Virtual Seminar on Climate Economics

Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

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The social value of offsets

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The Offset Market

- Renewable energy
- Energy efficiency
- Forestry: avoided deforestation or reforestation
- Transport
- Agriculture
- Methane capture
- Household (e.g. cook stoves)
- <u>https://www.pureleapfrog.org/ba/carbon</u> <u>neutral-faqs/</u>

Almost half of all offsets come from forestry and land use projects Share of credits issued, by project type (%)



The Offset Market

- Net-Zero + NDCs: COP26, UK, EU, India, etc.;
- GFANZ: \$130tn assets net zero by 2050;
- Shell, BP, claim net-zero using offsets;
- 2017 2019: \$750m carbon offsets traded (FT);
- Evidence:
 - ProPublica: Only 50% success rate in Acre, Brazil;
 - <u>Calel et al. (2021)</u> CDM: 40% of projects are additional, none are 100% individually.
 - <u>37% of forest projects overlapped with PAs (REDD+);</u>



The Offset Market: perceptions

- "guilty until proven innocent"
- "scaling up could be dangerous"
- "surplus of bad offsets"
- "no trust in the current system"
- Science Based Targets: No offsets!
- Financial institutions, ETS schemes: no credits.
 But:
- "perfect is the enemy of the good"
- "improved governance required"
 - Improvements
- Stand. Chart. + Mark Carney Task Force
- "standardise contracts..... trust and fungibility of the carbon offset market"



Research question

- Clear problems and risk with offsets:
 - Impermanence
 - Risk of failure
 - Additionality
- What is the social value of offsets?
 - How ought they to be "priced"
 - Should they be a part of the net-zero strategy?
- Nature-Based Solutions
 - Biodiversity is also important
 - (Dasgupta Review 2021, Kunming COP15: 30 by 30)



In a nutshell

- We show:
- The social value of an offset (SVO) formula

$$SVO_{\tau_{1},\tau_{2}}^{\phi,\widetilde{\varphi}} = SCC_{0} \underbrace{e^{(x-r)\tau_{1}}}_{delay until \tau_{1}} \underbrace{\left(1-e^{(x-r)\nu}\right)}_{Impermanence} \begin{bmatrix} (r-x) \\ \hline{r+\phi-x} \\ failure risk \end{bmatrix} - \underbrace{\frac{(r-x)}{r-x+\phi+\widetilde{\varphi}}}_{additionality risk}$$

- Number of risky offsets that compensate 1 tonne of CO2 emissions?
- Calibrate to analytical climate models and RPCs
- Result: SVO is more than zero and less than the social cost of carbon

Climate dynamics: a temporary reduction



(Joos et al, 2013; Geoffroy et al 2013, CIMP5 ensemble)



Temperature:

 $T_t = \underbrace{\zeta}_{TCRE} \begin{array}{c} S_t - \xi\\ \underbrace{\zeta}_{delay} \end{array}$

Cum Emission

Ben Gi

Social Cost of Carbon (SCC)

Social cost of carbon is the discounted sum of marginal damages

$$SCC_{\tau} = \int_{t=\tau+\xi}^{\infty} e^{-r(t-t_0)} \zeta \underbrace{D_T}_{marg \, damage} dt$$

Values a permanent removal of CO2 emissions

A temporary offset

A temporary offset

• Project absorbs emission from moment τ_1 to τ_2 (define $\nu = \tau_2 - \tau_1$)

$$SVO_{\tau_1\tau_2} = \int_{t=\tau_1+\xi}^{\tau_2+\xi} e^{-r(t-t_0)}\zeta \underbrace{D_T}_{marg\ damage} dt$$

• This is the difference between present values of the SCC_{τ_1} and SCC_{τ_2}

$$SVO_{\tau_1\tau_2} = e^{-r(\tau_1 - t_0)}SCC_{\tau_1} - e^{-r(\tau_2 - t_0)}SCC_{\tau_2}$$

• "Correction factor" compared to SCC (eternal riskless project), if x is the growth rate of the SCC:

$$SVO_{\tau_1,\tau_2} = SCC_0 \underbrace{e^{(x-r)\tau_1}}_{delay until \tau_1} \underbrace{(1-e^{(x-r)(\tau_2-\tau_1)})}_{Impermanence}$$

A temporary offset with failure risk

A temporary offset with failure risk

- Constant probability ϕ that the project fails;
- Probability of project surviving longer than τ years is $P(t \ge \tau) = e^{-\phi\tau}$
- The risk has a similar effect as the discount rate

$$SVO^{\phi}_{\tau_1,\tau_2} = \int_{t=\tau_1+\xi}^{\tau_2+\xi} e^{-(r+\phi)(t-\tau_1)} \zeta \underbrace{D_T}_{marg \ damage} dt$$

"Correction factor":

$$SVO^{\phi}_{\tau_{1},\tau_{2}} = SCC_{0} \underbrace{e^{(x-r)\tau_{1}}}_{delay until \tau_{1}} \underbrace{\left(1 - e^{(x-r)(\tau_{2} - \tau_{1})}\right)}_{Impermanence} \frac{(r-x)}{r + \phi - x}_{failure risk}$$

A temporary offset with failure and additionality risk

Additionality risk



Additionality risk

- **Reforestation project**: constant probability φ of non-additionality (reforestation in the baseline) \rightarrow add up ϕ and φ ;
- Conservation project: constant probability $\tilde{\varphi}$ in the baseline that the forest would have disappeared (and the project becomes additional);
- Likelihood of additionality from τ onwards $P(t \leq \tau) = 1 e^{-\tilde{\varphi}\tau}$;
- "Correction factor":

$$SVO_{\tau_{1},\tau_{2}}^{\phi,\widetilde{\varphi}} = SCC_{0} \underbrace{e^{(x-r)\tau_{1}}}_{delay until \tau_{1}} \underbrace{\left(1 - e^{(x-r)(\tau_{2} - \tau_{1})}\right)}_{Impermanence} \begin{bmatrix} (r-x) \\ \hline{r+\phi-x} \\ failure risk \end{bmatrix} - \underbrace{\frac{(r-x)}{r-x+\phi+\widetilde{\varphi}}}_{additionality risk}$$

Correction factors on an arbitrary emissions-damage-temp path

Correction factors on arbitrary path

- Assume damage is quadratic so.....
- Marginal damage: $Y_T = -Y\gamma T$;
- Simple, flexible integral form for the SVO correction factor:

$$\frac{SVO}{SCC} = \frac{e^{-r\tau_1} \int_{\tau_1+\xi}^{\tau_2+\xi} e^{-(r+\phi+\varphi)(t-\tau_1)} \zeta \gamma Y_t T_t dt}{\int_{t=\xi}^{\infty} e^{-rt} \zeta \gamma Y_t T_t dt}$$

- Both the damage factor and the TCRE cancel out!
- Could allow for projects that gradually absorb/emit carbon over time.

SVO Correction Factors: Calibration

- SVO can be used to evaluate optimal net-zero strategy:
- $BCR_i = \frac{SVO_i}{C_i} < \frac{SVO_j}{C_j}$

IPCC	Risk	Risk	SVO Correction factors				SCC $(\$/tCO_2)$			
Scenario	at start	at end	(max.duration, v)				Damages (γ)			
(Temp in	$ ilde{arphi}$	$\phi + \varphi$	25	50	100	∞ How	$\gamma = 0.0077$	$\gamma = 0.0025$		
2100)						Ster	Sterner, 2017			
RCP 2.6	1000	0	24%	44%	70% 🤇	100%	109	35		
$(1.8^{\circ}\mathrm{C})$		0.25	23%	42%	63%	83%	109	35		
		0.5	23%	40%	58%	71%	109	35		
	0.5	0	23%	43%	69%	99%	109	35		
		0.25	22%	40%	62%	82%	109	35		
		0.5	21%	38%	56%	69%	109	35		
	0.25	0	21%	41%	67%	97%	109	35		
		0.25	20%	39%	60%	80%	109	35		
		0.5	20%	36%	54%	68%	109	35		
RCP 3.4	1000	0	19%	37%	66%	100%	142	46		
(2.6°)		0.25	19%	35%	59%	81%	142	46		
		0.5	18%	33%	53%	68%	142	46		
	0.5	0	18%	36%	65%	99%	142	46		
		0.25	18%	34%	58%	80%	142	46		
		0.5	17%	32%	52%	67%	142	46		
	0.25	0	17%	35%	63%	97%	142	46		
		0.25	16%	33%	56%	79%	142	46		
		0.5	16%	31%	51%	66%	142	46		

SVO Correction Factors: Calibration

- Is permanence always desirable?
- 5*25 year offset = 1*infinite offset.
- Easier contracts?

IPCC	Risk	Risk	SV	VO Corre	SCC $(\$/tCO_2)$			
Scenario	at start	at end	$(\max. duration, v)$				Damages (γ)	
(Temp in 2100)	$ ilde{arphi}$	$\phi+\varphi$	25	50	100	∞	$\gamma = 0.0077$	$\gamma = 0.0025$
RCP 6.0	1000	0	17%	34%	64%	100%	161	52
$(3.1^{\circ}C)$		0.25	17%	32%	57%	81%	161	52
		0.5	16%	31%	51%	67%	161	52
	0.5	0	16%	33%	63%	99%	161	52
		0.25	16%	31%	56%	80%	161	52
		0.5	15%	30%	50%	66%	161	52
	0.25	0	15%	32%	61%	98%	161	52
		0.25	14%	30%	55%	78%	161	52
		0.5	14%	28%	49%	65%	161	52
RCP 8.5	1000	0	13%	29%	60%	100%	233	76
$(5.1^{\circ}C)$		0.25	13%	27%	53%	79%	233	76
		0.5	12%	25%	47%	64%	233	76
	0.5	0	12%	28%	59%	99%	233	76
		0.25	12%	26%	52%	78%	233	76
		0.5	12%	24%	46%	64%	233	76
	0.25	0	11%	27%	58%	98%	233	76
		0.25	11%	25%	51%	77%	233	76
		0.5	11%	24%	45%	63%	233	76

Cost Effectiveness Framing

Two 'Carbon Equivalent' Projects:

- i) A permanent project;
- ii) Portfolio of a temporary and a permanent project;
- Portfolio preferred if:

$$C_{\tau_1,\infty} > C_{\tau_1,\tau_2} + e^{-r(\tau_2 - \tau_1)} C_{\tau_2,\infty}$$

• Defining x as the mean rate of increase in the cost of projects:

$$C_{\tau_1,\tau_2} < (1 - e^{(x-r)(\tau_2 - \tau_1)}) C_{\tau_1,\infty}$$

- If x is the efficient growth (of SCC) we obtain our previous result (x < r);
- Under Cost Effectiveness: x = r (Hotellings Rule);
 - Temporary projects are worthless: ignore the delay value;
 - Non-welfare maximizing x will give non-welfare maximizing decision rule.

Conclusion

- Offsets: impermanent, risky and potentially non-additional: still have social value (SVO) due to delay (between zero and the SCC);
- Nature based solutions: although often uncertain, are not valueless;
- The BCR of NBS can be competitive compared to other offset technologies;
- CEA does not value the benefits of delay; CBA better (using SVO)
- Policy and governance:
 - Carney Task Force: contracting should take into account SVO;
 - Offset risk-ratings;
 - Disclosure by providers;
 - Comparisons can be done using our value-based correction factor
 - Extensions to systematic risks

Thanks!

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Additional Slides

Offsets and Net-zero

Offset prices have risen this year amid growing demand

S&P carbon credit prices (\$/MtCO2e)

Corsia-eligible offsets*
 Nature-based offsets

Household devices offsets**

https://www.ft.com/content/cfaa16bf-ce5d-4543-ac9c-9d9234e10e9d

Jun 14 21

Jul 5 21

Aug 2 21

2

Calibration

Table 1: Adjustment factors for non-permanence and risk. We assume a quadratic damages proportional to GDP $exp\left(-\frac{\gamma}{2}T^2\right)$ with damage parameters of Howard and Sterner (2017) (Column 8) as well as Nordhaus (2017) (Column 9). Temperature pathways evolve according to SSP1-RCP2.6; SSP4-RCP3.4; SSP4-RCP6.0 and SSP5-RCP8.5 (Riahi et al. 2017, www.https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at). Other parameters are r = 3.2%; $\tau_1 = 3year$; $\zeta = 0.0006^{\circ}C/GtCO_2$; GDPgrowth = 2%; $T_0 = 1.2^{\circ}C$. We use equation 9. For $\tilde{\varphi} = [0.5 \ 0.25]$ the likelihood that the project is additional after 5 years is 92% and 71% respectively. For $\varphi + \phi = [0.0025 \ 0.005]$ the likelihood that the project is additional after 50 years is 78% and 88% respectively.