


THE PEOPLE VS. THE MARKETS: A PARSIMONIOUS MODEL OF INFLATION EXPECTATIONS

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
*26th of March, 2021
San Francisco Fed conference
on macro and monetary policy*

People disagree about long-run inflation

Within people (Michigan)






Across people (Households - Dealers)



The people versus the markets

Subjective long-run expected inflation risk premium



Parsimonious model of the people

Have forecast v^h of inflation: $\pi = \pi_{t,T}$, fundamental RE is π^e , prior with mean π^*

1. Idiosyncratic noisy signal, match dispersion, average under-reaction (normal)

$$\mathbb{E}^h(\pi^e + e^h | \pi^e) = \pi^e \quad \text{and} \quad \text{Var}(e^h | \pi^e) = \sigma^2$$

2. Overconfidence, match over-reaction to news in the cross-section (linear)

$$\partial v^h / \partial(\pi^e + e^h) = \theta$$

3. Type-specific systematic bias, learning from experience, (linear in group)

$$z_c = c\pi^z$$

4. Infrequent updating across cohorts, endogenous disagreement, exponential

$$\lambda(1 - \lambda)^c$$

Parsimonious model of expectations

- Full model, conditional on (π^*, π^e) ,


follow an EMG distribution $F_t(\cdot)$

- 3 identified parameters, 3 non-zero moments

$$\theta, \sigma^2, \lambda/\pi^z$$

Identification and over-identification

EMG parameters over time



Checks on the model:

1. Both positive always
2. Kurtosis and higher-order moments are zero
3. Adjusted mean

$$\mu_t \equiv Mean_t - StDev_t(0.5Skew_t)^{1/3}$$

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\sum_t \mu_t}{T} = \pi^*$$

2.3% full sample 1.9% since 2010

Traders expectations and actions

- Indexed by i , draw prior v^i from $F(\cdot)$, trade bond that pays 1 and costs q today

$$p(\pi^e | v^i, q) \propto g(q | \pi^e) f(\pi^e | v^i)$$

- Goal is to choose $b^i \in [0, w_i]$ given an sdf $m(\cdot)$

$$\max \int [m(\pi) e^{-\pi} - q] b^i p(\pi^e | v^i, q) d\pi^e$$

- Payoff $y(\pi^e) = E(m(\pi) e^{-\pi} | \pi^e)$, MLRP of $F_t(\cdot)$, marginal trader signal v^* indifferent:

$$\int y(\pi^e) p(\pi^e | v^*, q) d\pi^e = q$$

- Market clearing since only those with low signal buy, B shocks with Beta dist.

$$F(v^* | \pi^e) = B/w \equiv \omega$$

Market prices and the discrepancy

- Property: the threshold v^* is a sufficient statistic for (π^e, ω) . Equilibrium price:

$$q(\pi^e, \omega) = Q(v^*) = \frac{\int y(\pi^e) g(v^* - \pi^e) f(v^* - \pi^e) d\pi^e}{\int g(v^* - \pi^e) f(v^* - \pi^e) d\pi^e}$$

- Monotonic in (π^e, ω) spans real line, so can fit data.
- Parameters: π^* shifts q l-to-l, β informativeness of market prices
- Model justifies a decomposition of the discrepancy



$$\phi_t = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_t^b(\pi_{t,T}) - \mathbb{E}_t^p(\pi_{t,T})}_{\text{disagreement across}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_t^m(\pi_{t,T}) - \mathbb{E}_t^b(\pi_{t,T})}_{\text{disagreement within}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_t^*(\pi_{t,T}) - \mathbb{E}_t^m(\pi_{t,T})}_{\text{risk compensation}}$$

Model's mechanics



Parameters: only two $\pi^* = 2\%$, and $\beta = 2$

Inputs: Five series in introduction.



Outputs: fundamental π^e_t , marginal trader v^* , decomposition of discrepancy



Expected inflation post-2011 and post-2000



Marginal trader and decomposition



Inflation GE: policy, expectations, outcomes

- Solve for expected and actual inflation, given log-linear model

$$\frac{dp_t}{p_t} = \pi_t^e dt + \alpha' dZ_t \quad \phi_t = -\alpha' \alpha + \chi_\pi (\pi_t^e - \pi^*) + \chi_\omega \hat{\omega}_t$$

- Transmission mechanism on natural rate

$$g_t = \ln(\zeta) + i_t^{CB} - \pi_t^e - \delta \phi_t$$

- Monetary policy response

$$di_t^{CB} = -\rho(i_t^{CB} - i^*)dt + \eta \left(\frac{dp_t}{p_t} - \pi^* \right) + \gamma d\phi_t$$

- Natural rate and financial shocks both OU processes.

Predictions

1. Inflation is determinate as long as:

$$\eta/\rho > 1 + \delta\chi_\pi$$

- *Stronger than Taylor condition if higher expectation of inflation lowers discrepancy, lowers real rates, pushes inflation up, need extra tightening for anchoring.*

2. Expected inflation is given by:

$$\pi^e = \pi^* + \frac{(\rho - \kappa_g)(g_t - g^*)}{\eta - \rho(1 + \delta\chi_\pi) + \kappa_g(1 - \chi_\pi(\gamma - \delta))} + \frac{\chi_\omega[\kappa_\omega(\gamma - \delta) + \rho\delta]\hat{\omega}_t}{\eta - \rho(1 + \delta\chi_\pi) + \kappa_\omega(1 - \chi_\pi(\gamma - \delta))}$$

- *Respond more to discrepancy: less volatility from real shocks, more from financial noise*

3. Feedback: if more dovish, more volatile discrepancy, respond more to it

- *May well be that people forecast as well as traders, which is a puzzling fact*

How are expectations of macro variables formed?

1. Parsimonious model of subjective expectations and market prices for business-cycle fluctuations of long-horizon expectations
2. US un-anchoring of inflation expectations, with a drift down 2014-19, revealed by skewness and discrepancy
3. Policy tradeoff in reacting to different measures of expectations, as both financial and fundamental shocks

Application to the Euro-area

