QUANTIFYING THE FORCES LEADING TO THE COLLAPSE OF GDP AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

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Structural and Cyclical Elements in Macroeconomics

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In this setting, the real interest rate is minus the rate of inflation.

Response to shock with standard DMP labor market



Unemployment rate

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Extended DMP model

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The rest of the talk is about the mechanism underlying the negative dependence.

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Equilibration with a Negative Dependence of DMP Unemployment on Inflation



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Thus, to explain the observation that inflation falls when unemployment rises by introducing a dependence of DMP unemployment on the inflation rate, the DMP labor-market curve must be flatter than the product-market curve.

GETTING INFLATION INTO THE WAGE-DETERMINATION FUNCTION

Walsh (2003): Sticky prices result in variations in market power, which enters the DMP model because higher market power lowers the revenue contribution of a worker. GETTING INFLATION INTO THE WAGE-DETERMINATION FUNCTION

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V. Ramey (2010) questions empirical evidence of countercyclical variations in markups.

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No departure from strict rationality.

The U.S. Economy in October 2008 AND October 2009, while at the

ZERO LOWER BOUND



INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT AFTER THE CRISIS



The U.S. Economy in December 2007 and December 2009



$$\beta_P \left(\frac{c_{P,t+1}}{c_{P,t}}\right)^{-1/\sigma} (1+r_t) = 1$$

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$$c_{I,t} = w_{t-1}n_{t-1} - (1+r_{t-1})v_{t-1} - \frac{\rho}{2} \left([v_{t-1} - b_{t-1}]^+ \right)^2 + v_t.$$

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FINANCIAL FRICTION

$$f_t = \frac{1}{q_t} \left[\alpha \frac{y_t}{k_t} + (1 - \delta) q_{t+1} \right] - 1 - r_t.$$

BORROWING BY IMPATIENT HOUSEHOLDS

$$v_t = (1 + r_{t-1})v_{t-1} + \frac{\rho}{2}\left([v_t - b_t]^+\right)^2 - w_{t-1}n_{t-1} + c_{I,t}$$

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$$b_t = v_t - x_t$$

TAYLOR RULE

$$r_{N,t} = [\tau_0 + \tau_\pi \pi_t - \tau_u u_t]^+$$

INVESTMENT/GDP RATIO AND COMPREHENSIVE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, 2005 TO 2022



The Implied Values of the Financial Friction



IMPLIED VALUES OF THE TIGHTENING OF THE BORROWING CONSTRAINT AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL CONSUMPTION



MODEL SOLUTION WITH FINANCIAL FRICTION ONLY



BURDEN OF DELEVERAGING AS A PERCENT OF CONSUMPTION

