Virtual Seminar on Climate Economics

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CLIMATE LINKERS: RATIONALE AND PRICING

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VSCE

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Motivation

• We make a case for the emergence of a novel class of financial instruments indexed to climate-related variables (sea levels, temperatures, carbon concentrations).

• Climate Linkers...

... would not directly contribute to the fight against climate risks (i.e. \neq green bonds);

... would provide, by construction, hedging against long-term global temperatures, carbon concentrations, or sea levels.



Contributions

- 1. We discuss the advantages of financial instruments (swaps, bonds, options) indexed to secular climate changes.
- We develop a modeling framework that allows for the fast pricing of these long-term instruments (= tractable Integrated Assessment Model, IAM).
 Tractability ⇒ possibility to look for parametrizations making the
 - model consistent with recent climate science.
- 3. We explore the pricing of Climate Linkers (CL) and study the *climate risk premiums* (= insurance premiums) they would embed.





Temperature Indexed Bond (TIB)

Debt instrument whose payoff at maturity (t + h) is indexed to a given measure of temperature (or carbon concentration, or sea levels). Specifically:

 $1 + \chi [T_{t+h} - \mathbb{E}_t(T_{t+h})], \qquad (\chi \text{ is a "leverage factor"})$

Note: the payoff expectation is equal to 1.

Rationale behind Climate Linkers (CL)

Demand

- Growing demand for (re)insurance against weather-related disasters Alternative Risk Transfer solutions (insurance-linked securities, CAT bonds). But only specific areas and short maturities (for which climate is predictable).
- CL address long-term and global risks (e.g., index. to temperature in 2100).
- CL ≠ Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) fixed-income products, whose final payoffs are not indexed to climate.

Supply

- Temperature-Indexed Bonds: Widening of governments' investor basis.
- Increase in govts' exposure to climate risk. However:
 - 2nd-order compared to potential direct effect on public finances.
 - Consistent with role of "insurer of last resort" of govts (Bruggeman et al., 2010).
- Private issuance of TIBs: Natural issuers (Asset-Liability Management) = firms whose activity relates to climate-risk mitigation (e.g., renewable-energy producers).

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Rationale behind Climate Linkers (CL): Information (1/2)

Informational content

- CL prices would make market participants reveal their expectations regarding future climate (akin to break-even inflation rates).
- Information captured in real-time, at high frequency.
- Extraction of expected trajectories of future temperatures from market quotes of temperature-indexed swaps or bonds (as done with inflation-linked bonds, Campbell and Shiller, 1996). private under-supply
- In particular: natural way to gauge the perceived credibility and effectiveness of international commitments regarding the climate.
- Observed prices would help inform the computation of key economic variables:
 - Social Cost of Carbon (Weitzman, 2013; Nordhaus, 2017; van den Bremer and van der Ploeg, 2021);
 - Long-Term Discount Rates, and Climate Betas (Bauer and Rudebusch, 2021; Dietz et al., 2018; Gollier, 2021; Giglio et al., 2021);
 - Climate-Value-at-Risks (Dietz et al., 2016).

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Rationale behind Climate Linkers (CL): Information (2/2)





Rationale behind Climate Linkers (CL): Information (2/2)



Model

- Joint dynamics of climate and economy: Integrated Assessment Model. Early IAM: Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy model (DICE) of Nordhaus (1992).
- Stochastic IAMs: Jensen and Traeger (2014); Bansal et al. (2016); Cai and Lontzek (2019).
- In spite of progress in terms of numerical solution methods (Daniel et al., 2019; Barnett et al., 2020; van den Bremer and van der Ploeg, 2021), no "instant results" to solve IAMs with stochastic disasters.

 \Rightarrow Challenging to look for model parametrizations that reproduce certain targets (moments).

• The approach in a nutshell:

Make the model conditionally affine (also done by Traeger, 2021).

NB: Different from linearization around a steady sate (large uncertainty).

 \Rightarrow Closed-form solutions for conditional moments (and distributions).















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Stochastic Affine IAM Model: Main ingredients

• Production function:

$$Y_t = A_t K_t$$
, with $A_t = \bar{A} + \sigma_A \eta_{A,t}$,

• Capital dynamics (Gomes et al., 2019; Miller et al., 2020):

Planned capital
$$K_t^* = (1 - dep)K_{t-1} + Inv_t$$
,
Effective capital $K_t = \exp(-D_t)K_t^*$,

where $D_t = 0$ (no disaster), or $D_t > 0$ (disaster).

Budget constraint:

$$Y_t = C_t + Inv_t + \Psi_t,$$

where Ψ_t is investment in mitigation technologies.

• Disaster shocks are more likely when temperature is higher:

$$D_t \sim \gamma_0(\ell_{D,0} + \ell_{D,1}T_{AT,t-1}, \mu_D),$$

 γ_0 distri \approx Poisson with random jumps (Monfort et al., 2017). In particular:

 $\mathbb{P}_{t-1}(D_t > 0) \approx \ell_{D,0} + \ell_{D,1} T_{AT,t-1}. \bullet \text{ details}$

Mitigation

• Investment in mitigation technologies:

$$\Psi_t = \mu_t^{\theta_2} B C_t Y_t$$

 μ_t : mitigation (or emission control) rate; BC_t exogen. \searrow over time.

• Agents dynamically decide on C_t/Inv_t , but decide on future μ_t s on date t = 0. Parametric trajectory: Chart

$$\boldsymbol{\mu_t} = \min\left[\exp\left(-\theta_a + \theta_b \times t\right); 1\right].$$

• Up to mitigation $(1 - \mu_t)$, industrial emissions grow as planned capital:

$$\mathcal{E}_{Ind,t} = (1 - \boldsymbol{\mu}_t) \exp\left[\sum_{i=1}^t (\mu_{k,i} + \sigma_{k,i} \eta_{A,i})\right],$$

proxied by [using $\exp(\mu+\sigma\varepsilon)\approx\exp(\mu+\sigma^2/2)(1+\sigma\varepsilon)]$:

$$\mathcal{E}_{Ind,t} = (1 - \boldsymbol{\mu_t}) \exp\left[\sum_{i=1}^t \left(\mu_{k,i} + \frac{\sigma_{k,i}^2}{2}\right)\right] \left[1 + \sum_{i=1}^t \sigma_{k,i} \eta_{A,i}\right].$$

Climate block (1/2)

• Atmospheric temperature depends on radiative forcings:

$$T_{AT,t} = T_{AT,t-1} + \xi_1 \left(F_t - \frac{\tau}{\nu} T_{AT,t-1} - \xi_2 \left[T_{AT,t-1} - T_{LO,t-1} \right] \right).$$

Radiative forcings depend on atmospheric carbon concentration: Linearization

$$F_t = \tau \log_2(m_0) + \frac{\tau}{\log(2)m_0} \left(\frac{M_{AT,t}}{M_{PI}} - m_0\right) + F_{EX,t} + \sigma_f \eta_{f,t}.$$

Carbon concentrations flow between reservoirs (AT, atmosphere, LO, lower ocean, UP, upper ocean), and depend on emissions (*E_t*):

$$M_{t} = \begin{bmatrix} M_{AT,t} \\ M_{UP,t} \\ M_{LO,t} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \bullet & \bullet & 0 \\ \bullet & \bullet & \bullet \\ 0 & \bullet & \bullet \end{bmatrix} M_{t-1} + \frac{\Delta t}{3.666} \begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{E}_{t-1} \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

$$\mathsf{M}_{\mathsf{L}} = \mathsf{M}_{\mathsf{L}} \mathsf$$

Climate block (2/2)

• Positive feedback loop:

s on FL

$$\begin{array}{cccccccc} \mathcal{E}_t & \to & M_t & \to & T_t \\ & \nwarrow & & \swarrow & \\ & & & N_t & \end{array}$$

• More precisely:

$$\mathcal{E}_t = \mathcal{E}_{Ind,t} + \mathcal{E}_{Land,t} + N_t.$$

• The higher the temperature, the more likely feedback effects:

$$N_t \sim \gamma_0(\rho_N N_{t-1} + \ell_{0,N} + \ell_{1,N} T_{AT,t-1}, \mu_N).$$
(1)

 If one of these loops is triggered, the probability of triggering the next one jumps ⇒ "tipping point" mechanisms (Lemoine and Traeger, 2016; Steffen et al., 2018; Dietz et al., 2020).

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IAM extension: Sea level rise (SLR)

- One of the most critical climate change's dangers (e.g., Hauer et al., 2016; Desmet et al., 2021).
- Relationship between temperatures and sea level: Rahmstorf (2007), Rahmstorf (2010), Kopp et al. (2016), and Mengel et al. (2018).
- Two principal channels of SLR: (a) melting of ice sheets, (b) the volume of the ocean is expanding as the water warms.
- "Semi-empirical" models: dynamic response of SLR to temperatures.
- Specification from Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009):

$$H_{t} = H_{t-1} + \Delta t \times a_{SAT}(T_{AT,t} - T_{0,S}) + b_{SAT}\Delta T_{AT,t},$$
(2)

where H_t measures global mean sea level, and $T_{0,S}$ is the average atmospheric temperature for the period from 1951 to 1980.



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Stochastic Affine IAM Model: Solution

- Repr. agent with Epstein-Zin preferences (unit EIS, risk aversion $\gamma > 1$).
- Simple solution. Resulting consumption growth process:

$$\Delta c_t = \mu_{c,t} + \sigma_{c,t} \eta_{A,t} - D_t,$$

where $\mu_{c,t}$ and $\sigma_{c,t}$ are deterministic functions of time.

Dynamics of the state vector X_t (macro + climate variables)

Stochastic affine dynamics around a deterministic trend. Laplace transform:

$$\mathbb{E}_t[\exp(u'X_{t+1})] = \exp(a_t(u) + b_t(u)'X_t),$$

where a_t and b_t are available in closed form.

 \Rightarrow Tractability of the model.

In particular, simple derivation of conditional distributions, at any horizon (based on Fourier transforms, as in, e.g., Duffie et al., 2000).

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Calibration

- Calibration approach exploits the tractability of the model.
- Closed-form solutions to:
 - utility and Stochastic Discount Factor (s.d.f., $M_{t,t+1}$);
 - $\bullet\,$ first- and second-order (un/conditional) moments of state variables.

Moment	Target	Model-implied	Source	
$\mathbb{E}(T_{AT,2100})$	3.50° C	3.34° C	RCP4.5+RCP6.0	
$Std(T_{AT,2100})$	$0.25^{\circ}C$	$0.34^{\circ}C$	RCP4.5+RCP6.0	
$\mathbb{E}(contribution \text{ of FL to GMST})$	$0.25^{\circ}C$	$0.27^{\circ}C$	Burke et al. (2012)	
$\mathbb{E}($ increase in Cum_E due to FL $)$	188 GtCO $_2$	190GtCO_2	Burke et al. (2012)	
Slope of Cum_D on GMST	-0.12	-0.12	Burke et al. (2015)	
Long-term rate target	1.00%	0.99%	US Treasury	
$\mathbb{E}(H_{2100})$	0.45 m	0.53 m	RCP4.5+RCP6.0	
Standard Deviation of H_{2100}	$0.10 \mathrm{m}$	0.05 m	Mengel et al. (2016)	

Table 1: Targeted and model-implied moments (in 2100)

Note: RCP stands for Representative Concentration Pathway.



etails on "Slope") \blacktriangleright details on "increase in CumE"

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Expected Atmospheric Temperature Path and Distributions



pricing

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Expected Global Mean Sea Level



(c) - P.d.f. of global sea level rise in 2100



Expected Carbon Concentration Path and Distributions



(a) - Trajectory of carbon concentration in the atmosphere

(b) - Trajectory of carbon concentration in the atmosphere including Risk-Premium

(c) - P.d.f. of emissions in 2100



Closed-Form Solutions

- Tractability of the model exploited at the calibration stage (supra).
- Asset-pricing analysis also benefits from closed-form formulas.
- Formulas for date-t prices of generic payoffs (settled on t + h):

$$\omega' X_{t+h} \quad \text{and} \quad (\omega' X_{t+h}) \mathbb{1}_{\{a' X_{t+h} < b\}},$$

where X_t is the state vector.

 \Rightarrow Building on these prices, closed-form solutions to temperature-indexed swaps, bonds, and options (and social cost of carbon, scc)



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Temperature Indexed Bond (TIB)

Payoff at maturity
$$(t+h)$$
: $1+\chi \left[T_{t+h}-\mathbb{E}_t(T_{t+h})
ight],$

where χ is a "leverage factor".

• If agents were not risk-averse, TIB prices would satisfy (maturity = h):

$$P_{t,h}^{rf} = P_{t,h}^{TIB},$$

with $P_{t,h}^{rf} = \mathbb{E}_t(\mathcal{M}_{t,t+h})$, price of riskfree bond (same expected payoffs: 1).

General case:

$$P_{t,h}^{TIB} = P_{t,h}^{rf} + \chi prem_{t,h}, \quad \text{with} \quad prem_{t,h} = \frac{\mathbb{C}ov_t\left[T_{t+h}, \mathcal{M}_{t,t+h}\right]}{\mathbb{E}_t\left[\mathcal{M}_{t,t+h}\right]}.$$

 \Rightarrow If higher temperature = "bad states of the world" (high marginal utility), then

$$\underbrace{P_{t,h}^{TIB} - P_{t,h}^{rf}}_{\text{climate risk premium}} > 0$$

• "Risk-adjusted distributions" are right-shifted.

Temperature p.d.f. Global Sea Level p.d.f. Carbon concentration p.d.f.

Swaps and Temperature-Indexed Bonds



(a) - Term structures of Temperature-Indexed Swap rates





Maturity

Digital Options



Concluding remarks

- Climate Linkers (CL) = long-term financial instruments whose payoffs are indexed to climate-related variables.
- Because agents are averse to climate risks, the pricing of CL would embed climate-risk premiums.
- CL would offer a public good by making market participants reveal their (risk-adjusted) expectations regarding future climate; akin to inflation-linked products.
- Necessary condition for development of a CL market: initial issuance of TIBs by governments (as for inflation-linked markets).
- First issuances: prices affected by "novelty premium."



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— Appendix —



New Sovereign Bonds as Public Goods **Deck**

Back to 1996: A Scorecard for Indexed Government Debt

"It is widely acknowledged that the proper role of the government is to provide public goods, and the demonstration by example of the potential for new financial markets and instruments is really a public good. [...]

Any firm which took on the public relations effort needed to first issue private indexed bonds would not be able to appropriate much of the societal benefits to doing so." (Campbell and Shiller, 1996)



Simulations of Shocks D_t and N_t (back)





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Enterprise for Soc

SCC and Risk Premium **back**

- Social Cost of carbon = Willingness to pay to reduce carbon emission by one ton.
- Marginal rate of substitution between atm. carbon concentration and C_t :

$$SCC_t = -\frac{\partial U_t}{\partial M_{AT,t}} \Big/ \frac{\partial U_t}{\partial C_t}.$$
 (3)



Risk Premium





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Risk Premium



Table 2: SCC comparison

Study	SCC (U.S. \$ per tC)	Tipping points	Stoch
Nordhaus (2017)	113		
Stern (2007)	312		
Jensen and Traeger (2014)	[40;70]		
Barnett et al. (2020)	[240;411]		
Cai and Lontzek (2019)	[40;100]	\checkmark	
Bansal et al. (2016)	[4;104]	\checkmark	
Lemoine and Traeger (2014)	[37;55]	\checkmark	
van den Bremer and van der Ploeg (2021) 146		
This paper	167	\checkmark	

Note: This table reports different SCC estimates. Cited studies differ along many dimensions, the last three columns highlight particularly important ones.



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Carbon-release feedback effects (back1) (back2)

- Earth is composed of an unknown number of feedback loops (FL), positive or negative.
 - Negative FL: absorption of greenhouse gases.
 - $\bullet~$ Positive FL = amplificiation of positive imbalances in radiative forcings.
- Positive FL: (a) release of tons of methane trapped in the permafrost, and (b) acidification of oceans.
- If one of these loops is triggered, the probability of triggering the next one jumps ⇒ "tipping point" mechanisms (Lemoine and Traeger, 2016; Steffen et al., 2018; Dietz et al., 2020).
- = "Self-excitation", as in Hawkes (1971) processes (applications to financial contagion, e.g., Aït-Sahalia et al., 2015).

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Gamma-zero distribution •••••

Definition

The non-negative r.v. $X \sim \gamma_0(\lambda, \mu)$, $\lambda > 0$ and $\mu > 0$, if

$$X \mid Z \sim \gamma_Z(\mu) \quad \text{with} \quad Z \sim \mathcal{P}(\lambda)$$

$$\Rightarrow \quad \mathbb{P}(X=0) = \mathbb{P}(Z=0) = \exp(-\lambda)$$





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Calibrating damages •••••



Figure 1: Burke et al. (2015, Figure 5.d)

- Decrease in consumption of about 50% for a 4-degree increase in T.
- \Rightarrow Regression slope of cumulated effects of disasters on consumption of -50%/4.
- Model-implied equivalent: Population slope = $\frac{\mathbb{C}ov_t(CumD_{t+H}, T_{t+H})}{\mathbb{V}ar_t(T_{t+H})}$.

Calibrating feedback effects • back

- Possibilities of feedback loops (FL) amplifying the positive imbalances in radiative forcings. (May give rise to "tipping points".)
- Examples of FL: (a) release of tons of methane trapped in the permafrost, and (b) acidification of oceans.
- Some studies aim at estimating the specific effect of FL on carbon release and temperatures (Burke et al., 2012).
- In our model, we can compare model-implied expected emissions with FL $(\mu_N > 0 \text{ in eq. 1})$ and without FL $(\mu_N = 0 \text{ in eq. 1})$:

 $\begin{array}{lll} \mathsf{Emission effect of FL} &= & \mathbb{E}_t(CumE_{t+H}) - \mathbb{E}_t^{noFL}(CumE_{t+H}) \\ \mathsf{Temperature effect of FL} &= & \mathbb{E}_t(T_{t+H}) - \mathbb{E}_t^{noFL}(T_{t+H}) \end{array}$



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Mitigation rate μ_t \bullet back



Linearization of radiative forcings •••••









Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS) uncertainty



Figure 2

Climate sensitivity uncertainty. Histogram (red) and normal density approximation (blue) for the climate sensitivity parameter β across models. The climate sensitivity parameter is in units of degrees tentigrate per teraton carbon. Figure based on evidence reported in Figure 3A by MacDougall, Swatr, and Kindt (2017) (© American Meteorological Society, used with permission) and constructed with data provided by the attribute-HEC Lausance



Parameter	Notation	Equation	Value	Unit/Note	Reference
Average TFP	Ā	(I.7)	0.4		
Standard deviation of the TFP shock	σ_A	(I.7)	0.05		
Average for approximation term	m_0	(32)	$\frac{1168}{607} - 1$		CDICE + IPCC
Rate of preference for present	δ	(37)	0.95		
Risk aversion	γ	(37)	7		
Carbon emissions from land 2015	ϵ_0	(21)	2.6	GtCO ₂ per year	DICE2016
Decline rate in land emissions (Eq. 21)	ρ	(21)	0.115	per period	DICE2016
Equilibrium concentration in atmosphere	mateq	(33)	607	GtC	CDICE
Equilibrium concentration in upper strata	mueq	(33)	600	GtC	CDICE
Equilibrium concentration in lower strata	mleq	(33)	1772	GtC	CDICE
2015 forcings of non-CO2 GHG	ϕ_0	(22)	0.5	Wm-2	DICE2016
2100 forcings of non-CO2 GHG	ϕ_1	(22)	1	Wm-2	DICE2016
Preindustrial concentration of carbon in the atmosphere	M_{PI}	(32)	607	GtC	CDICE
Carbon cycle parameter between atmosphere and upper ocea	$n\phi_{12}$	(33)	0.053		CDICE
Carbon cycle parameter between upper and lower ocean	φ_{23}	(33)	0.0042		CDICE
Climate equation coefficient for upper level	ξ1	(34)	$\Delta t \times 0.137$		CDICE
Transfer coefficient upper to lower stratum	ξ2	(34)	$\Delta t \times 0.10001$		CDICE
Transfer coefficient for lower level	ξ3	(35)	$\Delta t \times 0.00689$		CDICE
Forcings of equilibrium CO ₂ doubling	τ	(32)+(34)	3.45	Wm-2	CDICE
Equilibrium temperature impact	v	(34)	3.25	°C per doubling CO ₂	CDICE
Decline rate of decarbonization	δ_{σ}	(17)	-0.001	per period	DICE2016
Carbon intensity 2010	σ_0	(17)	$\frac{e_0}{a_0(1-\mu_0)}$	kgCO2 per output 2005 USD 2010	DICE2016
Industrial emissions in 2015	e_0	$(\sigma_0) + (\mathscr{E}_{2015})$	35.85	GtCO ₂ per year	DICE2016
Initial world gross output in 2015	q_0	$(29)+(\sigma_0)$	105.5	trillions of 2010 USD	DICE2016
Initial emision control rate in 2015	μ_0	(18)	0.03		DICE2016
Initial growth of sigma	$g_{\sigma,1}$	(17)	-0.0152	per year	DICE2016
Initial cost decline backstop cost	gback	(19)	0.025	per period	DICE2016
Exponent of control cost function	θ_2	(20)+(23)	2.6		DICE2016
Persistence of the radiative forcings shock	$\Phi_{[2,2]}$	(26)	0.95		
Global surface temperature weights $[T_{AT}, T_{LO}]$	weightsT		[0.6, 0.4]		IPCC
Base Temperature (sea level equilibrium)	$T_{0,S}$	(36)	-0.375	°C, Baseline [1951-1980]	Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009)
Coefficient attached to $\Delta_{(T_{AT},T_{0.5})}$	a _{SAT}	(36)	0.0015	m per °C per year	
Coefficient attached to $\Delta T_{AT,t}$	b_{SAT}	(36)	0.025	m	Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009)
Capital depreciation rate	dep	(I.7)	0.27	11	n
Time step	Δt		5	Ani	

Note: This table presents the parameters used in our baseline model. DICE16 refers to Nordhaus (2017). IPCC refers to IPCC (2014, Table 2.1.), CDP GE tages to our of the control of the c



Figure 2: Insurance gap – Source: Swiss Re, 2020.





Figure 3: Weather-related events and losses - Source: Swiss Re, 2020.



Catastrophe bonds and ILS cumulative issuance by year Cumulative cat bond issuance and number of deals by year - From the Artemis Deal Directory 160k 100 Transactions Cumulative 75 120k Issued \$m Deals 50 80k 40k 25 ~99⁶ ~99° 200 202 200 200 200 200 201 201 201 2010 2010 2020 Source: www.Artemis.bm Deal Directory UNIL | Université de Lausann HEC Lausanne Enterprise for Society

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Temperature Indexed Swap (TIS)

Protection buyer and protection seller exchange cash flows at t + h (maturity). On date t (negotiation date):



Figure 4: TIS

Temperature Indexed Bond (TIB)

Debt instrument whose payoff at maturity (t + h) is indexed to a given measure of temperature (or carbon concentration). Specifically:

```
1 + \chi \left[ T_{t+h} - \mathbb{E}_t(T_{t+h}) \right],
```

where χ is a "leverage factor".

Note: the payoff expectation is equal to 1.

Temperature Options

Nonlinear payoffs.

Option type	Price (notation)	Payoff (settled on maturity date $t + h$)
Digital	$Dig_{t,h}(T_K)$	$\mathbb{1}_{\{T_{t+h} > T_K\}}$
Call	$Call_{t,h}(T_K)$	$(T_{t+h} - T_K)^+ = \mathbb{1}_{\{T_{t+h} > T_K\}} (T_{t+h} - T_K)$
Put	$Put_{t,h}(T_K)$	$(T_{t+h} - T_K)^- = \mathbb{1}_{\{T_{t+h} < T_K\}} (T_K - T_{t+h})$



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