## "A Quantity-Based Approach to Constructing Climate Risk Hedge Portfolios"

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Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are those of the presenter; they do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Reserve System

#### **Summary**

Objective: Construct a long-short portfolio that has a high correlation with a chosen measure of climate news

#### Possibilities:

- A. Standard time-series approach to constructing "climate-mimicking" hedging portfolios:
  - I. Using historical data: Determine which stocks (industries) go up in price in response to bad global heat news
  - 2. Going forward: These stocks should go up in price with bad global heat news

Problem: Limited historical data for step 1, though this is a problem that will get smaller over time

- B. "Narrative" approach: Just conjecture which portfolios are likely to mimic climate news
- C. Quantity approach of current paper:
  - I. Determine which stocks (industries) are bought by locals (local equity mutual funds) in response to bad local heat news
  - 2. These stocks should go up in price with bad global heat news

#### Comment I. Defend the research question better. What would Greta Thunberg say about hedging?



"Why should I be studying for a future that soon may be no more, when no one is doing anything to save that future? And what is the point of learning facts when the most important facts clearly mean nothing to our society?"

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#### Some possible answers:

- I. If some are more willing/able to bear a risk than others, then trading a hedging portfolio is welfare-improving
  - Natural clienteles in climate context: Importance of believers vs, deniers well documented in housing climate finance
    - Effect of sea level rise on prices depends on fraction of people who believe climate change is happening (Baldauf, Garlappi, Yannelis, RFS 2020)
  - Suggestion: In a simple calibration, how large is the welfare gain of hedging for various assumptions about disagreement
    - Under people's own beliefs
    - O Given realistic modesty about how well hedging can be done in practice, or with perfect hedging
  - Suggestion: What evidence is there on amount of actual hedging?
    - Lots of "E-tils", but what fraction of "E-tilts" are hedging vs. "warm glow" vs. thinking it has high alpha? Survey?
    - O Are the main climate hedgers in practice firms?
      - Polluting firms who hedge the price of carbon permits using carbon futures?
      - If so, we're done: Hedge target=carbon permit price, mimicking portfolio is based on carbon futures

#### Comment I. Defend the research question better. What would Greta Thunberg say about hedging?

- 2. If hedging means tilting from brown to green stocks, then hedging helps the climate crisis (via costs of capital effects)
  - Hedging portfolios here don't look very green. Suggestions below
  - Does require that investors are correct about what is green

But, it's also possible that hedging climate risk could have negative climate impact:

- If the most concerned can hedge climate risk, they may do less to mitigate it
- 3. Financial stability: Hedging may prevent financial crises
  - Is climate risk special? Credit risk, interest rate risk, cyber, war, pandemics, politics ...
  - Hedging vs. higher capital
    - Can you say something about the pros of hedging?
    - Or can correlation of bank stock returns with hedging portfolios be used to calibrate capital requirements?

#### Summary of quantity approach

Step 1. Estimate climate-quantity-betas for each industry with respect to heat shock series S using county-level variation

$$ActiveChanges_{f,t}^{I} = \beta^{I} S_{loc(f),t} + \delta_{t}^{I} + \epsilon_{f,t}$$

I=industry, f=fund, t=time, loc(f)=county of fund f

- You estimate one regression for each industry, using panel data across funds and time
- Step 2. Quantity-based hedging portfolio, hedging US national heat shock series S (here f is riskfree, not fund)

$$QP_{S,t} = \sum_{I} \widehat{\beta_{S,t-1}^{I}} (R_t^I - R_t^f)$$

- One time series of the hedging portfolio return for a given heat shock series S
- Step 3. Does it work? Calculate correlation of hedging portfolio return with various national measures of climate news
  - Testing period is 2015-2019. Portfolios are constructed based on 5-years of monthly data (backward, rolling)
  - The national measure could be the same as the one used locally (why is this not emphasized?), but many are considered

#### Summary of quantity approach

Step 1. Local equity mutual funds buy auto, transportation, energy stocks when it's hot locally (measured several ways)

Table 4: Industry Climate- $\beta$  Coefficients

| GICS                                 | Description   | Avg.                                 | Fat./Inj.                            | Indemnities                          | Record Temp.                         |
|--------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 2510<br>4520<br>2030<br>4530<br>3010 | Auto & Components Tech. Hardw. & Equip. Transportation Semiconductors & Equip. Food & Staples Retailing | 0.12<br>0.10<br>0.08<br>0.05<br>0.05 | 0.07<br>0.05<br>0.02<br>0.04<br>0.03 | 0.15<br>0.20<br>0.14<br>0.00<br>0.08 | 0.15<br>0.06<br>0.08<br>0.12<br>0.03 |
| 4020<br>3020<br>1010<br>5010<br>5510 | Diversified Financials. Food, Bev. & Tobacco Energy Communication Services Utilities                    | 0.04<br>0.03<br>0.03<br>0.03<br>0.02 | 0.02<br>0.01<br>0.02<br>0.04<br>0.01 | 0.04<br>0.10<br>0.07<br>0.03<br>0.04 | 0.04 $-0.01$ $-0.00$ $0.00$ $0.02$   |
| 2010<br>4030<br>4010<br>4510<br>3520 | Capital Goods Insurance Banks Software & Services Pharma., Biotech., & Life Sc.                         | 0.02 $0.01$ $0.01$ $0.01$ $-0.01$    | 0.00 $-0.03$ $0.04$ $0.01$ $0.01$    | 0.07 $0.06$ $0.01$ $-0.03$ $-0.02$   | -0.01 $-0.00$ $-0.03$ $0.04$ $-0.01$ |
| 6010<br>5020<br>1510<br>3030<br>2530 | Real Estate Media & Entertainment Materials Household & Pers. Prod. Consumer Services                   | -0.01 $-0.03$ $-0.03$ $-0.03$        | -0.03 $-0.04$ $-0.02$ $0.01$ $-0.09$ | 0.00 $0.06$ $-0.02$ $-0.07$ $-0.03$  | -0.01 $-0.06$ $-0.04$ $-0.03$ $0.02$ |
| 3510<br>2550<br>2520<br>2020         | Health Care Equip. & Serv. Retailing Consum. Durables & Apparel Commercial & Prof. Serv.                | -0.04 $-0.04$ $-0.07$ $-0.11$        | -0.02 $-0.07$ $0.02$ $-0.12$         | -0.07 $-0.00$ $-0.18$ $-0.28$        | -0.02 $-0.05$ $-0.07$ $0.08$         |

"the identities of industries that are bought/sold are not necessarily those expected ex ante", but:

 Industries bought could, while currently potentially producers of emissions, be the source of innovation

Heads-up: Cohen, Gurun & Nguyen paper on NBER LTAM April 9

- As long as investors react consistently across local and global shocks, it doesn't matter what they buy/sell
- There's estimation noise

The proof is in the pudding

#### Summary of quantity approach

Step 3. Quantity based approach (blue labels) beats narrative approach (mostly) which beats standard approach (green labels).

#### But avg. correlation w/climate news<0.2. Climate hedging is hard

Heat: Fatalities/Injuries **Heat: High Indemnities** Long PBD Heat: Record Temperature -**Short Stranded Assets** Sustainalytics Lasso Reg: All-Industries Reg: ETFs Reg: Fama-French 3-Factors Reg: SPY -Short XLE --.2 .2 Ardia et al. Engle et al. Faccini et al. Kelly et al. National Google National Temperature

Figure 2: Climate Hedge Performance of Various Portfolios

**Note:** Dot plot of monthly return correlations for various climate hedge portfolios with various climate news series AR(1) innovations. Each dot represents one correlation coefficient. Different colors represent different groups to which the climate news series belong.

Quantity-based approach used works well if:

- You have data on representative local investors
- Locals trade with non-locals in response to bad local heat news
- Investor demand reacts similarly to local and global heat news
  - Irrational reaction to local heat news that local investors think is global
  - Rational reaction to global heat news

Quantity-based approach used works poorly if:

- You have data for sophisticated local investors
- Locals trade with each other in response to bad local heat news
  - Unsophisticated locals (retail investors) sell brown, buy green stocks in response to bad local heat news
  - Sophisticated locals take the other side: They realize unsophisticated locals are trading based on irrelevant information

Then the hedge portfolio is long brown, short green and thus may do poorly, not well, in response to bad global heat news

Which case are we in? Evidence from Choi, Gao and Jiang, RFS 2020 show importance of the problematic case

- Temperature variation across cities of the world with stock exchanges (local=city for temp., country for holdings)
  - Stock trading of Emission-Clean (EMC) portfolio
  - Retail ownership=100%- DataStream blockholders' ownership FactSet institutional ownership excluding blockholders
- Retail investors ("the majority of which are local") buy green & sell brown when local temperature is abnormally high Local blockholders do the opposite when local temperature is abnormally high

| B. Stock trading on abnorma | al temperature |          |                  |         |  |  |
|-----------------------------|----------------|----------|------------------|---------|--|--|
|                             | (1)            | (2)      | (3)              | (4)     |  |  |
|                             | EMC            | _∆Retail | EMC_ΔInstitution |         |  |  |
| Ab_Temp                     | -0.080*        |          | 0.003            |         |  |  |
|                             | (-2.01)        |          | (0.84)           |         |  |  |
| Ab_Temp Q2                  |                | -0.102   |                  | 0.012   |  |  |
|                             |                | (-0.67)  |                  | (0.89)  |  |  |
| Ab_Temp Q3                  |                | -0.165   |                  | -0.001  |  |  |
|                             |                | (-1.18)  |                  | (-0.05) |  |  |
| Ab_Temp Q4                  |                | -0.316** |                  | 0.005   |  |  |
| 200 200 - 200               |                | (-2.22)  |                  | (0.31)  |  |  |
| Ab_Temp Q5                  |                | -0.396   |                  | 0.037*  |  |  |
|                             |                | (-1.62)  |                  | (1.76)  |  |  |
| Year × Quarter FEs          | Yes            | Yes      | Yes              | Yes     |  |  |
| Obs.                        | 2,008          | 2,008    | 2,008            | 2,008   |  |  |
| Adj. $R^2$                  | .006           | .003     | .021             | .021    |  |  |

|               |   | (8)  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---------------|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| omBlockholder | EMC_ΔForBlockhold   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|               | 0.023   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|               | (0.94)  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0.003         |   | 0.036  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (0.02)        |   | (0.39)   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0.147         |   | -0.040   |  |  |  |  |  |
| (1.69)        |   | (-0.48)  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0.277*        |   | -0.006   |  |  |  |  |  |
| (1.83)        |   | (-0.08)  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0.128         |   | 0.172  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (1.31)        |   | (1.03)   |  |  |  |  |  |
| Yes           | Yes   | Yes  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2,008         | 2,008   | 2,008  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 007           | .005  | .005   |  |  |  |  |  |
|               | 0.003<br>(0.02)<br>0.147<br>(1.69)<br>0.277*<br>(1.83)<br>0.128<br>(1.31)<br>Yes<br>2,008 | 0.023<br>(0.94)<br>0.003<br>(0.02)<br>0.147<br>(1.69)<br>0.277*<br>(1.83)<br>0.128<br>(1.31)<br>Yes Yes<br>2,008 |  |  |  |  |  |

Suggestion: Use the quantity approach for unsophisticated locals

- I. Really bad mutual fund managers (worst alpha? smallest funds?)
- 2. Local retail investors at the county level (but hard to get data)
- 3. Local retail investors at the country level (as Choi, Gao and Jiang, 2020).

Suggestion: Use a standard time-series return approach with local (country) information to get more data. Avg. across countries

- For each country and industry: Estimate climate return betas relative to local heat news
- For a given industry: Average climate return betas across countries
- Construct world-wide climate-hedge portfolio based on average climate return betas and world industry returns (or US industry returns)

This works if local investors' trading affect prices in that country, which is true in Choi, Gao and Jiang (2020)

How can investors have real climate impact?

- I. "Market-efficiency ESG investing" (profitable): Get climate information (regulatory/physical) "priced in"
  - Ensures correct NPV calculations: If shareholders care, managers will need to care too
  - Many climate finance papers are about this. Good
  - But, "priced in" means prices reflect potential losses to current/future owners, not that carbon externalities are priced in
- 2. "Money-losing ESG investing": Investors with a preference for carbon reduction may be able to change relative costs of capital
  - Closer to addressing externalities. Tilts to/from has parallels to taxes/subsidies
  - Many climate finance papers assessing investors' willingness to lose money. Good
    - Mixed empirical results. We may just get sorting of ownership with modest changes to equilibrium costs of capital
    - Few investors appear willing to lose much

In surveys of ESG investors, many are interested in "market-efficiency" ESG investing

• BlackRock 2020 Global Sustainable Investing Survey

### **03** What are the top three drivers of your adoption of sustainable investing?





# Responsible investment

Our motivation for responsible investment is to achieve the highest possible return with moderate risk. Companies' activities have a considerable impact on society and the environment around them. Over time, this could affect their profitability and so the fund's return. We therefore consider both governance and sustainability issues, and publish clear expectations of companies in the portfolio.

So, realistically, to address externalities in a big way, government actions are important

- Is there a role for climate finance here? Yes
- There's already a large climate finance literature on how to value public investments in mitigation/adaptation
- And we can do more: Help ensure "program efficiency", in addition to market efficiency
  - Document what works well, theoretically and empirically
  - O Document cross-location inefficiencies: Equalize carbon reduction per dollar spent across locations
  - Monitor cross-location evasion: Relocation of production reduces effectiveness

Am I the only one saying this? Not at all!

Stroebel and Wurgler, 2021. Survey of 861 respondents about climate finance (academics, industry, government)

Table 5
Most influential forces for change.

Participants were asked: "Which mechanisms do you think are most important in moving corporations to reduce their climate risk exposures and/or carbon footprints? [Choose at most three]." Possible responses were ordered randomly, and listed below in order of their rank in the pooled sample.

|                                       |        | Role    |    |                   |                  | Climate<br>Concern |      | Works in<br>Climate<br>Finance |      |     |     |    |
|---------------------------------------|--------|---------|----|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|------|--------------------------------|------|-----|-----|----|
|                                       | Pooled | Faculty |    | Private<br>Sector | North<br>America | Europe             | Asia | ROW                            | High | Low | Yes | No |
| Biggest force for change (% in top-3) |        |         |    |                   |                  |                    |      |                                |      |     |     |    |
| Carbon Taxes                          | 52     | 59      | 65 | 37                | 51               | 59                 | 49   | 33                             | 56   | 42  | 52  | 50 |
| Institutional Investors               | 48     | 45      | 37 | 56                | 47               | 52                 | 53   | 52                             | 51   | 42  | 51  | 44 |
| Government Subsidies                  | 43     | 44      | 43 | 42                | 45               | 39                 | 39   | 29                             | 42   | 47  | 43  | 44 |
| Customers                             | 41     | 33      | 35 | 53                | 42               | 39                 | 29   | 52                             | 40   | 42  | 38  | 43 |
| Non-financial regulation              | 27     | 34      | 31 | 15                | 25               | 35                 | 27   | 38                             | 28   | 24  | 27  | 28 |
| Financial regulation                  | 22     | 20      | 21 | 26                | 22               | 22                 | 24   | 29                             | 24   | 19  | 26  | 16 |
| Banks/Creditors                       | 16     | 12      | 21 | 20                | 15               | 15                 | 22   | 10                             | 17   | 13  | 19  | 10 |
| Employees                             | 6      | 5       | 4  | 8                 | 6                | 4                  | 10   | 14                             | 6    | 6   | 5   | 8  |
| Individual Investors                  | 5      | 5       | 4  | 5                 | 6                | 1                  | 2    | 14                             | 5    | 5   | 5   | 5  |
| Voluntary                             | 0      | 0       | 0  | 0                 | 0                | 0                  | 0    | 0                              | 0    | 0   | 0   | 0  |
| Nothing will lead to change           | 0      | 0       | 0  | 0                 | 0                | 0                  | 0    | 0                              | 0    | 0   | 0   | 0  |

Table 6
Most important climate finance research topics vs. SSRN topic frequency.

Participants were asked: "Which of the following research areas do you find most important? [Choose at most three]." Possible responses were ordered randomly and listed below in order of their rank in the pooled sample.

|   |        | Role    |    |    | Location         |       |        |     | Climate<br>Concern |     | Works in<br>Climate<br>Finance |    |                            |  |
|---|--------|---------|----|----|------------------|-------|--------|-----|--------------------|-----|--------------------------------|----|----------------------------|--|
|   | Pooled | Faculty | J  |    | North<br>America | Europ | e Asia | ROW | High               | Low | Yes                            | No | SSRN<br>Topic<br>Frequency |  |
| Important Research Topics (% in top-3)      |        |         |    |    |                  |       |        |     |                    |     |                                |    |                            |  |
| Effects of gov incentives to mitigate/adapt | 35     | 36      | 39 | 37 | 38               | 34    | 34     | 8   | 39                 | 30  | 38                             | 35 | 22                         |  |
| Pricing climate risk in financial markets   | 34     | 33      | 34 | 36 | 35               | 30    | 31     | 52  | 36                 | 30  | 37                             | 30 | 36                         |  |
| Climate change effect on systemic risk      | 28     | 23      | 47 | 29 | 28               | 27    | 22     | 38  | 30                 | 21  | 29                             | 26 | 15                         |  |
| Real effects of SRI                         | 23     | 22      | 9  | 27 | 21               | 22    | 36     | 29  | 22                 | 24  | 23                             | 22 | 8                          |  |
| New financial instruments                   | 21     | 23      | 22 | 19 | 22               | 20    | 17     | 19  | 22                 | 21  | 23                             | 19 | 7                          |  |
| GE modeling of climate change & economy     | 19     | 20      | 22 | 17 | 19               | 25    | 15     | 19  | 18                 | 22  | 18                             | 21 | 6                          |  |
| Effects of green finance on transition      | 19     | 17      | 18 | 21 | 16               | 27    | 31     | 29  | 21                 | 13  | 22                             | 14 | 9                          |  |
| Measuring asset-level climate exposure      | 15     | 15      | 16 | 16 | 15               | 15    | 17     | 19  | 13                 | 21  | 17                             | 13 | 11                         |  |
| Pricing climate risk in real estate markets | 17     | 15      | 29 | 16 | 19               | 10    | 7      | 14  | 17                 | 16  | 15                             | 20 | 6                          |  |
| Climate risk in the insurance sector        | 13     | 14      | 21 | 10 | 15               | 10    | 5      | 14  | 13                 | 14  | 10                             | 17 | 3                          |  |
| Developing climate stress tests             | 13     | 10      | 19 | 17 | 14               | 9     | 14     | 14  | 14                 | 10  | 12                             | 14 | 4                          |  |
| Refinement of ESG-type ratings              | 12     | 13      | 3  | 13 | 11               | 11    | 19     | 10  | 12                 | 11  | 14                             | 9  | 5                          |  |
| Finance address social disparities from CC  | 10     | 10      | 4  | 12 | 10               | 12    | 12     | 0   | 13                 | 5   | 10                             | 10 | 4                          |  |