Optimal Policy Rules in HANK

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Inequality & stabilization policy

Does inequality change optimal stabilization policy? If so, how?

- Recently: increased policy interest & fast-growing academic literature.
 E.g.: Bhandari et al. (2021), Acharya et al. (2022), LeGrand et al. (2022), Davila-Schaab (2023), ...
 - a) Transmission: how do instruments affect any given target? (e.g., output & inflation)
 - b) Objectives: desire to dampen distributional effects of business cycle

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 - b) Objectives: desire to dampen distributional effects of business cycle
- This paper: linear-quadratic approximation to HANK model
 - Derive optimal policy rules as forecast target criteria, applicable for all shocks
 - Main benefits of our approach:
 - 1. Separate role of inequality through transmission vs. objectives
 - 2. Sufficient statistics for optimal rules

Main results

- a) Dual mandate $[\mathcal{L} = \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ \lambda_\pi \widehat{\pi}_t^2 + \lambda_y \widehat{y}_t^2 \right\}]$
 - Find same rule as in RANK. Optimal $\{y, \pi\}$ paths are unaffected by inequality.

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 - Our strategy: infer distributional incidence from rich quantitative model.
 - (i) Monetary policy is close to neutral w.r.t. distribution. \Rightarrow Optimal policy close to dual-mandate policy.
 - (ii) Stimulus checks have strong distributional effects.
 - \Rightarrow Complementary to monetary policy.

Model Environment

- We study perfect foresight transitions.
- Optimal stochastic linear-quadratic regulator features certainty equivalence.

Households

Unit continuum of ex-ante identical households $i \in [0, 1]$

- Consumption-savings problem
 - Standard preferences:

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[u(c_{it}) - \nu\left(\ell_{it}\right) \right]$$

• Idiosyncratic earnings—allows for unequal exposure to business cycle:

$$e_{it} = \Phi(\zeta_{it}, \boldsymbol{m}_t, \boldsymbol{e}_t), \quad \int_0^1 e_{it} di = e_t$$

where m_t is an "inequality shock" (= demand shock) & e_t is aggregate labor income

• Budget constraint $[a_{it} \text{ is value of portfolio}]$:

$$c_{it} + [\text{cost of asset purchases}] = a_{it} + (1 - \tau_y + \tau_{e,t})e_{it} + \tau_{x,t}, \quad a_{it} \ge \underline{a}$$

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Labor supply: intermediated by labor unions

Production & wage-setting

• Supply side structure

a) **Production**

 \circ Intermediate goods are produced using capital and labor: $y_{jt} = A k_{jt}^{lpha} \ell_{jt}^{1-lpha}$

- Subject to nominal rigidities. Pay labor & capital, and earn pure profits. A share 1α of profits goes to labor. Hard-wiring constant labor share.
- Aggregate capital is fixed at \bar{k}

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- b) Wage-setting
 - Unions use rep.-agent MRS for wage-setting [= MRS at average, not average MRS]
 - $\circ~$ Assume uniform labor rationing—everyone works the same amount
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 - Inequality does not affect labor supply
- Standard NKPC: $\hat{\pi}_t = \kappa \hat{y}_t + \beta \hat{\pi}_{t+1} + \psi \varepsilon_t$, where ε_t is a cost-push shock.

Assets

- Households can trade **three assets**:
 - 1. Capital
 - 2. Short-term nominal bonds
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- Don't need to model portfolio choice (all assets pay same return for $t=1,2,\cdots$)
- Only need existing date-0 portfolios when asset prices respond to news
 - We will impute these using data on portfolio composition across net worth levels Related to approach in Auclert-Rognlie (2020)

Government & eq'm characterization

- Policymaker sets two policy instruments
 - 1. Short-term nominal rate *i*t
 - 2. Uniform lump-sum transfers $\tau_{x,t}$

Background: taxes/transfers $\tau_{e,t}$ adjust to keep long-term budget balance.

• Perfect-foresight eq'm [notation: boldface = time paths]

Equilibrium

Given paths of shocks $\{m_t, \varepsilon_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and government policy instruments $\{i_t, \tau_{x,t}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, paths of aggregate output and inflation $\{y_t, \pi_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ are part of a linearized equilibrium if and only if

$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}} = \kappa \widehat{\boldsymbol{y}} + \beta \widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}_{+1} + \psi \widehat{\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}}$$

$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\alpha}} = \kappa \widehat{\boldsymbol{y}} + \beta \widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}_{+1} + \psi \widehat{\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}}$$
(NKPC)
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$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\nu}} = \widetilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\boldsymbol{y}}\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}} + \widetilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\pi}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}} + \widetilde{\mathcal{C}}_{i}\widehat{\boldsymbol{i}} + \widetilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\tau}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}_{\boldsymbol{x}} + \mathcal{C}_{m}\widehat{\boldsymbol{m}}$$
(IS*)

Dual Mandate

Dual mandate optimal policy problem

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 - Loss function [exogenously assumed]

$$\mathcal{L}^{DM} \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \left[\lambda_{\pi} \widehat{\pi}_{t}^{2} + \lambda_{y} \widehat{y}_{t}^{2} \right] = \lambda_{\pi} \widehat{\pi}' \mathcal{W} \widehat{\pi} + \lambda_{y} \widehat{y}' \mathcal{W} \widehat{y}$$
(1)
where $\mathcal{W} = \text{diag}(1, \beta, \beta^{2}, \dots)$

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where $\mathcal{W} = \text{diag}(1, \beta, \beta^{2}, \dots)$

• Constraint set [follows from eq'm characterization]

$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}} = \kappa \widehat{\boldsymbol{y}} + \beta \widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}_{+1} + \psi \widehat{\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}}$$

$$(NKPC)$$

$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}} = \widetilde{C}_{y} \widehat{\boldsymbol{y}} + \widetilde{C}_{\pi} \widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}} + \widetilde{C}_{i} \widehat{\boldsymbol{i}} + \widetilde{C}_{x} \widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}_{x} + C_{m} \widehat{\boldsymbol{m}}$$

$$(IS^{*})$$

• FOC for choice of i_t

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}^{DM}}{\partial \widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}} \quad \frac{\partial \widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}}{\partial i_t} \quad + \quad \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}^{DM}}{\partial \widehat{\boldsymbol{y}}} \quad \frac{\partial \widehat{\boldsymbol{y}}}{\partial i_t} = 0$$

• FOC for choice of i_t

$$(\lambda_{\pi}W\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}})' \quad \frac{\partial\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}}{\partial i_t} \quad + \quad (\lambda_yW\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}})' \quad \frac{\partial\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}}}{\partial i_t} = 0$$

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• Same holds at all dates. Transpose and stack equations for all *t*:

$$\Theta_{\pi,i}^{\prime}\lambda_{\pi}W\widehat{\pi}$$
 + $\Theta_{\gamma i}^{\prime}\lambda_{\gamma}W\widehat{y} = 0$

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$$(\lambda_{\pi}W\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}})' \quad \frac{\partial\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}}{\partial i_t} + (\lambda_y W\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}})' \quad \frac{\partial\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}}}{\partial i_t} = 0$$

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$$\Theta_{{m \pi},i}^{\prime}\lambda_{{m \pi}}W\widehat{{m \pi}} \hspace{0.4cm} + \hspace{0.4cm} \Theta_{yi}^{\prime}\lambda_{y}W\widehat{{m y}}=0$$

• Forecast targeting rule: adjust expected policy path so condition above holds.

Optimal policy rule

Proposition

The optimal monetary policy rule for a dual mandate policymaker can be written as the **forecast target criterion**

$$\widehat{\pi}_t + \frac{\lambda_y}{\lambda_\pi \kappa} \left(\widehat{y}_t - \widehat{y}_{t-1} \right) = 0, \quad \forall t = 0, 1, \dots$$
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• Same target criterion as in RANK model

- Inequality does not affect *optimal* $\{y, \pi\}$ paths in response to *any* non-policy shock
- Demand block only matters *residually* for sequence of interest rates needed to achieve the optimal $\{y, \pi\}$ paths?

• Example

Ramsey Problem

Social welfare function

• We consider a social welfare function with Pareto weights

$$\mathcal{V}^{HA} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \int \varphi(\zeta) \left[u(\omega_t(\zeta)c_t) - \nu(\ell_t) \right] d\Gamma(\zeta)$$
(3)

• ζ is the idiosyncratic history of a household, $\varphi(\zeta)$ is a Pareto weight on the utility of households with history ζ , and $\omega_t(\zeta)$ is the time-t consumption share of such households

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- Objective: evaluate (3) to second-order using first-order approximation of eq'm
- Our approach: ensure efficient steady state [as in Woodford (2003)] Formal Discussion
 - Assumptions: production subsidy + back out weights $\varphi(\zeta)$
 - Our SWF will capture cyclical insurance motive, not long-run redistribution

Full Ramsey problem

The problem then fits into linear-quadratic form:

• Loss function: to second order, social welfare function \mathcal{V}^{HA} is proportional to $-\mathcal{L}^{HA}$

$$\mathcal{L}^{HA} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \Big[\lambda_{\pi} \widehat{\pi}_{t}^{2} + \lambda_{y} \widehat{y}_{t}^{2} + \underbrace{\int \lambda_{\omega(\zeta)} \widehat{\omega}_{t}(\zeta)^{2} d\Gamma(\zeta)}_{\text{inequality term}} \Big]$$

$$=\lambda_{\pi}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}'W\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}+\lambda_{y}\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}}'W\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}}+\int\lambda_{\omega(\zeta)}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\omega}}(\zeta)'W\widehat{\boldsymbol{\omega}}(\zeta)d\Gamma(\zeta)$$

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$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}^{HA} &= \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \Big[\lambda_{\pi} \widehat{\pi}_t^2 + \lambda_y \widehat{y}_t^2 + \underbrace{\int \lambda_{\omega(\zeta)} \widehat{\omega}_t(\zeta)^2 d\Gamma(\zeta)}_{\text{inequality term}} \Big] \\ &= \lambda_{\pi} \widehat{\pi}' \mathcal{W} \widehat{\pi} + \lambda_y \widehat{y}' \mathcal{W} \widehat{y} + \int \lambda_{\omega(\zeta)} \widehat{\omega}(\zeta)' \mathcal{W} \widehat{\omega}(\zeta) d\Gamma(\zeta) \end{aligned}$$

• Computation: stabilizing consumption distribution = stabilizing prices

Ramsey Problem Optimal Monetary Policy

Proposition

The optimal monetary policy rule for a Ramsey planner with loss \mathcal{L}^{HA} can be written as the **forecast target criterion**

$$\underbrace{\Theta'_{\pi,i}\lambda_{\pi}W\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}} + \Theta'_{y,i}\lambda_{y}W\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}}}_{dual-mandate\ criterion} + \underbrace{\int \Theta'_{\omega(\zeta),i}\lambda_{\omega(\zeta)}W\widehat{\boldsymbol{\omega}}(\zeta)d\Gamma(\zeta)}_{effects\ of\ instrument\ on\ consumption\ shares} = \mathbf{0}$$

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- So does inequality affect the optimal policy rule?
 - No iff policy does not affect consumption shares ($\Theta_{\omega(\zeta),i} = 0$) [e.g. as in Werning (2015)]
 - Yes in prior work: large distributional effects that can offset effects of business-cycle shocks Bhandari et al. (2021): rate cut offsets distributional effects of cost-push shock.

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- So does inequality affect the optimal policy rule?
 - What do we know about $\Theta_{\omega(\zeta),i}$?
 - \Rightarrow **Our strategy**: use data on household balance sheets to discipline distributional effects.

Key calibration points


1. Income cyclicality: labor income more cyclical for low-income workers

 $e_{it} = \Phi(\zeta_{it}, m_t, e_t)$ calibrated as in Guvenen et al. (2022) Figure

Key calibration points

- 1. Income cyclicality: labor income more cyclical for low-income workers $e_{it} = \Phi(\zeta_{it}, m_t, e_t)$ calibrated as in Guvenen et al. (2022) Figure
- 2. Portfolios: using SCF (2019), map household balance sheets into capital, long-term bond, short-term bond. Table
 - e.g. typical middle-class household is long capital (housing) and short bonds (mortgage)


Consumption effects of monetary policy



Model


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- \Rightarrow find rather small distr. effects

Consumption effects of monetary policy




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
- Simulate expansionary monetary shock,
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- \Rightarrow find rather small distr. effects
- Empirical evidence
 - Holm et al. ('21): U-shaped effect
 - Coibion et al. ('17): progressive effect
 - Chang & Schorfheide ('22): regressive effect




• **Dual mandate**: cut rates to perfectly stabilize aggregate demand and so $\{y, \pi\}$



• Ramsey policy: similar, since monetary policy is ill-suited to offset the distr. incidence \Rightarrow stabilizing consumption at the bottom would imply large overshooting of y and π • Details




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- Joint fiscal-monetary: stimulus checks provide agg. & cross-sectional stabilization
 - $\Rightarrow\,$ monetary policy at the Ramsey optimum barely responds

Stimulus check incidence



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- How does inequality affect optimal stabilization policy?
 - a) Dual mandate
 - Same y & π outcomes
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 - b) Ramsey policy
 - Deviate from dual mandate policy iff monetary policy has substantial distributional effects
 - Our reading of evidence & model: exposure to MP is fairly uniform
 - $\circ~$ Fiscal policy is much better-suited for cyclical insurance

Appendix

Production block

- Unit continuum of unions k, demand ℓ_{ikt} units from household i. Total union labor supply is ℓ_{kt} ≡ ∫₀¹ e_{it}ℓ_{ikt}di.
- Total output is

$$y_t = \left(\int_k \ell_{kt}^{\frac{\varepsilon_t - 1}{\varepsilon_t}} dk\right)^{\frac{\varepsilon_t}{\varepsilon_t - 1}}$$

• The price index of the labor aggregate is

$$w_t = \left(\int w_{kt}^{1-\varepsilon_t} dk\right)^{1/(1-\varepsilon_t)}$$

and demand for labor from union k is

$$\ell_{kt} = \left(\frac{w_{kt}}{w_t}\right)^{-\varepsilon_t} y_t$$

Production block

• Union problem: choose the reset wage w^* and ℓ_{kt} to maximize

$$\sum_{s\geq 0}\beta^{s}\theta^{s}\left[u_{c}(c_{t+s})(1-\tau_{y})\frac{\bar{\varepsilon}\Xi}{(\bar{\varepsilon}-1)(1-\tau_{y})}\frac{w^{*}}{\rho_{t+s}}\ell_{kt}-\nu_{\ell}\left(\ell_{t+s}\right)\ell_{kt}\right]$$

subject to labor demand constraint

 Ξ is subsidy-related steady-state wedge, see loss function proof.

This gives

$$\widehat{\pi}_t = \kappa \widehat{y}_t + \beta \widehat{\pi}_{t+1} + \psi \widehat{\varepsilon}_t$$

where $\kappa \equiv (\phi + \gamma) \frac{(1-\theta)(1-\beta\theta)}{\theta}$, $\phi \equiv \frac{\nu_{\ell\ell}(\bar{\ell})\bar{\ell}}{\nu_{\ell}(\bar{\ell})}$ and $\psi \equiv -\frac{\kappa}{(\phi+\gamma)(\epsilon-1)}$

• Aggregating production gives $y_t = \frac{\ell_t}{d_t}$ where $\ell_t \equiv \int_0^1 \int_0^1 e_{it} \ell_{ikt} di dk$ and d_t captures efficiency losses

Equilibrium characterization

- NKPC is as in original optimality condition. Proof combines all other optimality and market-clearing conditions to get (IS*)
- Consumption-savings problem gives aggregate consumption function. Using output market-clearing, e_{it}w_t ℓ_{it} = e_{it}y_t, we get

$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}} = \mathcal{C}_{y}\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}} + \mathcal{C}_{r}\widehat{\boldsymbol{r}} + \mathcal{C}_{x}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}_{x} + \mathcal{C}_{e}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}_{e} + \mathcal{C}_{m}\widehat{\boldsymbol{m}}$$

Write relationships between asset prices and rates of return as

$$\widehat{r}_0 = r_0(\widehat{\pi}_0, \widehat{y}_0, \widehat{q}_0), \quad \widehat{r}_{+1} = r_{+1}(\widehat{i}, \widehat{\pi}), \quad \widehat{q} = q(\widehat{\pi}_{+1}, \widehat{y}_{+1}, \widehat{r}_{+1})$$

• From the government budget constraint we get

$$\widehat{oldsymbol{ au}}_e = au_e(\widehat{oldsymbol{y}},\widehat{oldsymbol{ au}}_{\scriptscriptstyle X},\widehat{oldsymbol{\pi}},\widehat{oldsymbol{q}})$$

▶ back

Equilibrium characterization

• Plugging the asset pricing and gov't budget relations into the consumption function:

$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}} = \mathcal{C}_{\boldsymbol{y}}\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}} + \mathcal{C}_{\boldsymbol{r}}\widehat{\boldsymbol{r}}(\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}},\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}},\widehat{\boldsymbol{i}}) + \mathcal{C}_{\boldsymbol{x}}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}_{\boldsymbol{x}} + \mathcal{C}_{\boldsymbol{e}}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}_{\boldsymbol{e}}(\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}},\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}},\widehat{\boldsymbol{i}},\widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}_{\boldsymbol{x}}) + \mathcal{C}_{\boldsymbol{m}}\boldsymbol{m}$$

and so

$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}} = \underbrace{\left[\mathcal{C}_{y} + \mathcal{C}_{r}\mathcal{R}_{y} + \mathcal{C}_{e}\mathcal{T}_{y}\right]}_{\widetilde{\mathcal{C}}_{y}}\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}} + \underbrace{\left[\mathcal{C}_{r}\mathcal{R}_{\pi} + \mathcal{C}_{e}\mathcal{T}_{\pi}\right]}_{\widetilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\pi}}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}} + \underbrace{\left[\mathcal{C}_{r}\mathcal{R}_{i} + \mathcal{C}_{e}\mathcal{T}_{i}\right]}_{\widetilde{\mathcal{C}}_{i}}\widehat{\boldsymbol{i}} + \underbrace{\left[\mathcal{C}_{x} + \mathcal{C}_{e}\mathcal{T}_{x}\right]}_{\widetilde{\mathcal{C}}_{x}}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}_{x} + \mathcal{C}_{m}\boldsymbol{m}$$

• This has verified all eq'm relations, giving sufficiency of (NKPC) and (IS*)

Optimal dual mandate rule: proof

• FOCs of optimal policy problem are

$$\begin{split} \lambda_{\pi} \mathcal{W} \widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}} &+ \Pi'_{\pi} \mathcal{W} \boldsymbol{\varphi}_{\pi} - \tilde{\mathcal{C}}'_{\pi} \mathcal{W} \boldsymbol{\varphi}_{y} &= \boldsymbol{0} \\ \lambda_{y} \mathcal{W} \widehat{\boldsymbol{y}} - \Pi'_{y} \mathcal{W} \boldsymbol{\varphi}_{\pi} + (I - \tilde{\mathcal{C}}'_{y}) \mathcal{W} \boldsymbol{\varphi}_{y} &= \boldsymbol{0} \\ - \tilde{\mathcal{C}}'_{i} \mathcal{W} \boldsymbol{\varphi}_{y} &= \boldsymbol{0}, \end{split}$$

• Guess that $\boldsymbol{\varphi}_{y} = \boldsymbol{0}$. Then we get

$$\lambda_{\pi}\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}} + \lambda_{y}W^{-1}\Pi_{\pi}'(\Pi_{y}')^{-1}W\widehat{\boldsymbol{y}} = \boldsymbol{0}$$

which can re-written to give the stated relation

Remains to verify the guess that φ_y = 0

Optimal dual mandate rule: proof

- Consider some arbitrary $(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{\varepsilon})$, and let $(\hat{\boldsymbol{y}}^*, \hat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}^*)$ denote the solution of the system (NKPC) + dual mandate rule given $(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{\varepsilon})$
- Plugging into the consumption function:

$$\underbrace{\widetilde{\boldsymbol{y}}^{*} - \widetilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\boldsymbol{y}} \widehat{\boldsymbol{y}}^{*} - \widetilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\pi} \widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}}^{*} - \mathcal{C}_{m} \boldsymbol{m}}_{\text{demand target}} = \widetilde{\mathcal{C}}_{i} \widehat{\boldsymbol{i}}$$

• Remains to show that we can find \hat{i}^* such that this relation holds

Optimal dual mandate rule: proof

• Supply term has NPV

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+\bar{r}}\right)^t \bar{y} \hat{y}_t$$

Aggregating household budget constraints we get that

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+\bar{r}}\right)^t \bar{c}\hat{c}_t = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+\bar{r}}\right)^t \left\{ (1+\bar{r})\bar{a}\hat{r}_t + (1-\tau_y)\bar{y}\hat{y}_t + \bar{\tau}_x\hat{\tau}_{xt} + \bar{\tau}_e\hat{\tau}_{et} \right\}$$

Doing the same for the gov't budget constraint:

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\frac{1}{1+\bar{r}}\right)^t \left\{ (1+\bar{r})\bar{a}\hat{r}_t + \bar{\tau}_x\hat{\tau}_{xt} + \bar{\tau}_e\hat{\tau}_{et} \right\} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \tau_y \bar{y}\hat{y}_t$$

 Thus the two have the same NPV. Then the stated condition is sufficient to ensure implementability.

Ramsey loss function

Proposition

To second order, the social welfare function (3) is proportional to $-\mathcal{L}^{HA}$, given as

$$\mathcal{L}^{HA} \equiv \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \left[\widehat{\pi}_{t}^{2} + \frac{\kappa}{\bar{\varepsilon}} \widehat{y}_{t}^{2} + \frac{\kappa \gamma}{(\gamma + \phi)\bar{\varepsilon}} \int \frac{\widehat{\omega}_{t}(\zeta)^{2}}{\bar{\omega}(\zeta)} d\Gamma(\zeta) \right]$$
(4)

where $\widehat{\omega}_t(\zeta) = \omega_t(\zeta) - \overline{\omega}(\zeta)$ and $\overline{\omega}(\zeta)$ is the steady-state consumption share of an individual with history ζ .

Write planner per-period utility flow as

$$U_{t} = \int \varphi(\zeta) \frac{\left(\bar{c}e^{\hat{c}_{t}}\omega_{t}(\zeta)\right)^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma} d\Gamma(\zeta) - \nu\left(\bar{\ell}e^{\hat{\ell}_{t}}\right)$$
(5)

- Objective: find 2nd-order approximation to Ut that depends only on 2nd-order terms
- Preliminary definitions

• Steady state needs to equalize marginal utility of consumption across histories:

$$\varphi(\zeta)\bar{c}^{1-\gamma}\bar{\omega}(\zeta)^{-\gamma}=\bar{u}_c\bar{c}\qquad\forall\zeta$$

 $\circ~$ Imposing that consumption shares integrate to 1 yields

$$\int \varphi(\zeta)^{1/\gamma} d\Gamma(\zeta) = \bar{c} \bar{u}_c^{1/\gamma}$$

- Preliminary definitions
 - $\circ~$ Can recover consumption shares as a function of planner weights:

$$ar{\omega}(\zeta) = rac{arphi(\zeta)^{1/\gamma}}{\int arphi(\zeta)^{1/\gamma} d\Gamma(\zeta)} \qquad orall \zeta$$

 $\circ~$ For future reference define

$$\equiv \equiv \left(\int \varphi(\zeta)^{1/\gamma} d\Gamma(\zeta)\right)^{\gamma} = \varphi(\zeta) \bar{\omega}(\zeta)^{-\gamma} \qquad \forall \zeta$$

- Now can begin with first-order terms:
 - \circ For c_t we get

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial \hat{c}_t} = \int \varphi(\zeta) (\bar{c}\bar{\omega}(\zeta))^{1-\gamma} d\Gamma(\zeta)$$
$$= \bar{c}^{1-\gamma} \Xi$$

- Now can begin with first-order terms:
 - For ℓ_t we have

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial \hat{\ell}_t} = -\nu_\ell(\bar{\ell})\bar{\ell}.$$

Set union subsidy so that $\Xi \bar{c}^{-\gamma} = \nu_\ell$

 \circ For consumption shares $\omega_t(\zeta)$ we have

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial \omega_t(\zeta)} = \varphi(\zeta) \bar{c}^{1-\gamma} \bar{\omega}(\zeta)^{-\gamma} d\Gamma(\zeta)$$
$$= \bar{c}^{1-\gamma} \Xi d\Gamma(\zeta)$$

- Next consider second-order terms:
 - $\circ~$ For level & split of consumption we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial^2 U_t}{\partial \hat{c}_t^2} &= (1 - \gamma) \Xi \bar{c}^{1 - \gamma} \\ \frac{\partial U_t}{\partial \omega_t(\zeta)^2} &= -\gamma \bar{c}^{1 - \gamma} \frac{\Xi}{\bar{\omega}(\zeta)} d\Gamma(\zeta) \\ \frac{\partial^2 U_t}{\partial \hat{c}_t \partial \omega_t(\zeta)} &= (1 - \gamma) \Xi \bar{c}^{1 - \gamma} d\Gamma(\zeta) \end{aligned}$$

 $\circ~$ For hours worked we have

$$\frac{\partial^2 U}{\partial \hat{\ell}_t^2} = -\nu_{\ell\ell}(\bar{\ell})\bar{\ell}^2 - \nu_{\ell}(\bar{\ell})\bar{\ell}$$

• We can now put everything together:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{U}_t &\approx \quad \bar{\mathcal{U}} + \bar{c}^{1-\gamma} \equiv \widehat{c}_t - \nu_{\ell}(\bar{\ell}) \bar{\ell} \widehat{\ell}_t \\ &+ \frac{1}{2} (1-\gamma) \equiv \bar{c}^{1-\gamma} \widehat{c}_t^2 - \frac{1}{2} \left[\nu_{\ell\ell}(\bar{\ell}) \bar{\ell}^2 + \nu_{\ell}(\bar{\ell}) \bar{\ell} \right] \widehat{\ell}_t^2 - \frac{1}{2} \gamma \bar{c}^{1-\gamma} \equiv \int \frac{\widehat{\omega}(\zeta)^2}{\bar{\omega}(\zeta)} d\Gamma(\zeta) \\ &+ \bar{c}^{1-\gamma} \equiv \int \widehat{\omega}_t(\zeta) d\Gamma(\zeta) + (1-\gamma) \bar{c}^{1-\gamma} \equiv \widehat{c}_t \int \widehat{\omega}_t(\zeta) d\Gamma(\zeta) \end{aligned}$$

Terms in last row are zero.

• Can now write this as

$$U_{t} \approx \bar{U} + \bar{c}^{1-\gamma} \Xi \hat{c}_{t} - \nu_{\ell}(\bar{\ell}) \bar{\ell} \left(\hat{c}_{t} + \hat{d}_{t} \right) \\ + \frac{1}{2} (1-\gamma) \Xi \bar{c}^{1-\gamma} \hat{c}_{t}^{2} - \frac{1}{2} (\phi+1) \nu_{\ell}(\bar{\ell}) \bar{\ell} (\hat{c}_{t} + \hat{d}_{t})^{2} - \frac{1}{2} \gamma \bar{c}^{1-\gamma} \Xi \int \frac{\hat{\omega}(\zeta)^{2}}{\bar{\omega}(\zeta)} d\Gamma(\zeta)$$

• Set union subsidy so that the \widehat{c}_t terms cancel. We thus have

$$U_t \approx \bar{U} - \nu_{\ell}(\bar{\ell})\bar{\ell}\hat{d}_t - \frac{1}{2}\nu_{\ell}(\bar{\ell})\bar{\ell}(\gamma + \phi)\hat{y}_t^2 - \frac{1}{2}\gamma\nu_{\ell}(\bar{\ell})\bar{\ell}\int \frac{\widehat{\omega}(\zeta)^2}{\bar{\omega}(\zeta)}d\Gamma(\zeta)$$

 Finally follow standard steps to express d_t in terms of the history of inflation. After standard steps we get

$$\begin{split} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} U_{t} &\approx -\nu_{\ell}(\bar{\ell}) \bar{\ell} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \left[\frac{\theta \bar{\varepsilon}}{2(1-\theta)(1-\beta\theta)} \widehat{\pi}_{t}^{2} + \frac{1}{2} \left(\gamma + \phi\right) \widehat{y}_{t}^{2} + \frac{\gamma}{2} \int \frac{\widehat{\omega}(\zeta)^{2}}{\bar{\omega}(\zeta)} d\Gamma(\zeta) \right] \\ &= -\frac{\nu_{\ell}(\bar{\ell}) \bar{\ell} \theta \bar{\varepsilon}}{2(1-\theta)(1-\beta\theta)} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \left[\widehat{\pi}_{t}^{2} + \frac{\kappa}{\bar{\varepsilon}} \widehat{y}_{t}^{2} + \frac{\kappa\gamma}{(\gamma + \phi) \bar{\varepsilon}} \int \frac{\widehat{\omega}(\zeta^{t})^{2}}{\bar{\omega}(\zeta^{t})} d\Gamma(\zeta^{t}) \right], \end{split}$$

Getting the Ω 's: computational details

- Idea: can obtain fluctuations in consumption shares as a function of fluctuations in a small number of inputs to the consumption-savings problem
- Formally, let x ≡ (r', y', τ'_x, τ'_e, m')' be the stacked sequences of inputs to the household problem. Then can show that there is symmetric matrix Q such that

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \int \frac{\widehat{\omega}_t(\zeta, \mathbf{x})^2}{\overline{\omega}(\zeta)} d\Gamma(\zeta) = \widehat{\mathbf{x}}' Q \widehat{\mathbf{x}} + \mathcal{O}(||\widehat{\mathbf{x}}||^3)$$

• Key step is to show that $\widehat{\omega}_t(\zeta, \mathbf{x}) \approx \Omega_t(\zeta) \widehat{\mathbf{x}}$ which yields

$$\frac{\widehat{\omega}_t(\zeta^t, \boldsymbol{x})^2}{\overline{\omega}(\zeta^t)} = \widehat{\boldsymbol{x}}' \underbrace{\frac{\Omega_t(\zeta^t)'\Omega_t(\zeta^t)}{\overline{\omega}(\zeta^t)}}_{\equiv Q_t(\zeta^t)} \widehat{\boldsymbol{x}} + \mathcal{O}(||\widehat{\boldsymbol{x}}||^3)$$

and so

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \int \frac{\widehat{\omega}_{t}(\zeta^{t}, \mathbf{x})^{2}}{\overline{\omega}(\zeta^{t})} d\Gamma(\zeta^{t}) = \widehat{\mathbf{x}}' \underbrace{\left(\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} \int Q_{t}(\zeta^{t}) d\Gamma(\zeta^{t})\right)}_{15 \qquad \equiv Q} \widehat{\mathbf{x}} + \mathcal{O}(||\widehat{\mathbf{x}}||^{3})$$

Getting the Ω 's: computational details

- We obtain $\Omega_t(\zeta)$ using sequence-space methods + simulation [see paper for details]
- Given Q, we have a finite-dimensional but non-diagonal LQ problem
 - $\circ~$ The objective function can be written as

$$\mathcal{L} \equiv \frac{1}{2} \mathbf{x}' P \mathbf{x},$$

 $\circ~$ We then get the FOC

$$\Theta'_{xz} P \mathbf{x} = 0$$

and the corresponding optimal instrument path

$$\boldsymbol{z}^{*} \equiv -\left(\Theta_{x,z}^{\prime} P \Theta_{x,z}\right)^{-1} \times \left(\Theta_{x,z}^{\prime} P \Theta_{x,\varepsilon} \cdot \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}\right)$$

More on model calibration


γ	CRRA	1.2
ϕ	Frisch elasticity	1
β	Discount factor	0.984
κ	Phillips curve slope	0.022
α	Capital share	36%
δ	Depreciation rate	1%
<u>a</u> /y	Borrowing limit	-0.27
δ	Bond duration	0.025
$ar{ au}_{\scriptscriptstyle X}$	Steady state transfer	$0.17 \times GDP$

Income and wealth distribution


	Wealth		Inc	Income		
	Data	Model	Data	Model		
Top 1%	37	27	17	20		
Top 5%	65	66	32	32		
Top 10%	76	82	43	44		
Top 25%	91	96	64	60		
Top 50%	99	101	84	77		

Table: Shares (%) of wealth and income concentrated in the top x% of the distribution. Data are from the 2019 Survey of Consumer Finance.

Factor structure of Volcker recession



Factor structure of Volcker recession




Household portfolios

		Holdings by net worth group			
Category	Total	Тор 1%	Next 9%	Ne×t 40%	Bottom 50%
Real estate and durables	167	24	48	72	23
Equity and mutual funds	191	101	66	23	2
Currency, deposits, and similar	60	16	23	19	2
Govt. and corp. bonds and similar	29	10	11	7	1
Pension assets	131	6	63	58	4
Mortgage liabilities	49	2	12	24	11
Consumer credit and loans	24	1	2	8	12
Net worth excluding pension assets	374	147	135	89	4
Capital	419	157	135	101	25
Short-term bonds	-12	1	7	-3	-16
Long-term bonds	-33	-11	-8	-9	-5
Total	374	147	135	89	4


Calibration of household portfolios

• Household portfolios

- $\circ~$ We classify SCF assets and liabilities into bundles of capital, short-term bonds, and long-term bonds
 - 1 = 1.32 capital 0.20 long-term bonds 0.12 short-term bonds
 - \$1 mortgage balance = -0.50 long-term bonds -0.50 short-term bonds
 - 1 consumer credit = -1 short-term bonds
 - 1 currency or deposits = 1 short-term bonds
- $\circ~$ We then impute portfolio for households in our model as a function of their net worth
- These portfolio positions will matter at date 0, through revaluation effects
- Pension assets
 - $\circ~$ We treat pensions as part of the government
 - $\circ~$ Returns earned on these assets are then paid out slowly through taxes




Quantitative illustration: supply shock



• { y, π } paths agree exactly. What about interest rates?

Quantitative illustration: supply shock



- {*y*, π } paths agree exactly. What about **interest rates**?
 - Could in principle disagree substantially. But we have emp. evidence on $i \rightarrow \{y, \pi\}$
 - Limiting th'm [McKay-Wolf]: optimal *i* path can in principle be fully characterized using empirical evidence on the propagation of monetary policy shocks