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Passive Quantitative Easing: Bond Supply Effects through a Halt to Debt Issuance

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&

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Abstract

This article presents empirical evidence of a supply-induced transmission channel to longterm interest rates caused by a halt to government debt issuance. This is conceptually equivalent to a central bank-operated asset purchase program, commonly known as quantitative easing (QE). However, as it involves neither asset purchases nor associated creation of central bank reserves, we refer to it as *passive* QE. We introduce a general classification scheme of central bank balance sheet policies according to which passive QE is likely quite stimulative. For evidence, we analyze the response of Danish government bond risk premia to a temporary halt in government debt issuance announced by the Danish National Bank. The results suggest that declines in long-term yields during its enforcement reflected both reduced term premia, consistent with supply-induced portfolio balance effects, and increased safety premia, consistent with safe assets scarcity effects.

JEL Classification: E43, E47, G12, G13

Keywords: unconventional monetary policy, portfolio balance effects, safety premia

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1 Introduction

The literature on asset price effects arising from central bank large-scale asset purchases, commonly known as quantitative easing (QE), has identified two distinct portfolio balance effects tied to financial frictions. One is caused by imperfect asset substitutability derived from the reduced supply of the purchased assets; see Gagnon et al. (2011) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), among many others. The other is due to the segmentation of the market for central bank reserves and works through banks' portfolio responses to associated reserves expansions; see Christensen and Krogstrup (2019, 2022). However, when a central bank operates a QE program, it is nearly impossible to distinguish between these two effects empirically as both transmission channels are operating simultaneously.

For separate identification of supply-induced portfolio balance effects—the main transmission channel emphasized in the literature—this paper argues that we need to focus on a halt to government debt issuance. This is so because such a policy is conceptually equivalent to a central bank-operated bond purchase program in that they both reduce the anticipated market supply of government bonds. However, there are two important differences that ensure the stated identification. First and most importantly, there is no creation of central bank reserves and hence no reserve-induced portfolio balance effects by definition. Second, without any active bond purchases by the central bank, there is also no change in the bargaining power between buyers and sellers in the market for government bonds and hence no reduction in bond liquidity risk premia; see Christensen and Gillan (2022). As a consequence, we refer to this unique policy as *passive* QE.

To put passive QE into perspective relative to conventional active QE programs, we introduce a novel classification scheme that can be used to jointly rank fiscal and central bank balance sheet outcomes across time and central bank jurisdictions. Its structure is centered around the 45 degree line, which marks the neutral line for balance sheet changes relative to changes in the outstanding amount of government debt. We then propose to use the minimum orthogonal distance to the 45 degree line as a way to rank such joint outcomes. According to this classification, passive QE is likely to have quite positive effects on financial conditions on par with—if not stronger than—conventional active QE programs.

For empirical evidence on the financial market impact of passive QE, we focus on Denmark, where the government in January 2015 unexpectedly announced a halt to government debt issuance that lasted until October 2015 and, by our estimates, reduced the outstanding amount of Danish government bonds by 29.9 billion Danish krones (about 5 billion U.S. dollars). The shortfall in issuance was never made up, as the Danish government had sufficient funds in its general account with the Danish National Bank (DNB) for its operations during this period. As a result, this policy permanently lowered the trajectory for the outstanding amount of Danish government debt. Moreover, Denmark is a near-ideal place for examining the financial market effects of passive QE thanks to its very long-established peg to the euro.¹ This implies that the announcement of the halt to government debt issuance was unlikely to affect investors' expectations about future monetary policy. This effectively rules out the signaling channel as a relevant transmission mechanism.²

We demonstrate the use of our novel classification scheme by comparing the Danish debt halt episode to annual fiscal and monetary policy outcomes in the United States between 2009 and 2023. The results show that the Danish debt halt is only outranked by the joint fiscal and central bank balance sheet outcome in 2013 when the Federal Reserve was operating its third QE program and the U.S. fiscal deficit was moderate. All other annual U.S. outcomes are ranked below the Danish debt halt episode in terms of their minimum distance to the neutral 45 degree line. Hence, we expect the debt halt to have had a positive impact on the Danish government bond market.

To analyze the potential transmission channels of the expected positive effects in a unified framework, we use the preferred dynamic term structure model of Danish government bond prices identified by Christensen and Hetland (2023, henceforth CH). In addition to providing estimates of standard term premia, this model also accounts for bond-specific safety premia as in Christensen and Mirkov (2022).

To examine the impact on Danish government bond risk premia from the announced debt halt, we regress Danish bond-specific safety and general term premium estimates on a dummy variable that is equal to one for the duration of the halt to debt issuance. Since both types of risk premia are likely to have been affected by the European Central Bank's (ECB) public sector bond purchase program (PSPP) ongoing at the time, we include two different measures of their size: one is the collateral scarcity premium of German government bonds, defined as the difference between the ECB deposit facility and the general collateral repo rate for German government bonds; the other is the ECB's holdings of government-backed securities acquired under the PSPP relative to nominal GDP in the euro area.³ Beyond these main policy variables, we control for a variety of additional confounding factors with a total of 15 variables.

The results show that the average Danish safety premium was 16-21 basis points higher than could otherwise have been anticipated for the duration of the halt to debt issuance. At the same time, the Danish ten-year term premium was reduced 35-68 basis points. Given that the safety premium represents the extra yield investors forgo by holding the very safe Danish government bonds, a higher safety premium is equivalent to a lower absolute yield. Hence, the combined results suggest that Danish government bond yields were significantly

¹Before the launch of the euro in 1999, the Danish krone was pegged to the German mark for many years. ²For a discussion of, and evidence on, the signaling transmission channel of QE for U.S. data, see Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) and Bauer and Rudebusch (2014).

³Although the ECB also purchased other securities such as corporate bonds and asset-backed securities during this period, we focus on its holdings of government bonds as the relevant measure of substitutes for Danish government bonds.

lower than they otherwise would have been by between 51 basis points and as much as 89 basis points for the duration of the halt to debt issuance.

Based on these findings we conclude that passive QE works mainly by lowering standard term premia—a result consistent with standard supply-induced portfolio balance effects— but also by lifting bond safety premia, which would be consistent with the scarcity safety premium channel highlighted by Christensen et al. (2023). Furthermore, given that the size of our estimated effects is quantitatively similar to those reported in studies of QE programs in the United States and the United Kingdom,⁴ our results suggest that passive QE may be about as effective at lowering long-term interest rates and easing financial market conditions as traditional active QE programs, as also suggested by our classification scheme.

In light of the recent elevated level of inflation around the world, it is important for policymakers and investors alike to understand the effects of both QE and quantitative tightening (QT), that is, how central bank bond purchases and sales affect bond yields through different risk premia and over the term structure. Given that QT—where it has been implemented—in many ways can be viewed as a passive reversal of previous QE programs by simply letting bonds mature with at most partial reinvestment, we feel compelled to point out the differences and similarities between the passive QE analyzed in this paper and the passive QT alluded to above.

Under passive QT, when government bonds reach maturity, the government issues new long-term bonds to obtain the funds to pay off the holders of maturing bonds. This produces an upward push on bond yields through the supply-induced transmission mechanism identified in this paper. The central bank then receives its share of these funds and uses it to cancel a matching amount of outstanding reserves. As a result, the banking sector as a whole will see its assets and liabilities reduced by a magnitude equal to the amount of maturing bonds held by the central bank. In response to these exogenous changes to their balance sheets, banks are likely to rebalance their portfolios, which may produce additional reserve-induced portfolio balance effects, as described in Christensen and Krogstrup (2019, 2022). Moreover, if this is taking place in a government bond market like the Danish one in which the bonds can command a safety convenience premium, the added bond supply is likely to put downward pressure on the safety premium through the scarcity channel, as also documented in this paper. In summary, passive QT may raise interest rates through two separate portfolio balance channels in addition to the scarcity channel. As such, it has the potential to be even more effectful than passive QE and hence quite contractionary for financial conditions.^{5,6}

The analysis in this paper relates to several important literatures. Most directly, it con-

⁴See Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) for an example.

⁵Note that, thanks to forward-looking behavior on the part of investors, a significant share of the increase in interest rates from passive QT is likely to materialize upon announcement and not when bonds held by the central bank actually mature.

⁶During the 2022-2023 monetary policy tightening cycle in the United States and elsewhere, passive QT coincided with large and rapid increases in conventional policy rates. This concurrence makes it almost impossible to isolate tightening effects on interest rates from QT during that episode.

tributes to the voluminous literature on the financial market effects of central bank large-scale asset purchases. Second, our results relate to research on financial market convenience and safety premia. Finally, the paper also speaks to the nascent literature about the economic consequences of QT when central banks scale back the size of their balance sheets.⁷

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our novel classification scheme of central bank balance sheet policies and ranks the Danish debt relative to U.S. fiscal and central bank balance sheet outcomes in the 2009-2023 period. Section 3 details the Danish halt to debt issuance, while Section 4 describes the estimated Danish bond risk premia used in the analysis. Section 5 examines the effects of the debt halt on the bond risk premia before Section 6 concludes the paper. Appendices available online contain details about the change to Swiss exchange rate policy in Janaury 2015, the Danish government bond data, and the model used.

2 Central Bank Balance Sheet Policy Classification Scheme

In this section, to put the Danish debt halt and passive QE more broadly into perspective relative to conventional active QE, we introduce a general classification scheme of central bank balance sheet policies that is intended to serve as a tool to quantify and rank the easing or tightening of financial conditions associated with a given balance sheet change relative to other periods with QE or QT. The ultimate purpose is to establish that the Danish debt halt qualifies as a significant QE episode that is comparable to the conventional active QE programs studied in the literature in terms of its potential for having had stimulative effects on financial markets.

The starting point for our classification scheme of central bank balance sheet policies is the change in outstanding marketable government debt.⁸ Provided a given balance sheet policy entails buying or selling an amount of government bonds equal to the change in their outstanding supply during that same period, we will refer to this policy as neutral. When the government runs a deficit and increases the amount of debt, a neutral balance sheet policy therefore involves bond purchases and we label it neutral QE. In the rare case where the government is running a surplus and ends up reducing the outstanding supply of bonds, and the central bank offsets that reduction by scaling back its balance sheet by a matching amount, we refer to that as neutral QT. To facilitate comparability across time, we choose to scale all numbers by nominal GDP. Hence, the relevant measures to consider in our proposed classification scheme are the changes in the amount of marketable government debt as a share of nominal GDP and the changes in the central bank's securities holdings, also as a share of nominal GDP. In Figure 1, they represent the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. Using

 $^{^{7}}$ See Vissing-Jorgensen (2023) for a theoretical discussion of central bank balance sheet policies and the role of reserves.

⁸For ease of exposition we limit the discussion to purchases and sales of government bonds, but it can easily be extended to include other classes of assets.



Figure 1: Illustration of Balance Sheet Policy Classification Scheme

this definition, neutral QE and neutral QT outcomes combined constitute the 45 degree line in the figure, each shown with a green and yellow line, respectively.

To have a consistent ranking of outcomes, we propose to use the minimum distance to the neutral 45 degree line. To calculate this, we label the change in outstanding government debt relative to nominal GDP by ΔGov_t and the change in the central bank's securities holdings, also relative to nominal GDP, by ΔCB_t . Using these terms and classic trigonometric calculus, the minimum distance to the neutral 45 degree line is given by

Min. dist. =
$$\sqrt{\Delta Gov_t^2 + \Delta CB_t^2} \cdot sin\left(\frac{\pi}{4} - \arctan\left(\frac{\Delta CB_t}{\Delta Gov_t}\right)\right)$$
,

where we note that the distance will be positive for outcomes below the 45 degree line and negative for outcomes above the 45 degree line.

We stress that the neutral 45 degree line is *not* intended to be a statement about the absolute financial market impact of announcing and implementing a given central bank balance sheet policy change—that impact must be measured relative to what financial market participants were expecting prior to the announcement; see Christensen and Krogstrup (2019) for an example. Rather, it is intended to serve as a device to create a baseline against which different fiscal and central bank balance sheet outcomes can be compared and contrasted. Furthermore, implicit in the neutral 45 degree baseline is the notion that it is the *joint* outcome of fiscal policy and central bank balance sheet policy that matters. While the minimum distance to the 45 degree line embeds an adjustment of both fiscal and monetary policy, the central bank only controls the latter. Hence, our rank measure is not intended to be viewed as an alternative actionable outcome that would have brought about some kind of neutral

outcome. Instead, in comparing two different outcomes of fiscal and monetary policy, say, in one calendar year versus another, it does provide a sense of how much fiscal and monetary policy jointly would have had to change in each year to have been on the neutral line as opposed to the actually realized outcomes. As such, we think of differences in those distances as a meaningful measure of differences in the stimulative effects of joint fiscal and monetary policy outcomes that can be compared across time and central bank jurisdictions.

Turning to our concept of passive QE, we note that it by definition involves no adjustment to the balance sheet of the central bank at the same time as the government effectively reduces government bond supply by not issuing any new bonds and letting old ones mature. Hence, passive QE is represented by the negative part of the horizontal axis and shown with a solid red line in Figure 1. By analogy, the positive part of the horizontal axis is labelled passive QT and highlighted with a solid blue line as the central bank is passively observing the government increasing the supply of government bonds during periods of fiscal deficits.

Focusing on the Danish debt halt in January 2015 marked with a purple cross in the figure, we note that it falls on the passive QE line as that policy involved no change in the balance sheet of the DNB. Still, according to our estimate described in the following section, it reduced the anticipated amount of outstanding government debt by almost 1.5 percent of Danish nominal GDP in 2015. Notably, this joint policy outcome lies above the neutral QE line, and comparable policy outcomes involving active QE with a positive change in the central bank's securities holdings and a similar distance to the neutral 45 degree line are shown with purple dots.

To demonstrate the use of our classification scheme and to put the Danish debt halt policy into an international perspective, we calculate the annual outcome of fiscal and monetary policy in the United States in the 2009-2023 period during which the balance sheet size of the Federal Reserve was a cornerstone of U.S. monetary policy. These numbers are listed in the first two columns in Table 1 and shown with blue crosses in Figure 1. The changes in the outstanding amount of marketable U.S. Treasury securities are based on data collected from the December statements of the Public Debt of the United States, which report the total outstanding federal government debt as of December 31 for each year.⁹ The changes in the Federal Reserve's securities holdings are based on data collected from the last weekly H.4.1 release each year.¹⁰ These statements contain weekly reports on factors affecting reserve balances, including the Fed's outright holdings of securities. For the annual U.S. fiscal and monetary policy outcomes, the associated minimum distance to the neutral 45 degree line are reported in the final column of Table 1.

Using our scheme, we note that most periods with QE programs operated by the U.S. Federal Reserve have actually been below the neutral QE line as indicated by their positive

 $^{^{9}}$ See https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/datasets/monthly-statement-public-debt/summary-of-treasury-securities-outstanding

¹⁰See https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/

Voor	Change in U.S. government	Change in Fed securities	Min. distance to
Tear	debt over GDP (ΔGov_t)	holdings over GDP (ΔCB_t)	neutral 45^0 line
2009	0.1019	0.0931	0.0062
2010	0.1057	0.0207	0.0601
2011	0.0688	0.0293	0.0279
2012	0.0687	0.0029	0.0465
2013	0.0484	0.0653	-0.0120
2014	0.0369	0.0275	0.0066
2015	0.0376	-0.0003	0.0268
2016	0.0380	-0.0011	0.0277
2017	0.0285	0.0001	0.0201
2018	0.0551	-0.0166	0.0507
2019	0.0494	-0.0060	0.0392
2020	0.2016	0.1397	0.0437
2021	0.0682	0.0652	0.0021
2022	0.0524	-0.0049	0.0405
2023	0.0889	-0.0336	0.0866

Table 1: Changes to the Outstanding Amount of Marketable U.S. Treasury Securities and the Fed's Securities Holdings

The table reports the calender year changes to the outstanding amount of marketable U.S. Treasury securities along with the calendar year changes to the Federal Reserve's securities holdings and the resulting minimum distance to the 45 degree line that marks a neutral stance for the annual change in the central bank securities holdings. The year with the most stimulative balance sheet change according to this ranking is highlighted in bold.

ranking numbers. Hence, in the 15 years between the start of 2009 and the end of 2023, the Fed at best periodically kept pace with the expansion in marketable U.S. Treasury debt—admittedly a formidable task given the significant increase in U.S. Treasury debt during this period.

Furthermore, some interesting individual years stand out. In 2022, when the Fed and most other central banks around the world raised interest rates significantly, its balance sheet policy was closer to the neutral line than in 2020, when it expanded its balance sheet by almost 14 percent of GDP in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the following year, though, the Fed scaled back its balance sheet in a decisive way by more than 3 percent of GDP. As this happened in the context of a large government deficit, the joint fiscal and monetary policy outcome for that calendar year is ranked as the most restrictive relative to the neutral line based on our scheme.

Importantly for our analysis, only 2013 is ranked as being above the neutral line with an absolute distance to the neutral line of 0.012. This was the year when the Fed operated its third QE program, commonly known as QE3, which was its largest program prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, a significant contribution to this ranking came from a below-average government deficit that year.

With an estimated reduction in government debt of 1.47 percent of GDP, the Danish debt

halt in 2015 has an absolute distance to the 45 degree line of 1.04. Hence, the Danish debt halt episode has a ranking almost on par with one of the most active QE periods in the U.S. once we factor in the change in the outstanding amount of government debt. Provided the U.S. QE3 program is viewed as having been quite stimulative for financial conditions in the U.S.,¹¹ our proposed classification scheme would suggest that the Danish debt halt in 2015 likely had quite significant stimulative effects on Danish government bond yields as well.

To conclude the section, we briefly touch upon a few practical considerations. First, the absolute size of the central bank's balance sheet may weigh on the general level of interest rates in the economy. Our measure emphasizes that it is the change in its size relative to the change in the bond supply brought to market that is relevant in comparing different balance sheet policies over time and across jurisdictions.

Second, one potential caveat about our basic scheme detailed above is that it makes no adjustment for differences in maturity or duration between the bonds purchased or sold by the central bank and the maturity and duration profile of the outstanding government debt. Hence, all bonds are treated equally independent of their coupon sizes and remaining time to maturity. We note that it would be straightforward to use maturity-adjusted amounts instead, say, measure securities in ten-year equivalents as has been done in the literature. Given that our application of the scheme is intended to be illustrative, we leave such refinements for future research.

Third, consistent with the existing literature on QE, we leave central bank reserves out of consideration given that they are safe assets that are immediately redeemable and have zero duration. This also maps to our example of passive QE where the Danish debt halt is matched by the Danish government drawing down on the money in its account at the DNB. For the joint balance sheet of the government and the central bank neither active nor passive QE change anything fundamentally.¹²

Additional minor, but still potentially relevant details about passive QE include the following. Clearly, omitting to do something leaves less of a trail than actively doing something. This applies to passive QE as well. There are generally fewer details available: The duration of the policy is left unspecified, the securities that could have been issued but end up *not* being so are unknown etc. On a somewhat related note, the duration of securities acquired in active QE programs are mostly not newly issued, but rather seasoned. This contrasts with passive QE where it is exactly new securities that are *not* being issued. Hence, all else being equal, the amount of duration risk *not* coming to market under passive QE would seem to be larger than the amount of duration risk taken out of the market under a comparable active QE program.

 $^{^{11}\}mathrm{See}$ D'Amico and Seida (2024) and references therein for evidence of the stimulative effects of the U.S. QE3 program.

¹²Obviously, this changes in the extreme case when there is no more government debt outstanding and the central bank will have to start buying other, less safe assets, a case we leave for future research.

Overall, the key takeaway for our analysis from the illustrative use of our novel classification scheme is that we can expect a debt halt as a policy to ease financial conditions by magnitudes similar to those generated by comparable active QE programs. The rest of the paper is dedicated to testing this conjecture.

3 The Danish Halt to Debt Issuance in 2015

In early 2015, there was extreme market pressure for the Danish krone to appreciate. During the first two months of the year the DNB increased its foreign reserves by 275 billion krones, or more than 40 billion U.S. dollars, an unprecedented amount in such a short period.¹³

The background for this immense pressure was that the Swiss National Bank had discontinued its minimum exchange rate to the euro on January 15, 2015, which resulted in an immediate and dramatic appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro.¹⁴ In addition, the ECB had announced its first outright QE program on January 22, 2015. Importantly, in that market environment, speculation in favor of the Danish krone could be considered almost risk-free. Either the DNB would be forced to give up the peg to the euro, which would mean that the Danish krone would most likely appreciate strongly against the euro as the Swiss franc had in mid-January, or the peg would be maintained and investors would be able to freely convert their acquired Danish krones back into euros at the existing exchange rate.

Faced with this pressure, the DNB unexpectedly announced on January 30, 2015, that the Danish government had decided—following advice from the DNB—to halt debt issuance for the foreseeable future.¹⁵ The announcement noted that the government expected to have sufficient funds for its operations at least through the end of 2015. Furthermore, it added that Danish long-term bond yields remained high despite a significant reduction in the DNB's key overnight policy rate to -0.50 percent and outsized purchases of foreign currency. The stated expectation was that the halt would help lower long-term bond yields, which were above their German counterparts, and thereby reduce the inflow of foreign currency.

During the ensuing spring and summer, financial market flows normalized. As a consequence, on August 26, the DNB was able to announce that debt issuance would be resumed as of October 1, 2015.¹⁶ In practice, the halt ended with the issuance of a three-year bond on October 25, 2015.

The DNB serves as the debt manager of the Danish government. In this role, it aims to maintain liquidity in the secondary market for government bonds through frequent reopen-

 $^{^{13}}$ See p. 105 in Abildgren (2022).

¹⁴See online Appendix A for details of the Swiss financial market reaction to the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate policy.

 $^{^{15}}$ See https://www.nationalbanken.dk/da/viden-og-nyheder/presse/arkiv/2015/stop-for-salg-af-statsobligationer-30-01-2015

 $^{^{16}} See \ https://www.nationalbanken.dk/da/viden-og-nyheder/presse/arkiv/2015/genoptagelse-af-statsobligationssalg-og-nedsaettelse-af-foliorammer-26-08-2015$

	New issuance			Buybacks		et issuance
	2015	Avg. 2016-2018	2015	Avg. 2016-2018	2015	Avg. 2016-2018
January	5,790	$7,\!803$	700	$3,\!688$	5,090	$4,\!115$
February	—	8,755	375	5,235	-375	3,520
March	—	6,953	200	2,928	-200	4,025
April	—	$6,\!663$	400	5,083	-400	1,580
May	2,000	$7,\!317$	$3,\!550$	$6,\!153$	-1,550	1,163
June	—	$7,\!807$	$4,\!950$	4,918	-4,950	2,888
July	2,500	4,388	$3,\!340$	4,765	-840	-377
August	—	$6,\!607$	$5,\!150$	$3,\!148$	-5,150	$3,\!458$
September	—	$7,\!547$	1,215	8,623	-1,215	-1,077
October	14,180	6,548	$6,\!420$	$4,\!637$	7,760	1,912
November	17,330	$7,\!157$	$5,\!405$	$3,\!342$	11,925	$3,\!815$
December	$2,\!440$	$3,\!678$	$4,\!695$	$2,\!430$	-2,255	1,248
Total, FebSep.	4,500	56,037	19,180	40,855	-14,680	15,182

Table 2: Changes to the Outstanding Amount of Danish Government Bonds The table reports the monthly changes to the outstanding amount of Danish government bonds caused by issuance of new bonds and buybacks of existing bonds during 2015 along with the average of the corresponding changes in 2016, 2017, and 2018. The last line reports the net changes for the period from February to September both for 2015 and averaged for the years 2016, 2017, and 2018. All numbers are measured in millions of Danish krones.

ings and about as frequent buyback auctions of existing bond series.¹⁷ At the start of 2015, the stated target for government bond issuance for the 2015 calendar year was 75 billion Danish krones and with no details about the intended buyback strategy.¹⁸ Furthermore, the target average duration of government debt was left unchanged at 12.5 years with admissible deviations of \pm 1 year. Thus, investors are not likely to have anticipated any major changes to either the issuance pattern or the debt maturity profile at the time of the announcement. Therefore, to get an estimate of the missing volumes of issuance and buybacks during the eight-month period the debt issuance halt was in place, we compare the change in the outstanding volume between February 1, 2015, and September 30, 2015, with the average change during the corresponding period in the years 2016, 2017, and 2018. These numbers are reported in Table 2.¹⁹ We note that, in the February-September period of 2016-2018, the average net issuance amount was 15.2 billion Danish krones. In 2015, the corresponding number shows a net decline in the outstanding amount of bonds equal to 14.7 billion Danish krones as buybacks continued, albeit at lower volumes compared with the 2016-2018 period. Although uncertain, we take these numbers to suggest that the outstanding amount of Danish

 $^{^{17} \}rm The$ Danish National Bank also operates a security lending facility that is open to all primary dealers and applies to all government securities provided their notional amounts are above a certain minimum. No changes were made to the operation of this facility during the period under analysis. Further details can be found at: https://www.nationalbanken.dk/media/whfjr1zn/terms-for-securities-lending.pdf

¹⁸See p. 8 of Danish National Bank (2015).

¹⁹The halt was not fully enforced as there were two small reopening auctions of a single bond in May and July 2015 to improve liquidity in the government bond market.



Figure 2: Yield Responses to Debt Halt Announcements

Panel (a) shows the one- and two-day responses of the outstanding Danish government bond yields to the announcement of the halt to debt issuance on January 30, 2015. Panel (b) shows the oneand two-day responses of the outstanding Danish government bond yields to the announcement of the resumption of debt issuance on August 26, 2015. The data are downloaded from Bloomberg.

government bonds is likely to have been reduced by about 29.9 billion Danish krones thanks to the debt issuance halt. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the government tried to make up for this shortfall by subsequently increasing its debt issuance. As a result, this unique policy choice appears to have effectively lowered the trajectory for the outstanding amount of government debt permanently.

Because the announcement of the debt halt was unexpected and involved notable volumes, it would be reasonable to expect an immediate reaction from bond investors. To explore that conjecture, we examine the one- and two-day reactions of Danish government bond yields to the announcement for the set of bonds outstanding at the time. Figure 2(a) shows how the entire Danish government bond yield curve varied during the two-day event window. We note a moderate immediate reaction lower across the yield curve on January 30, 2015, which was likely tempered because it happened on a Friday. By Monday's close on February 2, 2015, though, we see the full market reaction, which reveals a forceful movement lower in the entire yield curve of about 25 basis points. Crucially, given how low interest rates were already, the forceful immediate reaction to the announcement of the debt halt can be considered to be quite large.

Figure 2(b) shows the one- and two-day yield responses to the announcement of the resumption of debt issuance on August 26, 2015. We note a very modest, almost indifferent reaction to this announcement, even though a two-day event window still registers the anticipated *positive* uptick in the bond yields.

SNB announcement on January 15, 2015											
Maturity 1-year 2-year 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year											
1/14-2015	0.86	-11.89	-11.66	6.68	31.62	64.90					
1/16-2015	-2.38	-15.27	-15.14	3.10	27.99	61.25					
Change	-3.24	-3.38	-3.47	-3.58	-3.63	-3.66					

ECB announcement on January 22, 2015											
Maturity 1-year 2-year 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year											
1/21-2015	-16.71	-27.59	-25.97	-5.78	20.27	54.49					
1/23-2015	-27.04	-38.08	-36.48	-16.13	10.15	44.72					
Change	-10.33	-10.49	-10.51	-10.35	-10.11	-9.77					

DNB announcement on January 30, 2015											
Maturity	Maturity 1-year 2-year 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year										
1/29-2015	-32.93	-40.29	-36.69	-15.08	10.86	44.16					
2/2-2015	-62.11	-68.61	-64.21	-41.21	-14.20	20.24					
Change	-29.18	-28.32	-27.52	-26.14	-25.06	-23.92					

Table 3: **Response of Danish Government Bond Yields to Key Announcements** The table reports the two-day response of Danish government zero-coupon bond yields to the announcement by the SNB to discontinue its minimum exchange rate to the euro on January 15, 2015, the ECB's announcement of the PSPP on January 22, 2015, and the DNB's announcement to halt debt issuance on January 30, 2015. All numbers are measured in basis points.

For perspective and to put the market reaction above into context, we contrast the Danish bond market reaction to three key events in January 2015: the SNB announcement on January 15, 2015, when it discontinued its minimum exchange rate to the euro; the ECB's announcement of the PSPP on January 22, 2015; and the DNB's announcement to halt debt issuance on January 30, 2015. For consistency across events, we use the fitted zero-coupon vields from an arbitrage-free Nelson-Siegel (AFNS) model estimated on the full sample of daily Danish government bond prices covering the period from January 4, 1999, to December 31, 2021, as recommended by Andreasen et al. (2019). Table 3 reports the two-day yield response around each of these three announcements. First, we note a modest uniform reaction to the SNB announcement with a decline of about 3.5 basis points in the entire yield curve. We add that this would be our best estimate of the bond yield impact from an onset of expectations about a potential appreciation of the Danish krone against the euro triggered by the SNB discontinuing its minimum exchange rate to the euro. With a positive probability of an appreciation of the Danish krone to the euro, foreign investors should be willing to hold Danish bonds at lower interest rates than otherwise in light of the potential to earn an extra return through the exchange rate appreciation in case the peg were to be abandoned. The market reaction offers suggestive evidence that the SNB announcement indeed gave rise to



Figure 3: Danish 5-Year CDS Rate

the formation of such expectations.

Second, we find a stronger uniform reaction to the ECB's announcement of the PSPP with a decline of about 10 basis points in the entire yield curve. This matches similar declines in euro-area long-term interest rates and likely reflects a mix of both signaling and portfolio balance effects.²⁰

Against this background, the market reaction to the DNB's debt halt announcement is even more impressive, both in terms of its magnitude and given the fact that it took place from an overall lower yield level than the two previous announcements. Thus, the Danish debt halt announcement stands out in terms of its impact on Danish government bond yields. Moreover, provided the announcement was interpreted by investors to imply an elimination of any meaningful appreciation opportunities, Danish yields should have *increased* to maintain an unchanged expected return measured in euros.²¹ Instead, they *declined*. As a consequence, our reported results are likely best interpreted as lower bound estimates of the true market impact of the reduced bond supply following the Danish debt halt.

As for the credit risk of Danish government bonds, we note that the Danish government has held a AAA credit rating with Moody's since August 23, 1999, and with Standard & Poor's since February 27, 2001.²² Overall, this points to a very low level of credit risk in

²⁰Altavilla et al. (2021) report intraday declines in French, German, Italian, and Spanish ten-year government bond yields of 10-13 basis points in response to the initial announcement of the PSPP on January 22, 2015.

²¹An examination of the Swiss episode described in online Appendix A shows that Swiss bond yields declined when the SNB discontinued its the minimum exchange rate policy and allowed the Swiss franc to appreciate strongly against the euro.

²²Source: http://www.worldgovernmentbonds.com/credit-rating/denmark/



Figure 4: Danish Government Debt-to-GDP Ratio

general for the bonds issued by the Danish government.

To provide further support in favor of this view, Figure 3 shows the Danish 5-year CDS rate from mid-2008 until December 2021. For our key period under analysis from January 30, 2015, to August 26, 2015, the Danish 5-year CDS rate averaged 19.42 basis points with a standard deviation of 0.52 basis point. Hence, credit risk remained low during this period and did not change in any material way.

As a final point to underscore the low level of credit risk of Danish government bonds, we note that the Danish government debt-to-GDP ratio had been on a downward trend since 2012 when it reached 60.6 percent as shown in Figure 4. By 2022, it had dropped to 34.7 percent. In 2015, the Danish government debt-to-GDP ratio was 53.4 percent, down from 59.1 percent in 2014.²³ This comfortable position of Danish government finances at the time also explains why the Danish government and the DNB could decide to simply halt debt issuance for an extended period in January 2015.

Overall, we take this evidence to show that changes to the price of credit risk are not likely to have played any notable role during the period under analysis. Moreover, we stress that we include the debt-to-GDP ratio as a control variable in our regression analysis in an attempt to further minimize the role of credit risk for our results.

Finally, Figure 5 shows the exchange rate of the Danish krone to the euro since 1999. It reveals that the strong market dynamics in early 2015 in terms of volumes flowing into Danish money markets had little impact on the exchange rate. Thus, the price reaction to the debt halt announcement is entirely limited to interest rates and bond yields.

²³Source: https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-debt.htm



Figure 5: Exchange Rate of the Danish Krone to the Euro

In our analysis, we are interested in going beyond the immediate market reactions documented above and examine the more persistent effects on Danish bond risk premia from this unique policy choice. The rest of the paper is devoted to this task.

4 The Estimated Danish Bond Risk Premia

For our analysis we consider the preferred dynamic term structure model of Danish government bond prices identified by CH. We use this model to extract the safety premium in Danish government bond prices and to calculate the ten-year Danish term premium.²⁴

Figure 6 shows the average Danish government bond safety premium across the outstanding bonds at each point in time. The average estimated safety premium varies notably over time: it fell to a minimum of negative 12 basis points in late 2008; it later reached a maximum of 81 basis points in January 2015, shortly after the Swiss National Bank had abandoned its minimum exchange rate to the euro and the ECB had announced its first open-ended largescale purchases of euro-area government bonds. For the entire period, the series has an average of 29 basis points with a standard deviation of 19 basis points.

Figure 6 also shows the Danish ten-year term premium, which has changed little on net, but is characterized by fairly large persistent swings during our sample period. It averages 134 basis points with a standard deviation of 89 basis points. Thus, conventional term premia are an order of magnitude larger and more volatile than safety premia. Still, the two risk premium series have a negative correlation of -53 percent. Given that the safety premium represents

²⁴See online Appendix B for details of the model, its estimation, and the calculation of the bond risk premia.



Figure 6: Average Bond Safety Premium and Ten-Year Term Premium Illustration of the average estimated Danish government bond safety premium and the ten-year term premium of Danish government bonds. The data cover the period from January 31, 1999, to December 31, 2021.

the extra yield investors forgo by holding the very safe Danish government bonds, a higher safety premium is equivalent to a lower absolute yield. Hence, the negative correlation implies that changes in both premia tend to push the observed bond yields in the same direction, but the less-than-perfect correlation underscores that they represent distinct risk premia in the prices of Danish government bonds.

In terms of understanding the impact of the debt halt on Danish bond yields, we note up front that Denmark's exchange rate policy aimed at keeping the Danish krone stable against the euro is of particular importance. Accordingly, as shown in Figure 7, the DNB's key policy rate follows that of the ECB, with small deviations accounting for periods of extraordinary pressure on the krone in either direction. Consequently, the expectations component of longerterm Danish government bond yields tends to mirror those of core euro-area countries. That said, anticipated buying or selling pressures of the Danish krone vis-à-vis the euro may affect investors' near-term expectations about the spread between Danish and euro overnight rates. Overall, though, we are essentially assuming in our analysis that policy expectations in Danish and euro-area fixed-income markets are moving in tandem, and any unilateral actions by the DNB such as the halt to debt issuance analyzed here are assumed to *not* affect investors' policy expectations in any material way, in particular at medium- to long-term horizons. This effectively rules out any major yield effects materializing through the signaling channel.

In contrast, there are several tangible reasons why the risk premium components of Danish



Figure 7: Overnight Rate Differential

Illustration of the difference between the Danish overnight interest rate of the certificates of deposits set by the Danish National Bank and the main overnight rate set by the European Central Bank. The data are monthly covering the period from January 31, 1999, to December 31, 2021.

bond yields may not follow the same pattern as their euro-area counterparts, leading to interest rate spreads of considerable size at longer maturity horizons as described in Grønlund et al. (2022). First, because of the pegged exchange rate policy, unconventional monetary policy in the euro area is likely to have potential spillover effects on the risk premia of Danish government bonds. The ECB's government bond purchases reduce the free float of euroarea government bonds and lower their risk premia as documented by Eser et al. (2019). In a frictionless world, this should give investors an incentive to buy Danish government bonds as a close and safe substitute.²⁵ However, Danish government bonds cannot be used in euro-area general collateral repo agreements, which may make Danish government bonds comparatively less attractive to some investors, thereby dampening demand. Moreover, some investors may not be allowed to invest in Danish government bonds, say, due to restrictions on their investment mandates. Such financial frictions could adversely impact the substitution between euro-area government bonds and Danish bonds, thereby limiting the pass-through of unconventional monetary policy.

5 Regression Analysis

To examine the impact on Danish government bond risk premia from the announced halt to government debt issuance, we use the average Danish safety premium and the ten-year Danish term premium estimates at monthly frequency covering the period from January

 $^{^{25}}$ Koijen et al. (2017) find that foreign investors exhibited the strongest reaction to the ECB's asset purchases under the PSPP in terms of rebalancing their portfolios toward more attractive investment opportunities elsewhere. That process could also have let them to reassess their perceptions about the relative safety of Danish safe assets.

1999 to December 2021. As stated earlier, we are interested in going beyond the immediate announcement effects on bond yields reported in Section 3 and measure the longer lasting impact on the Danish bond risk premia from this policy. We therefore regress these series on a dummy variable that is equal to one for the duration of the halt to debt issuance.

To control for the potential effects of the ECB's government bond purchases on the Danish bond risk premia, we consider two different measures of their size in our regression analysis. The first measure is the collateral scarcity premium of German government bonds, defined as the difference between the ECB deposit facility and general collateral repo rate for German government bonds and measured in percent; see Arrata et al. (2020). When the scarcity premium is positive, funds can be placed in the repo market below the ECB deposit facility rate, possibly reflecting that government bonds are scarce and in demand for repo transactions. The ECB's government bond purchases pushed the German scarcity premium into positive territory for all general collateral segments, as demonstrated by Schaffner et al. (2019). The second measure of the ECB's government bond purchases is the ECB's holdings of government-backed securities relative to annual nominal GDP in the euro area. This serves as a proxy for the amount of truly safe assets held by the ECB, as argued by Christensen and Mirkov (2022).

In addition to these main policy variables, we control for a variety of confounding factors. In a core set of control variables, we consider the CBOE's volatility index (VIX), the spread between Italian and German ten-year bond yields, the TED spread, and the ten-year onthe-run premium in U.S. Treasuries to proxy for investors' risk aversion, financial market uncertainty, and demand for safe-haven assets.²⁶ This set also contains the debt-to-GDP ratio—interpolated linearly from quarterly to monthly frequency—to control for effects tied to the supply of Danish government bonds.²⁷ In addition, it includes the Danish overnight deposit rate as a proxy for the opportunity cost of holding money and the associated liquidity premia of Danish government bonds, as explained in Nagel (2016). Furthermore, we include the average Danish government bond age and the one-month realized volatility of the ten-year Danish government bond yield as additional proxies for bond liquidity following the work of Houwling et al. (2005).²⁸ Inspired by the analysis of Hu et al. (2013), we also include a noise measure of Danish government bond prices to control for the variation in the amount of arbitrage capital available in this market. Finally, as a control for credit risk, we use both the yield spread between Danish and German ten-year government bonds and the difference in the debt-to-GDP ratio between Denmark and Germany,²⁹ and we include the EUR-DKK crosscurrency basis to control for differences in funding costs. To go beyond this set of core control variables, we include a few additional potentially confounding factors in our regressions. We

 $^{^{26}\}mathrm{See}$ Grisse and Nitschka (2015).

 $^{^{27}\}mathrm{See}$ Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012).

²⁸The one-month realized volatility is estimated based on a standard sample estimator using daily yields.

²⁹An alternative measure is the credit default swap rate for Danish government bonds, which unfortunately only is available from 2008 onwards.

add the overnight federal funds rate to proxy for the U.S. safe-asset liquidity premium as in Nagel (2016), and reported earnings per share of companies in the S&P 500 stock price index to account for opportunity costs in the equity market. Finally, we also consider the MOVE volatility index to proxy for risk aversion in global bond markets.

To test for the potential effects of the halt to debt issuance, we run linear regressions that take the form:

$$Y_t = \alpha + \beta \cdot D_t^{halt} + \gamma \cdot QE_t + \delta \cdot X_t + \varepsilon_t, \tag{1}$$

where the dependent variable Y_t is the relevant outcome variable (the average safety premium or the ten-year term premium). In terms of the explanatory variables, D_t^{halt} is the key dummy variable for the government debt issuance stop in 2015, QE_t contains either the scarcity premium or the ECB's holdings of government bonds divided by the nominal euro-area GDP, and X_t contains the controlling variables. Finally, ε_t is an error term.

We run seven regressions for each bond risk premium measure. The first includes no controls to demonstrate that our results carry through even in this naive case. For each proxy for the ECB government bond purchases, we then run three separate regressions, one with no additional controls, another with the core set of controls, and a final one with all controls.

The results of the regressions are reported in Table 4. The empirically relevant results with controls (regressions 3, 4, 6, and 7) show that the average Danish safety premium was 16-21 basis points higher than could otherwise have been anticipated for the duration of the halt to debt issuance. At the same time, the Danish ten-year term premium was reduced by 35-68 basis points. Given that the safety premium represents the extra yield investors forgo by holding the very safe Danish government bonds, a higher safety premium is equivalent to a lower absolute yield. Moreover, given that the two bond risk premia represent separate components in the government bond prices, the estimated effects can be added together. Hence, the combined results suggest that Danish government bond yields were significantly lower than they would otherwise have been by between 51 basis points and as much as 89 basis points for the duration of the halt to debt issuance. Based on these findings we conclude that passive QE works by lowering long-term bond yields through both reduced term premia, which would be consistent with supply-induced portfolio balance effects, and increased safety premia, which would be consistent with scarcity effects of safe assets. Furthermore, given that the size of the estimated effects is quantitatively similar to those reported in studies of QE programs in the United States and the United Kingdom, the results suggest that passive QE may be about as effective at lowering interest rate levels and easing financial market conditions as traditional active QE programs.

Finally, the regression results show that the ECB's bond purchases tend to lower Danish safety premia and lift Danish term premia. These observations are consistent with the findings of both CH for Danish bond risk premia specifically and Christensen et al. (2023) based on

	1		age sarety	1 Ionnum						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)			
D_t^{halt}	33.79***	34.83***	21.04***	19.48^{***}	34.27^{***}	20.01***	15.75**			
	(6.41)	(7.12)	(6.37)	(6.90)	(6.65)	(6.98)	(7.55)			
Scarcity premium		23.81^{*}	-31.00***	-39.11^{**}						
		(16.65)	(15.92)	(17.12)						
(PSPP+PEPP)/GDP					0.13	-0.50**	-1.06^{***}			
					(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.34)			
Controls	None	None	Core	All	None	Core	All			
$\operatorname{Adj} R^2$	0.10	0.11	0.56	0.60	0.10	0.56	0.62			
DW	0.15	0.15	0.32	0.38	0.15	0.30	0.36			
Panel B: Ten-Year Term Premium										
	(1)	(2)	$(\overline{3})$	$(\overline{4})$	$(\overline{5})$	(6)	(7)			
D_t^{halt}	-164.25***	-186.26***	-67.37***	-68.19***	-179.38***	-51.00**	-35.11*			
-	(17.84)	(27.86)	(26.14)	(26.03)	(19.09)	(26.45)	(24.83)			

-19.34

(78.52)

Core

0.75

0.35

15.84

(78.54)

All

0.77

0.39

-4.14***

(1.04)

None

0.28

0.07

2.42***

(0.91)

Core

0.77

0.36

5.74***

(1.31)

All

0.81

0.40

Panel A: Average Safety Premium

Table 4: Estimated Effects of the Halt to Debt Issuance on Danish GovernmentBond Risk Premia

-503.06***

(82.82)

None

0.35

0.10

None

0.11

0.05

Scarcity premium

Controls

Adj R^2

DW

(PSPP+PEPP)/GDP

The top panel reports the estimated coefficients of the regression in equation (1) with the average Danish safety premium as the dependent variable, while the bottom panel reports the estimated coefficients of the same regression with the Danish ten-year term premium as the dependent variable. The numbers in parentheses contain the estimated standard deviations using Newey-West standard errors with three monthly lags. The sample starts in January 1999 and ends in December 2021. Stars *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.

an international panel of safety premia. The negative impact on the Danish safety premia underscores that safe asset purchases by major central banks have the ability to produce international spillover effects by altering investors' perceptions about the scarcity of safe assets in nearby foreign bond markets and hence depress the premium that safe foreign bonds can command. The positive effect on Danish term premia points to an international substitution channel whereby investors rotate out of non-targeted foreign safe assets and use the revenue to increase their exposures to the euro-area government bonds targeted by the ECB's bond purchases.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we argue that a temporary halt to debt issuance by the government is theoretically equivalent to the central bank launching a QE program of similar size in that they both reduce the anticipated future bond supply available to private investors. Operationally, however, this policy is unlikely to affect bond market liquidity conditions as it involves no active bond purchases by the central bank. Moreover, without the creation of any central bank reserves, it cannot produce any reserve-induced portfolio balance effects arising from banks' reaction to the dilution in the average interest rate risk of their asset portfolios. For these reasons it offers a unique opportunity to directly observe supply-induced portfolio balance effects. Furthermore, we introduce a novel classification of joint fiscal and central bank balance sheet outcomes that suggests that a debt halt and the associated portfolio balance effects are likely to be quite stimulative on financial conditions.

For evidence on the effects of such a passive QE policy, we focus on Denmark, where the government unexpectedly announced a halt to debt issuance in January 2015 that ended up lasting until October 2015. An added advantage of focusing on Denmark is that its tight exchange rate peg of the Danish krone to the euro allows us to rule out any signaling effects about future monetary policy from the debt halt announcement. As a consequence, we can limit our analysis to changes in Danish bond-specific safety and general term premia, where our results suggest that the halt raised bond safety premia and lowered term premia for the duration of its enforcement. This points to two main transmission mechanisms of passive QE to financial markets. One operates by raising bond safety premia through a scarcity channel, while the other works by lowering long-term bond yields through standard supply-induced portfolio balance effects on term premia. Based on the latter finding, we claim to be the first to provide *direct* evidence of the supply-induced portfolio balance channel that is the main transmission channel emphasized in the empirical literature on financial market effects of QE.

In terms of the practical relevance of passive QE, it is important to stress that a halt to government debt issuance only represents a viable alternative to launching a regular QE program in order to ease financial conditions provided the government can credibly claim to have sufficient funds to sustain its operations for the committed period. This necessary precondition should be kept in mind when it comes to pursuing this policy. However, as for the identified transmission channels, we think they would apply equally well to other safe government bond markets.

Finally, given that QT in many ways can be viewed as a passive reversal of previous QE programs as explained in the introduction, our findings suggest that this policy may be quite contractionary on financial conditions. However, we leave it for future research to examine that conjecture.

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Online Appendix

Passive Quantitative Easing: Bond Supply Effects through a Halt to Debt Issuance

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&

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The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting either the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Federal Reserve System or those of the Danish National Bank.

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Contents

A Sw	A Swiss Financial Market Reaction to January 2015 Events								
B Da	nish Government Bond Data	5							
C Mo	del Estimation and Results	6							
C.1	The AFNS-R Model	6							
C.2	Model Estimation and Econometric Identification	8							
C.3	Estimation Results	9							
C.4	The Estimated Bond Risk Premia	10							
C.5	Robustness Analysis of the Estimated Danish Safety Premium $\ldots \ldots \ldots$	11							
C.6	Robustness Analysis of the Estimated Danish Ten-Year Term Premium $\ . \ .$	14							

A Swiss Financial Market Reaction to January 2015 Events

In this appendix, we put the Danish bond market reaction to the debt halt in January 2015 into perspective by contrasting it to the Swiss bond market reaction to three key events in January 2015: the Swiss National Bank (SNB) announcement on January 15, 2015, when it discontinued its minimum exchange rate to the euro; the European Central Bank's (ECB) announcement of the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) on January 22, 2015; and the Danish National Bank's (DNB) announcement to halt debt issuance on January 30, 2015.



Figure 1: Exchange Rate of the Swiss Franc to the Euro

Figure 1 shows the exchange rate of the Swiss franc to the euro since 1999. Note that by January 2015 the Swiss National Bank (SNB) had been keeping the Swiss franc artificially low against the euro with its policy of a minimum exchange rate of 1.20 adopted in September 2011; see Christensen and Krogstrup (2019) for an analysis of this unique episode. The objective of the policy was to prevent a significant appreciation of the Swiss franc with the fear being that such an appreciation would further depress the already low level of Swiss inflation. By mid-January 2015, with a major ECB QE program on the way as telegraphed by leading ECB officials (see De Santis 2020), this policy became untenable. As a consequence, the SNB discontinued it in a surprise announcement on January 15, 2015, a week before the ECB announced its PSPP. In response, the Swiss franc appreciated sharply and came close to par with the euro where it largely remained the following years. Furthermore, we note that neither the ECB's announcement of the PSPP on January 22, 2015, nor the DNB's

SNB announcement on January 15, 2015											
Maturity 1-year 2-year 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year											
1/14-2015	-40.68	-40.82	-34.83	-18.30	-2.43	17.20					
1/16-2015	-56.00	-59.23	-54.43	-38.78	-22.89	-2.44					
Change	-15.32	-18.41	-19.60	-20.48	-20.46	-19.64					

ECB announcement on January 22, 2015											
Maturity 1-year 2-year 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year											
1/21-2015	-104.55	-95.83	-85.20	-63.57	-44.31	-20.74					
1/23-2015	-121.39	-114.63	-103.53	-79.78	-58.38	-32.19					
Change	-16.84	-18.80	-18.34	-16.20	-14.07	-11.46					

DNB announcement on January 30, 2015											
Maturity 1-year 2-year 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year											
1/29-2015	-89.98	-88.56	-78.68	-54.36	-32.07	-5.29					
2/2-2015	-89.50	-87.35	-78.73	-56.79	-36.16	-10.75					
Change	0.49	1.21	-0.06	-2.44	-4.08	-5.47					

Table 1: Response of Swiss Government Bond Yields to Key Announcements The table reports the two-day response of Swiss government zero-coupon bond yields to the announcement by the SNB to discontinue its minimum exchange rate to the euro on January 15, 2015, the ECB's announcement of the PSPP on January 22, 2015, and the DNB's announcement to halt debt issuance on January 30, 2015. All numbers are measured in basis points.

announcement to halt debt issuance on January 30, 2015, appear to have left much of a mark on the Swiss franc exchange rate, in particular not in comparison to the outsized move on January 15, 2015.

Table 1 reports the two-day response of Swiss government bond yields around each of these three announcements.¹ First, as could be expected, we note a strong almost uniform reaction to the SNB announcement on January 15, 2015, with a decline of close to 20 basis points in the entire yield curve. In light of the strong currency appreciation, foreign investors were satisfied to earn a lower expected return measured in Swiss frances to be willing to hold Swiss france-denominated assets.

Second, we see a notable reaction to the ECB's announcement of the PSPP on January 22, 2015, with a decline of between 11 and 19 basis points. This matches similar declines in

¹For consistency across events, we use the fitted zero-coupon yields from the arbitrage-free generalized Nelson-Siegel (AFGNS) model developed in Christensen et al. (2009) estimated on a sample of daily Swiss government bond prices covering the period from January 4, 1993, to December 31, 2021, taken from Christensen et al. (2023).

euro-area long-term interest rates reported in Altavilla et al. (2021) and likely reflects both signaling and portfolio balance effects, as discussed in Christensen and Rudebusch (2012), among many others. With little reaction in the exchange rate to this announcement as noted in Figure 1, the market response materializes through interest rate movements much in the same way as what we observe in Denmark around the announcement of the debt halt when the exchange rate of the Danish krone to the euro barely changed.

Finally, we highlight that the reaction of Swiss government bond yields to the Danish debt halt announcement on January 30, 2015, is modest in comparison. This underscores that the Danish debt halt is a uniquely Danish event without implications for other European countries, including Switzerland. This seems reasonable given the small size of the Danish economy and financial markets.

Now, we use the Swiss market reaction as a guide to what to expect related to the Danish debt halt announcement. First, we note that, provided the debt halt was interpreted as a signal that the DNB would *not* abandon the peg of the Danish krone to the euro, investors' expectations of an immediate appreciation gain from holding Danish krones—similar to the one observed in Switzerland two weeks earlier—would be curtailed. As a consequence, without any reasonable chance of any material appreciation of the Danish krone, Danish yields should have *increased* to maintain an unchanged expected return measured in euros and hence make foreign investors willing to continue to buy and hold Danish krone-denominated assets (all else being equal). Instead, we stress that the Danish yield data show large immediate *declines* in response to the debt halt. As a consequence, our reported results in the main text regarding the impact of the debt halt on Danish bond yields are likely best interpreted as lower bound estimates of the true market impact of the reduced bond supply following the Danish debt halt.

B Danish Government Bond Data

In this appendix, we briefly describe our sample of Danish government bond prices downloaded from Bloomberg. We use the same 40 bond prices as in Christensen and Hetland (2023) observed monthly from January 1999 to December 2021.



Figure 2: Yield to Maturity of Danish Government Bonds Illustration of the yield to maturity of the Danish government bonds considered in the paper, which are subject to two sample choices: (1) sample limited to the period from January 31, 1999, to December 31, 2021; (2) censoring of a bond's price when it has less than three months to maturity.

Figure 2 shows the Danish government bond prices converted into yields to maturity. Several things are worth noting regarding these yield series. First, there is a trend lower in the general yield level during this period from roughly 6 percent in the early 2000s to around zero by the end of our sample. Second, there is pronounced business cycle variation in the shape of the yield curve around the lower trend. The yield curve tends to flatten ahead of recessions and steepen during the initial phase of economic recoveries. These characteristics are the practical motivation behind our choice of using a three-factor model for the frictionless part of the Danish yield curve, adopting an approach similar to what is standard for U.S. and U.K. data; see Christensen and Rudebusch (2012).

Finally, we note that shorter-term Danish yields turned negative for the first time in 2012 and were firmly in negative territory from summer 2014 when the ECB introduced negative policy rates through the end of our sample. As a consequence, we choose to focus on a model with Gaussian dynamics, which can easily handle negative interest rates.

C Model Estimation and Results

In this appendix, we first detail the model that serves as the benchmark in our analysis before we describe the restrictions imposed to achieve econometric identification of the model.

C.1 The AFNS-R Model

To begin, let $X_t = (L_t, S_t, C_t, X_t^R)$ denote the state vector of the four-factor model we use. Here, L_t denotes a level factor, while S_t and C_t represent slope and curvature factors. Finally, X_t^R is the marketwide bond-specific risk factor structured as in Andreasen et al. (2021). Given that it is an augmented version of the arbitrage-free Nelson-Siegel (AFNS) models described in Christensen et al. (2011), we refer to it as the AFNS-R model.

The instantaneous risk-free rate is defined as

$$r_t = L_t + S_t. \tag{1}$$

The risk-neutral Q-dynamics of the state variables used for pricing are given by

$$\begin{pmatrix} dL_t \\ dS_t \\ dC_t \\ dX_t^R \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \lambda & -\lambda & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \lambda & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \kappa_R^{\mathbb{Q}} \end{pmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \theta_R^{\mathbb{Q}} \end{pmatrix} - \begin{pmatrix} L_t \\ S_t \\ C_t \\ X_t^R \end{pmatrix} \end{bmatrix} dt + \Sigma \begin{pmatrix} dW_t^{L,\mathbb{Q}} \\ dW_t^{S,\mathbb{Q}} \\ dW_t^{C,\mathbb{Q}} \\ dW_t^{R,\mathbb{Q}} \end{pmatrix},$$

where Σ is a lower-triangular matrix.

Based on the Q-dynamics above, zero-coupon bond yields preserve a Nelson and Siegel (1987) factor loading structure

$$y_t(\tau) = L_t + \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda\tau}}{\lambda\tau}\right)S_t + \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda\tau}}{\lambda\tau} - e^{-\lambda\tau}\right)C_t - \frac{A(\tau)}{\tau},\tag{2}$$

where $\frac{A(\tau)}{\tau}$ is a convexity term that adjusts the functional form in Nelson and Siegel (1987) to ensure absence of arbitrage (see Christensen et al. (2011)).

Importantly, due to bond-specific premia in the Danish government bond market, individual bond prices are sensitive to the variation in the bond-specific risk factor X_t^R . As a consequence, the pricing of the bonds is not performed with the standard discount function above, but rather with a discount function that accounts for the bond-specific risk:

$$\overline{r}_{t}^{i} = r_{t} + \beta^{i} (1 - e^{-\lambda^{R,i}(t - t_{0}^{i})}) X_{t}^{R},$$
(3)

where t_0^i denotes the date of issuance of the specific security and β^i is its sensitivity to the variation in the marketwide bond-specific risk factor. Furthermore, the decay parameter $\lambda^{R,i}$ is assumed to vary across securities as well.

As shown in Christensen and Rudebusch (2019), the net present value of one Danish krone paid by bond i at time $t + \tau$ has the following exponential-affine form

$$\begin{aligned} P_t^i(t_0^i,\tau) &= E^{\mathbb{Q}} \Big[e^{-\int_t^{t+\tau} \overline{\tau}^i(s,t_0^i)ds} \Big] \\ &= \exp \Big(B_1^i(\tau)L_t + B_2^i(\tau)S_t + B_3^i(\tau)C_t + B_4^i(t_0^i,t,\tau)X_t^R + A^i(t_0^i,t,\tau) \Big). \end{aligned}$$

This implies that the model belongs to the class of Gaussian affine term structure models. Note also that, by fixing $\beta^i = 0$ for all *i*, we recover the AFNS model.

Now, consider the whole value of the bond issued at time t_0^i with maturity at $t + \tau$ that pays a coupon C annually. Its price is given by²

$$\overline{P}_t^i(t_0^i,\tau) = C(t_1-t)E^{\mathbb{Q}}\left[e^{-\int_t^{t_1}\overline{\tau}^i(s,t_0^i)ds}\right] + \sum_{j=2}^N CE^{\mathbb{Q}}\left[e^{-\int_t^{t_j}\overline{\tau}^i(s,t_0^i)ds}\right] + E^{\mathbb{Q}}\left[e^{-\int_t^{t+\tau}\overline{\tau}^i(s,t_0^i)ds}\right].$$
 (4)

So far, the description of the AFNS-R model has relied solely on the dynamics of the state variables under the Q-measure used for pricing. However, to complete the description of the model and to implement it empirically, we will need to specify the risk premia that connect these factor dynamics under the Q-measure to the dynamics under the real-world (or physical) P-measure. It is important to note that there are no restrictions on the dynamic drift components under the empirical P-measure beyond the requirement of constant volatility. To facilitate empirical implementation, we use the essentially affine risk premium specification introduced in Duffee (2002). In the Gaussian framework, this specification implies that the risk premia Γ_t depend on the state variables; that is,

$$\Gamma_t = \gamma^0 + \gamma^1 X_t,$$

²This is the clean price that does not account for any accrued interest and maps to our observed bond prices.

where $\gamma^0 \in \mathbf{R}^4$ and $\gamma^1 \in \mathbf{R}^{4 \times 4}$ contain unrestricted parameters.

Thus, the resulting unrestricted four-factor AFNS-R model has P-dynamics given by

$$dX_t = K^{\mathbb{P}}(\theta^{\mathbb{P}} - X_t) + \Sigma dW_t^{\mathbb{P}},$$

where $K^{\mathbb{P}}$ is an unrestricted 4×4 mean-reversion matrix, $\theta^{\mathbb{P}}$ is a 4×1 vector of mean levels, and Σ is a 4×4 lower triangular volatility matrix. This is the transition equation in the extended Kalman filter estimation of the AFNS-R model.

C.2 Model Estimation and Econometric Identification

Due to the nonlinear relationship between state variables and bond prices in equation (4), the model cannot be estimated with the standard Kalman filter. Instead, we use the extended Kalman filter as in Kim and Singleton (2012); see Christensen and Rudebusch (2019) for details. Furthermore, to make the fitted errors comparable across bonds of various maturities, we scale each bond price by its duration. Thus, the measurement equation for the bond prices takes the following form

$$\frac{\overline{P}_t^i(t_0^i,\tau^i)}{D_t^i(t_0^i,\tau^i)} = \frac{\widehat{P}_t^i(t_0^i,\tau^i)}{D_t^i(t_0^i,\tau^i)} + \varepsilon_t^i.$$

Here, $\widehat{P}_t^i(t_0^i, \tau^i)$ is the model-implied price of bond i, $D_t^i(t_0^i, \tau^i)$ is its duration, which is calculated before estimation, and ε_t^i represents independent and Gaussian distributed measurement errors with mean zero and a common standard deviation σ_{ε} . See Andreasen et al. (2019) for evidence supporting this formulation of the measurement equation.

Furthermore, since the marketwide bond-specific risk factor is a latent factor that we do not observe, its level is not identified without additional restrictions. As a consequence, we let the first 30-year bond issued on April 6, 1994, and maturing on November 10, 2024, with 7 percent coupon have a unit loading on this factor, that is, $\beta^i = 1$ for this security. This choice implies that the β^i sensitivity parameters measure sensitivity to this factor relative to that of the 30-year 2024 bond. Moreover, we note that the $\lambda^{R,i}$ -parameters can be hard to identify if their values are too large or too small. As a result, we impose the restriction that they fall within the range from 0.0001 to 10, which is without practical consequences. Also, for numerical stability during model optimization, we impose the restriction that the β^i -parameters fall within the range from 0 to 250.

Finally, we follow the finance literature and assume stationarity of the state variables,

$K^{\mathbb{P}}$	$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{\cdot,1}$	$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{\cdot,2}$	$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{\cdot,3}$	$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{\cdot,4}$	$ heta \mathbb{P}$		Σ
$K_{1,\cdot}^{\mathbb{P}}$	0.0138	0	0	0	0.0632	σ_{11}	0.0062
	(0.0508)				(0.0462)		(0.0002)
$K_{2,\cdot}^{\mathbb{P}}$	0	0.8410	0	1.8676	-0.0297	σ_{22}	0.0116
, ,		(0.2428)		(0.5291)	(0.0100)		(0.0009)
$K_{3,\cdot}^{\mathbb{P}}$	0	0	0.2147	0	-0.0162	σ_{33}	0.0156
, ,			(0.1909)		(0.0209)		(0.0011)
$K_{4.\cdot}^{\mathbb{P}}$	0	0	0	0.4665	0.0020	σ_{44}	0.0070
,				(0.2996)	(0.0051)		(0.0008)

Table 2: Estimated Dynamic Parameters of the Preferred AFNS-R Model The table shows the estimated parameters of the $K^{\mathbb{P}}$ matrix, $\theta^{\mathbb{P}}$ vector, and diagonal Σ matrix for the preferred AFNS-R model. The estimated value of λ is 0.2921 (0.0058), while $\kappa_R^{\mathbb{Q}} = 1.9506$ (0.1103) and $\theta_R^{\mathbb{Q}} = -0.0030$ (0.0003). The maximum log likelihood value is 16,179.75. The numbers in parentheses are the estimated parameter standard deviations.

which allows us to start the Kalman filter at their unconditional mean.

C.3 Estimation Results

For our analysis we consider the preferred specification of the AFNS-R model identified by Christensen and Hetland (2023, henceforth CH). They use a general-to-specific strategy starting from an unrestricted $K^{\mathbb{P}}$. In each step, the parameter in $K^{\mathbb{P}}$ with the lowest *t*-statistic is eliminated. They then rely on the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and marginal likelihood ratio tests to find the optimal stopping point, as in Christensen et al. (2014b). Their preferred specification has \mathbb{P} -dynamics given by

$$\begin{pmatrix} dL_t \\ dS_t \\ dC_t \\ dX_t^R \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \kappa_{11}^{\mathbb{P}} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \kappa_{22}^{\mathbb{P}} & 0 & \kappa_{24}^{\mathbb{P}} \\ 0 & 0 & \kappa_{33}^{\mathbb{P}} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \kappa_{44}^{\mathbb{P}} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \theta_1^{\mathbb{P}} \\ \theta_2^{\mathbb{P}} \\ \theta_3^{\mathbb{P}} \\ \theta_4^{\mathbb{P}} \end{pmatrix} - \begin{pmatrix} L_t \\ S_t \\ C_t \\ X_t^R \end{pmatrix} \end{pmatrix} dt + \Sigma \begin{pmatrix} dW_t^{L,\mathbb{P}} \\ dW_t^{S,\mathbb{P}} \\ dW_t^{C,\mathbb{P}} \\ dW_t^{R,\mathbb{P}} \\ dW_t^{R,\mathbb{P}} \end{pmatrix},$$

where Σ is a diagonal matrix as recommended by Christensen et al. (2011).

We note that the 11 parameters eliminated in the $K^{\mathbb{P}}$ mean-reversion matrix are statistically insignificant both individually and collectively as demonstrated by CH. Hence, the data are singling out this favored specification in a very strong way. As a consequence, we feel comfortable relying on this preferred specification for our analysis of bond-specific safety and general term premia in the Danish government bond market.

The estimated parameters of the preferred specification are reported in Table 2, while results reported in CH show that the AFNS-R model provides a very tight fit to the Danish bond price data and hence not repeated here. Furthermore, the fact that $\kappa_{24}^{\mathbb{P}}$ is large and positive implies that there is a fairly strong negative correlation between the slope factor S_t and the bond-specific risk factor X_t^R , i.e., a high value of X_t^R will tend to drive S_t lower. Practically speaking, this means that when X_t^R is high and the Danish safety premia are under pressure, Danish short-term interest rates have a tendency to fall. Economically, a declining Danish safety premium means that Danish government bond yields are being pushed up. All else being equal, this should be associated with capital inflows from abroad attracted by the higher interest rates. This will put upward pressure on the value of the Danish krone against the euro. To offset that pressure and keep the tight peg of the exchange rate to the euro, the DNB can at first intervene in the exchange rate market, but if the pressure is sustained, the ultimate remedy is to lower the Danish overnight rate, which will show up in our analysis as a decline in S_t .

C.4 The Estimated Bond Risk Premia

We first use the estimated AFNS-R model to extract the safety premium in the Danish government bond market. To compute this premium, we first use the estimated parameters and the filtered states $\{X_{t|t}\}_{t=1}^{T}$ to calculate the fitted bond prices $\{\hat{P}_{t}^{i}\}_{t=1}^{T}$ for all outstanding securities in our sample. These bond prices are then converted into yields to maturity $\{\hat{y}_{t}^{c,i}\}_{t=1}^{T}$ by solving the fixed-point problem

$$\hat{P}_{t}^{i} = C(t_{1}-t)\exp\left\{-(t_{1}-t)\hat{y}_{t}^{c,i}\right\} + \sum_{k=2}^{n}C\exp\left\{-(t_{k}-t)\hat{y}_{t}^{c,i}\right\}
+ \exp\left\{-(T-t)\hat{y}_{t}^{c,i}\right\},$$
(5)

for $i = 1, 2, ..., n_t$, meaning that $\left\{\hat{y}_t^{c,i}\right\}_{t=1}^T$ is approximately the rate of return on the *i*th bond if held until maturity (see Sack and Elsasser 2004). To obtain the corresponding yields with correction for the safety premium, a new set of model-implied bond prices are computed from the estimated AFNS-R model but using only its frictionless part, i.e. with the constraints that $X_{t|t}^R = 0$ for all $t, \ \theta_R^{\mathbb{Q}} = 0$, and $\sigma_{44} = 0$. These prices are denoted $\left\{\tilde{P}_t^i\right\}_{t=1}^T$ and converted into yields to maturity $\tilde{y}_t^{c,i}$ by solving equation (5) in the same way as above. They represent estimates of the prices that would prevail in a world without any financial frictions or convenience premia. The safety premium for the ith bond is then defined as

$$\Psi_t^i \equiv \tilde{y}_t^{c,i} - \hat{y}_t^{c,i}.$$
(6)

Second, we define the term premium in the standard way as

$$TP_t(\tau) = y_t(\tau) - \frac{1}{\tau} \int_t^{t+\tau} E_t^{\mathbb{P}}[r_s] ds.$$
(7)

That is, the term premium is the difference in expected return between a buy-and-hold strategy for a τ -year bond and an instantaneous rollover strategy at the risk-free rate r_t . Importantly, $y_t(\tau)$ is the frictionless yield left over after the bond-specific safety premia have been accounted for and calculated using equation (2). The model thus allows us to decompose bond yields into their respective term premia and short-rate expectations components in addition to the safety premia described above.

C.5 Robustness Analysis of the Estimated Danish Safety Premium

This section examines the robustness of the average safety premium of Danish government bonds to some of the main assumptions imposed. Throughout the AFNS-R model with diagonal $K^{\mathbb{P}}$ and Σ matrices serves as the benchmark.

First, we examine the sensitivity of the estimated safety premium series to the choice of sample start date by repeating the model estimation, but using a sample that starts in January 1995 as in Christensen and Mirkov (2022). Figure 3 shows the two estimated average safety premium series where we note the almost identical results for the overlapping period. Hence, the choice to start our sample in January 1999 after the launch of the euro does not materially affect our safety premium results.³

Second, we assess whether the specification of the dynamics within the AFNS-R model matters for the estimated Danish government bond safety premium. To do so, we estimate the AFNS-R model with unconstrained dynamics, that is, the AFNS-R model with unrestricted $K^{\mathbb{P}}$ and lower triangular Σ matrix. Figure 4 shows the estimated Danish safety premium series from this estimation and compares it to the series produced by our benchmark model. Note that they are barely distinguishable. Thus, we conclude that the specification of the dynamics within the AFNS-R model only plays a very modest role for the estimated bond-specific risk

³Andreasen et al. (2021) report similar results for U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities.



Figure 3: Average Estimated Danish Government Bond Safety Premium: Sample Start Date

Illustration of the average estimated safety premium of Danish government bonds for each observation date implied by the AFNS-R model estimated with monthly data from January 31, 1999, to December 31, 2021, as in the paper and compared with the corresponding premium from the same model estimated with monthly data from January 31, 1995, to December 31, 2021. In both cases, the AFNS-R model is estimated with a diagonal specification of $K^{\mathbb{P}}$ and Σ .

premia.⁴

Third, we assess whether the data frequency plays any role for our results. To do so, we estimate the AFNS-R model using weekly and monthly data, and based on the results above it suffices to focus on the most parsimonious AFNS-R model with diagonal $K^{\mathbb{P}}$ and Σ matrices. Figure 5 shows the estimated Danish safety premium series from the two estimations. Note that they are barely distinguishable. Thus, we conclude that data frequency matters little for our results. Clearly, at the higher weekly frequency, there are a few isolated spikes that are absent in the monthly series, but they are too few to have an impact on the estimation results.

Fourth, we explore whether allowing for stochastic volatility in one or more of the frictionless factors within the AFNS-R model affects the estimated Danish government bond safety premium. Specifically, we consider the four admissible combinations of allowing for spanned stochastic volatility generated by one or two factors in the model following the work of Christensen et al. (2014a). In light of the results above, it suffices to focus on the most

 $^{^{4}}$ This is consistent with similar findings by Andreasen et al. (2021) in the context of U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities.



Figure 4: Average Estimated Danish Government Bond Safety Premium: Alternative \mathbb{P} Dynamics

Illustration of the average estimated Danish government bond safety premium for each observation date implied by the AFNS-R model when estimated with unconstrained dynamics as detailed in the text instead of independent factor dynamics. In both cases, the safety premia are measured as the estimated yield difference between the frictionless yield to maturity of individual bonds with the market risk factor turned off and the corresponding fitted yield to maturity. The data cover the period from January 31, 1999, to December 31, 2021.

parsimonious specification of each model with diagonal $K^{\mathbb{P}}$ and Σ matrices. We refer to these models as AFNS models because they share the key properties of the AFNS model. First, the three frictionless state variables have joint dynamics under the risk-neutral probability measure used for pricing closely matching the arbitrage-free Nelson-Siegel models described in Christensen et al. (2011). Furthermore, the frictionless short rate remains defined as $r_t = L_t + S_t$. Therefore, to keep the notation simple, we use AFNS(i) to denote a model as defined above with *i* referring to the factors generating stochastic volatility with letters—L, S, and C—used to indicate the source(s) of stochastic volatility in the model. Figure 6 shows the estimated safety premium series from these estimations. Note that they are very similar and highly positively correlated. Thus, we conclude that allowing for stochastic volatility within the AFNS-R model only plays a very modest role for our results. Hence, this provides support for our choice to only focus on the Gaussian AFNS-R model with constant volatility.

To summarize, we find the estimated safety premium series to be robust to both different sample start dates and alternative model dynamics. As a consequence, we are comfortable using the AFNS-R model preferred by CH in the empirical analysis in the paper. Furthermore,



Figure 5: Average Estimated Danish Government Bond Safety Premium: Data Frequency

Illustration of the average estimated Danish government bond safety premium for each observation date implied by the AFNS-R model when estimated using weekly and monthly data. In all cases, the safety premia are measured as the estimated yield difference between the frictionless yield to maturity of individual bonds with the market risk factor turned off and the corresponding fitted yield to maturity. The data cover the period from January 4, 1999, to December 31, 2021.

given the persistence of the risk premium changes we are interested in, we are also comfortable focusing on the results from monthly data, which greatly reduces the computational time and simplifies the regression analysis in the paper.

C.6 Robustness Analysis of the Estimated Danish Ten-Year Term Premium

In this section, we examine the robustness of the estimated Danish ten-year term premium to some of the main model assumptions.

To assess the sensitivity of our ten-year term premium to the specification of the meanreversion matrix $K^{\mathbb{P}}$, we compare it in Figure 7 to the corresponding estimates from the AFNS-R models with unrestricted and diagonal $K^{\mathbb{P}}$ matrix. We note some sensitivity of the ten-year term premium to the choice of $K^{\mathbb{P}}$ specification. Importantly, both of the alternative estimates suggest that the ten-year term premium has broadly followed a path similar to the one estimated by the preferred AFNS-R model.

Next, we explore the sensitivity of our yield decompositions to the data frequency by



Figure 6: Average Estimated Danish Government Bond Safety Premium: Allowing for Stochastic Volatility

Illustration of the average estimated Danish government bond safety premium for each observation date implied by the AFNS-R model when estimated with and without allowing for stochastic volatility as detailed in the text. In all cases the bond safety premia are measured as the estimated yield difference between the frictionless yield to maturity of individual bonds with the market risk factor turned off and the corresponding fitted yield to maturity. The data cover the period from January 31, 1999, to December 31, 2021.



Figure 7: Sensitivity of Ten-Year Term Premium to $K^{\mathbb{P}}$ Specification

estimating our preferred AFNS-R model using weekly data instead of the monthly frequency considered throughout the paper. Figure 8 compares the ten-year term premium from the



Figure 8: Sensitivity of Ten-Year Term Premium to Data Frequency



Figure 9: Accuracy of Real-Time Estimates of the Ten-Year Term Premium

two estimations. The results show that, with the exception of a few episodes with some high-frequency sharp short-lived deviations, the estimated ten-year term premium is robust to varying the data frequency.

A well-known criticism of macro-based estimates of term premia is that they can exhibit significant variation as additional and revised data become available. All else equal, finance-based estimates should be less subject to this line of criticism as the key model input, namely the observed bond prices, are available in real time and not subject to any revisions. However, finance-based estimates could still vary as the sample length increases, for example the estimated persistence of the state variables may change, and this could be particularly relevant in the current environment where the general level of interest rates declined for two decades before reversing some of the decline recently. To dispel such concerns, we estimate the preferred AFNS-R model in real time starting in 2010 through December 2021. This allows us to generate real-time estimates of the ten-year term premium and compare them to the corresponding full sample "look back" estimates, which is done in Figure 9. Although we do see some discrepancies between the estimates as we go back through time, these results show that the ten-year term premium estimates from our preferred AFNS-R model are reliable in real time.

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