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The Macroeconomic Impact of Europe's Carbon Taxes

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Climate change and the energy transition





The switch from coal to natural gas and, now, renewables for electricity production has driven emissions reductions...







Annual Energy Outlook, reference case.

The switch from coal to natural gas and, now, renewables for electricity production has driven emissions reductions...



Source	%, 2019
Gas	38.4
Coal	23.5
Nuclear	19.7
Wind	7.3
Hydro	6.6
Solar	1.8



- Because of the carbon, investment, and network externalities, markets won't reduce emissions (enough) on their own
- One of the main policy tools, loved by economists, is a carbon tax...

Tax schedules for carbon tax bills in the current Congress

Figure 1: Carbon Tax Rates for Federal Carbon Tax Proposals (2020 dollars/ton)



THE BAKER SHULTZ CARBON DIVIDENDS PLAN



ISSUED BY THE BROADEST CLIMATE COALITION IN U.S. HISTORY

CUTS U.S. CO2 EMISSIONS IN HALF BY 2035

PROVIDES A FAMILY OF FOUR \$2,000 A YEAR

REDUCES UNNECESSARY REGULATIONS

PAYS FOR ITSELF

DRIVES GROWTH AND INNOVATION

COMPELS OTHER COUNTRIES TO FOLLOW

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REMARKS

Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord

ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT Issued on: June 1, 2017

Compliance with the terms of the Paris Accord and the onerous energy restrictions it has placed on the United States could cost America as much as 2.7 million lost jobs by 2025 according to the National Economic Research Associates....

According to this same study, by 2040, compliance with the commitments put into place by the previous administration would cut production for the following sectors: paper down 12 percent; cement down 23 percent; iron and steel down 38 percent; coal — and I happen to love the coal miners — down 86 percent; natural gas down 31 percent. The cost to the economy at this time would be close to \$3 trillion in lost GDP and 6.5 million industrial jobs, while households would have \$7,000 less income and, in many cases, much worse than that.

Impacts of a carbon tax

- 1. Computable general equilibrium models
 - a) GDP effect (e.g. Goulder and Hafstead, *Confronting the Climate Challenge* (2018); Jorgenson (2013), etc.; <u>RFF Carbon Pricing</u> <u>Calculator</u>
- Parallel shift down
- Importance of revenue recycling method
- Example: Tax of \$40/ton @5%/year GDP loss in 2035 =
 1 5% (toy 8 dividend)
 - -1.5% (tax & dividend)
 - -1.2% (payroll tax cut)



Source: Goulder-Hafstead E3 model

Source: RFF Carbon Pricing Calculator at https://www.rff.org/cpc/

- 1. Computable general equilibrium models
 - a) GDP effect (e.g. Goulder and Hafstead, *Confronting the Climate Challenge* (2018); Jorgenson (2013), etc.
 - b) Employment effect: Hafstead and Williams, NBER EEPE, (2019)





Source: Hafstead and Williams (2019, Fig. 1)

- 1. Computable general equilibrium models
 - a) GDP effect (e.g. Goulder and Hafstead, *Confronting the Climate Challenge* (2018); Jorgenson (2013), etc.
 - b) Employment effect: Hafstead and Williams, NBER EEPE, (2019)
- 2. NEMS and IAMS
 - Weak or nonexistent macro modules

Survey: Metcalf (BPEA, 2019)

A fair number of studies examine carbon tax effect on emissions: partial list

Lin and Li (2011) – Scandinavia + Netherlands Rivers and Schaufele (2012) – BC transportation emissions Murray and Rivers (2015) – review of older literature on BC carbon tax Haites et. al. (2018) – carbon pricing generally, effectiveness and political economy Dolphin, Pollitt, and Newberry (2019) – political economy of carbon tax rates (not effectiveness) Pretis (2019) – BC Andersson (2019) – Sweden (carbon tax + VAT on fuel) Runst and Thonipara (2019) – Swedish residential sector Hajek et al (2019), energy sector emissions (SWE, FIN, DNK, IRE, SLO) He at al (2019) OECD environmental taxes Fauceglia et al. (2019) – Swiss industry Abrell et al. (2019) – UK Carbon Price Support on top of EU-ETS, plant-level

Fewer study the effect on GDP and employment

Elgie and McClay (2013) – BC income Yamazaki (2017), Yip (2018) – BC employment Metcalf (2015, 2019) – BC (2015) and EU (2019) Bernard et. al. (2018) – BC carbon tax and provincial income (VAR on with-tax fuel price) Olale et. al. (2019) – BC carbon tax and net farm income Mundaca (2017) – eliminating fuel tax subsidies in Middle East/North Africa

This paper: Evidence from Europe

Figure 1. Regional, national and subnational carbon taxes around the world, July 2019



Source: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment (August 2019)

Data set:

- EU + Iceland + Norway + Switzerland (n = 31) all countries in the European emissions trading system
 - Of which, 15 also have a carbon tax, almost entirely on emissions not covered by the ETS
- Annual, 1985 2018
 - EU ETS started in 2005 (power sector and certain energy-intensive industries) (subsequently expanded to aviation)

Sources:

- Carbon prices: World Bank (new carbon price data)
 - Carbon tax rates are real local currency, scaled to 2018 USD using 2018 PPP
 - Some countries have multiple tax rates, WB data set has highest and lowest rate and fuels to which it applies; we used the highest rate (typically this is the rate on gasoline & diesel)
 - Weighted for coverage of tax
 - Sensitivity check with new data from Dolphin et al (2020)
- GDP, population: World Bank except
 - Norway we use mainland GDP
 - Ireland we use Ireland official statistics
- Employment: Eurostat
- Fuel prices and fuel taxes: IEA
- Emissions: Eurostat,
 - emissions in road transport, commercial & institutional, and household sectors
 - Alternatively, emissions from fuel consumption

Carbon taxes in 2018

Source: World Bank

Country	Year of Adoption	Rate in 2018 (USD)	Coverage (2019)
Finland	1990	\$70.65	0.36
Poland	1990	0.16	0.04
Norway	1991	49.30	0.62
Sweden	1991	128.91	0.40
Denmark	1992	24.92	0.40
Slovenia	1996	29.74	0.24
Estonia	2000	3.65	0.03
Latvia	2004	9.01	0.15
Switzerland	2008	80.70	0.33
Ireland	2010	24.92	0.49
Iceland	2010	25.88	0.29
UK	2013	25.71	0.23
Spain	2014	30.87	0.03
France	2014	57.57	0.35
Portugal	2015	11.54	0.29

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Carbon tax history for the 15 countries with carbon taxes

Data source: World Bank (carbon price data in press)

Carbon tax rates are real local currency, scaled to 2018 USD using 2018 PPP

GDP growth: World Bank (except as noted below)



Real rate in local currency, normalized to 2018 USD

Real GDP per capita, growth (annual %)

Before and after imposition of carbon tax



Deviated from country's pre-tax mean. Horizontal lines are pre/post means. Dots and bars denote mean and 90% confidence interval by year.

Total employment, growth (annual %)



Deviated from country's pre-tax mean. Horizontal lines are pre/post means. Dots and bars denote mean and 90% confidence interval by year.

CO2 emissions from fuel combustion per capita (log)

Before and after imposition of carbon tax



Deviated from country's pre-tax mean. Horizontal lines are pre/post means. Dots and bars denote mean and 90% confidence interval by year.

- Estimand: cumulative dynamic causal effect of change in tax rate on real variables
- Three methods, two exogeneity conditions (identifying assumptions)

Distributed lag (panel)

Exogeneity condition:

Local projections (panel)

Exogeneity condition:

$$\Delta \ln(GDP_{t}) = \beta_{yx}(L)\tau_{t} + \gamma(L)W_{t} + u_{t}$$

$$E(u_{t} \mid \tau_{t}, \tau_{t-1}, ..., W_{t}, W_{t-1}, ...) = E(u_{t} \mid W_{t}, W_{t-1}, ...)$$

 $\begin{aligned} \ln(GDP_{t+h} / GDP_{t-1}) &= \Theta_{yx,h} \tau_t + \beta(L) \tau_{t-1} + \delta(L) \Delta \ln(GDP_{t-1}) + \gamma(L) W_t + u_t \\ & E\left(u_t \mid \tau_t, \tau_{t-1}, ..., \Delta \ln(GDP_{t-1}), W_t, W_{t-1}, ...\right) \\ &= E\left(u_t \mid \tau_{t-1}, \tau_{t-2}, ..., \Delta \ln(GDP_{t-1}), W_t, W_{t-1}, ...\right) \end{aligned}$

Note: $\Theta_{yx,h}$ is h-period ahead cumulative impulse response function in VAR jargon

Panel VAR

Same identifying assumption as LP

Restricted or unrestricted: Impose zero long-run effect on growth (restricted), or not (unrestricted)

Odds and ends

- All regressions include country & year fixed effects
- Carbon tax enters weighted by coverage share
- Standard errors: heteroskedasticity-robust for LP (Plagborg-Møller and Wolf (2019))
- Effects calibrated to \$40 carbon tax at 0% real increase
 - Tax innovations in are solved from IRF of tax shock to tax rate IRF (Sims (1986) method)
- 4 lags of control variables used (base case) (BIC selects 2, AIC selects 4 in VAR)

Results: Tests of parallel paths restriction

t-statistics testing long-run effect of carbon tax change on the growth rate of y = 0(*p*-values in second line)

- For SVAR, this is implied long-run IRF
- For LP, this is 8-year effect
- Fail to reject "parallel paths" restriction

	GDP	Employment	Emissions
LP	0.33	-0.63	-2.09
	0.75	0.53	0.04
SVAR	1.34	0.62	-1.26
	0.18	0.53	0.21
Revenue Recycli	ing Countries		
LP	0.05	-0.72	-0.95
	0.96	0.47	0.34
SVAR	1.39	0.17	-0.40
	0.16	0.87	0.69
Large Carbon Tax Countries			
LP	-0.41	0.14	-0.53
	0.69	0.89	0.60
SVAR	1.00	1.23	-0.34
	0.32	0.22	0.73
Scandinavian Countries			
LP	-0.44	0.80	0.19
	0.66	0.42	0.85
SVAR	0.95	1.04	0.16
	0.34	0.30	0.87

IRF for \$40 carbon tax increase: LP Carbon tax rate (real, 2018 USD) wtd by coverage share Dep. vble: Δlrgdp; Controls = YE; Sample = EU+ Sample: EU+ 4 **Method: Linear Projection** Unrestricted З points 2 Percentage p 2 -1 0 2 ကု 4 0 2 3 5 6 Years after implementation

67% and 95% confidence bands. Includes 4 lags of all regressors.







Sample: EU+



counterfactual

Cumulative IRF for \$40 carbon tax increase: LP Carbon tax rate (real, 2018 USD) wtd by coverage share Dep. vble: Δlrgdp; Controls = YE; Sample = EU+



67% and 95% confidence bands. Includes 4 lags of all regressors.

Sample: EU+



 This is the empirical counterpart to the CGE counterfactual

Cumulative IRF for \$40 carbon tax increase: SV4

Carbon tax rate (real, 2018 USD) wtd by coverage share Dep. vble: Δlrgdp; Controls = YE; Sample = EU+











Sample: EU+

Method: LP Restricted Cumulative IRF

This cumulative IRF is the estimated effect of the tax increase on the *level* of log(emissions), imposing the "parallel path" assumption

Emissions series:

Emissions in sectors exposed to the carbon tax

Cumulative IRF for \$40 carbon tax increase: LP

Carbon tax rate (real, 2018 USD) wtd by coverage share Dep. vble: Δlemission_ctsectors; Controls = YE; Sample = EU+



Sample: EU+



This cumulative IRF is the estimated effect of the tax increase on the *level* of log(emissions), imposing the "parallel path" assumption

Emissions series:

Emissions in sectors exposed to the carbon tax

Cumulative IRF for \$40 carbon tax increase: SV4

Carbon tax rate (real, 2018 USD) wtd by coverage share Dep. vble: Δlemission_ctsectors; Controls = YE; Sample = EU+



Sample: EU+

Method: LP Restricted Cumulative IRF

This cumulative IRF is the estimated effect of the tax increase on the *level* of log(emissions), imposing the "parallel path" assumption

Emissions series: Emissions from fuel consumption

Cumulative IRF for \$40 carbon tax increase: LP

Carbon tax rate (real, 2018 USD) wtd by coverage share Dep. vble: Δlemission6; Controls = YE; Sample = EU+



- 1. Are the positive GDP and employment results a consequence of how the country uses the revenue?
- 2. Are the results driven by
 - Scandinavia?
 - No: results for SCA-only, or EUxSCA, are similar to overall results, just noisier
 - Countries that have low taxes?
 - No: very similar results if you use only countries with tax of at least \$10/ton share-weighted (\$40/ton x 30% coverage = \$12/ton shareweighted)
- 3. Sensitivity check:
 - Dolphin et al. (2019) tax rate series
 - **Essentially no difference in results, see the paper**









IRF for \$40 carbon tax increase: LP

67% and 95% confidence bands. Includes 4 lags of all regressors.

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Summary



Caveats/comments on this paper:

- Spillover effects on comparison group (countries that don't increase CT)
 - (treatment affects the control group)
- Endogeneity issues:
 - Changes in tax rate change once imposed?
 - Endogeneity of adoption of tax in the first place
- Interaction with EU ETS
- External validity

Discussion

Bigger picture:

- Outside of the power sector, a carbon tax has little effect on emissions
 - \$40/ton ≈ 40¢/gallon of gasoline
- The energy transition must be affordable so consumers *choose* clean technologies
 - Critical role for (smart) technology policy





Additional Slides

More details on carbon pricing schemes internationally

Summary map of regional, national and subnational carbon pricing initiatives



ETS implemented or scheduled for implementation
 ETS or carbon tax under consideration
 ETS implemented or scheduled, tax under consideration

Carbon tax implemented or scheduled for implementati...
 ETS and carbon tax implemented or scheduled
 Carbon tax implemented or scheduled, ETS under consi...

Data odds and ends

Ireland: Replace World Bank GDP data with adjusted Irish statistical agency data





Norway:

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Focus on Scandinavia

Data source: World Bank (carbon price data in press)

Country	Year of Adoption	Rate in 2018 (USD)	Coverage (2019)
Finland	1990	\$70.65	0.36
Poland	1990	0.16	0.04
Norway	1991	49.30	0.62
Sweden	1991	128.91	0.40
Denmark	1992	24.92	0.40
Slovenia	1996	29.74	0.24
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Switzerland	2008	80.70	0.33
Ireland	2010	24.92	0.49
Iceland	2010	25.88	0.29
UK	2013	25.71	0.23
Spain	2014	30.87	0.03
France	2014	57.57	0.35
Portugal	2015	11.54	0.29

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VAR IRF: Denmark

VAR(2) IRF for \$40 carbon tax: Denmark Tax variable: Carbon tax rate (real, LCU, 2018 USD @ PPP) Dep. vble: dlrgdp; Controls = none



VAR IRF: Denmark

VAR(2) IRF for \$40 carbon tax: Denmark

Tax variable: Carbon tax rate (real, LCU, 2018 USD @ PPP) Dep. vble: dlemptot; Controls = none





VAR IRF: Finland

VAR(2) IRF for \$40 carbon tax: Finland Tax variable: Carbon tax rate (real, LCU, 2018 USD @ PPP) Dep. vble: dlrgdp; Controls = none



VAR IRF: Finland

VAR(2) IRF for \$40 carbon tax: Finland Tax variable: Carbon tax rate (real, LCU, 2018 USD @ PPP)

Dep. vble: dlemptot; Controls = none





VAR IRF: Norway

VAR(2) IRF for \$40 carbon tax: Norway Tax variable: Carbon tax rate (real, LCU, 2018 USD @ PPP) Dep. vble: dlrgdp; Controls = none



VAR IRF: Norway

VAR(2) IRF for \$40 carbon tax: Norway

Tax variable: Carbon tax rate (real, LCU, 2018 USD @ PPP) Dep. vble: dlemptot; Controls = none





VAR IRF: Sweden

VAR(2) IRF for \$40 carbon tax: Sweden

Tax variable: Carbon tax rate (real, LCU, 2018 USD @ PPP) Dep. vble: dlrgdp; Controls = none



VAR IRF: Sweden

VAR(2) IRF for \$40 carbon tax: Sweden

Tax variable: Carbon tax rate (real, LCU, 2018 USD @ PPP) Dep. vble: dlemptot; Controls = none



Any tax anticipation effect?

Augment distributed lag regressions with 1 or 2 *leads* (*t*-statistics in parentheses)

Dependent variable (growth rate)	Tax variable	Cumulative lead effect (@ \$40 tax) 1 lead	Cumulative lead effect (@ \$40 tax) 2 leads
GDP	Real tax rate	-0.40 (1.28)	-0.10 (1.33)
Total employment	Real tax rate	-0.89 (1.01)	-0.84 (1.04)