta \bar{\varphi}_t \xi(\kappa_t).$$

The housing Euler equation in the representative-agent model is given by Eq. (2) and we rewrite it here for convenience of referencing:

$$\frac{Q_t}{c_t} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \frac{Q_{t+1}}{c_{t+1}} + \beta \varphi_{t+1} h_{t+1} - \theta_{t+1} \right].$$

The housing market clearing condition in the representative-agent model implies that $h_{t+1} = 1$. Thus, if $\bar{\varphi}_t \xi(\kappa_t) = \mathbb{E}_t \varphi_{t+1}$, then the housing Euler equations in the two different economies are formally identical. Furthermore, goods market clearing implies that $c_t = y_t$ in both models. Thus, the equilibrium house price is also identical. $\square$

Proposition IV.3 provides a microeconomic foundation for the reduced-form housing demand shock. In this model, aggregate housing demand is a function of credit supply conditions measured by the loan-to-value shock $\kappa_t$ (through the $\xi(\kappa_t)$ function). In general, any shock that shifts the cutoff point $\epsilon_t^*$ also shifts aggregate housing demand, and thereby driving fluctuations in the house price.

We now show that an increase in the LTV ratio $\kappa_t$ leads to an increase in housing demand $\xi(\kappa_t)$ and therefore an increase in the house price $Q_t$, but it has no effect on the housing rent $r_{ht}$. This is established in Proposition IV.4 below.

Proposition IV.4. An increase in the LTV ratio $\kappa_t$ raises the house price $Q_t$ but has no effect on the rent $r_{ht}$. That is,

$$\frac{\partial Q_t}{\partial \kappa_t} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial r_{ht}}{\partial \kappa_t} = 0.$$

Proof. We first show that the housing demand shifter $\xi(\kappa_t)$ increases with $\kappa_t$. Since $\epsilon_t^*$ is strictly increasing in $\kappa_t$ (see Lemma IV.1), it is sufficient to show that $\xi_t$ strictly
increases with \( \varepsilon_t^* \). Differentiating \( \xi_t \) in Eq (IV.2) with respect to \( \varepsilon_t^* \) to obtain

\[
\frac{\partial \xi_t}{\partial \varepsilon_t^*} = \frac{f(\varepsilon_t^*)}{\int [1 - F(\varepsilon_t^*)]^2} \int \varepsilon dF(\varepsilon) - \frac{\varepsilon_t^* f(\varepsilon_t^*)}{1 - F(\varepsilon_t^*)} \\
= \frac{f(\varepsilon_t^*)}{1 - F(\varepsilon_t^*)} \left[ \frac{\int \varepsilon dF(\varepsilon)}{1 - F(\varepsilon_t^*)} - \varepsilon_t^* \right] \\
> \frac{f(\varepsilon_t^*)}{1 - F(\varepsilon_t^*)} \left[ \frac{\int \varepsilon^* dF(\varepsilon)}{1 - F(\varepsilon_t^*)} - \varepsilon_t^* \right] = 0,
\]

where \( f(\varepsilon) \equiv F'(\varepsilon) > 0 \) is the probability density function.

Given that \( \frac{\partial \xi_t}{\partial \kappa_t} > 0 \) and that \( \lambda_t = 1/y_t \) is invariant to \( \kappa_t \), the housing Euler equation (23) implies that \( \frac{\partial Q_t}{\partial \kappa_t} > 0 \).

The housing rent is given by

\[
r_{ht} = \tilde{\varphi}_t \frac{s_{ht}}{\lambda_t} = \tilde{\varphi}_t y_t,
\]

which is independent of \( \kappa_t \).

Since changes in credit conditions (LTV) drive changes in the house price without affecting the rent, the heterogeneous agent model here is able to generate arbitrarily large volatility of the house price relative to that of the rent.

Finally, the model with heterogeneous beliefs also generates positive correlations between house trading volumes and the house price through changes in credit conditions, in line with the empirical evidence of Mian and Sufi (2021) (see also Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) and Clayton et al. (2009)).

Define the house trading volume as

\[
TV_t \equiv \frac{1}{2} \int \int |h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) - h_t(\varepsilon_{t-1})|dF(\varepsilon_t)dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}),
\]

which measures the average number of houses that are either bought or sold from period \( t - 1 \) to period \( t \). Proposition IV.5 below shows that the trading volume is positively correlated with the LTV ratio \( \kappa_t \).

**Proposition IV.5.** The equilibrium house trading volume is given by

\[
TV_t = \max \{ \kappa_t, \kappa_{t-1} \}.
\]
Proof.

\[ TV_t = \frac{1}{2} \int_{\varepsilon_t^*}^{\varepsilon_{t-1}} \int_{\varepsilon_t^*}^{1} \left| \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} - \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_{t-1}} \right| dF(\varepsilon_t) dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) \]

\[ + \frac{1}{2} \int_{\varepsilon_t^*}^{1} \int_{0}^{\varepsilon_{t-1}} \left| \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} - 0 \right| dF(\varepsilon_t) dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) \]

\[ + \frac{1}{2} \int_{0}^{\varepsilon_t^*} \int_{0}^{\varepsilon_{t-1}} |0 - \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t}| dF(\varepsilon_t) dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) \]

\[ = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ |\kappa_t - \kappa_{t-1}| + F(\varepsilon_{t-1})[1 - F(\varepsilon_t)] \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} + \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_{t-1}}[1 - F(\varepsilon_{t-1})] F(\varepsilon_t) \right\} \]

\[ = \frac{1}{2} \left\{ |\kappa_t - \kappa_{t-1}| + \kappa_{t-1} + \kappa_t \right\} \]

\[ = \max\{\kappa_t, \kappa_{t-1}\} \]

\[ \square \]

V. Empirical evidence

Our model suggests that heterogeneity in beliefs about future changes in house value is a crucial ingredient for the main mechanism to generate high volatility of house prices that is not tied to the volatility of rents. The model mechanism implies that, following a credit supply expansion (e.g., a relaxation of the loan-to-value requirements), the marginal house buyers become more optimistic about future house value and increase house purchases, boosting aggregate housing demand and house prices without changing rents. We now discuss some empirical evidence that supports the model’s mechanism and key predictions.

V.1. Evidence supporting the model’s mechanism. The model mechanism is supported by the empirical evidence documented by [Mian and Sufi (2021)]. They use micro-level data to show that heterogeneity in house buyer beliefs (optimists vs pessimists) helps explain the observed booms in house prices and housing transactions in the US following an exogenous credit supply expansion in the early 2000s. They show that the 2003 surge in private-label mortgage securitization led to a large expansion in mortgage credit supply from lenders financed with noncore deposits (i.e., noncore liability lenders, or NCL lenders). The mortgage credit supply expansion fueled speculative house trading and amplified house price fluctuations. Areas more exposed to NCL lenders experienced larger house price booms and simultaneously a larger
increase in housing transaction volume, both driven by a small group of speculators who bought multiple houses in a short time period or bought and sold a given house within a year. Speculators in areas more exposed to NCL lenders had a large effect on local housing markets despite their small size (about 1.5% of the overall population). In contrast, high credit score traditional homebuyers in areas exposed to high NCL lenders experienced a relative decline in home purchase activity.

The finding of Mian and Sufi (2021) that belief heterogeneity played an important role in driving house price booms in the early 2000s is consistent with survey data. Mian and Sufi (2021) note that the 2003-06 housing boom was not accompanied by widespread optimism of house buying conditions. As shown in Figure 3, the fraction of households who are pessimistic about house buying conditions increased during that period (left panel), while the fraction of optimists decreased (right panel). However, there was an increasing cluster of optimistic households saying that it was a good time to buy because prices would increase (right panel). Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) made a similar observation and they argue that this pattern of beliefs suggests that the 2003-06 housing boom was driven by a small but expanding cluster of optimists who believed that house prices would rise.

Figure 3 shows that the divergence of beliefs occurred again after the Great Recession. From late 2012 to 2018, house prices increased steadily. During that period, the share of households in the Michigan Survey saying that it was a bad time to buy because of price reasons increased (left panel), whereas the share of households saying that it was a good time to buy because of price reasons stayed flat and then declined (right panel, blue line). The steady increases in house prices during this period were accompanied by a rising cluster optimists who said it was a good time to buy because of price reasons (right panel, green line). This pattern of belief divergence is similar to the 2003-06 housing boom, suggesting that the increases in house prices during this more recent period are also likely driven by purchases of a small but expanding cluster of optimists, consistent with our theory.

The Michigan Survey covers the general population and does not contain information on whether a household bought a house recently. Mian and Sufi (2021) use the data on housing market expectations of actual home buyers from Case et al. (2012). They show that there was a similar divergence of beliefs among actual home buyers during the 2003-06 housing boom. While the share of individuals saying that it was a bad time to buy because of price reasons rose during that period, the price expectations of individuals who bought a house recently also rose, suggesting that
V.2. Evidence supporting the model’s predictions. Our model predicts that a credit supply shock can have a large impact on the house price, but not on rent. These predictions are consistent with empirical evidence from both international and U.S. regional data.

To establish such evidence, we follow the approach in Mian et al. (2017) and identify a credit supply shock as an acceleration in credit growth during periods with low mortgage spreads. We use both international data and U.S. regional data. For the international data, we use an unbalanced panel of 25 advanced economies, with annual data covering the periods from 1965 to 2013. We measure credit growth by the year-over-year changes in the household debt-to-GDP ratio in each country, as in Mian et al. (2017). The mortgage spread for each country is the spread between the mortgage interest rates and the 10-year sovereign bond yields. For the U.S. regional data, we use an unbalanced panel of 21 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the United States, with annual data covering the years from 1978 to 2017. Credit growth is measured by the year-over-year changes in the housing loan-to-price ratio in each
MSA, and the mortgage spreads are the effective mortgage interest rates minus the 10-year U.S. Treasury yields.\footnote{Details of the data and summary statistics are presented in the Appendix A (Tables A1 and A3).}

Using each set of panel data (international or regional), we estimate the dynamic responses of the housing market variables (price, rent, the price-rent ratio) to a credit supply shock using the local projections approach of Jorda (2005). In particular, we estimate the instrumental-variable local projections (IV-LP) model

\[ \log Y_{i,t+h} - \log Y_{i,t} = \alpha^h_0 + \sum_{j=0}^{8} \beta^h_j \Delta D_{i,t-j}^{HH} + \gamma^h_i + u^h_{i,t+h}, \]  

where \( Y_{i,t+h} \) denotes the variable of interest (the house price, rent, or the price-to-rent ratio) in country (or region) \( i \) and year \( t+h \), \( \Delta D_{i,t}^{HH} \) denotes the credit growth rate in country (or region) \( i \) in year \( t \) from \( t-1 \), \( \gamma^h_i \) captures the country (region) fixed effects, and the term \( u^h_{i,t+h} \) denotes a regression residual. The parameters \( \alpha^h_0 \) and \( \beta^h_j \) are common for all countries (regions). Following Mian et al. (2017), we instrument credit growth by a dummy variable that equals one if the mortgage spread is below the median and zero otherwise. The F-statistics from the first-stage regressions suggest that we do not have a problem with weak instruments, because the instrumental variable (mortgage spread dummy) here is highly and positively correlated with the endogenous variable (credit growth) in the IV-LP regression, both for the international sample and for the regional sample (see Tables A2 and A4 in the appendix).

Figure 4 shows that the estimated dynamic responses of the house price, the rent price, and the price-to-rent ratio following a credit supply expansion, using both the international data (the left column) and the U.S. regional data (right column). In each case, a positive credit supply shock leads to large, persistent, and statistically significant increases in the house price. In both the international data and the MSA data, a one percentage point increase in credit supply growth leads to a roughly 7.5 percent increase in the house price at the peak, although the house price responses estimated from the international data are more persistent than those from the U.S. regional data. This finding is consistent with the literature (Mian et al., 2017; Jordà et al., 2016). In contrast, the responses of the rent to a credit supply shock is small and statistically insignificant, as shown in the middle panels of the figure. The estimated rent responses from the MSA data become statistically significant after 3 years following the impact of the shock, but the magnitude of the rent responses is dwarfed by the house price responses.
Figure 4. The dynamic responses of the house price, rent, and the price-to-rent ratio to a positive credit supply shock. The left column (“International”) shows the responses estimated using data from 25 OECD economies. The right column (“MSA”) shows the responses estimated using data from 21 U.S. MSAs. The solid line in each panel shows the point estimates of the dynamic responses of each variable following an increase in credit supply using the local projection approach of Jorda (2005), and the shaded areas show the one standard-deviation confidence bands of the estimated responses.
Unlike a housing demand shock in the standard representative-agent model, a credit supply shock in our heterogeneous model can generate responses consistent with these empirical findings. That is, a credit supply shock leads to a large and persistent increase in the price-to-rent ratio (bottom panel of Figure 4).

VI. Robustness

In our baseline model with heterogeneous beliefs, a credit supply shock in the form of an increase in the loan-to-value ratio would shift the marginal home buyer’s belief about future growth of rents, and thus raising aggregate housing demand and house prices without affecting rents. In reality, a credit supply shock can also originate from a relaxation of credit standards or a decline in the mortgage interest rate. We now show that our model’s mechanism is robust to these alternative sources of credit supply shocks. The model mechanism is also robust when we allow beliefs to be serially correlated.

VI.1. Time-varying credit standards. We first consider a modification of the baseline heterogeneous-agent model in Section IV that incorporates time-varying credit standards. In the decentralized housing markets, a trader with belief $\varepsilon_t^j$ about future growth of house value receives internal funds $a_t x_t^j$ from the family, where $x_t^j$ is a net worth shock, which is drawn from the i.i.d. distribution $G(\cdot)$ and which satisfies $\int x_t^j dG(x_t^j) = 1$. In this environment, access to mortgage credit is segmented, depending on a trader’s net worth. We assume that there is an exogenous threshold, denoted by $x_t^*$, such that only traders with $x_t^j \geq x_t^*$ can obtain loans for house purchases. The threshold $x_t^*$ captures time-varying credit standards. Each trader is indexed by her belief $\varepsilon_t$ and net worth shock $x_t$.

In the decentralized housing markets, the trader with belief $\varepsilon_t$ and net worth shock $x_t$ finances house purchases with both internal net worth $a_t x_t$ and external debt $b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t)$ provided that $x_t \geq x_t^*$. If the trader’s net worth shock falls below $x_t^*$, then she has no access to external credit and needs to finance house purchases with internal funds only.

The trader indexed by $(\varepsilon_t, x_t)$ faces the flow-of-funds constraint

$$Q_t h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t) \leq a_t x_t + \frac{b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t)}{R_t},$$

and the borrowing constraint

$$\frac{b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t)}{R_t} \leq \kappa(x_t) Q_t h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t),$$
where \( \kappa(x_t) = \kappa \) if \( x_t \geq x_t^* \) and \( \kappa(x_t) = 0 \) if \( x_t < x_t^* \). In addition, the trader faces the short-sale restriction

\[
h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t) \geq 0.
\]

The household faces the family budget constraint

\[
c_t + r_{ht} s_{ht} + a_t \leq y_t + (Q_t + r_{ht}) \int \int h_t(\varepsilon_{t-1}, x_{t-1})dF(\varepsilon_{t-1})dG(x_{t-1})
- \int \int b_t(\varepsilon_{t-1}, x_{t-1})dF(\varepsilon_{t-1})dG(x_{t-1}),
\]

We provide more details of the model and derivations in the online appendix (Appendix B). We also prove that a relaxation of credit standards (i.e., a decline in \( x_t^* \)) makes the marginal house buyer more optimistic (i.e., \( \varepsilon_t^* \) increases) and thus raises house prices, with no effects on rents. These results are summarized in the following proposition.

**Proposition VI.1.** A relaxation of the credit standard makes the marginal investor more optimistic, raising the house price \( Q_t \), without affecting the rent \( r_{ht} \). Specifically, we have

\[
\frac{\partial(\varepsilon_t^*)}{\partial x_t^*} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial(Q_t)}{\partial x_t^*} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial(r_{ht})}{\partial x_t^*} = 0.
\]

*Proof.* See the online appendix (Appendix B).

**VI.2. Interest-rate shocks.** We now consider how shocks to interest rates (e.g., following monetary policy changes) would affect house prices and rents. For this purpose, we introduce an exogenous wedge between the mortgage interest rate and the risk-free deposit interest rate, capturing variations in the mortgage credit spread. Specifically, we assume that the mortgage rate \( R_t \) is related to the risk-free rate \( r_t^f \) through

\[
R_t = \tau_t r_t^f,
\]

where \( \tau_t \geq 1 \) can be interpreted as a mortgage credit spread.\(^{14}\) The economic environment is otherwise identical to that in the baseline model.

In the decentralized housing markets, a trader can buy houses using both internal funds obtained from the family and external debt borrowed at the mortgage rate \( R_t \). If a trader chooses not to buy a house, she can save the internal funds at the risk-free deposit rate \( r_t \). The presence of the interest rate wedge \( \tau_t > 1 \) implies an equilibrium in which traders are divided into three groups, depending on their beliefs. There are two cutoff points \( \varepsilon_t^* \) and \( \varepsilon_t^{**} \) satisfying that \( \varepsilon_t^* < \varepsilon_t^{**} \), such that pessimistic traders

\(^{14}\)The wedge between the risk-free rate and the mortgage interest rate can arise from segmented financial markets, as in [Garriga et al. (2019)](https://example.com).
with beliefs $\varepsilon_t < \varepsilon^*_t$ are sellers, optimistic traders with beliefs $\varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon^{**}_t$ are leveraged buyers (who face binding collateral constraints), and those with beliefs $\varepsilon_t \in [\varepsilon^*_t, \varepsilon^{**}_t)$ are buyers who do not borrow but self-finance their purchases.

In the online appendix (Appendix C), we provide details of the model environment and optimizing conditions. We show that a reduction in the interest-rate wedge $\tau_t$ (holding all else equal) would raise the unconstrained marginal buyer’s belief $\varepsilon^*_t$ and lower the credit-constrained marginal buyer’s belief $\varepsilon^{**}_t$, such that both the set of sellers (i.e., those with $\varepsilon_t < \varepsilon^*_t$) and the set of constrained buyers (i.e., those with $\varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon^{**}_t$) expand, while the set of self-financed buyers shrinks. Thus, we have

**Proposition VI.2.** Following an exogenous reduction in the interest-rate wedge $\tau_t$, the unconstrained marginal investor becomes more optimistic and more investors borrow to finance their house purchases. Specifically, we have

$$\frac{\partial \varepsilon^*_t}{\partial \tau_t} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial \varepsilon^{**}_t}{\partial \tau_t} > 0.$$  

**Proof.** See the online appendix (Appendix C). \qed

Since the reduction in the interest-rate wedge makes the unconstrained marginal buyer more optimistic (i.e., it raises $\varepsilon^*_t$), aggregate housing demand increases, boosting the equilibrium house price. On the other hand, changes in the interest-rate wedge does not affect the equilibrium rent because, as in the baseline model, the rent is determined by the endowment income. These results are formally stated in the next proposition.

**Proposition VI.3.** An decrease in the interest-rate wedge $\tau_t$ raises the house price, but has no effect on the rent. Specifically,

$$\frac{\partial (Q_t)}{\partial \tau_t} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial (r_{ht})}{\partial \tau_t} = 0.$$  

**Proof.** See the online appendix (Appendix C). \qed

The model’s prediction that a decline in the interest rate wedge—reflecting, for example, an expansionary monetary policy shock—should raise house prices without affecting rents is consistent with the U.S. data. We use the measure of U.S. monetary policy shocks developed by Romer and Romer (2004) based on the Federal Reserve’s narrative accounts of intended federal funds rate changes at each FOMC meeting and the Federal Reserve’s internal Greenbook forecasts for the period 1969-1996. The Romer-Romer monetary policy shock series has been updated by Wieland and Yang (2020) through 2007. We use quarterly U.S. regional data to estimate the impulse
responses of the house price, the rent, and the price-rent ratio to a Romer-Romer shock using the local projections approach. We have quarterly data on these variables, with the sample covering the period 1979Q1-2007Q4. Specifically, we estimate the local projections specification

\[
\log Y_{i,t+h} - \log Y_{it} = \alpha^h + \sum_{j=0}^{20} \beta_j^h M_{t-j} + \gamma^h_i + u_{i,t+h}^h,
\]

where \(Y_{i,t+h}\) denotes the variable of interest (the house price, rent, or the price-rent ratio) in region \(i\) and quarter \(t+h\), \(M_t\) denotes (the negative of) the Romer-Romer shock in quarter \(t\) indicating an expansionary monetary policy shock, \(\gamma^h_i\) captures the region fixed effects, and \(u_{i,t+h}^h\) is the regression residual. The parameters \(\alpha^h\) and \(\beta^h\) are common for all regions. The term \(h\) denotes the forecast horizons (quarters).

Figure 5 shows that the estimated cumulative impact of an expansionary monetary policy shock on the house price, the rent price, and the price-to-rent ratio for horizons up to 20 quarters. The top panel shows that, following a shock to monetary policy that is equivalent to one percentage point decline in the federal funds rate, the house price rises persistently, reaching a peak of about 15 percent above the mean in about 20 quarters. The responses of the house price are statistically significant throughout the forecasting horizon. The middle panel shows that the rent also rises modestly following an expansionary monetary policy shock. However, the effects on the rent are much more muted than those on the house price (with a peak effect of about two percent vs. 15 percent). The bottom panel shows that the price-rent ratio rises persistently following the shock, with a magnitude of the responses similar to that of the house price. These impulse responses of the house price, the rent, and the price-rent ratio following a monetary policy shock are consistent with the model’s predictions.

VI.3. Correlated beliefs. For analytical simplicity, we have focused on i.i.d. beliefs in the baseline heterogeneous-agent model. The model mechanism, however, does not hinge upon this simplifying assumption. Consider the case with serially correlated beliefs. Specifically, with the probability \(\theta\), trader \(j\)’s belief about the future growth rate of house value stays the same as her belief in the previous period such that \(\varepsilon^j_t = \varepsilon^j_{t-1}\), and with the complementary probability, the belief is randomly drawn such that \(\varepsilon^j_t = z^j_t\), where \(z^j_t\) is drawn from the i.i.d. distribution \(F(\cdot)\). Since the only source of heterogeneity is beliefs, we can index each trader in the decentralized
housing markets by the belief $\varepsilon_t$ without tracking the individual index $j$, as in the baseline model.

As we show in the online appendix (Appendix D), allowing serially correlated beliefs does not affect the relation between the credit supply shock $\kappa_t$ and aggregate housing demand, house prices, and rents. In particular, an increase in $\kappa_t$ makes the marginal

**Figure 5.** The dynamic responses of the house price, rent, and the price-to-rent ratio to a Romer-Romer monetary policy shock. The solid line in each panel shows the point estimates of the dynamic responses of each variable following an expansionary monetary policy shock using the local projection approach of [Jorda (2005)](#), and the shaded areas show the one standard-deviation confidence bands of the estimated responses.
house buyer more optimistic (i.e., the marginal buyer’s belief $\varepsilon_t^*$ increases), raising aggregate housing demand and the house price, with no effects on the rent. Serially correlated beliefs do affect the analytical relation between the house trading volume and credit supply, although the trading volume still increases with the credit supply shock.

Thus, the main mechanism in the baseline heterogeneous agent model stays the same in an environment with correlated beliefs.

VI.4. **Heterogeneous beliefs about income growth.** The theoretical insights obtained from the benchmark model do not hinge upon the particular form of belief heterogeneity. We illustrate this point by presenting a model that features heterogeneous beliefs about future income growth instead of the future value of housing services. Suppose that aggregate income grows at the rate $\frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t} = g_{t+1}$, where $g_{t+1}$ is a random variable with the i.i.d. distribution $\tilde{F}$. In the beginning of period $t$, the household members each draws a belief shock $\varepsilon_j^t$ about future income growth from the i.i.d. distribution $F(\cdot)$, which needs not to be the same as the distribution $\tilde{F}$ of income growth. The members are then dispersed to decentralized markets to trade houses based on their beliefs $\varepsilon_t$ about income growth $g_{t+1}$. The utility function is the same as in the benchmark model, except that the taste shifter is held constant at $\tilde{\varphi}_t = \varphi$. The utility-maximizing problem is subject to a similar set of constraints to those in the benchmark model.

As shown in the online appendix (Appendix E), belief heterogeneity about income growth gives rise to an intertemporal wedge in the housing Euler equation for the marginal agent with the belief $\varepsilon_t^*$. In particular, no-arbitrage between housing and the risk-free bond implies that

$$q_t = \frac{e_t^*}{R_t} E_t[q_{t+1} + \varphi].$$

The term $\frac{e_t^*}{R_t}$ is the effective discount rate analogous to that in the dividend discount model of Gordon (1959). Here, the marginal trader’s belief about future income growth $e_t^*$ can be interpreted as the dividend growth rate in the Gordon model. The difference is that $e_t^*$ is endogenous, and it responds to changes in credit conditions.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{15}}\text{For simplicity, we focus on the simple model with heterogeneous beliefs about the point realizations of income growth. The model can be generalized to allow belief heterogeneity about the distribution ($\tilde{F}$) of income growth.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{16}}\text{As in the benchmark model, the members’ house purchase and bond holding decisions can be fully identified by their beliefs $e_t$ without carrying the $j$ index.}\]
summarized by $\kappa_t$. Optimistic traders with beliefs $e_t \geq e_t^*$ are house buyers who face binding collateral constraints, whereas pessimistic traders with beliefs $e_t < e_t^*$ are sellers. As in the benchmark model, the equilibrium cutoff point $e_t^*$ in this model increases with the LTV $\kappa_t$. Through its impact on the discount factor, a positive credit supply shock raises the marginal agent’s perceived income growth rate, boosting aggregate housing demand and the house price. Since the rent is independent of beliefs, this model can also generate arbitrarily large volatility of the house price relative to that of the rent. Consistent with Cochrane (2011), fluctuations in the house price-to-rent ratio in this model are driven mainly by variations in the effective discount factor. Overall, the qualitative implications of this model are similar to our benchmark model.

VII. Conclusion

We provide a microeconomic foundation for aggregate housing demand shocks with a tractable heterogeneous-agent framework. Working through a heterogeneous-belief channel, the model predicts that a credit supply shock that raises the LTV ratio boosts aggregate housing demand and the house price, without generating counterfactually large fluctuations in rent. The heterogeneous-agent framework also allows us to study the fluctuation of the house trading volume: a credit supply shock generates a positive correlation between the trading volume and the house price.

Housing demand shocks are popular reduced-form shocks used by the standard macroeconomic models to study the linkage between the house price and the macroeconomic activity. Understanding the microeconomic forces that underpin these reduced form shocks, as well as how the house price and the rent respond to these micro-founded factors, is an important first step for designing appropriate policy interventions in the housing market. We contribute to this important research area by providing a tractable framework whose key theoretical predictions are consistent with the data.

References


A THEORY OF HOUSING DEMAND SHOCKS

TABLE A1. Summary of countries in the sample and key statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start Year</th>
<th>Mean $\Delta D^{HH}$</th>
<th>SD $\Delta D^{HH}$</th>
<th>Mean $I^{MS}$</th>
<th>SD $I^{MS}$</th>
<th>Mean $\Delta \ln(P)$</th>
<th>SD $\Delta \ln(P)$</th>
<th>Mean $\Delta \ln(R)$</th>
<th>SD $\Delta \ln(R)$</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>2.58</td>
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<td>6.60</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>2.03</td>
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<td>1967</td>
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<td>0.98</td>
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<td>1.62</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>2.05</td>
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<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>2.40</td>
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<td>-1.23</td>
<td>2.17</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>2.88</td>
<td>2.71</td>
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<td>7.90</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.77</td>
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<td>9.40</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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<td>2.04</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>0.82</td>
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<td>0.98</td>
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<td>-0.30</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.67</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
<td>8.67</td>
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<td>-7.07</td>
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<td>5.20</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>1988</td>
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<td>4.03</td>
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<td>3.08</td>
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<tr>
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Notes: This table lists the 25 countries and the years covered used in the international data sample. The variable $\Delta D^{HH}$ denotes the year-over-year changes in the household debt-to-GDP ratio, $I^{MS}$ denotes the mortgage spread dummy, which equals one if the mortgage spread is below the median and zero otherwise (the mortgage spread is the difference between the mortgage interest rate and the 10-year sovereign bond yields), $\Delta \ln(P)$ denotes the year-over-year log-changes in the real house price, and $\Delta \ln(R)$ denotes the year-over-year log-changes in the real rent.

Appendix

APPENDIX A. DATA AND REGRESSIONS

In the empirical analysis in Section V we use both cross-country data and U.S. regional data.

A.1. International data. The cross-country data are an unbalanced panel of 25 advanced economies, covering the years from 1965 to 2013. The time series in each country includes the household debt-to-GDP ratio, the mortgage spread, the house price, and the rent. The household debt-to-GDP ratio and the mortgage spread are the same as those used by Mian et al. (2017). The house price and the rent series are taken from the OECD Main Economic Indicators through Haver Analytics. We deflate the nominal rent series using the consumer price index in each country (or the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices for the European countries in our sample).

Table A1 presents the list of the countries and some summary statistics of the data. Table A2 presents the first-stage regression results in our instrumental variable local projection regression using the international data.
Table A2. First-stage regression: Dependent variable is $\Delta D_{it}^{HH}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Real Rent</th>
<th>Real Housing Prices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I_t^{MS}$</td>
<td>0.68***</td>
<td>0.71***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{t-1}^{HH}$</td>
<td>0.40***</td>
<td>0.39***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{t-2}^{HH}$</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{t-3}^{HH}$</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{t-4}^{HH}$</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{t-5}^{HH}$</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{t-6}^{HH}$</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{t-7}^{HH}$</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>-0.14**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta d_{t-8}^{HH}$</td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Stat</td>
<td>30.02</td>
<td>30.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table shows the first-stage regression results for the local projections model specified in (27). The two columns correspond to the two different local projection specifications, one for the rent and the other for the house price. The first-stage regression in each case regress the log-growth rate of the household debt-to-GDP ratio $\Delta D_{it}^{HH}$ in country $i$ and year $t$ on its own lags and also on the instrumental variable, which is the mortgage spread dummy $I_t^{MS}$ that equals one if the mortgage spread is below its median and zero otherwise.

A.2. U.S. regional data. The U.S. regional data are an unbalanced panel, consisting of 21 MSAs, covering the years from 1978 to 2017. The time series in each MSA includes the housing loan-to-price ratio and the effective mortgage interest rate, both taken from the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB). The effective mortgage rate is defined as the contract mortgage rate plus fees and charges amortized over a 10-year...
### Table A3. Summary of countries in the sample and key statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSA</th>
<th>Start Year</th>
<th>Mean $\Delta D^{HH}$</th>
<th>SD $\Delta D^{HH}$</th>
<th>Mean $I^{MS}$</th>
<th>SD $I^{MS}$</th>
<th>Mean $\Delta \ln(P)$</th>
<th>SD $\Delta \ln(P)$</th>
<th>Mean $\Delta \ln(R)$</th>
<th>SD $\Delta \ln(R)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATL</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BON</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>4.39</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>7.43</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>2.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTM</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHG</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAA</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>7.81</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFW</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNV</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HON</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>20.53</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTN</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>3.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNA</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIM</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSP</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYT</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>7.27</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHI</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHO</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>14.77</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>8.18</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STL</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STW</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>6.48</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMA</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSH</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table lists the 21 MSAs and the years covered in the U.S. regional data sample. The variable $\Delta D^{HH}$ denotes the year-over-year changes in the housing loan-to-price ratio, $I^{MS}$ denotes the mortgage spread dummy, which is one if the mortgage spread is below median (the mortgage spread is the difference between the effective mortgage interest rate and the 10-year Treasury yields), $\Delta \ln(P)$ denotes the year-over-year log-changes in the real house price, and $\Delta \ln(R)$ denotes the year-over-year log-changes in the real rent.

period, the estimated average life of conventional mortgages. The mortgage spread used in our regression is the spread between the effective mortgage rates and the 10-year Treasury yields. The data include the house price index in each MSA from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the rent index, which is measured by the “rent of primary residence” in the expenditure categories of the consumer price index (CPI-All Urban Consumers) for each MSA. We convert the nominal house price and the nominal rent into real units by using the MSA-level CPI.

Table [A3] presents the list of the MSAs and some summary statistics of the data.
Table A4. First-Stage regression with dependent variable $\Delta D_{it}^{HH}$: cross-MSA sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rent</th>
<th>House price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I_{it}^{MS}$</td>
<td>0.47**</td>
<td>0.46**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta D_{it-1}^{HH}$</td>
<td>-0.11**</td>
<td>-0.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta D_{it-2}^{HH}$</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta D_{it-3}^{HH}$</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta D_{it-4}^{HH}$</td>
<td>-0.23***</td>
<td>-0.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta D_{it-5}^{HH}$</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta D_{it-6}^{HH}$</td>
<td>-0.09**</td>
<td>-0.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta D_{it-7}^{HH}$</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta D_{it-8}^{HH}$</td>
<td>-0.13***</td>
<td>-0.14***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Stat</td>
<td>20.39</td>
<td>28.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table displays first-stage regression results in the local projection regression specified in (27) using the MSA panel data. Column (1) corresponds to the specification for rent and Column (2) for the house price. The first-stage regression in each case regresses the growth rate of the ratio of household debts to GDP $\Delta D_{it}^{HH}$ in country $i$ and year $t$ on its own lags as well as the instrumental variable, which is the mortgage spread dummy $I_{it}^{MS}$ that equals one if the mortgage spread is below its median and zero otherwise.
Supplemental Appendices: For Online Publication

APPENDIX A. A REPRESENTATIVE-AGENT MODEL WITH STICKY RENT AND AN INTEGRATED HOUSING MARKET

In main text we argue that a reasonably calibrated sticky-rent model with segmented housing market cannot match observed relative volatility of housing price. In this section, we show if the rental market and the owner-occupied housing market are fully integrated, this would make it more difficult for the sticky-rent model to generate the observed large relative volatility.

Assume that, with the probability $\theta \in (0,1)$, the rent in period $t$ stays the same as in the previous period. With the complementary probability $1 - \theta$, the rent is reset to the desired level denoted as $r_{ht}^*$, which equals

$$r_{ht}^* = (1 - \theta)E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \theta^j \varphi_{t+j}$$

In this environment, the (log-linearized) average rent is given by

$$\hat{r}_{ht} = \hat{r}_{h,t-1} + (1 - \theta)(1 - \theta \rho)E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \theta^j \hat{\varphi}_{t+j},$$

where, for simplicity, we have imposed the assumption that the income is constant such that $\hat{y}_t = 0$. Under the AR(1) process of the housing demand shock

$$\hat{\varphi}_t = \rho \hat{\varphi}_{t-1} + e_t,$$  \hfill (A.1)

the rent becomes

$$\hat{r}_{ht} = \theta \hat{r}_{h,t-1} + (1 - \theta) \frac{1 - \beta \theta}{1 - \beta \theta \rho} \hat{\varphi}_t.$$  \hfill (A.2)

Iterating the housing Euler equation, we obtain the house price

$$Q_t = E_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j r_{h,t+j} = \frac{\beta \theta}{1 - \beta \theta} r_{ht} + (1 - \theta)E_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \left[ \sum_{i=0}^{j} \theta^i r_{h,t+j-i}^* \right]$$

Log-linearizing the solution to house price equation around the deterministic steady state and assuming $\hat{y}_t = 0$, we obtain

$$\hat{Q}_t = \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} E_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \hat{r}_{h,t+j}.$$
Imposing the rent equation Eq. (A.2) and shock process in Eq. (A.1), the last equation becomes

$$\hat{Q}_t = \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \theta^j \hat{r}_{ht} + \frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} (1 - \theta) \frac{1 - \beta \theta}{1 - \beta \theta \rho} E_t \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j \left[ \sum_{i=1}^{j} \theta^{j-i} \rho^i \hat{\phi}_t \right],$$

which simplifies to

$$\hat{Q}_t = \frac{(1 - \beta) \theta}{1 - \beta \theta} \hat{r}_{ht} + (1 - \theta) \frac{(1 - \beta \theta)}{1 - \beta \theta \rho} \frac{\rho}{\theta - \rho} \left[ \frac{(1 - \beta) \theta}{1 - \beta \theta} - \frac{(1 - \beta) \rho}{1 - \beta \rho} \right] \hat{\phi}_t. \quad (A.3)$$

Note that when $\theta = 0$, Eq. (A.2) and Eq. (A.3) are identical to benchmark case with flexible rent. With $\hat{y}_t = 0$, the relative volatility of the house price is given by

$$\frac{\text{STD}(\hat{Q}_t)}{\text{STD}(\hat{r}_{ht})} = \frac{(1 - \beta) \theta}{1 - \beta \theta} + \sqrt{(1 + \theta)(1 - \theta)} \frac{\rho}{\theta - \rho} \left[ \frac{(1 - \beta) \theta}{1 - \beta \theta} - \frac{(1 - \beta) \rho}{1 - \beta \rho} \right] < 1$$

Thus, for any value of $\theta < 1$, the model predicts the largest relative volatility of the house price is less than 1. This implies that sticky rent alone is not sufficient to generate high relative volatility of housing price to rent.
APPENDIX B. HETEROGENEOUS-AGENT MODEL WITH TIME-VARYING CREDIT STANDARDS

This section proves that a relaxation of credit standards increases the optimism of the marginal house buyer’s belief and thus raises house prices, with no effects on rents.

Model environment. The household family has the utility function

\[ E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \log c_t + \tilde{\varphi}_t s_{ht}^{1-\theta} \right], \tag{B.1} \]

where \( c_t \) and \( s_{ht} \) denote consumption of goods and housing services, respectively, \( \tilde{\varphi}_t \) denotes a shock to the utility value of housing services, the parameter \( \beta \in (0, 1) \) is a subjective discount factor, and \( \mathbb{E} \) is an expectation operator. Suppose that the shock to the value of housing services (i.e., \( \tilde{\varphi}_t \)) follows a random walk process, and its growth rate \( \frac{\tilde{\varphi}_{t+1}}{\tilde{\varphi}_t} = g_{t+1} \) is randomly drawn from the i.i.d. distribution \( \tilde{F} \).

In the decentralized housing markets, a trader with belief \( \varepsilon_t \) about future growth of house value receives internal funds \( a_t x_t \) from the family, where \( x_t \) is a net worth shock, which is drawn from the i.i.d. distribution \( G(\cdot) \) and which satisfies \( \int x_t dG(x_t) = 1 \). In this environment, access to mortgage credit is segmented, depending on a trader’s net worth. We assume that there is an exogenous threshold, denoted by \( x^*_t \), such that only traders with \( x_t \geq x^*_t \) can obtain loans for house purchases. The threshold \( x^*_t \) captures time-varying credit standards. Each trader is indexed by her belief \( \varepsilon_t \) and net worth shock \( x_t \).

In the decentralized housing markets, the trader with belief \( \varepsilon_t \) and net worth shock \( x_t \) finances house purchases with both internal net worth \( a_t x_t \) and external debt \( b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t) \) provided that \( x_t \geq x^*_t \). If the trader’s net worth shock falls below \( x^*_t \), then she has no access to external credit and needs to finance house purchases with internal funds only.

The trader indexed by \( (\varepsilon_t, x_t) \) faces the flow-of-funds constraint

\[ Q_{ht+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t) \leq a_t x_t + \frac{b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t)}{R_t}, \tag{B.2} \]

and the borrowing constraint

\[ \frac{b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t)}{R_t} \leq \kappa(x_t) Q_{ht+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t), \tag{B.3} \]
The first order condition with respect to short-sale restriction \( \kappa \) where
\[
h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t) \geq 0. \quad \text{(B.4)}
\]

The household faces the family budget constraint
\[
c_t + r_{ht}s_{ht} + a_t \leq y_t + (Q_t + r_{ht}) \int \int h_t(\varepsilon_{t-1}, x_{t-1})dF(\varepsilon_{t-1})dG(x_{t-1}) - \int \int b_t(\varepsilon_{t-1}, x_{t-1})dF(\varepsilon_{t-1})dG(x_{t-1}), \quad \text{(B.5)}
\]

The household maximizes the utility function \((B.1)\), subject to the flow-of-funds constraint \((B.2)\), the borrowing constraint \((B.3)\), the short-sale restriction \((B.4)\) and the family budget constraint \((B.5)\). Denote the multiplier associated with these constraints as \( \eta(\varepsilon_t, x_t) \), \( \pi_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t) \), \( \mu_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t) \) and \( \lambda_t \) respectively.

The first order condition with respect to \( c_t \) and to \( s_{ht} \) are identical to the baseline model. The first order condition with respect to \( a_t \) is
\[
\lambda_t = \int \int \eta_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t)dF(\varepsilon_t)dG(x_t)
\]

The first order condition with respect to \( h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t) \) is
\[
\eta_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t)Q_t = \beta E_t \left\{ \lambda_{t+1}(Q_{t+1} + r_{ht+1}) \mid \bar{\varphi}_{t+1} = \varepsilon_t \right\} + \kappa(x_t)Q_t\pi_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t) + \mu_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t) \quad \text{(B.6)}
\]

The first order condition with respect to \( b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t) \) is
\[
\eta_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t) = \beta R_t E_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} \left| \frac{\bar{\varphi}_{t+1}}{\bar{\varphi}_t} = \varepsilon_t \right\} + \pi_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t) \right] \quad \text{(B.7)}
\]

A competitive equilibrium is a collection of prices \( \{Q_t, R_t, r_{ht}\} \) and allocations \( \{c_t, a_t, s_{ht}, h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t), b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t)\} \), such that

1. Taking the prices as given, the allocations solve the household’s utility maximizing problem.
2. Markets for goods, rental, housing, and credit all clear, so that
\[
c_t = y_t,
\]
\[
s_{ht} = \int \int h_t(\varepsilon_{t-1}, x_{t-1})dF(\varepsilon_{t-1})dG(x_{t-1}),
\]
\[
\int \int h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t)dF(\varepsilon_t)dG(x_t) = 1,
\]
\[
\int \int b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t)dF(\varepsilon_t)dG(x_t) = 0.
\]

Notice since \( \int \int h_t(\varepsilon_{t-1}, x_{t-1})dF(\varepsilon_{t-1})dG(x_{t-1}) = 1 \), we then have \( s_{ht} = 1 \).
Equilibrium characterization. We now characterize the equilibrium. Identical to the baseline model, the equilibrium rent is a function of income alone, and does not depend on the credit supply conditions $\kappa(x_t)$ or $x^*_t$.

$$r_{ht} = \tilde{\varphi}_t y_t.$$  

We conjecture that there exists a cutoff point, $\epsilon^*_t$, in the support of the distribution of beliefs ($F(\epsilon)$) such that, conditional on access to credit (i.e., $x_t \geq x^*_t$), those members (traders) with optimistic beliefs (i.e., $\epsilon_t \geq \epsilon^*_t$) buy houses on margin, and the rest agents save.

- The marginal investor, who is indifferent between buying house on margin and saving, has belief $\epsilon^*_t$. We have $\pi(\epsilon^*_t, x_t) = \mu(\epsilon^*_t, x_t) = 0$.

The first-order condition (B.6) implies that perceived return on housing for the marginal agent is given by

$$\eta(\epsilon^*_t, x_t)Q_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{\varphi}_t \epsilon^*_t$$

where the condition that $r_{ht} = \tilde{\varphi}_t y_t$ is used. The first-order condition (B.7) implies that the return on bond holding is given by

$$\eta(\epsilon^*_t, x_t) = \beta R_t E_t \lambda_{t+1}$$

In an equilibrium, the marginal trader is indifferent between the two types of assets: houses and bonds. Thus, the expected return on housing and on bond holdings should be equalized:

$$\beta R_t E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{\varphi}_t \epsilon^*_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (B.8)

- Traders with $\epsilon_t > \epsilon^*_t$ are leveraged investors. We have $\mu_t(\epsilon_t, x_t) = 0$.

The first order conditions imply

$$\eta_t(\epsilon_t, x_t)Q_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{\varphi}_t \epsilon_t + \kappa Q_t \pi_t(\epsilon_t, x_t) \quad \forall \epsilon_t \geq \epsilon^*_t.$$  

and

$$\eta_t(\epsilon_t, x_t) = \beta R_t E_t \lambda_{t+1} + \pi_t(\epsilon_t, x_t) \quad \forall \epsilon_t \geq \epsilon^*_t.$$  

which together implies

$$\pi_t(\epsilon_t, x_t) = \frac{\beta}{1 - \kappa} \left[ \frac{\tilde{\varphi}_t \epsilon_t + E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1}}{Q_t} - R_t E_t \lambda_{t+1} \right], \quad \forall \epsilon_t \geq \epsilon^*_t.$$
and

\[ \eta_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t)Q_t = \beta R_t E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_t + \frac{\beta \bar{\theta}_t}{1 - \kappa_t} (\varepsilon_t - \varepsilon_t^*) \]

\[ = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \bar{\theta}_t \varepsilon_t^* + \frac{\beta \bar{\theta}_t}{1 - \kappa_t} (\varepsilon_t - \varepsilon_t^*) \quad \forall \varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon_t^*. \]

Since \( \frac{b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t)}{R_t} = \kappa Q_t h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t) \), we have \( h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t) = \frac{x_t}{1 - \kappa} \).

- Traders with \( \varepsilon_t < \varepsilon_t^* \) are savers. We have \( \pi_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t) = 0 \).

The first order condition implies

\[ \eta_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t)Q_t = \beta R_t E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \bar{\theta}_t \varepsilon_t^* \quad \forall \varepsilon_t < \varepsilon_t^*. \]

where the second equality uses equation (B.8). Since \( \mu_t(\varepsilon_t) h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t) = 0 \), we have \( h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t) = 0 \).

The optimal portfolio choice for agents without access to credit (i.e., \( x_t < x_t^* \)) can be characterized as follows:

- The marginal investor, who is indifferent between buying house with internal fund and saving, has belief \( \varepsilon_t^{**} \). We have \( \pi(\varepsilon_t^{**}, x_t) = \mu(\varepsilon_t^{**}, x_t) = 0 \).

The first-order condition (B.6) implies that perceived return on housing for the marginal agent is given by

\[ \eta(\varepsilon_t^{**}, x_t)Q_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \bar{\theta}_t \varepsilon_t^{**} \]

where the condition that \( r_{ht} = \bar{\theta}_t y_t \) is used. The first-order condition (B.7) implies that the return on bond holding is given by

\[ \eta(\varepsilon_t^{**}, x_t) = \beta R_t E_t \lambda_{t+1} \]

In an equilibrium, the marginal trader is indifferent between the two types of assets: houses and bonds. Thus, the expected return on housing and on bond holdings should be equalized:

\[ \beta R_t E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \bar{\theta}_t \varepsilon_t^{**} \quad \text{(B.9)} \]

Equation (B.8) and (B.9) imply that \( \varepsilon^* = \varepsilon^{**} \).

- Traders with \( \varepsilon_t > \varepsilon_t^* \) are self-financed investors. We have \( \mu_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t) = 0 \).

The first order conditions imply

\[ \eta_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t)Q_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \bar{\theta}_t \varepsilon_t, \quad \forall \varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon_t^*. \]

and

\[ \eta_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t) = \beta R_t E_t \lambda_{t+1} + \pi_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t), \quad \forall \varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon_t^*. \]
which together implies

$$\pi_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t) = \beta \left[ \tilde{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t + \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} \right] / Q_t, \quad \forall \varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon_t^*. $$

and

$$\eta_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t) Q_t = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_t + \beta \tilde{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t, \quad \forall \varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon_t^*. $$

We have $h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t) = x_t$.

- Traders with $\varepsilon_t < \varepsilon_t^*$ are savers. We have $\pi_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t) = 0$.

The first order condition implies

$$\eta_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t) Q_t = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_t + \beta \tilde{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t^*, \quad \forall \varepsilon_t < \varepsilon_t^*. $$

where the second equality uses equation (B.8). We have $h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t, x_t) = 0$.

The market clearing condition for housing implies

$$\int_{x_t}^{x_t^*} \int_{x_t^*}^{\varepsilon_t} x dF(\varepsilon) dG(x) + \int_{x_t^*}^{x_t} \int_{x_t^*}^{\varepsilon_t} \frac{x}{1 - \kappa} dF(\varepsilon) dG(x) = 1$$

The first order condition with respect to $a_t$, which we rewrite here for convenience of reference

$$\lambda_t = \int \int \eta_t(\varepsilon_t, x_t) dF(\varepsilon_t) dG(x_t)$$

implies a housing Euler equation:

$$\lambda_t Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t^* + \int_{x_t^*}^{x_t} \int_{x_t^*}^{\varepsilon_t} (\varepsilon - \varepsilon_t^*) dF(\varepsilon) dG(x) + \int_{x_t^*}^{x_t} \int_{x_t^*}^{\varepsilon_t} \frac{(\varepsilon - \varepsilon_t^*)}{1 - \kappa} dF(\varepsilon) dG(x) \equiv \xi_t, $$

where $\beta \tilde{\varphi}_t \xi_t$ is a housing demand shifter capturing expectation in heterogeneous valuation of housing service.

**Credit policy.** This section proceeds to investigate the effect of relaxed credit standard, which is captured by a decline in threshold $x_t^*$.

**Proposition B.1.** When credit standard decreases ($x_t^*$ decreases), marginal investor becomes more optimistic. That is,

$$\frac{\partial \varepsilon_t^*}{\partial x_t^*} < 0$$

**Proof.** Denote $\Phi(x_t^*)$ as

$$\Phi(x_t^*) \equiv \int_{x_t^*}^{x_t} x dG(x) + \int_{x_t^*}^{x_t} \frac{x}{1 - \kappa} dG(x)$$
and \( \Phi'(x^*_t) > 0 \) for \( \kappa \in (0, 1) \). Taking derivative with respect to \( x^*_t \) on both sides of the housing market clearing condition, which can be written as

\[
\Phi(x^*_t) = \frac{1}{1 - F(\varepsilon^*_t)}
\]

we obtain

\[
\Phi'(x^*_t) = \frac{1}{[1 - F(\varepsilon^*_t)]^2} f(\varepsilon^*_t) \frac{\partial \varepsilon^*_t}{\partial x^*_t} < 0
\]

Last inequality implies

\[
\frac{\partial \varepsilon^*_t}{\partial x^*_t} < 0
\]

\[\square\]

**Proposition B.2.** A decrease in credit standard \((x^*_t)\) raises the house price \(Q_t\), but has no effect on the rent \(r_{ht}\). That is

\[
\frac{\partial (Q_t)}{\partial x^*_t} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial (r_{ht})}{\partial x^*_t} = 0.
\]

**Proof.** Given \( r_{ht} = \hat{\varphi}_t y_t \), it’s obvious that \( \frac{\partial (r_{ht})}{\partial x^*_t} = 0 \).

We then show \( \frac{\partial Q_t}{\partial x^*_t} < 0 \), which takes two steps. We first prove that

\[
\frac{\partial \xi_t}{\partial \varepsilon^*_t} > 0
\]

Re-write \( \xi_t \) as

\[
\xi_t = \varepsilon^*_t + G(x^*_t) \left[ \int_{\varepsilon^*_t}^{\varepsilon} (\varepsilon - \varepsilon^*_t) dF(\varepsilon) \right] + [1 - G(x^*_t)] \int_{\varepsilon^*_t}^{\varepsilon} \frac{\varepsilon - \varepsilon^*_t}{1 - \kappa} dF(\varepsilon)
\]

Take derivative with respect to \( \varepsilon^*_t \) on both sides, we obtain

\[
\frac{\partial \xi_t}{\partial \varepsilon^*_t} = 1 - \frac{\kappa g(x^*_t)}{1 - \kappa} \frac{\partial x^*_t}{\partial \varepsilon^*_t} \left[ \int_{\varepsilon^*_t}^{\varepsilon} (\varepsilon - \varepsilon^*_t) dF(\varepsilon) \right] + \left[ \frac{1}{1 - \kappa} (1 - G(x^*_t)) - G(x^*_t) \right] [1 - F(\varepsilon^*_t)]
\]

\[
= F(\varepsilon^*_t) - \frac{\kappa g(x^*_t)}{1 - \kappa} \frac{\partial x^*_t}{\partial \varepsilon^*_t} \left[ \int_{\varepsilon^*_t}^{\varepsilon} (\varepsilon - \varepsilon^*_t) dF(\varepsilon) \right] + \left[ \frac{1}{1 - \kappa} (1 - G(x^*_t)) + 1 - G(x^*_t) \right] [1 - F(\varepsilon^*_t)]
\]

\[
> 0
\]

where last inequality uses the condition \( \frac{\partial x^*_t}{\partial \varepsilon^*_t} < 0 \) from previous proposition, which also implies that

\[
\frac{\partial \xi_t}{\partial x^*_t} < 0
\]

Given that \( \frac{\partial Q_t}{\partial \xi_t} > 0 \) and \( \lambda_t \equiv 1/y_t \) is invariant to \( x^*_t \), the housing Euler equation implies that

\[
\frac{\partial Q_t}{\partial x^*_t} < 0
\]

\[\square\]
Appendix C. The heterogeneous-agent model with interest rate shocks

This section extends the baseline model with heterogeneous beliefs to incorporate exogenous variations in the interest rate that captures the effects of monetary policy shocks. We introduce an exogenous wedge between the risk-free interest rate and the mortgage lending rate, and examine the effects of changes in that interest-rate wedge (or credit spread) on the house price, the rent, and the price-rent ratio.

Model environment. The household utility function is the same as that in the baseline model. In the decentralized housing markets, each trader receives a transfer of \( a_t \) units of goods from the family, which is independent of their beliefs. A trader with belief \( \varepsilon_t \) can borrow \( b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) \) at the mortgage interest rate \( R_t \) or save \( s_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) \) at the risk-free interest rate \( r^f_t \). We assume that there is an exogenous wedge between the mortgage rate \( R_t \) and the risk-free rate \( r^f_t \) such that

\[
R_t = \tau_t r^f_t,
\]

where \( \tau_t \geq 1 \) can be interpreted as a mortgage credit spread.\(^{17}\)

The trader finances house purchasing using both the internal funds \( a_t \) and net external debt, subject to the flow-of-funds constraint

\[
Q_t h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) \leq a_t + \frac{b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)}{R_t} - \frac{s_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)}{r^f_t}, \tag{C.1}
\]

Investors are subject to the same borrowing constraint \( \text{(B.3)} \) and short-sale restriction \( \text{(B.4)} \) as in the baseline model. Furthermore, we impose constraints on borrowing and saving, such that

\[
\frac{b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)}{R_t} \geq 0, \tag{C.2}
\]

and

\[
\frac{s_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)}{r^f_t} \geq 0. \tag{C.3}
\]

The household faces the family budget constraint

\[
c_t + r_h s_h + a_t = y_t + (Q_t + r_h) \int h_t(\varepsilon_{t-1}) dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) + \int (s_t(\varepsilon_{t-1}) - b_t(\varepsilon_{t-1})) dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) + T_t \tag{C.4}
\]

where \( T_t \) is lump-sum transfer that balances government’s budget.

\(^{17}\)The wedge between the risk-free rate and the mortgage interest rate can arise from segmented financial markets, as in Garriga et al. (2019).
Denote by $\eta_t(\varepsilon_t)$, $\pi_t(\varepsilon_t)$, $\mu_t(\varepsilon_t)$, $\xi^b_t(\varepsilon_t)$, $\xi^s_t(\varepsilon_t)$, and $\lambda_t$ the Lagrangian multipliers associated with Eq. (C.1)-(C.4), respectively. The first order conditions with respect to $c_t$, $s_{ht}$ and $a_t$ are identical to the baseline model. The first order condition with respect to $h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)$ is

$$\eta_t(\varepsilon_t)Q_t = \beta E_t \left\{ \lambda_{t+1}(Q_{t+1} + r_{ht,t+1}) \frac{\tilde{\varphi}_{t+1}}{\tilde{\varphi}_t} = \varepsilon_t \right\} + \kappa_t Q_t \pi_t(\varepsilon_t) + \mu_t(\varepsilon_t). \quad (C.5)$$

The first order condition with respect to $b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)$ is

$$\eta_t(\varepsilon_t) = \beta R_t E_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} \frac{\tilde{\varphi}_{t+1}}{\tilde{\varphi}_t} = \varepsilon_t \right] + \pi_t(\varepsilon_t) - \xi^b_t(\varepsilon_t) \quad \text{(C.6).}$$

The first order condition with respect to $s_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)$ is

$$\eta_t(\varepsilon_t) = \beta^f R_t E_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} \frac{\tilde{\varphi}_{t+1}}{\tilde{\varphi}_t} = \varepsilon_t \right] + \xi^b_t(\varepsilon_t).$$

A competitive equilibrium is a collection of prices $\{Q_t, R_t, r^f_t, r_{ht}\}$ and allocations $\{c_t, a_t, s_{ht}, h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t), b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t), s_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)\}$, such that

1. Taking the prices as given, the allocations solve the household’s utility maximizing problem.
2. Markets for goods, rental, housing, and credit all clear, so that

$$c_t = y_t,$$

$$s_{ht} = \int h_t(\varepsilon_{t-1}) dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}),$$

$$\int h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) dF(\varepsilon_t) = 1,$$

$$\int \left[ \frac{s_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)}{r^f_t} - \frac{b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t)}{R_t} \right] dF(\varepsilon_t) = 0.$$  

Notice since $\int h_t(\varepsilon_{t-1}) dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) = 1$, we then have $s_{ht} = 1$.

Equilibrium characterization. We now characterize the equilibrium. Identical to the baseline model, the equilibrium rent is a function of income alone, and does not depend on the credit supply conditions $\kappa_t$ or interest rate wedge $\tau_t$.

$$r_{ht} = \tilde{\varphi}^f y_t.$$

We conjecture that there are two cutoff points, $\varepsilon_t^{**}$ and $\varepsilon_t^*$ in the support of the distribution of beliefs ($F(\varepsilon)$) such that those members (traders) with most optimistic beliefs (i.e., $\varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon_t^{**}$) buy houses on margin, those with optimistic beliefs (i.e., $\varepsilon_t \in [\varepsilon_t^{*}, \varepsilon_t^{**})$ self-finance housing purchase, and those with pessimistic beliefs (i.e., $\varepsilon_t < \varepsilon_t^{*}$) sell.
• The marginal (self-financed) investor, who is indifferent between buying house and saving, has belief \( \varepsilon^*_t \). We have \( \pi(\varepsilon^*_t) = \mu(\varepsilon^*_t) = \xi^*(\varepsilon^*_t) = 0 \).

The first-order condition \( \text{[C.5]} \) implies that perceived return on housing for the marginal agent is given by

\[
\eta(\varepsilon^*_t)Q_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{\phi}_t \varepsilon^*_t
\]

where, to obtain the second equality, we have used the condition that \( r_{ht} = \tilde{\phi}_t y_t \). The first-order condition \( \text{[C.6]} \) implies that the return on bond holding is given by

\[
\eta(\varepsilon^*_t) = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1}
\]

In an equilibrium, the marginal trader is indifferent between the two types of assets: houses and bonds. Thus, the expected return on housing and on bond holdings should be equalized:

\[
\beta r^f_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{\phi}_t \varepsilon^*_t
\]

Equation \( \text{[C.7]} \) and equation \( \text{[C.8]} \) together implies

\[
\beta r^f_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} \varepsilon_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} \varepsilon_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{\phi}_t \varepsilon^*_t
\]

Combining last two equations together delivers

\[
\beta r^f_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{\phi}_t \varepsilon^*_t
\]

Equation \( \text{[C.7]} \) and equation \( \text{[C.8]} \) together implies

\[
\beta \tilde{\phi}_t (\varepsilon^{**}_t - \varepsilon^*_t) = \beta (\tau_t - 1) r_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_t
\]

• Traders with \( \varepsilon_t = \varepsilon^{**}_t \) are leveraged investors. We have \( \xi^b_t(\varepsilon_t) = \mu_t(\varepsilon_t) = 0 \).

Their first order conditions with respect to housing and debt imply

\[
\eta_t(\varepsilon^{**}_t)Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{\phi}_t \varepsilon^{**}_t
\]

\[
\eta_t(\varepsilon^{**}_t) = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1}
\]

Combining last two equations together delivers

\[
\beta r^f_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{\phi}_t \varepsilon^{**}_t
\]

Equation \( \text{[C.7]} \) and equation \( \text{[C.8]} \) together implies

\[
\beta \tilde{\phi}_t (\varepsilon^{**}_t - \varepsilon^*_t) = \beta (\tau_t - 1) r_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_t
\]

• Traders with \( \varepsilon_t > \varepsilon^{**}_t \) are leveraged investors. We have \( \xi^b_t(\varepsilon_t) = \mu_t(\varepsilon_t) = 0 \).

The first order conditions imply

\[
\eta_t(\varepsilon_t)Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{\phi}_t \varepsilon_t + \kappa_t Q_t \pi_t(\varepsilon_t)
\]

and

\[
\eta_t(\varepsilon_t) = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} + \pi_t(\varepsilon_t)
\]

which together implies

\[
\pi_t(\varepsilon_t) = \frac{\beta}{1 - \kappa_t} \left[ \frac{\tilde{\phi}_t \varepsilon_t + \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1}}{Q_t} - R_t \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} \right], \quad \forall \varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon^{**}_t.
\]
and
\[
\eta_t(\varepsilon_t)Q_t = \beta R_t E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_t + \frac{\beta \bar{\varphi}_t}{1 - \kappa_t} (\varepsilon_t - \varepsilon_t^{**})
\]
\[
= \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \bar{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t^{**} + \frac{\beta \bar{\varphi}_t}{1 - \kappa_t} (\varepsilon_t - \varepsilon_t^{**}) \quad \forall \varepsilon_t \geq \varepsilon_t^{**}.
\]

Since \( s_t(\varepsilon_t) = 0 \) and \( b_t(\varepsilon_t) = \kappa_t Q_t h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) \), we have \( h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) = \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} \).

- Traders with \( \varepsilon_t \in [\varepsilon_t^*,\varepsilon_t^{**}] \) are self-financed investors. We have \( \pi_t(\varepsilon_t) = \mu_t(\varepsilon_t) = 0 \).

The first order conditions with respect to housing, combined with equation \((C.7)\), implies
\[
\eta_t(\varepsilon_t)Q_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \bar{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t^{**}, \quad \forall \varepsilon_t \in [\varepsilon_t^*,\varepsilon_t^{**}).
\]

Since \( b_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) = s_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) = 0 \), we have \( h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) = 1 \).

- Traders with \( \varepsilon_t < \varepsilon_t^* \) are savers. We have \( \pi_t(\varepsilon_t) = \xi_t^*(\varepsilon_t) = 0 \).

The first order condition implies
\[
\eta_t(\varepsilon_t)Q_t = \beta r_t^f E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \bar{\varphi}_t \varepsilon_t^*, \quad \forall \varepsilon_t < \varepsilon_t^*.
\]

where the second equality uses equation \((C.7)\). Since \( \mu_t(\varepsilon_t) h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) = 0 \), we have \( h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) = 0 \).

The market clearing condition for housing implies
\[
F(\varepsilon_t^{**}) - F(\varepsilon_t^*) + \frac{1 - F(\varepsilon_t^{**})}{1 - \kappa_t} = 1
\]

The first order condition with respect to \( a_t \), which we rewrite here
\[
\lambda_t = \int \eta_t(\varepsilon_t) dF(\varepsilon_t)
\]
implies a housing Euler equation:
\[
\lambda_t Q_t = \beta E_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \bar{\varphi}_t \left[ \varepsilon_t^* F(\varepsilon_t^*) + \int_{\varepsilon_t^*}^{\varepsilon_t^{**}} \varepsilon_t dF(\varepsilon_t) + \int_{\varepsilon_t^{**}}^{\varepsilon_t^{*}} \frac{\varepsilon_t - \varepsilon_t^{**}}{1 - \kappa_t} dF(\varepsilon_t) \right] = \xi_t
\]

where \( \beta \bar{\varphi}_t \xi_t \) is a housing demand shifter capturing expectation in heterogeneous valuation of housing service.
Interest rate shocks. A decline in the interest rate wedge $\tau_t$ reduces the borrowing costs, stimulating aggregate housing demand and therefore increasing the house price. This is formally stated in the next proposition.

Proposition C.1. Following an exogenous reduction in the interest rate wedge $\tau_t$, the marginal investor (who is indifferent between self-financed purchasing and selling) becomes more optimistic, and more investors borrow to finance their purchases. Specifically, we have

$$\frac{\partial (\varepsilon^*_t)}{\partial \tau_t} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial (\varepsilon^{**}_t)}{\partial \tau_t} > 0.$$ 

Proof. Taking derivative with respect to $\tau_t$ on both sides of housing market clearing condition, we obtain

$$f(\varepsilon^*_t) \frac{\partial (\varepsilon^*_t)}{\partial \tau_t} + \frac{\kappa}{1 - \kappa} f(\varepsilon^{**}_t) \frac{\partial (\varepsilon^{**}_t)}{\partial \tau_t} = 0$$

which implies

$$\frac{\partial (\varepsilon^*_t)}{\partial \tau_t} \frac{\partial (\varepsilon^{**}_t)}{\partial \tau_t} < 0$$

Taking derivative with respect to $\tau_t$ on both sides of equation (C.9), we obtain

$$\frac{\partial (\varepsilon^{**}_t)}{\partial \tau_t} - \frac{\partial (\varepsilon^*_t)}{\partial \tau_t} > 0$$

Combining last two inequalities proves the proposition. \hfill \Box

Proposition C.2. An decrease in interest rate wedge $\tau_t$ raises the house price $Q_t$, but has no effect on the rent $r_{ht}$. That is

$$\frac{\partial (Q_t)}{\partial \tau_t} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial (r_{ht})}{\partial \tau_t} = 0.$$ 

Proof. Given $r_{ht} = \tilde{\varphi}_{t} y_{t}$, it’s obvious that $\frac{\partial (r_{ht})}{\partial \tau_t} = 0$.

We then show $\frac{\partial (Q_t)}{\partial \tau_t} < 0$, which takes two steps. Firstly,

$$\frac{\partial (\xi_t)}{\partial \tau_t} = F(\varepsilon^*_t) \frac{\partial \varepsilon^*_t}{\partial \tau_t} - \frac{\kappa}{1 - \kappa} [1 - F(\varepsilon^*_t)] \frac{\partial \varepsilon^{**}_t}{\partial \tau_t}$$

Rewrite the housing market clearing condition as

$$\frac{\kappa}{1 - \kappa} [1 - F(\varepsilon^{**}_t)] = F(\varepsilon^*_t)$$

and we obtain

$$\frac{\partial (\xi_t)}{\partial \tau_t} = F(\varepsilon^*_t) \left[ \frac{\partial \varepsilon^*_t}{\partial \tau_t} - \frac{\partial \varepsilon^{**}_t}{\partial \tau_t} \right] < 0$$
where the last inequality follows previous proposition. Secondly, given that $\frac{\partial (\xi)}{\partial \tau} < 0$ and that $\lambda_t = 1/y_t$ is invariant to $\tau$, the housing Euler equation (C.10) implies

$$\frac{\partial (Q_t)}{\partial \tau} < 0$$

□

APPENDIX D. A HETEROGENEOUS-AGENT MODEL WITH CORRELATED BELIEF

The baseline model assumes that individual $j$’s perceived marginal utility of housing services is independent across time. We now consider a simple extension with serially correlated belief. We will show that allowing serially correlated beliefs does not affect the relation between the credit supply shock and aggregate housing demand, house prices, and rents.

**Model environment.** The household utility function is the same as that in the baseline model. Individual traders’ beliefs about marginal utility of housing services is given by $\tilde{\phi}_{t+1} = \tilde{\phi}_{t} \epsilon_t^j$. Different from the baseline model where the beliefs are i.i.d. across time, the belief $\epsilon_t^j$ now can be serially correlated: with probability $\theta$, $\epsilon_t^j = \epsilon_{t-1}^j$ and with complement probability $1 - \theta$, $\epsilon_t^j = z_t^j$ is i.i.d. drawn from the distribution $F(\cdot)$. Note that $\tilde{F}$ and $F$ need not to be the same. Since the only source of heterogeneity is belief shocks, we can index an individual trader’s house purchases and bond holdings in the decentralized markets by the belief $\epsilon_t$, without the $j$ index.\(^{18}\)

The optimization problem is identical to that in the baseline model.

**Equilibrium characterization.** Given identity in optimization problem, the extended model preserves all lemmas and propositions except for the one related to trading volume. In this section we present these propositions for convenience of reference without showing repeated proof.

**Lemma D.1.** There exists a unique cutoff point $\epsilon_t^* \epsilon_t$ in the support of the distribution $F(\epsilon)$ and it is given by

$$F(\epsilon_t^*) = \kappa_t.$$  

**Proposition D.2.** The equilibrium house price satisfies the aggregate Euler equation

$$\lambda_t Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1} + \beta \tilde{\phi}_t \xi(\kappa_t),$$

\(^{18}\)As long as the family do not know which belief is correct, they will assign the same amount of internal fund to each member.
Proof.

Proposition D.3. If \( \hat{\varphi}_t \xi(\kappa_t) = \varphi_{t+1} \), then the equilibrium house price in the heterogeneous agent model coincides with that in the representative agent model.

Proposition D.4. An increase in the LTV ratio \( \kappa_t \) raises the house price \( Q_t \) but has no effect on the rent \( r_{ht} \). That is,

\[
\frac{\partial Q_t}{\partial \kappa_t} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial r_{ht}}{\partial \kappa_t} = 0.
\]

Since changes in credit conditions (LTV) drive changes in the house price without affecting the rent, the generalized model with correlated shock is able to generate arbitrarily large volatility of the house price relative to that of the rent.

Correlation in perceived value of housing service generates correlation in housing demand, thus implied housing trading volumes will be affected. Finally, the model with correlated heterogeneous beliefs also generates positive correlations between house trading volumes and the house price through changes in credit conditions.

Define the house trading volume as

\[
TV_t \equiv \frac{1}{2} \int \int |h_{t+1}(\varepsilon_t) - h_t(\varepsilon_{t-1})|dF(\varepsilon_t)dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}),
\]

which measures the average number of houses that are either bought or sold from period \( t - 1 \) to period \( t \). Proposition [D.5] below shows that the trading volume is positively correlated with the LTV ratio \( \kappa_t \).

Proposition D.5. The equilibrium house trading volume is given by

\[
TV_t = \theta(1 - \frac{1 - \max\{\kappa_t, \kappa_{t-1}\}}{1 - \min\{\kappa_t, \kappa_{t-1}\}}) + (1 - \theta) \max\{\kappa_t, \kappa_{t-1}\}. \tag{D.1}
\]

Proof.

\[
\begin{align*}
TV_t & = \frac{1}{2} \theta \int_{\varepsilon_t} \int_{\varepsilon_{t-1}} |\frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} - \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_{t-1}}|dF(\varepsilon_{t-1})dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) + \frac{1}{2}(1 - \theta) \int_{\varepsilon_t} \int_{\varepsilon_{t-1}} |\frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} - \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_{t-1}}|dF(z_t)dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) \\
& + \frac{1}{2} \theta \int_{\varepsilon_t} \int_{0}^{\varepsilon_{t-1}} |\frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} - 0|dF(\varepsilon_{t-1})dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) + \frac{1}{2}(1 - \theta) \int_{\varepsilon_t} \int_{0}^{\varepsilon_{t-1}} |\frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} - 0|dF(z_t)dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) \\
& + \frac{1}{2} \theta \int_{0}^{\varepsilon_t} \int_{\varepsilon_{t-1}} |0 - 0|dF(\varepsilon_{t-1})dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) + \frac{1}{2}(1 - \theta) \int_{0}^{\varepsilon_t} \int_{\varepsilon_{t-1}} |0 - 0|dF(z_t)dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) \\
& + \frac{1}{2} \theta \int_{0}^{\varepsilon_t} \int_{0}^{\varepsilon_{t-1}} |0 - \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_{t-1}}|dF(\varepsilon_{t-1})dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) + \frac{1}{2}(1 - \theta) \int_{0}^{\varepsilon_t} \int_{0}^{\varepsilon_{t-1}} |0 - \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_{t-1}}|dF(z_t)dF(\varepsilon_{t-1})
\end{align*}
\]
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\[ = \frac{1}{2} \theta \left\{ \int_{\max\{\varepsilon_t^*, \varepsilon_{t-1}^*\}} \left| \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} - \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_{t-1}} \right| dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) + \int_{\min\{\varepsilon_t^*, \varepsilon_{t-1}^*\}}^{\max\{\varepsilon_t^*, \varepsilon_{t-1}^*\}} \frac{1}{1 - \min\{\kappa_t, \kappa_{t-1}\}} dF(\varepsilon_{t-1}) \right\} \\
+ \frac{1}{2} (1 - \theta) \left\{ |\kappa_t - \kappa_{t-1}| + \kappa_{t-1}(1 - \kappa_t) \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} + \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_{t-1}} (1 - \kappa_{t-1}) \kappa_t \right\} \\
= \theta (1 - \max\{\kappa_t, \kappa_{t-1}\}) + (1 - \theta) \max\{\kappa_t, \kappa_{t-1}\} \]

To illustrate the relation between \( \kappa_t \) and \( TV_t \) in Eq. (D.1), suppose that the economy starts from the steady-state with \( \kappa_{t-1} = \kappa_t = \bar{k} \), where \( \bar{k} \) is the steady-state LTV ratio. The steady-state transaction volume would be \( TV = (1 - \theta)\bar{k} \).

Now, suppose that the LTV increases from the steady state such that \( \kappa_t > \bar{k} \). The transaction volume would then be given by

\[ TV_t = \theta \left( 1 - \frac{1 - \kappa_t}{1 - \bar{k}} \right) + (1 - \theta)\kappa_t > TV = (1 - \theta)\bar{k}. \]

Thus, the transaction volume increases with the LTV ratio.

APPENDIX E. HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS ABOUT FUTURE INCOME GROWTH

We have shown that belief heterogeneity provides a microeconomic foundation for the reduced-form housing demand shock. The benchmark heterogeneous-agent model, unlike the representative-agent model, can generate large fluctuations of the house price relative to the rent. The theoretical insights from the benchmark model do not hinge upon the particular form of belief heterogeneity. In this section, we illustrate this point by studying a model that features heterogeneous beliefs in future income growth.

Model environment. Suppose that aggregate output (i.e., income) grows at the rate \( \frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t} = g_{t+1} \), where \( g_{t+1} \) is a random variable with the i.i.d. distribution \( \tilde{F} \). The household consists of a large number of members, who are ex ante identical. Before entering the decentralized housing markets in the beginning of period \( t \), the members each draw an i.i.d. belief shock about future income growth. In particular, member \( j \) believes that income growth will be \( g_{t+1} = \varepsilon^j_t \), where \( \varepsilon^j_t \) is i.i.d. random variable drawn from the distribution \( F(\cdot) \). Note that \( \tilde{F} \) and \( F \) need not to be the same.\(^{19}\)

\(^{19}\)For simplicity, we focus on the simple model with heterogeneous beliefs about the point realizations of income growth. The model can be generalized to allow belief heterogeneity about the distribution (\( \tilde{F} \)) of income growth. Details are available from the authors upon request.
Under perfect risk sharing, all family members enjoy the same consumption of goods and housing services. The household has the expected utility function

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \log c_t + \varphi s_{ht}^{1-\theta} \right],$$

where, as in the previous model, $c_t$ and $s_{ht}$ denote the consumption of goods and housing services, respectively, $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is a subjective discount factor, $E$ is an expectation operator. We assume that there is no housing preference shock such that $\varphi$ is a constant.

In the beginning of period $t$, all members enjoy the same amount of consumption goods and housing service, and receive a lump-sum transfer of $a_t$ units of consumption goods from the family. The members are then dispersed to decentralized markets to trade houses based on their beliefs $e_t$ about income growth $g_{t+1}$.

In the decentralized housing markets, the member with belief $e_t$ finances house purchases ($Q_t h_{t+1}(e_t)$) with both family transfer $a_t$ and external debt $b_{t+1}(e_t)$, subject to the flow-of-funds constraint

$$Q_t h_{t+1}(e_t) \leq a_t + \frac{b_{t+1}(e_t)}{R_t}, \quad (E.1)$$

and the borrowing constraint

$$\frac{b_{t+1}(e_t)}{R_t} \leq \kappa_t Q_t h_{t+1}(e_t), \quad (E.2)$$

where, as in the benchmark heterogeneous-agent model, the risk-free interest rate $R_t$ and the loan-to-value ratio $\kappa_t$ are common for all borrowers. In addition, the housing purchase must be non-negative, such that

$$h_{t+1}(e_t) \geq 0. \quad (E.3)$$

At the end of the period, all members return to the household family. They receive the amount of consumption goods and housing services. The household faces the family budget constraint

$$c_t + r_h s_{ht} + a_t = y_t + (Q_t + r_h) \int h_t(e_{t-1})dF(e_{t-1}) - \int b_t(e_{t-1})dF(e_{t-1}), \quad (E.4)$$

where $h_t(e_{t-1})$ and $b_t(e_{t-1})$ denotes previous-period house purchase and bond holding of the family member who had idiosyncratic belief shock $e_{t-1}$. In addition to the endowment income $y_t$, the household receives the rental income and resale value of the houses that it carried over from period $t-1$ (i.e., $\int h_t(e_{t-1})dF(e_{t-1})$) at the rental

---

\[20\] As in the benchmark model, the members’ house purchase and bond holding decisions can be fully identified by their beliefs $e_t$ without carrying the $j$ index.
rate $r_{ht}$ and the house price $Q_t$. Using these sources of income net of repayments of the outstanding debt $\int b_t(e) dF(e_{t-1})$, the household finances consumption expenditures on goods and housing rental services, as well as lump-sum transfers $a_t$ to the family members.

Denote by $\eta_t(e_t)$, $\pi_t(e_t)$, $\mu_t(e_t)$, and $\lambda_t$ the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the constraints (E.1), (E.2), (E.3), and (E.4), respectively. The first order condition with respect to $c_t$ is given by

$$\frac{1}{c_t} = \lambda_t.$$ 

The first order condition with respect to $s_{ht}$ implies

$$\lambda_t r_{ht} = \varphi s_{ht}^{\theta}. \quad (E.5)$$

The first order condition with respect to $a_t$ implies

$$\lambda_t = \int \eta_t(e_t) dF(e_t). \quad (E.6)$$

The first order condition with respect to $h_{t+1}(e_t)$ is given by

$$\eta_t(e_t)Q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \lambda_{t+1}(Q_{t+1} + r_{h_{t+1}}) \left| \frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t} = e_t \right\} \right\} + \kappa_t Q_t \pi_t(e_t) + \mu_t(e_t). \quad (E.7)$$

The first order condition with respect to $b_{t+1}(e_t)$ is

$$\eta_t(e_t) = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \lambda_{t+1} \frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t} = e_t \right] + \pi_t(e_t) \quad (E.8)$$

In these first-order conditions, the term $\mathbb{E}_t[\cdot | \frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t} = e_t]$ is the expectation operator for member with belief that $\frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t} = e_t$.

A **competitive equilibrium** is a collection of prices $\{Q_t, R_t, r_{ht}\}$ and allocations $\{c_t, a_t, s_{ht}, h_{t+1}(e_t), b_{t+1}(e_t)\}$, such that

1. Taking the prices as given, the allocations solve the household’s utility maximizing problem.
2. Markets for goods, rental, housing, and credit all clear, so that

$$c_t = y_t,$$

$$s_{ht} = \int h_t(e_{t-1}) dF(e_{t-1}) = 1,$$

$$\int b_{t+1}(e_t) dF(e_t) = 0.$$
**Equilibrium characterization.** We now characterize the equilibrium.

After imposing the market clearing conditions that $c_t = y_t$ and $s_{ht} = 1$, Eq. (E.5) implies that

$$r_{ht} = \varphi y_t. \quad (E.9)$$

Thus, the equilibrium rent is a function of income alone, and does not depend on the credit supply conditions $\kappa_t$.

We conjecture that the equilibrium house price satisfies $Q_t = q(\kappa_t)y_t \equiv q_t y_t$. The price-rent ratio is then given by $Q_t r_{ht} = \varphi y_t$, which is proportional to $q_t$.

We also conjecture that there is a cutoff point $e^* _t$ in the support of the distribution of beliefs ($F(e)$) such that those members (traders) with optimistic beliefs (i.e., $e_t \geq e^* _t$) buy houses and those with pessimistic beliefs (i.e., $e_t < e^* _t$) sell.

The marginal trader with belief $e^* _t$ is a buyer, although the collateral constraint (E.2) is not binding. Thus, we have $\pi(e^* _t) = \mu(e^* _t) = 0$. The first-order condition (E.7) implies that the return on housing for the marginal agent is given by

$$\frac{\eta(e^* _t)}{\lambda_t} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \frac{\lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \left| \frac{y_{t+1}}{yt} = e^* _t \right\} + \frac{\varphi}{Q_t \lambda_t} = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \frac{q_{t+1} + \varphi}{q_t} q_t \right\}. \quad (E.10)$$

where, to obtain the second equality, we have used the conditions that $\lambda_t = \frac{1}{yt}$ and that $Q_t = q_t y_t$ and $r_{ht} = \varphi y_t$.

The marginal trader with belief $e^* _t$ also trade bonds. The first-order condition (E.8) implies that the return on bond holding is given by

$$\frac{\eta(e^* _t)}{\lambda_t} = \beta R_t \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \frac{\lambda_{t+1} Q_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \left| \frac{y_{t+1}}{yt} = e^* _t \right\} = \beta R_t \frac{q_{t+1} + \varphi}{e^* _t}. \quad (E.11)$$

In an equilibrium, the marginal trader is indifferent between the two types of assets: houses and bonds. Thus, the expected return on housing and on bond holdings should be equalized. In particular, from Equations (E.10) and (E.11), we obtain

$$q_t = \frac{e^* _t}{R_t} \mathbb{E}_t[q_{t+1} + \varphi]. \quad (E.12)$$

The term $\frac{e^* _t}{R_t}$ is analogous to the dividend discount model of Gordon (1959). Here, the marginal trader’s belief about future income growth $e^* _t$ can be interpreted as the dividend growth rate in the Gordon model. The difference is that $e^* _t$ is endogenous, and it responds to changes in credit conditions summarized by $\kappa_t$.

Optimistic traders with $e_t \geq e^* _t$ are house buyers who face binding collateral constraints, whereas pessimistic traders with $e_t < e^* _t$ are sellers. As in the baseline model, the equilibrium cutoff point $e^* _t$ in this model increases with the LTV $\kappa_t$. This result is formally stated in the proposition below.
Proposition E.1. The equilibrium cutoff point \( e_t^* \) is given by

\[
F(e_t^*) = \kappa_t, \tag{E.13}
\]

where \( F(\cdot) \) is the cumulative density function of the belief shocks. Clearly, the equilibrium cutoff point \( e_t^* \) is strictly increasing in the LTV \( \kappa_t \). That is,

\[
\frac{\partial e_t^*}{\partial \kappa_t} > 0. \tag{E.14}
\]

Proof. The proof is similar to that in the benchmark heterogeneous-agent model. Pessimistic traders with \( e_t < e_t^* \) are house sellers with \( h_{t+1}(e_t) = 0 \). Optimistic traders with \( e_t \geq e_t^* \) face binding collateral constraints. After imposing the market clearing conditions in the family budget constraint \([E.4]\), the binding collateral constraint \([E.2]\) and the flow-of-funds constraint \([E.1]\) for the optimistic traders imply that \( h_{t+1}(e_t) = \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} \). House market clearing implies that

\[
1 = \int h_{t+1}(e) dF(e) = \int_{e_t^*}^{\infty} \frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} dF(e),
\]

which leads to the solution to \( e_t^* \) in Eq. \((E.13)\). Eq. \((E.14)\) immediately follows from differentiating Eq. \((E.13)\). \( \Box \)

As in the benchmark model, a credit supply expansion that raises \( \kappa_t \) also raises the house price but has no effect on the rent. This result is formally stated in the next proposition.

Proposition E.2. An increase in \( \kappa_t \) raises the house price \( Q_t \) but has no effect on the rent \( r_{ht} \). That is,

\[
\frac{\partial Q_t}{\partial \kappa_t} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial r_{ht}}{\partial \kappa_t} = 0.
\]

Proof. Eq \((E.9)\) shows that \( r_{ht} = \varphi y_t \) is independent of \( \kappa_t \). It remains to show that \( \frac{\partial Q_t}{\partial \kappa_t} > 0 \).

Rewrite Eq. \((E.12)\) here for convenience of referencing:

\[
q_t = \frac{e_t^*}{R_t} \mathbb{E}_t[q_{t+1} + \varphi]. \tag{E.15}
\]

We now consider two cases.

(1) First we consider \( e_t \geq e_t^* \), we have \( \pi_t(e_t) > 0 \), implying that the borrowing constraint \([E.2]\) is binding. Imposing market clearing conditions, we obtain
\( h_{t+1}(e_t) = \frac{1}{1-\kappa_t} > 0 \). Thus, \( \mu_t(e_t) = 0 \). Equations (E.7) and (E.8) together imply that

\[
\pi_t(e_t) = \frac{\beta}{(1 - \kappa_t) \hat{y_t} q_t} \left[ \mathbb{E}_t q_{t+1} + \varphi - R_t \frac{q_t}{e_t} \right], \quad \forall e_t \geq e_t^* 
\]

and

\[
\eta_t(e_t) = \beta R_t \frac{1}{\hat{y_t} e_t} + \frac{\beta}{(1 - \kappa_t) \hat{y_t} q_t} \left[ \mathbb{E}_t q_{t+1} + \varphi - R_t \frac{q_t}{e_t} \right] 
\]

\[
= \beta R_t \frac{1}{\hat{y_t} e_t} + \frac{\beta R_t q_t}{(1 - \kappa_t) \hat{y_t} q_t} \left[ \frac{1}{e_t^*} - \frac{1}{e_t} \right], \quad \forall e_t \geq e_t^* 
\]

where the second line has used the fact \( \beta \mathbb{E}_t q_{t+1} + \varphi = R_t \frac{q_t}{e_t^*} \).

(2) In this case with \( e < e_t^* \), we have \( \pi_t(e_t) = 0 \), such that

\[
\eta_t(e_t) = \beta R_t \frac{1}{\hat{y_t} e_t}, \quad \forall e_t < e_t^* 
\]

and

\[
\mu_t(e_t) = R_t \frac{1}{e_t} q_t - \beta \mathbb{E}_t q_{t+1} + \beta \varphi = R_t q_t \left( \frac{1}{e_t} - \frac{1}{e_t^*} \right) > 0, \quad \forall e_t < e_t^* 
\]

Since \( \mu_t(e_t) h_{t+1}(e_t) = 0 \), we have \( h_{t+1}(e_t) = 0 \).

With the expression of \( \eta_t(e_t) \), we can rewrite equation (E.6) as

\[
1 = \beta R_t \int_{e_{\min}}^{e_{\max}} \frac{1}{e} dF(e) + \frac{\beta R_t}{(1 - \kappa_t)} \int_{e_t^*}^{e_{\max}} \left[ \frac{1}{e_t^*} - \frac{1}{e} \right] dF(e),
\]

Finally housing market clearing condition yields

\[
\frac{1}{1 - \kappa_t} \int_{e_t^*}^{e_{\max}} dF(e) = 1.
\]

We then have

\[
\frac{e_t^*}{R_t} = \beta e_t^* \int \frac{1}{e} dF(e) + \frac{\beta}{(1 - \kappa_t)} \int_{e_t^*}^{e_{\max}} \left[ 1 - \frac{e_t^*}{e} \right] dF(e)
\]

\[
= \beta + \beta e_t^* \left[ \int \frac{1}{e} dF(e) - \frac{1}{1 - F(e_t^*)} \int_{e_t^*}^{e_{\max}} \frac{1}{e} dF(e) \right].
\]

Denote \( \phi(e_t^*) = \frac{1}{1 - F(e_t^*)} \int_{e_t^*}^{e_{\max}} \frac{1}{e} dF(e) \), we have

\[
\frac{\phi'(e_t^*)}{\phi(e_t^*)} = \frac{f(e_t^*)}{1 - F(e_t^*)} - \frac{f(e_t^*)}{\int_{e_t^*}^{e_{\max}} \frac{1}{e} dF(e)} < \frac{f(e_t^*)}{1 - F(e_t^*)} - \frac{f(e_t^*)}{\int_{e_t^*}^{e_{\max}} 1 dF(e)} = \frac{f(e_t^*)}{1 - F(e_t^*)} - \frac{f(e_t^*)}{1 - F(e_t^*)} = 0
\]
Hence we have $\phi'(e^*_t) < 0$. It is then obvious that
\[ \frac{\partial (e^*_t/R_t)}{\partial e^*_t} > 0 \]
Finally, since $F(e^*_t) = \kappa_t$, it is clear that $\frac{\partial (e^*_t)}{\partial \kappa_t} > 0$.

It then follows from Eq. (E.15) that $\frac{\partial q_t}{\partial \kappa_t} > 0$, implying that $\frac{\partial Q_t}{\partial \kappa_t} > 0$ since $Q_t = q_t y_t$.

Following the same logics as in the benchmark model, it is straightforward to show that the house trading volume $TV_t$ in this model is given by
\[ TV_t = \max\{\kappa_t, \kappa_{t-1}\} \]
Thus, the trading volume is an increasing function of the LTV ratio $\kappa_t$ and positively correlated with the house price.