### International Transmission of Climate Shocks

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- Climate: global public good
  - Climate change policy: national, sub-national
- Do international linkages exacerbate or mitigate costs of climate change?



- Damages and adaptation
  - Trade
  - Migration
  - Conflict
- Mitigation
  - Trade policy
  - Multinational production
  - Innovation
  - International agreements

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## Damages and Adaptation: Trade (1/3)




Figure 1: Predicted Yield Changes. Percent changes in yield due to climate change in GAEZ model. Gray areas denote regions for which predicted yields are zero both before and after climate change.

Source: Costinot, Donaldson, and Smith (2016)

# Damages and Adaptation: Trade (2/3)

|                               | Exports to U         | nited States      | Exports to "world"      |                  |  |
|-------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|------------------|--|
| Variables                     | 1 digit              | 2 digit           | 1 digit                 | 2 digit          |  |
|                               | (1)                  | (2)               | (3)                     | (4)              |  |
| Temperature (degrees Celsius) | 0.364<br>(0.421)     | 0.114 (0.465)     | -0.356<br>(0.289)       | -0.192 (0.326)   |  |
| Temperature × Poor            | -4.173***<br>(1.272) | -5.812*** (1.409) | $-1.637^{*}$<br>(0.846) | -2.216** (0.942) |  |
| Precipitation (100 mm/year)   | 0.0830               | 0.0141            | -0.0526                 | -0.0878          |  |
|                               | (0.105)              | (0.110)           | (0.103)                 | (0.0882)         |  |
| Precipitation × Poor          | 0.0166               | 0.253             | 0.105                   | 0.415***         |  |
|                               | (0.138)              | (0.195)           | (0.149)                 | (0.152)          |  |
| Observations                  | 19,164               | 63,990            | 31,654                  | 123,956          |  |
| Years                         | 1973-2001            | 1973–2001         | 1963–2000               | 1963-2000        |  |
| Product categories            | 10                   | 66                | 10                      | 70               |  |
| R <sup>2</sup>                | 0.165                | 0.188             | 0.308                   | 0.297            |  |
| Poor effect                   | -3.810***<br>(1.235) | -5.698*** (1.255) | -1.993**<br>(0.833)     | -2.409***        |  |


Notes: Each specification includes country x product fixed effects and product x year fixed effects. Regressions are Feasible Generalized Least Squares. Standard errors are clustered by exporting country.

\*\*\*Significant at the 1 percent level.

\*\* Significant at the 5 percent level.

\*Significant at the 10 percent level.

## Damages and Adaptation: Trade (3/3)



Source: tradingeconomics.com

## Damages and Adaptation: Migration





Figure 6: Gains and losses in amenities and productivities from global warming in the year 2200.

Source: Cruz and Rossi-Hansberg (2022)

## Damages and Adaptation: Conflict

Climate and conflict across spatial scales. Evidence that temperature influences the risk of modern human conflict. (A) local violence in 1° grid cells, (B) civil war in countries, and (C) civil conflict risk in the tropics. The map depicts regions of analysis corresponding to nonparametric watercolor regressions in (A) to (C). The color intensity in (A) to (C) indicates the level of certainty in the regression line.



Source: Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2013)

- Damages and adaptation
  - ► Trade
  - Migration
  - Conflict

#### Mitigation

- Trade policy
- Multinational production
- Innovation
- International agreements

## Mitigation: Trade Policy




FIGURE 3. NUMBER OF PARTICIPATING REGIONS BY INTERNATIONAL TARGET CARBON PRICE AND TARIFF RATE


## Mitigation: Trade Policy

| Country | Non-Cooperative Border Taxes |            |            | Cooperative Carbon Taxes     |            |            |  |  |
|---------|------------------------------|------------|------------|------------------------------|------------|------------|--|--|
|         | $\Delta \operatorname{CO}_2$ | $\Delta V$ | $\Delta W$ | $\Delta \operatorname{CO}_2$ | $\Delta V$ | $\Delta W$ |  |  |
| EU      | 0.7%                         | -1.2%      | -1.3%      | -9.2%                        | 0.0%       | 2.0%       |  |  |
| BRA     | -6.0%                        | -1.3%      | -1.3%      | -70.7%                       | -1.3%      | -0.8%      |  |  |
| CHN     | 3.0%                         | -1.0%      | -1.0%      | -69.3%                       | -1.3%      | -0.9%      |  |  |
| IND     | 1.1%                         | -4.4%      | -4.4%      | -76.0%                       | -2.6%      | -2.1%      |  |  |
| JPN     | 3.4%                         | -0.9%      | -0.9%      | -23.1%                       | -0.2%      | 1.5%       |  |  |
| MEX     | -1.6%                        | -3.2%      | -3.2%      | -79.5%                       | -0.6%      | -0.4%      |  |  |
| USA     | 1.3%                         | -1.7%      | -1.7%      | -48.2%                       | -0.3%      | 0.3%       |  |  |
| Global  | -0.6%                        | -1.7%      | -1.7%      | -61.0%                       | -0.6%      | 0.4%       |  |  |

Source: Farrokhi and Lashkaripour (2022)

## Mitigation: Multinational Production / FDI


Figure 1: Carbon Intensity of Production, by Country



Source: Garcia-Lembergman et al. (2022)

## Mitigation: Multinational Production / FDI

Figure 3: Shares of Trade and Multinational Production in Output, by Broad Sector



Source: Garcia-Lembergman et al. (2022)


## Mitigation: Multinational Production / FDI

| Dependent variable: Firm log CO <sub>2</sub> rate | (1)                    | (2)               | (3)             | (4)              | (5)                   | (6)                   |
|---|------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Home country's log CO <sub>2</sub> rate           | $0.96^{***}$<br>(0.24) | 1.07***<br>(0.22) | 0.56*<br>(0.30) | 0.63**<br>(0.25) | $0.63^{**}$<br>(0.23) | $0.60^{**}$<br>(0.29) |
| Host country's log CO <sub>2</sub> rate           | 0.89***<br>(0.09)      | 0.86*** (0.09)    |                 |                  |                       |                       |
| Firm log revenues                                 |                        |                   |                 |                  |                       | -0.48***<br>(0.08)    |
| Observations                                      | 4,833                  | 4,833             | 4,833           | 4,833            | 4,833                 | 4,833                 |
| R-squared   | 0.05                   | 0.24              | 0.28            | 0.48             | 0.63                  | 0.70                  |
| # host countries                                  | 42                     | 42                | 42              | 42               | 42                    | 42                    |
| # home countries                                  | 32                     | 32                | 32              | 32               | 32                    | 32                    |
| Industry FE                                       | no                     | yes               | no              | yes              |                       |                       |
| Host country FE                                   | no                     | no                | yes             | yes              | -                     |                       |
| Industry x host country FE                        | no                     | no                | no              | no               | yes                   | yes                   |

Table 1: Affiliate's CO<sub>2</sub> Rates Vary by Home Country

Source: Garcia-Lembergman et al. (2022)

## Mitigation: Innovation



## Mitigation: International Agreements

17 Sep 1979 10 Oct 1980 10 Oct 1981 02 Oct 1982 17 Oct 1983 25 Sep 1984 12 Oct 1985 06 Oct 1986 29 Sep 1987 20 Sep 1928 22 Sep 1989 03 Oct 1990 02 Oct 1991 19 Sep 1992 21 Sep 1993 25 Sep 1994 27 Sep 1995 07 Sep 1996 18 Sep 2002 05 Oct 1997 20 Sep 1998 15 Sep 1999 06 Sep 2000 15 Sep 2001 12 Sep 2003 17 Sep 2004 19 Sep 2005 15 Sep 2006 12 Sep 2007 13 Sep 2008 18 Sep 2009 25 Sep 2010 17 Sep 2011 22 Sep 2012 15 Sep 2013 01 Oct 2014 Maximum yearly ozone hole extent Copernicus CECMWF 09 Oct 2015 19 Sep 2016 01 Oct 2017 20 Sep 2018 30 Sep 2011

Fig. 4: Maximum ozone hole extent over the southern hemisphere, from 1979 to 2019

Source: Copernicus Atmosphere Monitoring Service provided by Copernicus Atmosphere Monitoring Service (CAMS), via urlhttps://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/production-and-consumption-of-ozone-3/assessment

- Do national borders mitigate or exacerbate climate change?
  - Both
  - Challenge: constrained optimal policy