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Quantitative Easing, Bond Risk Premia and the Exchange Rate in a Small Open Economy

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Abstract

We assess the impact of simultaneous large-scale asset purchases, commonly known as quantitative easing (QE), conducted by Sveriges Riksbank and the European Central Bank (ECB) on bond risk premia in the Swedish government bond market. Using a novel arbitrage-free dynamic term structure model of nominal and real bond prices that accounts for bond-specific safety premia, we find that Sveriges Riksbank's bond purchases raised inflation and short-rate expectations, lowered nominal and real term premia and inflation risk premia, and increased nominal bond safety premia, suggestive of signaling, portfolio rebalance, and safe asset scarcity effects. Furthermore, we document spillover effects of ECB's QE programs on Swedish bond markets that are similar to the Swedish QE effects only after controlling for exchange rate fluctuations, highlighting the importance of exchange rate dynamics in the transmission of QE spillover effects.

JEL Classification: C32, E43, E52, E58, F41, F42, G12

Keywords: term structure modeling, financial market frictions, safety premium, unconventional monetary policy

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1 Introduction

What happens to bond market functioning and bond risk premia when a central bank introduces a large-scale bond purchase program, also known as quantitative easing (QE)? The answer to that question regained importance after the spread of the coronavirus pandemic, as many central banks around the world had to turn to some form of QE to respond to the economic downturn caused by the pandemic. Furthermore, from an academic perspective, the question remains unsettled in the literature exactly how QE programs affect financial markets and the wider economy. Finally, it may have important policy implications for how best to design, implement, and communicate future asset purchase programs and how to navigate the exit from existing ones. In light of the recent elevated levels inflation around the world, it is of great importance for policymakers to understand the effects of quantitative easing and tightening, that is, how central bank bond purchases and sales affect bond yields through different risk premia and over the term structure.

In this paper, we aim to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the most important transmission channels discussed in the literature. However, to offer a new perspective and minimize any bias and informed priors from previous studies, we focus on Sweden because it represents an understudied neutral¹ small open advanced economy with a well-established inflation target for monetary policy in which large-scale asset purchases have been implemented in addition to both forward guidance and negative interest rates. Specifically, we examine the monetary policies implemented between 2015 and 2019 by the Swedish central bank, the Riksbank, when it acquired large volumes of nominal and real Swedish government bonds through various QE programs.² Furthermore, as the Swedish government bond market is not as liquid as those in other larger countries, we explicitly model the liquidity conditions in the nominal and real bond markets separately.

We consider Sweden an interesting case for studying the transmission channels of QE for several notable reasons. Unlike the QE programs in many other countries, the asset purchase programs operated by the Riksbank were introduced to ease monetary policy in a low interest rate environment, rather than to improve the functioning of financial markets in times of distress. There are also a few institutional features that make the Swedish QE experience unique. For instance, the Riksbank started its bond purchases in the nominal government bond market, and later expanded them to include real bond purchases. At the same time, the Riksbank had lowered its main policy rate to negative levels.³ Moreover, Sweden is unique in that it represents a small open economy that was affected by simultaneous domestic and foreign QE programs during the 2015–2019 period. When the Riksbank started its QE

¹Sweden’s application for NATO membership did not receive final approval by all NATO member states until February 26, 2024.

²We leave an evaluation of the measures taken during the COVID-19 pandemic for future research.

³See Christensen (2019) for an analysis of the Swedish bond market reaction to the introduction of negative interest rates.

program, the European Central Bank (ECB) was actively expanding its balance sheet through its public sector purchase program (PSPP) in the euro area. Sweden therefore offers a unique opportunity to compare and contrast the transmission channels of both domestic and foreign QE programs in the context of a small open economy.⁴

Equally importantly, the Swedish government bond market offers a near-ideal setting to perform a comprehensive analysis of domestic and foreign QE transmission channels. First, the Swedish government is not heavily indebted as it targeted a government surplus of 1 percent of nominal GDP on average over the business cycle for many years, following a conservative fiscal rule introduced in 2000. This surplus rule was replaced in 2019 with a balanced-budget target that caps the government net lending target over the business cycle to one-third of 1 percent of GDP. As a consequence of these strict budgetary rules, the Swedish government holds a triple-A credit rating. This implies that the credit risk of Swedish government bonds is entirely negligible. Second, the Riksbank has had an explicit inflation target of 2 percent since 1995, and the public views the inflation target as highly credible. In an attempt to ease monetary policy further and put upward pressure on inflation in the low inflation environment of the 2010s to meet this target, the Riksbank's QE program was designed with a clear single policy goal. Moreover, financial markets in Sweden at the time were stable and well-functioning. Hence, the transmission of conventional and unconventional monetary policy was not impaired, unlike what is the case for many of the programs studied in the early literature on QE; see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), among many others. As a consequence, we are able to cleanly identify and contrast different transmission channels.

Finally and crucially to our analysis, Sweden has followed a flexible floating exchange rate policy since the mid-1990s. As a result, the central bank rarely intervenes in the exchange rate markets. Although the Riksbank announced in January 2016 that it was prepared to use foreign exchange (FX) intervention to weaken the currency, it never actually implemented the policy. Bacchetta and Chikhani (2021) argue that the Riksbank's QE program may have induced a portfolio shift towards holding more foreign currency assets, which is in effect similar to direct FX interventions. Hence, this view poses an interesting question of whether the exchange rate can amplify or dampen the effects of domestic and foreign QE programs on domestic bond risk premia, an issue we aim to examine further and compare with key QE transmission channels from that perspective.

In the literature, the success of the U.S. Federal Reserve's large-scale asset purchases in reducing Treasury yields and mortgage rates is well established; see Gagnon et al. (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), and Christensen and Rudebusch (2012), among many others.⁵ These studies show that yields on longer-maturity Treasuries and other secu-

⁴See Christensen et al. (2025) for an analysis of the effects of U.S. and U.K. QE programs on Canadian government bond yields. However, the Bank of Canada did not operate any QE programs at the time.

⁵Similar evidence for U.K. interest rates can be found in Joyce et al. (2011).

rities declined on days when the Fed announced it would increase its holdings of longer-term securities. Such announcement effects are thought to be related to the effects on market expectations about future monetary policy and declines in risk premia on longer-term debt securities, known as signaling and portfolio rebalance effects, respectively; see Christensen and Krogstrup (2019, 2022) for detailed discussions. Christensen and Gillan (2022) argue that it is also possible for QE programs to reduce priced frictions to trading as reflected in liquidity premia through a liquidity channel.⁶ This effect comes about because the operation of a QE program is tantamount to introducing a large committed buyer into the financial markets of the securities targeted by the program. The persistent presence of the central bank in these markets increases the bargaining power of sellers relative to buyers, which, as shown by Duffie et al. (2007), can lower the liquidity premia of these securities. D’Amico and King (2013) emphasize local supply effects as an important mechanism for QE to affect long-term interest rates. Under this local supply channel, declines in the stock of government debt available for trading induced by QE purchases should push up bond prices (temporarily) due to preferred habitat behavior on the part of investors. Finally, Hattori et al. (2016) stress that central bank asset purchases have the potential to provide insurance against macroeconomic tail risks by limiting the downside risk to asset prices. Unlike the liquidity channel discussed above, these effects are economy-wide in nature and would impact all asset classes instantaneously upon announcement, thanks to the forward-looking behavior of investors.⁷

To analyze these various transmission channels in a unified framework, we use a state-of-the-art term structure model of nominal and real bond prices developed by Christensen and Zhang (2023). The model allows us to identify bond investors’ underlying inflation expectations as in Christensen et al. (2010) and hence account for inflation risk premia. Furthermore, it offers a way to generate market-based measures of the natural real rate r_t^* , which we define as in Christensen and Rudebusch (2019).⁸ Finally, the model accounts for bond-specific safety premia in the prices of both nominal and inflation-indexed bonds as in Christensen and Mirkov (2022). The underlying mechanism assumes that, over time, an increasing proportion of the outstanding notional amount is locked up in buy-and-hold investors’ portfolios. Given the forward-looking behavior of investors, this lockup effect means that a particular bond’s sensitivity to the market-wide bond-specific risk factor will vary depending on how seasoned the bond is and how close to maturity it is. In a careful study of nominal U.S. Treasuries, Fontaine and Garcia (2012) find a pervasive bond-specific risk factor

⁶Gagnon et al. (2011) mention a liquidity, or market functioning, channel for the transmission of QE and stipulate a mechanism that shares similarities with the liquidity channel, but they do not provide any empirical assessment of the importance of such a channel. See also Hancock and Passmore (2011) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) for discussions.

⁷There are other potential channels for QE to work. For example, it may affect the perception and pricing of risk, leading to a so-called “risk-taking” channel, as discussed in Borio and Zhu (2012).

⁸Their definition focuses on the real short rates expected to prevail five to ten years in the future, once all current transitory shocks to the economy are expected to have faded and the economy is growing at its trend rate.

that affects all bond prices, with loadings that vary with the maturity and age of each bond. By observing a cross section of security prices over time, the bond-specific risk factor in each market can be separately identified.

With this relevant model output in hand, we proceed to use it to shed light on the impact of the Riksbank's various unconventional monetary policies in the 2015–2019 period. First, to detect effects of the signaling channel emphasized by Christensen and Rudebusch (2012) and Bauer and Rudebusch (2014), we study the responses of estimates of standard nominal short-rate expectations, inflation expectations, and the natural real rate r_t^* . If the signaling channel is active, by committing to buy and hold a large portfolio of government bonds for an extended period, the central bank sends a credible signal to keep the policy rate low for longer than previously anticipated. Thus, the expectations for future short-term interest rates, inflation, and the natural real rate may react to the central bank bond purchase program.

Second, to assess the importance of portfolio rebalance effects as discussed in Gagnon et al. (2011), Joyce et al. (2011), and Christensen and Krogstrup (2019), we follow that literature and examine the changes in estimates of nominal and real term premia, in addition to effects on estimates of inflation risk premia. These premia represent the compensation investors demand to hold long-term bonds. With less available bond supply, investors will have to settle for a lower compensation for assuming the interest rate risk of long-term bonds, and this in turn should encourage businesses and households to borrow more and increase the overall credit supply in the economy.

Third, to evaluate the relevance of the liquidity or market functioning channel highlighted by Christensen and Gillan (2022) and Grimaldi et al. (2021), we use regressions to establish a connection between our estimated bond safety premia and the Riksbank's government bond purchases. If the liquidity conditions of the government bond markets improve or deteriorate following the central bank bond purchases, we expect the bond-specific risk premia to respond to variation in the purchase volumes under the QE program.

Lastly, to explore whether these policies had any impact on investors' perceptions about severe tail risks in the economy as stressed by Hattori et al. (2016), we study their impact on estimates of the deflation risk premium in the Swedish government bond market, calculated using formulas taken from Christensen et al. (2012). If the QE program affects the economy through investors' expectations of tail events, we can uncover the effects by examining the deflation risk premium as a measure of such perceived tail risks.

Overall, we find that the Riksbank's QE programs affected the bond market through the signaling, portfolio rebalance, and liquidity-scarcity channels. These effects are statistically significant and economically meaningful. For inflation expectations the results entail an increase of 2.74 basis points and 1.50 basis points at the five- and ten-year maturity, respectively, per 1 percentage point of Swedish nominal GDP in bond purchases. For the expected short rates, the corresponding increases are 9.98 basis points and 4.74 basis points, respec-

tively. In addition, that same amount of bond purchases leads to a reduction in the nominal term, real term, and inflation risk premia of 12.20 basis points, 9.79 basis points, and 2.42 basis points, respectively, at the five-year maturity, while the corresponding declines at the ten-year maturity are 7.87 basis points, 6.48 basis points, and 1.40 basis points, respectively, although the latter estimate is not statistically significant. Moreover, that same amount of bond purchases raises the nominal safety premium by 4.48 basis points, while the real safety premium experiences a smaller increase. These results confirm that signaling, portfolio rebalance, and scarcity transmission channels were active during the operation of the Riksbank's QE program. For perspective, the Riksbank purchased Swedish government bonds worth a total of SEK 383 billion between February 2015 and the end of 2021, or 6 percent of nominal GDP in 2021.⁹ Combining this cumulative total with our regression results, we conclude that the Swedish QE bond purchases had a large impact on both bond investors' expectations for future monetary policy and Swedish bond risk premia, in particular those of nominal bonds, which were the primary target of the purchases. Furthermore, our results suggest that they did not significantly affect tail risks as measured by our deflation risk premia.

Interestingly, our initial results taken at face value would seem to suggest that the QE programs operated by the ECB tended to affect Swedish bond risk premia in the opposite direction of the effects associated with the Riksbank's QE program. However, these results are reversed once we include an interaction term between our measure of the ECB QE program and the spot SEK-EUR exchange rate in our regressions.¹⁰ Hence, after accounting for the exchange rate effects, the ECB's QE program influenced the Swedish bond risk premia in broadly the same way as the Riksbank's domestic QE bond purchases, although mostly statistically insignificantly so. This surprising result is explained by the fact that the exchange rate fluctuations play a significant role—statistically and economically—and tend to mitigate or offset the spillover effects from the ECB's QE program. We add that these results do not hold up when we replace the spot exchange rate with the forward exchange rate. The key takeaway is that we need to take the simultaneous changes in the exchange rate into account to more fully understand the impact of the ECB's QE bond purchases on Swedish bond risk premia. A coincidental appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate significantly affects the resulting net effects. We interpret these findings as evidence of an international spillover channel of unconventional monetary policy from the euro area to Sweden, a small open economy. In particular, the results highlight the importance of accounting for exchange rate fluctuations in understanding the cross-border effects flowing from unconventional monetary policies.

A few theoretical papers in the literature have investigated the international spillover effects of central banks' QE programs. Foreign QE can affect domestic economic conditions

⁹By April 2020, the Riksbank owned more than half of the outstanding nominal bonds and about a quarter of the inflation-indexed bonds.

¹⁰We stress that this difference in results is not due to scaling effects, as the size of both QE purchases is measured as a fraction of the respective regional nominal GDP.

via different channels, for instance exchange rates, long-term interest rates, and risk premia. Kolasa and Wesolowski (2020) develop a model to show that asset purchase programs of foreign central banks can spill over to small open economies through international capital movements and exchange rate adjustments.¹¹ Alpanda and Kabaca (2020) estimate a two-country DSGE model to show that foreign QE programs can drive down domestic term premia and long term rates through the portfolio rebalancing of private investors. Dedola et al. (2013) show that under financial integration unconventional policies aimed at stabilizing domestic financial and credit conditions can lead to large international spillovers because domestic QE shocks can improve foreign banks' balance sheets due to the financial integration. Thus, foreign firms may face lower risk premia and better borrowing conditions.

The empirical literature has mostly focused on the international spillover on macroeconomic conditions and aggregate variables from foreign QE programs. Fratzscher et al. (2018) find that the U.S. Federal Reserve's QE programs increased the pro-cyclicality of capital flows outside the United States, rebalancing towards non-U.S. assets. Dedola et al. (2021) find that typical Fed or ECB QE shocks improve the quality of domestic banks' balance sheet and depreciate the local currencies. Kabaca and Tuzcuoglu (2024) document that U.S. QE shocks were expansionary for Canada despite the appreciation of the Canadian dollar against the U.S. dollar. Using a structural Bayesian VAR model, Di Casola and Stockhammar (2022) show that the ECB's QE program had large positive effects on GDP and inflation in Sweden. They also find that the domestic Swedish QE raised GDP, lowered unemployment, and depreciated the Swedish currency against the U.S. dollar and the euro. Our paper complements these existing studies by exploring the information extracted from high-frequency financial market data using a novel term structure model. This allows us to test the direct effects on and the policy transmission through the financial markets.¹²

Besides the large literature on the effects of unconventional monetary policies, our paper contributes to several important strands of literature. Our analysis is relevant for the literature on small open economies with financial frictions. Huybens and Smith (1998) show that financial frictions can lead to the existence of two steady states where monetary policy changes can have opposite effects on economic activity. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) compare five specifications of a standard small open economy model. Their results suggest that a complete asset market model can induce smoother consumption dynamics. Another related literature highlights the role played by the exchange rate in considering monetary policy and its transmission in small open economies (e.g. Cushman and Zha 1997 and Gali and Monacelli 2005). More broadly, Itskhoki and Mukhin (2021) propose a dynamic general equilibrium

¹¹Akkaya et al. (2023) calibrate the model of Kolasa and Wesolowski (2020) to evaluate the effects of domestic and foreign QE programs in Sweden. They find that foreign QE strengthened the Swedish kronor exchange rate and had modestly negative effects on GDP and inflation. Domestic QE is reported to have had the opposite effects.

¹²Central banks' asset purchases may have substantial spillovers to financial markets in different countries; see for instance Gnewuch (2022) and Yang and Zhou (2017).

model that can account for all major exchange rate puzzles, including an extended analysis on small open economies.


Our paper also has ties to the finance literature on bond risk premia broadly and on the connection between exchange rates and bond risk premia. A number of papers have investigated the joint dynamics of exchange rates, yield curves, bond risk premia, and macroeconomic fundamentals, including Backus et al. (2001), Bansal (1997), Chabi-Yo and Yang (2007), and Rogers et al. (2018). Hofmann et al. (2021) present evidence of endogenous co-movements between bond risk premia and exchange rates that materialize through global investors' portfolio choices. In addition, our paper contributes to the literature on safety premia of safe assets specifically; see Caballero et al. (2017), Christensen and Mirkov (2022), and the review by Golec and Perotti (2017). Lastly, given that we provide a finance-based estimate of the natural real rate for Sweden, it also relates to the important literature on estimation of the level of the natural real rate; see Laubach and Williams (2003), Holston et al. (2017), and Christensen and Rudebusch (2019), among many others.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the Swedish bond data, while Section 3 provides a description of the no-arbitrage term structure model we use. Section 4 presents the empirical results, including an examination of the estimated bond-specific safety premia, nominal and real term premia, long-term inflation expectations and risk premia, the natural real rate r_t^* , and the deflation risk premia. Section 5 analyzes the effects of the Riksbank's and the ECB's QE purchases on these expectations and risk premium components. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and offers some avenues for future research. Appendices available online contain a summary of key monetary policy and QE announcements made by the Riksbank and the ECB and detailed tables with the full results of our regressions.


2 Swedish Government Bond Data

This section briefly describes the Swedish government bond data we use in the model estimation. We start with a description of the market for Swedish nominal fixed-coupon government bonds. We then proceed to describe the market for Swedish inflation-indexed bonds that reference the Swedish consumer price index (CPI), which are known as SGB ILs. To give a sense of the size of the Swedish government bond market, we note up front that, as of the end of December 2019, the total outstanding notional amount of marketable bonds issued by the Swedish government was SEK 1,113 billion, or 22 percent of GDP.

The relatively modest size of the Swedish government bond market is a key factor why the Swedish government holds a triple-A rating with either a stable or a positive outlook from all major rating agencies. Thus, there is essentially no credit risk to account for in the bond price data. More importantly, standard and inflation-indexed bonds have the same priority in the government debt structure, as argued by Fleckenstein et al. (2014). Hence, there is no



(a) Nominal bonds



(b) Inflation-indexed bonds

Figure 1: **Yield to Maturity of Swedish Nominal and Real Government Bonds**

relative credit risk to take into account in performing a joint modeling of the Swedish nominal and real bond prices.

To estimate the nominal factors in our model, we follow Christensen et al. (2024) and use the prices of standard Swedish government fixed-coupon bonds starting in January 1999 when the euro was launched. These are all marketable, non-callable bonds denominated in Swedish kronor that pay a fixed rate of interest annually. We note that the Swedish government has systematically been issuing ten-year bonds mixed with occasional issuance of five- and fifteen-year bonds and a single thirty-year bond during this period. The dispersion in the cross-sectional distribution of the bonds provides the identification of the nominal level, slope, and curvature factor within our model in addition to the nominal common bond-specific risk factor.

Figure 1(a) shows the yields to maturity for all Swedish nominal government bonds in our

sample at a weekly frequency from January 8, 1999, to December 27, 2019. The significant persistent decline in nominal yields over this 21-year period is clearly visible. Swedish long-term nominal government bond yields were close to 5 percent in the late 1990s and had dropped close to zero by December 2019.

Regarding the important question of a lower bound, Sveriges Riksbank had already lowered its conventional policy rate well below zero during the last six years of our sample. As a consequence, short- and medium-term Swedish bond yields were significantly below zero during that period, with no visible lower constraint. Thus, it is not clear that one would need to impose a lower bound to model these data. Empirically, it is generally challenging to determine whether an unconstrained Gaussian model like ours is more appropriate than a model approach enforcing a lower bound in such cases; see Andreasen and Meldrum (2019) for a detailed discussion.

The Swedish government issued its first inflation-indexed bond on April 1, 1994. At the end of December 2019, the outstanding amount of Swedish inflation-indexed bonds was SEK 70 billion. Thus, this is a relatively small market in a European context. Furthermore, as noted by Gürkaynak et al. (2010), prices of inflation-indexed bonds near their maturity tend to be somewhat erratic because of the indexation lag in their payouts. Therefore, to facilitate model estimation, we censor the prices of the inflation-indexed bonds from our sample when they have less than one year to maturity.

We note that a repeated, although somewhat infrequent, issuance of long-term inflation-indexed bonds implies that there is a fairly wide range of available maturities in the data going back to the start of our sample in 2002. This cross-sectional dispersion provides the econometric identification of the real yield factors in our model, including the inflation-indexed bond-specific risk factor.

Figure 1(b) shows the yields to maturity for all 12 inflation-indexed bonds in our sample at a weekly frequency from January 4, 2002, to December 27, 2019. The significant persistent decline in real yields over this 18-year period is clearly visible. Swedish long-term real yields were around 3.5 percent in the early 2000s and had fallen well below -1 percent by December 2019.

3 Model and Estimation

In this section, we first detail the model that serves as the benchmark in our analysis before we describe its estimation and the restrictions imposed to achieve econometric identification.

3.1 An Arbitrage-Free Model of Nominal and Real Yields with Bond-Specific Risk Premia

To begin, let $X_t = (L_t^N, S_t, C_t, X_t^N, L_t^R, X_t^R)$ denote the state vector of our six-factor model. Here, L_t^N and L_t^R denote the level factor unique to the nominal and real yield curve, respectively, while S_t and C_t represent slope and curvature factors common to both yield curves. Finally, X_t^N and X_t^R represent the risk factors added to capture nominal and real bond-specific risk premia, respectively. We follow Christensen and Zhang (2023) and refer to this six-factor Gaussian model as the $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model.

The instantaneous nominal and real risk-free rates are defined as

$$r_t^N = L_t^N + S_t, \quad (1)$$

$$r_t^R = L_t^R + \alpha^R S_t. \quad (2)$$

Note that the differential scaling of the real rates to the common slope factor is captured by the parameter α^R as in Christensen et al. (2010).¹³

The risk-neutral \mathbb{Q} -dynamics of the state variables used for pricing are given by

$$\begin{pmatrix} dL_t^N \\ dS_t \\ dC_t \\ dX_t^N \\ dL_t^R \\ dX_t^R \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \lambda & -\lambda & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \lambda & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \kappa_N^{\mathbb{Q}} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \kappa_R^{\mathbb{Q}} \end{pmatrix} \left[\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ \theta_N^{\mathbb{Q}} \\ 0 \\ \theta_R^{\mathbb{Q}} \end{pmatrix} - \begin{pmatrix} L_t^N \\ S_t \\ C_t \\ X_t^N \\ L_t^R \\ X_t^R \end{pmatrix} \right] dt + \Sigma \begin{pmatrix} dW_t^{L^N, \mathbb{Q}} \\ dW_t^{S, \mathbb{Q}} \\ dW_t^{C, \mathbb{Q}} \\ dW_t^{X^N, \mathbb{Q}} \\ dW_t^{L^R, \mathbb{Q}} \\ dW_t^{X^R, \mathbb{Q}} \end{pmatrix},$$

where Σ is assumed to be a diagonal matrix as per Christensen et al. (2011).

Based on the \mathbb{Q} -dynamics above, nominal and real frictionless zero-coupon bond yields preserve a Nelson and Siegel (1987) factor loading structure

$$y_t^N(\tau) = L_t^N + \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda\tau}}{\lambda\tau} \right) S_t + \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda\tau}}{\lambda\tau} - e^{-\lambda\tau} \right) C_t - \frac{A^N(\tau)}{\tau}, \quad (3)$$

$$y_t^R(\tau) = L_t^R + \alpha^R \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda\tau}}{\lambda\tau} \right) S_t + \alpha^R \left(\frac{1 - e^{-\lambda\tau}}{\lambda\tau} - e^{-\lambda\tau} \right) C_t - \frac{A^R(\tau)}{\tau}, \quad (4)$$

where $A^N(\tau)$ and $A^R(\tau)$ are convexity terms that adjust the functional form in Nelson and Siegel (1987) to ensure absence of arbitrage; see Christensen et al. (2011).

On the other hand, due to the bond-specific risk premia in the markets for nominal and real bonds, their pricing is not performed with the standard frictionless discount functions

¹³This restriction across nominal and real yields is supported by the Swedish bond data; see online Appendix A.

shown above, but rather with a discount function that accounts for the bond-specific risk:

$$\bar{r}^{N,i}(t, t_0^i) = r_t^N + \beta^{N,i}(1 - e^{-\delta^{N,i}(t-t_0^i)})X_t^N = L_t^N + S_t + \beta^{N,i}(1 - e^{-\delta^{N,i}(t-t_0^i)})X_t^N, \quad (5)$$

$$\bar{r}^{R,j}(t, t_0^j) = r_t^R + \beta^{R,j}(1 - e^{-\delta^{R,j}(t-t_0^j)})X_t^R = L_t^R + \alpha^R S_t + \beta^{R,j}(1 - e^{-\delta^{R,j}(t-t_0^j)})X_t^R, \quad (6)$$

where t_0^i and t_0^j denote the dates of issuance of the specific nominal and real bonds, respectively, and $\beta^{N,i}$ and $\beta^{R,j}$ are their sensitivities to the variation in their respective bond-specific risk factors. Furthermore, the decay parameters $\delta^{N,i}$ and $\delta^{R,j}$ are assumed to vary across securities as well.

Christensen and Rudebusch (2019) show that the net present value of one unit of currency paid by nominal bond i at time $t + \tau^i$ has the following exponential-affine form

$$\begin{aligned} P_t^N(t_0^i, \tau^i) &= E^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[e^{-\int_t^{t+\tau^i} \bar{r}^{N,i}(s, t_0^i) ds} \right] \\ &= \exp \left(B_1^N(\tau^i) L_t^N + B_2^N(\tau^i) S_t + B_3^N(\tau^i) C_t + B_4^N(t, t_0^i, \tau^i) X_t^N + A^N(t, t_0^i, \tau^i) \right). \end{aligned}$$

Andreasen et al. (2021) show that the net present value of one consumption unit paid by real bond j at time $t + \tau$ has the following exponential-affine form

$$\begin{aligned} P_t^R(t_0^j, \tau^j) &= E_t^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[e^{-\int_t^{t+\tau^j} \bar{r}^{R,j}(s, t_0^j) ds} \right] \\ &= \exp \left(B_1^R(\tau^j) S_t + B_2^R(\tau^j) C_t + B_3^R(\tau^j) L_t^R + B_4^R(t, t_0^j, \tau^j) X_t^R + A^R(t, t_0^j, \tau^j) \right). \end{aligned}$$

These formulas imply that the model belongs to the class of Gaussian affine term structure models. Note also that, by fixing $\beta^{N,i} = 0$ for all i and $\beta^{R,j} = 0$ for all j , we recover the original model analyzed in Christensen et al. (2010) and denoted the $G(4)$ model.

Now, consider the whole value of the nominal bond i issued at time t_0^i with maturity at $t + \tau^i$ that pays an annual coupon C^i . Its price is given by¹⁴

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{P}_t^{N,i}(t_0^i, \tau^i, C^i) &= C^i(t_1 - t) E^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[e^{-\int_t^{t_1} \bar{r}^{N,i}(s, t_0^i) ds} \right] + \sum_{k=2}^n C^i E^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[e^{-\int_t^{t_k} \bar{r}^{N,i}(s, t_0^i) ds} \right] \\ &\quad + E^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[e^{-\int_t^{t+\tau^i} \bar{r}^{N,i}(s, t_0^i) ds} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, the price of the real bond j issued at time t_0^j with maturity at $t + \tau^j$ that pays an annual coupon C^j is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{P}_t^{R,j}(t_0^j, \tau^j, C^j) &= C^j(t_1 - t) E^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[e^{-\int_t^{t_1} \bar{r}^{R,j}(s, t_0^j) ds} \right] + \sum_{k=2}^n C^j E^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[e^{-\int_t^{t_k} \bar{r}^{R,j}(s, t_0^j) ds} \right] \\ &\quad + E^{\mathbb{Q}} \left[e^{-\int_t^{t+\tau^j} \bar{r}^{R,j}(s, t_0^j) ds} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

¹⁴This is the clean nominal bond price that does not account for any accrued interest and maps to our observed nominal bond prices. The same applies to the real bond price formula.

There are two minor omissions in the real bond price formula above. First, we do not account for the value of deflation protection offered by the inflation-indexed bonds, given that Christensen and Zhang (2023) find that this very time-consuming adjustment has little impact on the estimation results thanks to generally positive inflation in Sweden during our sample period. Second, we do not account for the lag in the inflation indexation of the real bond payoff, but the potential error should be modest in most cases; see Grishchenko and Huang (2013) and D’Amico et al. (2018) for evidence in the case of the U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) market.

So far, the description of the $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model has relied solely on the dynamics of the state variables under the \mathbb{Q} -measure used for pricing. However, to complete the description of the model and to implement it empirically, we will need to specify the risk premia that connect the factor dynamics under the \mathbb{Q} -measure to the dynamics under the real-world (or historical) \mathbb{P} -measure. It is important to note that there are no restrictions on the dynamic drift components under the empirical \mathbb{P} -measure beyond the requirement of constant volatility. To facilitate empirical implementation, we use the essentially affine risk premium specification introduced in Duffee (2002). In the Gaussian framework, this specification implies that the risk premia Γ_t depend on the state variables; that is,

$$\Gamma_t = \gamma^0 + \gamma^1 X_t,$$

where $\gamma^0 \in \mathbf{R}^6$ and $\gamma^1 \in \mathbf{R}^{6 \times 6}$ contain unrestricted parameters.

Thus, the resulting unrestricted six-factor $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model has \mathbb{P} -dynamics given by

$$dX_t = K^{\mathbb{P}}(\theta^{\mathbb{P}} - X_t) + \Sigma dW_t^{\mathbb{P}},$$

where $K^{\mathbb{P}}$ is an unrestricted 6×6 mean-reversion matrix, $\theta^{\mathbb{P}}$ is a 6×1 vector of mean levels, and Σ is a 6×6 diagonal triangular volatility matrix. This is the transition equation in the extended Kalman filter estimation of this model.

3.2 Model Estimation and Econometric Identification

Due to the nonlinearity of the bond pricing formulas, the model cannot be estimated with the standard Kalman filter. Instead, we use the extended Kalman filter, as in Kim and Singleton (2012); see Christensen and Rudebusch (2019) for details. To make the fitted errors comparable across bonds of various maturities, we scale each bond price by its duration. Thus, the measurement equation for the nominal bond prices takes the following form:

$$\frac{\overline{P}_t^N(t_0^i, \tau^i)}{D_t^N(\tau^i)} = \frac{\widehat{P}_t^N(t_0^i, \tau^i)}{D_t^N(\tau^i)} + \varepsilon_t^{N,i},$$

where $\hat{P}_t^N(t_0^i, \tau^i)$ is the model-implied price of nominal bond i and $D_t^N(\tau^i)$ is its duration, which is fixed and calculated before estimation. Similarly, the measurement equation for the real bond prices takes the following form:

$$\frac{\bar{P}_t^R(t_0^j, \tau^j)}{D_t^R(\tau^j)} = \frac{\hat{P}_t^R(t_0^j, \tau^j)}{D_t^R(\tau^j)} + \varepsilon_t^{R,j},$$

where $\hat{P}_t^R(t_0^j, \tau^j)$ is the model-implied price of real bond j and $D_t^R(\tau^j)$ is its duration, which is again fixed and calculated before estimation. See Andreasen et al. (2019) for evidence supporting this formulation of the measurement equations.

Since the bond-specific risk factors are latent factors that we do not observe, their level is not identified without additional restrictions. As a consequence, we let the second standard fixed-coupon bond in our sample have a unit loading on the nominal bond-specific factor X_t^N , that is, the fixed-coupon bond issued on July 22, 1991, with maturity on May 5, 2003, and a coupon rate of 10.25 percent has $\beta^i = 1$. Similarly, we let the first inflation-indexed bond in our sample have a unit loading on the real bond-specific factor X_t^R , that is, the inflation-indexed bond issued on June 6, 1996, with maturity on December 1, 2020, and a coupon rate of 4 percent has $\beta^j = 1$.

Furthermore, we note that the $\delta^{N,i}$ and $\delta^{R,j}$ parameters can be hard to identify if their values are too large or too small. As a consequence, we impose the restriction that they fall within the range from 0.01 to 10, which is without practical consequences for our results, as also noted by Andreasen et al. (2021). Also, for numerical stability during the model optimization, we impose the restriction that the $\beta^{N,i}$ and $\beta^{R,j}$ parameters fall within the range from 0 to 100, which turns out not to be a binding constraint at the optimum.

Finally, we assume that all nominal bond price measurement equations have *i.i.d.* fitted errors with zero mean and standard deviation σ_ε^N . Similarly, all real bond price measurement equations have fitted errors that are assumed to be *i.i.d.* with zero mean and standard deviation σ_ε^R .

4 Results

In this section, we briefly summarize our estimation results and detail the formulas underlying the yield decompositions we use.

Throughout we consider the preferred specification of the $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model identified in Christensen and Zhang (2023) and estimated using our weekly data. It has a diagonal volatility matrix Σ as per Christensen et al. (2011), while its mean-reversion matrix takes the

$K^{\mathbb{P}}$	$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{\cdot,1}$	$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{\cdot,2}$	$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{\cdot,3}$	$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{\cdot,4}$	$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{\cdot,5}$	$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{\cdot,6}$	$\theta^{\mathbb{P}}$		Σ
$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{1,\cdot}$	1.8963 (0.3134)	0	0	0	-1.9749 (0.3418)	0	0.0612 (0.0012)	σ_{11}	0.0053 (0.0001)
$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{2,\cdot}$	0	0.6564 (0.1925)	0	0	0	1.6135 (0.2994)	-0.0225 (0.0095)	σ_{22}	0.0101 (0.0003)
$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{3,\cdot}$	-6.0403 (0.5037)	0	0.2243 (0.1862)	0	6.4303 (0.5423)	0	-0.0413 (0.0278)	σ_{33}	0.0177 (0.0005)
$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{4,\cdot}$	0	0	0	0.5709 (0.2869)	0	0	-0.0018 (0.0025)	σ_{44}	0.0046 (0.0002)
$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{5,\cdot}$	-3.4450 (0.4101)	0	0	0	3.6205 (0.4384)	0	0.0387 (0.0012)	σ_{55}	0.0051 (0.0001)
$K^{\mathbb{P}}_{6,\cdot}$	2.6693 (0.5097)	0	0	0	-2.9110 (0.5430)	0.7669 (0.2645)	0.0024 (0.0044)	σ_{66}	0.0081 (0.0005)

Table 1: **Estimated Dynamic Parameters of the Preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ Model**

The table shows the estimated parameters of the $K^{\mathbb{P}}$ matrix, $\theta^{\mathbb{P}}$ vector, and diagonal Σ matrix for the $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model preferred by Christensen and Zhang (2023). The estimated value of λ is 0.5600 (0.0033), while $\alpha^R = 0.7803$ (0.0086), $\kappa_N^{\mathbb{Q}} = 1.9192$ (0.0396), $\theta_N^{\mathbb{Q}} = -0.0012$ (0.0001), $\kappa_R^{\mathbb{Q}} = 0.6369$ (0.0176), and $\theta_R^{\mathbb{Q}} = -0.0026$ (0.0002). The maximum log likelihood value is 100,661.2. The numbers in parentheses are the estimated parameter standard deviations.

form

$$K^{\mathbb{P}} = \begin{pmatrix} \kappa_{11}^{\mathbb{P}} & 0 & 0 & 0 & \kappa_{15}^{\mathbb{P}} & 0 \\ 0 & \kappa_{22}^{\mathbb{P}} & 0 & 0 & 0 & \kappa_{26}^{\mathbb{P}} \\ \kappa_{31}^{\mathbb{P}} & 0 & \kappa_{33}^{\mathbb{P}} & 0 & \kappa_{35}^{\mathbb{P}} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \kappa_{44}^{\mathbb{P}} & 0 & 0 \\ \kappa_{51}^{\mathbb{P}} & 0 & 0 & 0 & \kappa_{55}^{\mathbb{P}} & 0 \\ \kappa_{61}^{\mathbb{P}} & 0 & 0 & 0 & \kappa_{65}^{\mathbb{P}} & \kappa_{66}^{\mathbb{P}} \end{pmatrix}.$$

The estimated parameters of the preferred specification are reported in Table 1. The estimated \mathbb{Q} -dynamics used for pricing and determined by $(\Sigma, \lambda, \alpha^R, \kappa_N^{\mathbb{Q}}, \theta_N^{\mathbb{Q}}, \kappa_R^{\mathbb{Q}}, \theta_R^{\mathbb{Q}})$ are close to those reported in Christensen and Zhang (2023). This implies that the model fit and the estimated bond-specific parameters are very similar to theirs and therefore not shown. Furthermore, the estimated objective \mathbb{P} -dynamics in terms of $\theta^{\mathbb{P}}$ and Σ are also qualitatively similar to those reported in their paper. Finally, we note that the bond-specific factor for the inflation-indexed bonds matters for the expected excess return of nominal bonds through $\kappa_{26}^{\mathbb{P}}$ in addition to its effect on the inflation-indexed bond pricing, while the real level factor is important for the expected return of both nominal and real bonds.

4.1 The Estimated Bond-Specific Safety Premia

We now use the estimated $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model to extract the bond-specific risk premia in the Swedish government bond market. To compute these premia, we first use the estimated parameters and the filtered states $\{X_{t|t}\}_{t=1}^T$ to calculate the fitted bond prices $\{\hat{P}_t^i\}_{t=1}^T$ for




Figure 2: **Average Estimated Safety Premia**

Illustration of the average estimated bond-specific risk premia of Swedish nominal and inflation-indexed bonds for each observation date implied by our preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model. The nominal bond price data cover the period from January 4, 1999, to December 31, 2019, while the real bond price data cover the period from January 2, 2002, to December 31, 2019.

all outstanding securities in our sample. These bond prices are then converted into yields to maturity $\{\hat{y}_t^{c,i}\}_{t=1}^T$ by solving the fixed-point problem

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{P}_t^i = & C(t_1 - t) \exp \left\{ -(t_1 - t) \hat{y}_t^{c,i} \right\} + \sum_{k=2}^n C \exp \left\{ -(t_k - t) \hat{y}_t^{c,i} \right\} \\ & + \exp \left\{ -(T - t) \hat{y}_t^{c,i} \right\}, \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

for $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$, meaning that $\{\hat{y}_t^{c,i}\}_{t=1}^T$ is approximately the rate of return on the i th bond if held until maturity (see Sack and Elsassner 2004). To obtain the corresponding yields corrected for the bond-specific risk premia, we compute a new set of model-implied bond prices from the estimated $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model using only its frictionless part, i.e., using the constraints that $X_{t|t}^N = 0$ for all t as well as $\sigma_{44} = 0$ and $\theta_N^Q = 0$, and $X_{t|t}^R = 0$ for all t as well as $\sigma_{66} = 0$ and $\theta_R^Q = 0$. These prices are denoted $\{\tilde{P}_t^i\}_{t=1}^T$ and converted into yields to maturity $\tilde{y}_t^{c,i}$ using equation (7). They represent estimates of the prices that would prevail in a world without any financial frictions or convenience premia. The bond-specific premium for the i th bond is then defined as

$$\Psi_t^i \equiv \tilde{y}_t^{c,i} - \hat{y}_t^{c,i}. \quad (8)$$

Figure 2 shows the average bond-specific risk premia in the nominal and inflation-indexed bond market across the outstanding set of bonds in each market at each point in time. The fact that the shown bond-specific premia are positive means that the frictionless yields are

above the fitted yields from the bond price data. As a consequence, the bond-specific premia can be interpreted as convenience premia that cause the observed bond prices to be above the level we would expect to see in a world without any frictions to bond trading. We follow Christensen and Mirkov (2022), who report estimates of such convenience premia in the prices of Danish and Swiss government bonds, and refer to them as safety premia due to the high credit quality and relatively low liquidity of the considered bonds. Furthermore, these safety premia tend to be slightly larger for nominal bonds compared to those estimated for the inflation-indexed bonds. This could suggest that the size of the convenience premia of the inflation-indexed bonds are tempered or somewhat offset by illiquidity premia, thanks to their lower liquidity compared to the nominal bonds.

4.2 The Deflation Risk Premium

To have a consistent measure of deflation protection values across time that is not affected by variation in inflation index ratios, coupon differences, and maturity mismatches, we construct synthetic T -year real par-coupon yield spreads.

We calculate the deflation option values by comparing the price of a newly issued SGB IL that has deflation protection but no accrued inflation compensation and that of a similar SGB IL that does not offer this protection. First, consider the latter hypothetical SGB IL with T years remaining to maturity that pays an annual coupon C . As this bond does not offer any deflation protection, its par coupon is determined by the equation

$$\sum_{i=1}^T C E_t^Q[e^{-\int_t^{t_i} r_s^R ds}] + E_t^Q[e^{-\int_t^T r_s^R ds}] = 1.$$

The first term is the sum of the present value of the T coupon payments using the model's frictionless real yield curve at day t . The second term is the discounted value of the principal payment. We denote the coupon rate that solves this equation as C_{NO} .

Next, consider the corresponding SGB IL with deflation protection but no accrued inflation compensation. Since its coupon payments are not protected against deflation, the difference is in accounting for the deflation protection on the principal payment, as explained in Christensen and Spiegel (2022). Therefore, the par coupon for this bond is given by the solution to the following equation

$$\sum_{i=1}^T C E_t^Q[e^{-\int_t^{t_i} r_s^R ds}] + E_t^Q[e^{-\int_t^T r_s^R ds}] + \left[E_t^Q[e^{-\int_t^T r_s^N ds} \mathbf{1}_{\{\frac{\pi_T}{\pi_t} \leq 1\}}] - E_t^Q[e^{-\int_t^T r_s^R ds} \mathbf{1}_{\{\frac{\pi_T}{\pi_t} \leq 1\}}] \right] = 1,$$

where the last term on the left-hand side represents the net present value of the deflation protection of the principal in the SGB IL contract, which is calculated using formulas provided in Christensen et al. (2012). We denote as C_O the par-coupon yield of the new hypothetical SGB IL that solves this equation.




Figure 3: Value of Ten-Year Deflation Protection Options

Shown is the “deflation risk premium” defined as the spread between the par yield of a synthetic newly issued ten-year inflation-indexed bond lacking deflation protection and that of a deflation-protected bond with the same maturity.

The difference between C_{NO} and C_O is a measure of the advantage of holding a newly issued SGB IL at the inflation adjustment floor, and we refer to it as the deflation risk premium. Figure 3 shows the difference between the C_{NO} and C_O values that solve the pricing equations at the ten-year maturity using our preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model. Prior to the financial crisis, the differences between the two synthetic SGB IL yields were averaging less than 5 basis points. However, the yield differences then spiked with the onset of the crisis. After the crisis ended, the yield difference remained elevated until late 2016, when it fell notably following the U.S. presidential election on November 8, 2016. It remained at that lower level for the remainder of our sample.

4.3 Yield Decompositions

In this section, we describe the yield decompositions we use to generate the key dependent variables for our subsequent empirical analysis.

First, we define the nominal and real term premia in the usual way as

$$TP_t^j(\tau) = \tilde{y}_t^j(\tau) - \frac{1}{\tau} \int_t^{t+\tau} E_t^{\mathbb{P}}[r_s^j] ds, \quad j = N, R.$$

That is, the nominal term premium is the difference in expected nominal returns between a buy-and-hold strategy for a τ -year nominal bond and an instantaneous rollover strategy at the risk-free nominal rate r_t^N . The interpretation for the real term premium is similar.

The model thus allows us to decompose nominal and real yields into their respective term premia and short-rate expectations components. Importantly, we are using the frictionless yields $\tilde{y}_t(\tau)$ in these calculations, i.e., after accounting for the embedded safety premia.

Next, as explained in Christensen and Spiegel (2022), the price of a nominal zero-coupon bond with maturity in τ years can be written as

$$P_t^N(\tau) = P_t^R(\tau) \times E_t^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi_{t+\tau}} \right] \times \left(1 + \frac{\text{cov}_t^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\frac{M_{t+\tau}^R}{M_t^R}, \frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi_{t+\tau}} \right]}{E_t^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\frac{M_{t+\tau}^R}{M_t^R} \right] \times E_t^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi_{t+\tau}} \right]} \right),$$

where $P_t^R(\tau)$ is the price of a real zero-coupon bond that pays one consumption unit in τ years, M_t^R is the real stochastic discount factor, and Π_t is the price level.

By taking logarithms, this can be converted into

$$\tilde{y}_t^N(\tau) = \tilde{y}_t^R(\tau) + \pi_t^e(\tau) + \phi_t(\tau),$$

where $\tilde{y}_t^N(\tau)$ and $\tilde{y}_t^R(\tau)$ are nominal and real zero-coupon frictionless yields as described in the previous section, while the market-implied average rate of inflation expected at time t for the period from t to $t + \tau$ is

$$\pi_t^e(\tau) = -\frac{1}{\tau} \ln E_t^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi_{t+\tau}} \right] = -\frac{1}{\tau} \ln E_t^{\mathbb{P}} \left[e^{-\int_t^{t+\tau} (r_s^N - r_s^R) ds} \right]$$

and the associated inflation risk premium for the same time period is

$$\phi_t(\tau) = -\frac{1}{\tau} \ln \left(1 + \frac{\text{cov}_t^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\frac{M_{t+\tau}^R}{M_t^R}, \frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi_{t+\tau}} \right]}{E_t^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\frac{M_{t+\tau}^R}{M_t^R} \right] \times E_t^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi_{t+\tau}} \right]} \right).$$

This last equation demonstrates that the inflation risk premium can be positive or negative. It is positive if and only if

$$\text{cov}_t^{\mathbb{P}} \left[\frac{M_{t+\tau}^R}{M_t^R}, \frac{\Pi_t}{\Pi_{t+\tau}} \right] < 0.$$

That is, the riskiness of nominal bonds relative to real bonds depends on the covariance between the real stochastic discount factor and inflation, and is ultimately determined by investor preferences, as in, for example, Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).

Now, the breakeven inflation (BEI) rate is defined as the difference between nominal and real frictionless yields of the same maturity

$$BEI_t(\tau) \equiv \tilde{y}_t^N(\tau) - \tilde{y}_t^R(\tau) = \pi_t^e(\tau) + \phi_t(\tau).$$

Note that it can be decomposed into the sum of expected inflation and the inflation risk premium.

Finally, following Christensen and Rudebusch (2019), our definition of the equilibrium real rate of interest r_t^* is

$$r_t^* = \frac{1}{5} \int_{t+5}^{t+10} E_t^{\mathbb{P}}[r_{t+s}^R] ds, \quad (9)$$

that is, the average expected real short rate over a five-year period starting five years ahead, where the expectation is with respect to the objective \mathbb{P} -probability measure. We note that this 5yr5yr forward average expected real short rate should be little affected by short-term transitory shocks. Alternatively, r_t^* could be defined as the expected real short rate at an infinite horizon, as discussed in Christensen and Rudebusch (2019). However, this quantity will depend crucially on whether the factor dynamics exhibit a unit root. The typical spans of the available time series data do not distinguish strongly between highly persistent stationary processes and nonstationary ones. Our model follows the finance literature and adopts the former structure, so strictly speaking, our infinite-horizon steady-state expected real rate is constant. However, our data sample likely has insufficient information in the ten-year to infinite horizon to definitively pin down that steady state.

4.3.1 Estimated Nominal and Real Term Premia


Figure 4 shows these decompositions at the ten-year maturity for both nominal and real yields since 2002. Note that the ten-year frictionless nominal and real yields have trended persistently lower during this period. Furthermore, the average expected nominal and real short rates trend down in tandem during our sample period. This leads to very similar patterns in the estimated nominal and real term premia.

4.3.2 Empirical BEI Decomposition


In this section, we describe the decomposition of the ten-year BEI implied by our estimation results.

The starting point for the decomposition is the fitted ten-year BEI rate from the $G(4)$ model, which offers the cleanest and most straightforward fit of the raw bond data without any adjustments. This measure of ten-year BEI is shown with a solid black line in Figure 5. The estimated ten-year frictionless BEI from the $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, which does not contain any bond-specific safety premia, is shown with a solid gray line. It fluctuates mostly above the ten-year fitted BEI, which implies that the safety premia of nominal bonds are generally larger than those of inflation-indexed bonds, as also evident from Figure 2.

As explained in Section 4.3, the $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model also provides a decomposition of the estimated ten-year frictionless BEI into an expected CPI inflation component (solid red line) and the associated inflation risk premium (solid green line). The ten-year inflation risk pre-



(a) Nominal yields



(b) Real yields

Figure 4: Ten-Year Nominal and Real Yield Decompositions

Illustration of the ten-year nominal and real yield decompositions implied by the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model. The shown data cover the period from January 2, 2002, to December 31, 2019.

mium is variable and mostly positive, but it did turn negative briefly in late 2015 and early 2016 when global energy and commodity prices fell sharply.¹⁵ In addition, it experienced a temporary softening around the peak of the financial crisis in late 2008, when CPI inflation in Sweden and elsewhere started to fall; see Christensen et al. (2012) for a U.S. analysis of this episode. Many studies have found inflation risk premia to be positive on average and relatively stable; see Ang et al. (2008), Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005), and Hördahl and Tristani (2014), among many others. Thus, we consider the estimated inflation risk premium from the $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model to be reasonable in terms of both its level and time-series variation.

In comparison, the estimated ten-year inflation expectations are less variable and char-

¹⁵Note that, due to the model's Gaussian dynamics, the conditional variance of expected inflation is constant. As a result, changes in the inflation risk premium reflect changes in the risk premia within the model.




Figure 5: **Ten-Year BEI Decomposition**

Illustration of the ten-year fitted BEI implied by the $G(4)$ model, i.e. the model without adjustment for bond-specific premia in the prices of nominal and real bonds, and its decomposition into (1) the fitted frictionless BEI, (2) the ten-year expected inflation, and (3) the residual ten-year inflation risk premium based on the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model. Also shown are the ten-year inflation forecasts from the Consensus Forecasts and the year-over-year change in the Swedish CPI.

acterized by a very stable pattern remaining close to 2 percent for the entire period. This suggests that investors' long-term inflation expectations in Sweden are very well anchored near the Riksbank's 2 percent inflation target. This is also consistent with the responses to the Consensus Forecasts survey of professional forecasters, who twice a year are asked about their expectations for inflation over the following ten years. The mean responses in each survey since 2002 are shown with blue crosses in Figure 5 and have remained very close to 2 percent throughout this period. As a consequence, both investors and the forecasters appear to agree that the variation in Swedish long-term BEI rates mainly reflects fluctuations in inflation risk premia rather than changes in the expected inflation. Importantly, we stress that this result is not a consequence of lack of persistence of the state variables within our model or their assumed stationarity as evidenced by the pronounced declines in the expectations component of nominal and real ten-year yields in Figure 4; see Bauer et al. (2012) for a discussion.

4.3.3 Estimates of the Natural Real Rate

Our market-based measure of the natural rate is the average expected real short rate over a five-year period starting five years ahead. This 5yr5yr forward average expected real short rate should capture the persistent trends in the natural real rate.

Figure 6 shows the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model decomposition of the 5yr5yr forward fric-




Figure 6: **5yr5yr Real Yield Decomposition**

tionless real yield based on the standard definition of the real term premium

$$TP_t^R(\tau) = \tilde{y}_t^R(\tau) - \frac{1}{\tau} \int_t^{t+\tau} E_t^{\mathbb{P}}[r_s^R] ds,$$

where $\tilde{y}_t^R(\tau)$ is the fitted frictionless real zero-coupon yield with maturity in τ years. The solid gray line is the 5yr5yr forward real term premium, which has exhibited a mild lower trend since 2002 that leaves it close to zero at the end of 2019. In comparison, the estimate of the natural real rate of interest implied by the $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model—the black line—shows a steeper and more pronounced decline from above 2 percent in the early 2000s to below -1 percent by the end of the sample. Thus, much of the downward trend in the 5yr5yr forward real yield is driven by declines in this measure of r_t^* , while the corresponding real term premium has declined much less on net during this period.

5 The Transmission of QE to Bond Yields

In this section, we first provide a brief description of the key events and motivations behind the Riksbank's unconventional monetary policies during the 2015-2019 period before we turn to our empirical analysis of their impact on Swedish government bond yields.

5.1 The Riksbank's Unconventional Monetary Policies

In response to the low inflation in the years after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2011-2012, Sveriges Riksbank lowered its policy rate (repo rate) to zero and later moved it into negative territory starting in February 2015. At the same time, the Riksbank introduced a QE program involving large-scale asset purchases to provide further monetary stimulus. Initially, the Riksbank only purchased standard nominal

Swedish government bonds with long maturities. In April 2016, the Riksbank added purchases of inflation-indexed government bonds to its existing nominal bond purchase program. By April 2020, it owned more than half of the outstanding nominal bond market and about a quarter of the market for inflation-indexed bonds. Online Appendix B provides a summary of the key monetary policy decisions and QE announcements made by the Riksbank in the 2015–2019 period.¹⁶ Note that the table only includes monetary policy decision dates with interest rate changes or QE announcements.

5.2 ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy

The European Central Bank (ECB) also implemented unconventional monetary policy in the form of QE aimed at stimulating the economy and combatting deflationary pressures. The QE program of the ECB started operating in March 2015.¹⁷ At its peak in 2022, the Eurosystem held assets in an amount equal to around 56 percent of euro-area nominal GDP.

The primary goal of the ECB’s QE program was to bring the inflation rate up to the ECB’s 2 percent target and boost economic growth in the Eurozone. Under the program, the ECB purchased a substantial amount of government bonds and other eligible assets issued by countries in the Eurozone. The ECB had certain selection criteria for the eligible assets. For instance, bonds had to be above a minimum credit rating and meet certain maturity requirements. This helped maintain the quality and safety of the assets held by the ECB under the QE program. These purchases have been shown to have direct impacts on financial markets; see, for example, De Santis (2020), Koijen et al. (2021), Arrata et al. (2020), among many others. They have also been found to have substantial effects on the macroeconomy; see Gambetti and Musso (2017) and Hohberger et al. (2019), among others. Online Appendix B lists a number of key speeches and announcements about the ECB’s monetary policy and QE programs in the 2015–2019 period.

Finally, we obtain weekly balance sheet and transactions data from the Riksbank with details of the execution of its QE programs, including information on the price, amount, and maturity of the bonds acquired in each purchase auction. We will use this data in our empirical analysis.

¹⁶During the coronavirus pandemic, the Riksbank announced a number of measures that led to a further increase in its balance sheet to alleviate the negative economic impact of the government policies imposed to fight the pandemic. The Riksbank decided to expand its balance sheet up to a maximum of SEK 700 billion by the end of 2021, which included purchases of government bonds, treasury bills, covered bonds (mortgage bonds), municipal bonds, and corporate debt securities. These measures aimed at stimulating the economic recovery and supporting market liquidity and functioning. Given that these measures fall outside of our sample period, we leave it for future research to evaluate their effects.

¹⁷On 22 January 2015, the ECB announced the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP), which would supplement its existing Asset-Backed Securities and Covered Bonds Purchase Programmes, known as ABSPP and CBPP3, respectively.

5.3 Domestic versus Foreign QE and the Role of the Exchange Rate

The SEK-EUR exchange rate, which moves in response to both home and foreign QE programs, could play an important role for the demand of government bonds. There exist both an empirical and a theoretical literature that provide support for a link between the exchange rate and the market for, and properties of, safe assets such as the Swedish government bonds examined here. Avdjiev et al. (2019) and Engel and Wu (2023) both relate the U.S. dollar exchange rate to the safety and convenience services provided by U.S. Treasuries. Jiang et al. (2021) show within a theoretical model that the demand for U.S. dollar-denominated safe assets affects the U.S. dollar exchange rate. Essentially, this literature establishes that the convenience or safety premia can be linked to the exchange rate through the safe asset demand of foreign investors. Recently, Jiang et al. (2022) further demonstrate that the demand for safe assets is an important but understudied channel through which the Federal Reserve affects the U.S. dollar exchange rate via its QE programs.

While U.S. dollar-denominated safe securities are the primary safe assets demanded by global investors, it is reasonable to believe that other relevant classes of safe assets exist, including government bonds denominated in domestic currencies. Due to market incompleteness and market segmentation, investors from other countries will need safe assets denominated in their local currencies to hold or pledge as collateral in their domestic financial markets. At the same time, home-biased investors would have an appetite for holding local currency-denominated safe assets, rather than combining U.S. safe assets with a foreign exchange rate hedging strategy. Typically, such strategies are too costly for most investors to profitably pursue. In our initial set of baseline regressions, the ECB's bond purchases are normalized using the nominal GDP in the euro area, so the SEK-EUR exchange rate should not affect our measure of the ECB QE program as it is without a monetary unit. However, using a standard small open economy model with Ricardian equivalence and perfect asset substitutability, Bacchetta and Chikhani (2021) argue that a QE program can be viewed as equivalent to direct foreign exchange interventions. In turn, this points to a potentially important role for the exchange rate in the resulting effects of domestic and foreign QE programs. Against this background of unsettled theoretical questions, it is ultimately an empirical question whether accounting for exchange rate fluctuations can help us better understand the effects of foreign QE programs on domestic bond risk premia.

5.4 Empirical Results

In this section, we use time series regressions to examine the channels through which the Riksbank's bond purchases affected Swedish government bond yields of various maturities. In general, our baseline regressions take the form

$$\Phi_t = \alpha + \beta Q_t + \gamma X_t + \epsilon_t, \tag{10}$$

where the dependent variable, Φ_t , is a component from the weekly yield decompositions produced by our preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ dynamic term structure model described earlier, while Q_t quantifies the Riksbank’s QE program in terms of total purchases, measured as a percentage of Swedish nominal GDP.¹⁸

Next, we are interested in examining the spillover effects from the ECB’s QE program on top of the domestic unconventional monetary policy. We extend the regression to include the ECB’s bond purchases, measured as a fraction of the euro area nominal GDP and denoted Q_t^* .

$$\Phi_t = \alpha + \beta Q_t + \beta^* Q_t^* + \gamma X_t + \epsilon_t. \quad (11)$$

To control for the effects of the ECB and the Riksbank asset purchases on the SEK-EUR exchange rate—as suggested by the analysis in Jiang et al. (2022) and Kolasa and Wesolowski (2020)—we refine our regression analysis further to allow for an explicit role of the exchange rate. Specifically, the regression model is modified to include the exchange rate via its interaction with the ECB’s QE program variable. Note that the interaction term shows how the exchange rate mitigates or amplifies the effects from the ECB’s QE program (Q_t^*), depending on the sign of its coefficient β_3 :

$$\Phi_t = \alpha + \beta_1 Q_t + \beta_2 Q_t^* + \beta_3 Q_t^* \times E_t + \gamma X_t + \epsilon_t, \quad (12)$$

where E_t stands for the SEK-EUR exchange rate, i.e. the number of Swedish kronor per euro. Figure 7 shows the exchange rate of the Swedish kronor to the euro since 1999.¹⁹

We add several monetary policy shock measures in the regressions to control for yield changes unrelated to the QE program, including the monetary policy rate changes (Int. rate), the monetary policy surprises (MPS) calculated using the measure of De Rezende and Ristiniemi (2020), and the QE surprises (QES) normalized by Swedish GDP.²⁰ We also include a dummy variable for announcement dates regarding the Riksbank’s QE program. Moreover, we control for broader bond market conditions using a noise measure to account for limits to arbitrage capital (Hu et al. 2013), the average bond age, and realized volatility of the ten-year yield to proxy for liquidity (Houweling et al. 2005). Note that these three variables can be computed for the nominal and real bond market separately, so we include them throughout the analysis.

Finally, we note that the sample used throughout for the regression analysis contains weekly data covering the period from March 13, 2015, to December 27, 2019, a total of 251

¹⁸The reported results are robust to instead using the Riksbank’s bond holdings, which takes into account that certain bonds matured in the Riksbank portfolio. It does not change the results if we use the nominal value of the bond holdings instead of the ratio to Swedish GDP.

¹⁹Note that we do not include the exchange rate E_t as a separate explanatory variable due to concerns about endogeneity. The exchange rate fluctuated in the range between 9.07 and 10.91 during our regression period, which runs from mid-March 2015 through the end of December 2019.

²⁰These are computed as the difference between market survey expectations of the QE amounts and the actual announced amounts.




Figure 7: **Exchange Rate of the Swedish Kronor to the Euro**

observations. This allows us to focus squarely on the part of our sample during which both the Riksbank and the ECB operated QE programs. In the following sections, we look into four channels: signaling, portfolio rebalancing, liquidity-scarcity, and tail risk.

5.4.1 Signaling Channel

There is a large literature arguing that the operation of large-scale asset purchase programs sends a strong signal about future monetary policy. Specifically, by committing to buy and hold a large portfolio of government bonds for an extended period, the central bank sends a credible signal that it plans to keep the policy rate low for longer than previously anticipated.

We investigate whether the Riksbank's bond purchases had signaling effects on the inflation and short-rate expectations, both averaged over the next five years and ten years, respectively, and the natural real rate r_t^* extracted from our yield curve model. That is, we run the regression in Equation (10) – (12) with the estimated expectations components from our yield decompositions as the dependent variable. The results are reported in Table 2.

Panel A shows the results for the effects on the extracted five- and ten-year inflation expectations. The results from three different empirical specifications are presented in the table. We find that there are significant effects of the Riksbank's bond purchases on inflation expectations, with positive coefficients at both maturities. Importantly, in the second regression specification with both the ECB's and the Riksbank's QE programs, the ECB's asset purchases put significant downward pressure on Swedish inflation expectations, and more so in the near term. Thirdly, as for the effects of the added interaction between the measure of the ECB's QE program and the SEK-EUR exchange rate, the estimated coefficients are all negative and mostly statistically significant.

Panel B reports the effects on the short-rate expectations implied from the yield curve

Panel A: Inflation Expectations (bps)						
	5yr			10yr		
Riksbank's QE	0.812*** (0.148)	2.736*** (0.597)	2.351*** (0.574)	0.483*** (0.084)	1.502*** (0.338)	1.301*** (0.331)
ECB's QE		-0.770*** (0.238)	0.926 (0.811)		-0.409*** (0.135)	0.479 (0.436)
ECB's QE \times E_t			-0.154** (0.072)			-0.081** (0.038)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of obs.	252	251	251	252	251	251
R^2	0.619	0.666	0.684	0.604	0.645	0.663
Adj. R^2	0.602	0.649	0.667	0.586	0.628	0.644

Panel B: Short-Rate Expectations (bps)						
	5yr			10yr		
Riksbank's QE	2.348*** (0.802)	9.978*** (3.191)	7.384*** (2.774)	1.079* (0.592)	4.735** (2.308)	2.917 (2.026)
ECB's QE		-3.007** (1.202)	8.427 (5.471)		-1.420* (0.859)	6.593* (3.985)
ECB's QE \times E_t			-1.040** (0.520)			-0.729* (0.380)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of obs.	252	251	251	252	251	251
R^2	0.761	0.779	0.796	0.778	0.786	0.801
Adj. R^2	0.750	0.767	0.785	0.768	0.775	0.791

Panel C: Natural Real Rate r_t^*			
Riksbank's QE	-0.344 (0.489)	-0.775 (1.819)	-1.800 (1.762)
ECB's QE		0.214 (0.687)	4.730* (2.743)
ECB's QE \times E_t			-0.411 (0.255)
Controls	✓	✓	✓
No. of obs.	252	251	251
R^2	0.757	0.760	0.769
Adj. R^2	0.746	0.748	0.756

Table 2: **QE Program Impact on Inflation Expectations, Short-Rate Expectations and the Natural Real Rate**

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of expected inflation, short-rate expectations, and the natural real rate from the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, all measured in basis points. The QE bond holdings are normalized by Swedish nominal GDP. The ECB QE amounts are normalized by the nominal GDP in the euro area. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by Swedish nominal GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.

model for five- and ten-year. These results show that the bond purchases are associated with rising short-rate expectations at both horizons. The regression with the Riksbank's and ECB's QE program suggests that the ECB's QE program had a tendency to depress

the short-rate expectations in Sweden, although the results are not very strong statistically. However, if we add the interaction term between the ECB’s QE program and the exchange rate, the ECB’s QE program will have the same impact as the Riksbank’s QE program. The estimated coefficients for the interaction terms are negative and statistically significant.

The results for the real rate r_t^* are presented in Panel C. We find that the impact of the Riksbank’s bond purchases on our estimate of r^* is negative, but insignificant. Thus, the QE bond purchases do not seem to affect the level of the natural rate much.

To understand the effects of the exchange rate and to interpret the results from the interaction term, we have to note that the ECB QE program should push down euro-area interest rates and put downward pressure on the value of the euro against other currencies, including the Swedish kronor. Hence, if the SEK depreciates against the euro (an increase in E_t) during the ECB QE program as documented in Figure 7, it means that some economic forces specific to Sweden are able to offset the baseline push towards an appreciation of the Swedish kronor—the leading candidate would be the Riksbank’s own QE purchases. The negative regression coefficients on the interaction term with the ECB QE measure then suggest that these economic forces primarily affect and lower investors’ inflation and short-rate expectations, while they appear to matter little for our estimate of the natural real rate. Overall, this would be consistent with an easing of financial conditions in Sweden.

Given that the SEK-EUR exchange rate fluctuated between 9 and 11 during our sample period, the estimated coefficients on the interacted terms with the exchange rate imply that the net effect of the ECB’s QE program on Swedish inflation and short rate expectations is negative, but to varying degrees depending on the level of the exchange rate. Again, the natural real short rate is the exception, where the net effect is positive for all assumed values of E_t during our sample period.

On the other hand, if the SEK appreciates against the euro—meaning E_t declines—while the ECB is operating its QE program, investors’ inflation and short-rate expectations will tend to increase more than indicated by the insignificant regression coefficients of the ECB QE measure on their own. That is, an appreciation in the midst of foreign QE tends to be correlated with a firming of domestic inflation and monetary policy expectations. This could be interpreted as investors being bullish about the prospects for the domestic Swedish economy under those circumstances.

We note that the estimated coefficients on the Riksbank’s bond purchases are qualitatively similar in all three specifications for each dependent variable considered. As for the other control variables, we see a tendency for our liquidity control variables—that is, the average age of our nominal and real bonds and the realized one-month volatility of the ten-year nominal and real yields—to negatively affect our expectations measures. Our findings provide evidence of the signalling channel of the central bank’s bond purchases in Sweden. Moreover, the fluctuations in the exchange rate indeed play a unique role for how foreign QE programs

affect domestic investors' economic outlook.

5.4.2 Portfolio Rebalancing Channel

The portfolio rebalancing channel works by affecting the compensation investors demand for assuming the risk of holding long-term bonds. In our analysis, this compensation is quantified by the nominal and real term premium series in addition to the inflation risk premium. We therefore explore the effects of the Riksbank's and ECB's QE programs on these risk premia.

Table 3 presents the regression results for the nominal and real term premium (Panel A and B), and inflation risk premium (Panel C) estimates at the five- and ten-year maturities, following Equation (10) – (12). The results suggest that the bond purchases affected nominal and real term premia negatively at both maturities. The effects are statistically significant, with a 1 percentage point of Swedish GDP increase in the Riksbank's bond holdings reducing the five-year nominal term premium by 12.20 basis point, while the effect at the ten-year maturity is a smaller 7.87 basis points. The corresponding results for the real term premia and the inflation risk premia are somewhat smaller, but still statistically significant, with the exception of the ten-year inflation risk premium. In general, the effects at the long end of the yield curve are smaller, which seems reasonable given that the five-year horizon is likely the more relevant horizon for monetary policy effects. Moreover, the Riksbank's bond purchases were concentrated around the five-year maturity point. The economically and statistically significant reduction of nominal and real term premia along the yield curve in response to the QE program shows that the portfolio rebalancing channel may be a strong and active transmission mechanism in Sweden during the operation of the domestic QE program. The Riksbank's domestic QE program still significantly lowered standard bond risk premia in the Swedish government bond market, across different econometric specifications.

In contrast and interestingly, the ECB's QE program had the exact opposite effect as it tended to put upward pressure on all three risk premia in the initial set of regressions, as shown in the regression without considering the exchange rate effects. The effect of the ECB's QE program is smaller than that of the Riksbank QE program, which means that the foreign QE program can partially offset the effects from the domestic QE program.

To re-examine the effects of the portfolio rebalancing channel with the exchange rate interaction term for the ECB QE variable included, we run regressions as in equation (12). Now, ECB's QE bond purchases give rise to negative but insignificant effects on Swedish nominal and real term premia, while they tend to have significantly positive effects on Swedish inflation risk premia. Mechanically, this latter finding comes about because the ECB QE purchases tend to lower Swedish real term premia more than the nominal term premia. The estimated coefficients for the other control variables remain little affected by the different regression specifications.

Given that SEK-EUR exchange rate fluctuated in the 9 to 11 range during this period, it

Panel A: Nominal Term Premium						
	5yr			10yr		
Riksbank's QE	-2.732*** (0.701)	-12.199*** (2.531)	-10.522*** (2.152)	-1.514*** (0.412)	-7.867*** (1.466)	-7.160*** (1.358)
ECB's QE		3.785*** (0.987)	-3.607 (4.267)		2.551*** (0.586)	-0.567 (2.207)
ECB's QE \times E_t			0.672 (0.411)			0.283 (0.206)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of obs.	252	251	251	252	251	251
R^2	0.702	0.746	0.758	0.610	0.685	0.694
Adj. R^2	0.688	0.733	0.745	0.592	0.669	0.677
Panel B: Real Term Premium						
	5yr			10yr		
Riksbank's QE	-3.672*** (0.544)	-9.789*** (2.157)	-7.958*** (1.725)	-2.771*** (0.328)	-6.476*** (1.265)	-5.386*** (1.050)
ECB's QE		2.440*** (0.846)	-5.635 (3.624)		1.484*** (0.505)	-3.320 (2.044)
ECB's QE \times E_t			0.734** (0.350)			0.437** (0.194)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of obs.	252	251	251	252	251	251
R^2	0.716	0.740	0.763	0.701	0.724	0.748
Adj. R^2	0.703	0.727	0.750	0.687	0.710	0.734
Panel C: Inflation Risk Premium						
	5yr			10yr		
Riksbank's QE	0.937*** (0.260)	-2.421** (1.035)	-2.575** (1.026)	1.255*** (0.228)	-1.398 (1.012)	-1.780* (0.996)
ECB's QE		1.348*** (0.413)	2.026* (1.225)		1.069*** (0.408)	2.752** (1.070)
ECB's QE \times E_t			-0.062 (0.109)			-0.153* (0.093)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of obs.	252	251	251	252	251	251
R^2	0.654	0.705	0.705	0.611	0.653	0.661
Adj. R^2	0.638	0.690	0.689	0.593	0.636	0.642

Table 3: **QE Program Impact on Standard Bond Risk Premia**

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of the nominal and real term premium and the inflation risk premium from the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, all measured in basis points. The QE bond holdings are normalized by Swedish nominal GDP. The ECB QE amounts are normalized by the nominal GDP in the euro area. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by Swedish nominal GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.

is once again the case that the interaction term dominates and determines the sign of the net effect from the ECB QE purchases. Thus, the counterintuitive effects reported in our baseline regressions seem to materialize as the squeeze of Swedish standard bond risk premia we should

have observed from the ECB’s QE purchases get counteracted by the depreciation of the Swedish kronor. In general, a depreciation should coincide with an increase in domestic bond yields through higher term premia (assuming no change in monetary policy or monetary policy expectations) to keep the expected bond return measured in the foreign currency unchanged. Our results would be consistent with this exact mechanism.

Against that background it seems reasonable that the coefficient on the interaction term between the ECB QE variable and the exchange rate is only significantly positive in the regressions with the real term premium series as the dependent variable. This implies that an exchange rate appreciation (E_t decline) in the midst of ongoing ECB QE purchases will tend to reinforce the downward pressure on Swedish real term premia that is already in place from the ECB QE purchases themselves. Such reinforcing effects from an exchange rate appreciation also exist but are statistically insignificant at the 5 percent level for the Swedish nominal term and inflation risk premia.

We find that the regression results are consistent with transmission through the conventional portfolio rebalancing channel emphasized in the existing literature on QE and underscores the strength of this particular conclusion from our analysis.

5.4.3 Liquidity-Scarcity Channel

Next, we examine the effect of the Riksbank’s QE program on the bond-specific safety premia using the regression framework with the results reported in Panel A of Table 4. The first three columns show that the average nominal safety premium goes up as the Riksbank increases its bond holdings. The estimated coefficient indicates that an increase in the Riksbank’s cumulated bond purchases equal to 1 percentage point of Swedish nominal GDP raises the average nominal safety premium by 4.48 basis points. We take this statistically significant result to imply that the Riksbank’s bond purchases made the nominal bonds more scarce and exclusive. As reported in the last three columns, the real bond safety premium was marginally affected by the QE program, with an estimated coefficient of 1.045 basis point that is statistically significant, but only when we don’t consider the effects of ECB’s QE program. This weaker result for the real bond market may reflect the fact that the Riksbank’s purchases of inflation-indexed bonds started later and were much smaller relative to the nominal bond purchases.

Similar to the previous results, the ECB asset purchases have an offsetting effect in that they tend to lower the safety premium of Swedish nominal government bonds. Christensen and Mirkov (2022) report similar results for the impact of the ECB’s QE program on Danish and Swiss government bond safety premia, while Christensen et al. (2025) extend that analysis to include German and Swedish government bond safety premia and confirm these findings for all four bond markets.

We next investigate the spillover effects of the ECB asset purchases on the Swedish bond-

Panel A: Safety Premium						
	Nominal			Real		
Riksbank's QE	0.286 (0.219)	4.484*** (0.726)	4.009*** (0.732)	1.045*** (0.183)	0.716 (0.732)	0.206 (0.658)
ECB's QE		-1.679*** (0.282)	0.412 (1.247)		0.139 (0.276)	2.384* (1.236)
ECB's QE \times E_t			-0.190* (0.111)			-0.204* (0.117)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of obs.	252	251	251	252	251	251
R^2	0.675	0.771	0.781	0.706	0.701	0.717
Adj. R^2	0.660	0.760	0.769	0.693	0.686	0.702

Panel B: Deflation Risk Premium						
	5yr			10yr		
Riksbank's QE	-7.488*** (0.919)	-3.911 (3.515)	-1.127 (3.179)	-14.702*** (1.708)	-2.249 (8.100)	3.171 (7.544)
ECB's QE		-1.438 (1.379)	-13.713*** (3.682)		-5.020 (3.255)	-28.914*** (8.387)
ECB's QE \times E_t			1.116*** (0.331)			2.173*** (0.740)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of obs.	252	251	251	252	251	251
R^2	0.780	0.781	0.801	0.706	0.715	0.735
Adj. R^2	0.770	0.770	0.790	0.693	0.701	0.721

Table 4: **QE Program Impact on the Safety Premium and Deflation Risk Premia**

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of the average nominal and real safety premium from the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, both measured in basis points. The QE bond holdings are normalized by the Swedish GDP. The ECB QE amounts are normalized by the nominal GDP in the euro area. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by the Swedish GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.

specific safety premia with the regression results that include the exchange rate interaction term for the ECB QE variable, as in equation (12). First, as in our baseline regression, we note the highly significant positive effects of the Riksbank's domestic bond purchases on the nominal safety premia, which is consistent with increased scarcity of the very safe Swedish nominal government bonds. Although there remains a positive effect on the average safety premium of real bonds as well, it is smaller than before and entirely without statistical significance. Again, these results seem reasonable, given that the Riksbank's bond purchases were concentrated in the nominal bond market.

Second, the results show that, after including the interaction term with the exchange rate, the ECB's bond purchases also tend to put upward pressure on Swedish safety premia, presumably through a relative scarcity channel, although these effects are not significant at the 5 percent level. Importantly, the exchange rate interaction terms have negative estimated

coefficients that are borderline significant. For the relevant values of E_t between 9 and 11, the net effect becomes negative, consistent with our original baseline results as well as the findings of Christensen et al. (2025). That paper relates its findings from an international panel of safety premia that includes the Swedish nominal safety premia examined here to increased supply of truly safe assets in the euro area; our results in this study suggest that part of this negative effect materializes through a depreciation of the exchange rate, which may make Swedish safe assets less attractive as a store of value—from the perspective of foreign investors.

Third, the estimated negative coefficient on the interaction term with the exchange rate implies that an exchange rate appreciation (E_t decline) in the midst of ongoing ECB QE purchases will tend to reinforce the upward pressure on Swedish safety premia, in tandem with the reduction in nominal and real term premia described in the previous section. This pattern is similar to the one found for Danish bond risk premia by Christensen and Hetland (2024) in their analysis of the temporary Danish halt to debt issuance in January 2015.

5.4.4 Tail Risk Channel

Hattori et al. (2016) present evidence that the QE programs in the United States helped lower both the option-implied volatility in the stock market and the level of interest rate risk. While their analysis employed event study regressions to analyze the impact from unconventional monetary policy announcements, we focus on the effect of QE on an extreme downside tail risk to the inflation outlook that we measure through our estimated deflation risk premia, as in Christensen and Spiegel (2022). Moreover, instead of relying on an event-study approach, we run regressions using our continuous tail risk measure as the dependent variable.²¹

Panel B of Table 4 reports the regression results for the effect of the QE bond purchases on our estimates of the deflation risk premium. Consistent with the findings for the expected inflation in Table 2, the Riksbank’s QE purchases of bonds valued as 1 percentage point of Swedish GDP push down the deflation risk premium 7.49 basis points and 14.70 basis points at the five- and ten-year maturity, respectively. These effects are statistically significant. Thus, the Riksbank’s QE program have affected investors’ perceptions about downside tail risks to the Swedish economy, in much the same way as reported by Hattori et al. (2016) for the Fed’s QE program and its impact on U.S. macroeconomic downside tail risks. However, the effects become insignificant once we include the ECB’s QE program in the regression.

We further examine the effect on the deflation risk premium with the extended regression including the exchange rate interaction term for the ECB QE variable. First, we note that the effects of the Riksbank’s domestic QE purchases remain negative and insignificant at the five-year maturity, and much smaller relative to our baseline results. Meanwhile, the

²¹As there are only a very small number of announcements regarding the Riksbank’s QE programs, an event-study approach will have very limited statistical power.

estimated coefficient has turned positive at the ten-year maturity, but remains insignificant. Overall, these results imply that there is now less evidence to suggest that the Riksbank can significantly lower extreme downside tail risks such as the risk of deflation through QE. As a small open economy, the most serious downside risks to the Swedish economy may be foreign shocks, as suggested by the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. As a consequence, the Riksbank’s actions, including its QE program, may only play a secondary role for Swedish deflation risk premia.

In contrast, the ECB’s QE purchases now have estimated coefficients that are negative and highly statistically significant. This suggests that ECB’s QE program indeed was able to mitigate macroeconomic downside tail risks for the euro area and beyond, including neighboring economies like Sweden. Moreover, the interaction term of the ECB QE variable with the SEK-EUR exchange rate has significant positive estimated coefficients. This suggests that, if the Swedish kronor depreciates against the euro (an increase in E_t) while ECB’s QE program is ongoing, the reductions in the perceived level of deflationary tail risk for the Swedish economy would be partially offset, but the net effect would remain negative for any value of E_t in the relevant interval from 9 to 11. These results seem reasonable given that we found that this combination of outcomes would also tend to lower investors’ inflation expectations, which in turn should raise the risk of low-inflation outcomes (all else being equal). However, we stress that the marginal effects flowing from the exchange rate fluctuations never dwarf the significantly positive *direct* effects of the ECB’s QE program that help to reduce the perceived likelihood of extremely unfavorable macroeconomic outcomes, which is an important function of monetary policy, in particular during times of economic and financial stress.

5.4.5 Comment on the Spillover Effects of the ECB’s QE Program

If we don’t consider the fluctuation in exchange rates, the spillover effects from the ECB’s QE program onto the Swedish government bond markets appear to be negative, essentially counteracting or offsetting the stimulus provided by the Riksbank’s domestic QE program. Thus, the joint effect appears to have a “beggar-thy-neighbor” or zero-sum feature to it that seems counterintuitive, given that both central banks were actively pursuing policies to ease financial conditions and promote economic growth. This raises the question of whether there is a role to be played by the fluctuations in the SEK-EUR exchange rate for our assessment of the effects on Swedish bond markets from the ECB’s QE programs.

Furthermore, these results are also puzzling because of the close relationship between Sweden and the euro area through both economic and financial linkages. In a small open economy with a floating exchange rate regime like Sweden, the domestic financial markets are well connected with other European markets due to the free mobility of capital. Still, financial frictions in exchange rate markets could play an important role in determining the spillover effects from the ECB’s unconventional monetary policies.

Once we allow the foreign QE program to interact with the exchange rate fluctuations, we find that active bond purchases by both domestic and foreign monetary authorities will push up domestic investors' inflation and monetary policy expectations and put downward pressure on the domestic nominal and real term premia. Importantly, though, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms with the exchange rate are such that they more than offset these positive effects for the relevant values of the exchange rate, which explains the surprising counterintuitive results from our regressions without accounting for the exchange rate effects. Thus, the bond market effects materializing through the additional variation in the exchange rate are able to offset the direct stimulative foreign QE effects. Based on these results we feel that we can rule out the existence of some kind of negative “beggar-thy-neighbor” implications of foreign QE programs, at least in the context of advanced European economies. Furthermore, even if the exchange rate moves in such a way as to give rise to negative spillover effects from foreign QE programs, our results clearly indicate that they can be successfully countered through a domestic QE program.

Overall, our results suggest that the literature on the role of the exchange rate in relating safe asset demand and convenience and safety premia can be expanded further, to better understand the interaction and complementarity among the documented QE transmission channels and the exchange rate channel. Taken together, our findings demonstrate that the link between different components of the Swedish bond yield curve and domestic and foreign QE programs can be significantly affected by movements in the exchange rate.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we aim to provide novel evidence on how domestic and foreign central bank large-scale asset purchases work and affect interest rates in a small open economy with an established inflation target for monetary policy and a flexible exchange rate regime. To do so, we focus on Sweden, a neutral advanced small open economy with the added advantage that its central bank, Sveriges Riksbank, has implemented both negative interest rates and forward guidance in addition to engaging in quantitative easing through government bond purchases. At the same time, the ECB operated its own asset purchase program, which spilled over to the Swedish economy through trade and financial market linkages. Our study highlights the importance of evaluating the effects arising from both domestic and foreign unconventional monetary policy in a joint framework, while allowing for a role for the exchange rate.

By relying on a novel state-of-the-art term structure model of nominal and inflation-indexed bond prices, we report accurate estimates of bond-specific safety premia for all bonds in our sample, in addition to producing convincing decompositions of nominal and real yields and breakeven inflation into their respective expectations and risk premium components. This allows us to empirically examine within a unified framework the relative importance of four transmission channels highlighted in the existing literature on QE and unconventional

monetary policy: signaling, portfolio rebalancing, liquidity-scarcity, and tail risk.

Using regression analysis with the various components from our yield decompositions as dependent variables, we find that the Riksbank’s bond purchases raised inflation and short-rate expectations along with the level of the natural real rate r_t^* , lowered nominal term premia, and increased nominal bond safety premia by statistically significant and economically meaningful amounts. These results suggest that the signaling, portfolio rebalancing, and scarcity channels were operating during the Swedish QE programs. In contrast, we find no strong effects on the tail risk as measured by the deflation risk premia produced by our yield curve model. However, interestingly, we find significant effects on Swedish investors’ perceptions of these tail risks from the ECB’s QE program in that those purchases have tended to put downward pressure on Swedish deflation risk premia. This points to an important international spillover channel from unconventional monetary policies pursued by one of the world’s major central banks.

Another important takeaway from the empirical analysis using the exchange rate dynamics is that it is crucial to control for the effect of fluctuations in the exchange rate when it comes to evaluating the spillover effects from foreign QE programs, even if the asset purchases are measured as a fraction of GDP. Without properly accounting for the spot exchange rate, the foreign QE program will appear as crowding out or reversing the domestic QE program in terms of its effects on the domestic bond market—akin to a classic “beggar-thy-neighbor” outcome. However, factoring in the exchange rate changes is the key to uncovering the complementarity of domestic and foreign QE programs. This reveals that the foreign QE program has the same economic impact on domestic bond risk premia as domestic central bank’s bond purchases, but exchange rate movements can partially—and sometimes fully—offset the effects based on our estimates. We leave it for future research to explore whether these results carry over to other advanced or emerging small open economies with inflation targets and flexible exchange rates. A two-country asset pricing model could potentially rationalize our findings and provide insights into the intriguing interaction between exchange rate dynamics and the prices of safe assets. However, we also leave that endeavor for future research.

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Online Appendix

Quantitative Easing, Bond Risk Premia and the Exchange Rate in a Small Open Economy

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The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the Federal Reserve System, or Sveriges Riksbank.

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A Support for Cross Yield Curve Restriction




Figure 1: Slope of Swedish Nominal and Real Yield Curves

Illustration of the 10-year over 5-year nominal yield spread in the Swedish government bond market using daily data covering the period from January 4, 1999, to June 30, 2025. Also shown is the 10-year over 5-year real yield spread in the Swedish SGB-IL market using daily data covering the period from June 20, 2000, to June 30, 2025.

Support for the restriction across the nominal and real yield curves built into the Christensen et al. (2010) model structure is provided in Figure 1. It shows the 10-year over 5-year nominal yield spread in the Swedish government bond market starting in January 1999 along with the corresponding real yield spread from the Swedish SGB-IL market starting in June 2000. For the overlapping period the correlation is more than 75 percent at daily frequency. Thus, although the model was originally designed for the U.S. Treasury and TIPS markets, its structure is well supported by the Swedish bond market data.

B Key Monetary Policy Decisions and QE Announcements

Date	Δ Rate	Rate	Riksbank's QE announcements
Feb 12, 2015	-10	-10	Purchase government bonds for SEK 10 billion and is prepared to act on short notice.
Mar 18, 2015	-15	-25	Purchase government bonds for SEK 30 billion.
Apr 29, 2015	0	-25	Riksbank buys government bonds for SEK 40-50 billion.
Jul 2, 2015	-10	-35	Purchases of government bonds extended by SEK 45 billion.
Oct 28, 2015	0	-35	Purchases bonds of SEK 65 billion more.
Dec 15, 2015	0	-35	The Riksbank is still highly prepared to act.
Feb 11, 2016	-15	-50	
Apr 21, 2016	0	-50	Purchase government bonds of a further SEK 45 billion.
Oct 27, 2016	0	-50	Riksbank Executive Board ready to extend government bond purchases in Dec. 2016.
Dec 21, 2016	0	-50	Further purchases of government bonds SEK 30 billion.
Apr 27, 2017	0	-50	Government bond purchases extended by SEK 15 billion.
Jul 4, 2017	0	-50	Continue bond purchases according to plan.
Sep 7, 2017	0	-50	Continue bond purchases according to plan.
Dec 20, 2017	0	-50	Bond reinvestments starting in January 2018.
Dec 20, 2018	25	-25	
Dec 19, 2019	25	0	

Table 1: Sveriges Riksbank's Key Monetary Policy Decisions and QE Announcements: 2015–2019

Date	ECB's QE announcements
Jan 2, 2015	Draghi hints that ECB is in preparations to adjust its stimulus program
Jan 22, 2015	Expanded Asset Purchase Program (EAPP) is announced. ECB will buy 60 billion per month until September 2016
Sep 3, 2015	Draghi hints about further purchases
Oct 22, 2015	Draghi hints that further measures will be announced in December 2015
Dec 3, 2015	ECB lowers its deposit facility rate and extends the asset purchase program to March 2017
Jan 21, 2016	ECB signals more easing to come in March 2016
Mar 10, 2016	ECP lowers policy rates and expands EAPP to 80 billion per month, expected to last until March 2017
Sep 8, 2016	ECB surprises with not announcing EAPP extension
Oct 20, 2016	ECB hints that EAPP extension will be announced in December 2016
Dec 8, 2016	EAPP extended to December 2017, with purchases reduced to 60 billion per month
Jun 27, 2017	Draghi's speech in Sintra suggests that ECB is considering to scale back the asset purchase
Sep 7, 2017	ECB leaves rates on hold and paves the way for tapering its stimulus program
Oct 26, 2017	Purchases under EAPP extended to September 2018, but reduced to 30 billion per month from January 2018
Jun 14, 2018	Purchases under EAPP to end in December 2018, but reduced to 15 billion per month from October 2018
Sep 13, 2018	ECB confirms that EAPP asset purchases will decline to 15 billion per month until December 2018
Oct 25, 2018	Purchases under EAPP to end in December 2018 provided that data confirm the expected medium-term outlook
Dec 13, 2018	ECB to keep key interest rates at least through the summer of 2019. Purchases under EAPP will end in December 2018
Mar 7, 2019	ECB announces its TLTRO-III program to start in September 2019 and end in March 2021
Jun 18, 2019	Draghi's speech in Sintra reveals that additional stimulus is needed if outlook does not improve
Jul 25, 2019	ECB keeps policy on hold, but signals additional stimulus
Sep 12, 2019	ECB announces -10 bps rate cut, 20 billion per month in EAPP

Table 2: ECB's Key Speeches and QE Announcements: 2015–2019

C The Effects of the Riksbank's QE

	Inflation Expectations (bps)		Short-Rate Expectations (bps)		r^*
	5yr	10yr	5yr	10yr	
Riksbank's QE	0.975*** (0.087)	0.589*** (0.050)	2.492*** (0.520)	0.999** (0.398)	-0.697** (0.322)
Int. rate (bps)	-0.504* (0.278)	-0.271* (0.153)	-3.011** (1.509)	-1.964** (0.990)	-0.880* (0.511)
MPS (bps)	0.657** (0.297)	0.360** (0.169)	2.690 (1.897)	1.424 (1.429)	0.095 (1.111)
QES	-2.421* (1.392)	-1.232 (0.778)	-16.689** (7.587)	-11.397** (5.297)	-6.064 (3.822)
D(News)	2.630 (2.673)	1.493 (1.475)	7.887 (14.218)	3.626 (9.860)	-0.990 (7.301)
Noise ^N	5.045*** (1.308)	2.798*** (0.739)	20.463*** (7.346)	10.718* (5.482)	0.426 (4.479)
Age ^N	3.305 (4.460)	2.573 (2.430)	-40.591 (26.177)	-43.057** (17.965)	-47.366*** (11.080)
RVol ^N	0.800** (0.366)	0.432** (0.201)	2.367 (2.248)	0.732 (1.649)	-0.967 (1.229)
Noise ^R	-0.917 (0.908)	-0.547 (0.495)	-4.888 (6.071)	-3.371 (4.573)	-1.677 (3.548)
Age ^R	-8.795*** (1.140)	-4.606*** (0.624)	-57.444*** (6.829)	-38.803*** (4.900)	-19.750*** (3.489)
RVol ^R	-13.436*** (4.246)	-6.583*** (2.367)	-91.642*** (25.603)	-59.825*** (19.340)	-28.283* (15.581)
No. of obs.	270	270	270	270	270
R^2	0.755	0.759	0.773	0.770	0.734
Adj. R^2	0.744	0.749	0.763	0.760	0.723

Table 3: **QE Program Impact on Inflation Expectations, Short-Rate Expectations and the Natural Real Rate**

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of expected inflation, short-rate expectations, and the natural real rate from the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, all measured in basis points. The QE bond holdings are normalized by Swedish nominal GDP. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by Swedish nominal GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.

	Nominal Term Premium		Real Term Premium		Inflation Risk Premium	
	5yr	10yr	5yr	10yr	5yr	10yr
Riksbank's QE	-3.342*** (0.416)	-1.951*** (0.229)	-4.236*** (0.412)	-3.207*** (0.258)	0.892*** (0.175)	1.255*** (0.187)
Int. rate (bps)	3.465*** (1.211)	1.976*** (0.652)	2.485** (1.054)	1.331** (0.616)	0.980*** (0.257)	0.644*** (0.213)
MPS (bps)	-3.220** (1.480)	-1.987** (0.773)	-2.615** (1.128)	-1.670*** (0.622)	-0.608 (0.553)	-0.319 (0.462)
QES	13.592** (6.353)	7.023* (3.675)	10.676** (4.691)	5.589** (2.490)	2.922 (2.296)	1.439 (1.966)
D(News)	-11.472 (13.205)	-6.429 (8.041)	-15.706 (9.706)	-11.972** (5.395)	4.216 (5.150)	5.533 (4.583)
Noise ^N	-21.039*** (6.492)	-13.211*** (3.906)	-15.388*** (5.177)	-9.360*** (3.041)	-5.663** (2.542)	-3.858 (2.374)
Age ^N	14.431 (24.902)	-4.279 (13.825)	21.338 (19.779)	6.791 (11.140)	-6.922 (6.704)	-11.076** (5.149)
RVol ^N	-4.193** (1.818)	-3.088*** (0.994)	-2.227 (1.576)	-1.365 (0.910)	-1.970*** (0.595)	-1.724*** (0.569)
Noise ^R	5.642 (4.843)	2.773 (2.679)	5.808 (3.957)	3.622* (2.165)	-0.168 (1.472)	-0.849 (1.308)
Age ^R	46.692*** (5.665)	24.262*** (3.191)	36.153*** (4.733)	18.783*** (2.743)	10.551*** (2.026)	5.488*** (1.896)
RVol ^R	83.791*** (21.247)	48.940*** (12.049)	47.896** (19.275)	20.581* (11.869)	35.934*** (7.226)	28.381*** (7.224)
No. of obs.	270	270	270	270	270	270
R^2	0.763	0.715	0.794	0.813	0.636	0.603
Adj. R^2	0.753	0.703	0.785	0.805	0.620	0.586

Table 4: QE Program Impact on Standard Bond Risk Premia

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of the nominal and real term premium and the inflation risk premium from the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, all measured in basis points. The QE bond holdings are normalized by Swedish nominal GDP. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by Swedish nominal GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.

	Nominal Safety Premium	Real Safety Premium
Riksbank's QE	0.208 (0.132)	1.453*** (0.146)
Int. rate (bps)	-0.867** (0.345)	-0.750* (0.384)
MPS (bps)	1.199*** (0.459)	0.408 (0.522)
QES	-4.367** (2.195)	-2.564 (1.721)
D(News)	1.558 (5.037)	1.480 (2.537)
Noise ^N	7.931*** (2.571)	4.022** (1.908)
Age ^N	8.166 (6.564)	-4.134 (6.089)
RVol ^N	2.166*** (0.534)	-0.670 (0.480)
Noise ^R	0.566 (1.468)	-2.845*** (1.064)
Age ^R	-13.450*** (1.705)	-12.263*** (1.562)
RVol ^R	-34.297*** (6.054)	-1.937 (4.995)
No. of obs.	270	270
R^2	0.691	0.801
Adj. R^2	0.677	0.792

Table 5: QE Program Impact on the Average Nominal and Real Safety Premium

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of the average nominal and real safety premium from the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, both measured in basis points. The QE bond holdings are normalized by the Swedish GDP. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by the Swedish GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.

	Deflation Risk Premium	
	5yr	10yr
Riksbank's QE	-9.120*** (1.169)	-16.950*** (2.165)
Int. rate (bps)	-1.732 (1.266)	-3.193 (2.378)
MPS (bps)	-2.218 (2.986)	-2.841 (4.765)
QES	-4.926 (7.526)	-5.676 (15.348)
D(News)	-32.097* (18.133)	-61.372* (36.920)
Noise ^N	-0.464 (9.147)	6.395 (19.383)
Age ^N	10.365 (16.620)	77.750** (35.561)
RVol ^N	3.640 (3.045)	9.177 (5.834)
Noise ^R	3.817 (3.992)	11.309 (9.825)
Age ^R	-1.597 (7.323)	-1.328 (15.849)
RVol ^R	-101.056*** (37.889)	-186.052*** (71.173)
No. of obs.	270	270
R^2	0.783	0.728
Adj. R^2	0.774	0.716

Table 6: QE Program Impact on Deflation Risk Premia

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of deflation risk premium at the five- and ten-year maturities from the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, both measured in basis points. The QE bond holdings are normalized by the Swedish GDP. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by the Swedish GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.

D The Effects of the Riksbank's QE and ECB's QE

	Inflation Expectations (bps)		Short-Rate Expectations (bps)		r^*
	5yr	10yr	5yr	10yr	
Riksbank's QE	2.736*** (0.597)	1.502*** (0.338)	9.978*** (3.191)	4.735** (2.308)	-0.775 (1.819)
ECB's QE	-0.770*** (0.238)	-0.409*** (0.135)	-3.007** (1.202)	-1.420* (0.859)	0.214 (0.687)
Int. rate (bps)	-0.300 (0.291)	-0.157 (0.158)	-2.533 (1.577)	-1.882* (1.013)	-1.218** (0.471)
MPS (bps)	0.226 (0.368)	0.123 (0.204)	1.196 (2.262)	0.760 (1.625)	0.304 (1.138)
QES	-2.264 (1.610)	-1.171 (0.893)	-15.612* (8.354)	-10.797* (5.591)	-5.906 (3.669)
D(News)	2.835 (2.876)	1.579 (1.599)	9.334 (15.189)	4.606 (10.525)	-0.444 (7.693)
Noise ^N	2.606* (1.488)	1.398* (0.821)	14.684 (9.169)	9.413 (6.630)	3.953 (4.712)
Age ^N	3.492 (4.128)	2.610 (2.243)	-34.909 (26.019)	-38.013** (18.410)	-42.847*** (11.879)
RVol ^N	-0.306 (0.435)	-0.170 (0.244)	-2.461 (2.562)	-1.937 (1.879)	-1.379 (1.445)
Noise ^R	-1.611** (0.808)	-0.894** (0.436)	-8.491 (6.221)	-5.441 (4.826)	-2.215 (3.790)
Age ^R	-7.511*** (1.253)	-3.846*** (0.676)	-56.618*** (8.025)	-40.238*** (5.677)	-23.682*** (3.640)
RVol ^R	-3.917 (4.291)	-1.708 (2.326)	-38.842 (29.422)	-27.251 (21.861)	-16.163 (15.822)
No. of obs.	251	251	251	251	251
R^2	0.666	0.645	0.779	0.786	0.760
Adj. R^2	0.649	0.628	0.767	0.775	0.748

Table 7: **QE Program Impact on Inflation Expectations, Short-Rate Expectations and the Natural Real Rate**

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of expected inflation, short-rate expectations, and the natural real rate from the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, all measured in basis points. The QE bond holdings are normalized by Swedish nominal GDP. The ECB QE amounts are normalized by the nominal GDP in the euro area. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by Swedish nominal GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.

	Nominal Term Premium		Real Term Premium		Inflation Risk Premium	
	5yr	10yr	5yr	10yr	5yr	10yr
Riksbank's QE	-12.199*** (2.531)	-7.867*** (1.466)	-9.789*** (2.157)	-6.476*** (1.265)	-2.421** (1.035)	-1.398 (1.012)
ECB's QE	3.785*** (0.987)	2.551*** (0.586)	2.440*** (0.846)	1.484*** (0.505)	1.348*** (0.413)	1.069*** (0.408)
Int. rate (bps)	2.509* (1.309)	1.245* (0.710)	1.982* (1.092)	1.004 (0.633)	0.526** (0.251)	0.241 (0.150)
MPS (bps)	-1.262 (1.964)	-0.683 (1.056)	-1.169 (1.520)	-0.726 (0.818)	-0.093 (0.526)	0.043 (0.374)
QES	12.347* (7.217)	6.124 (4.185)	10.426* (5.394)	5.620* (2.925)	1.926 (2.348)	0.508 (1.931)
D(News)	-11.671 (13.748)	-6.350 (8.190)	-16.589 (10.156)	-12.650** (5.503)	4.896 (5.003)	6.289 (4.350)
Noise ^N	-10.118 (8.034)	-5.229 (4.600)	-8.405 (6.325)	-4.635 (3.701)	-1.718 (2.621)	-0.598 (2.211)
Age ^N	12.599 (23.634)	-4.020 (12.612)	18.120 (19.294)	5.179 (10.729)	-5.538 (6.005)	-9.207** (4.627)
RVol ^N	1.155 (2.137)	0.148 (1.195)	2.128 (1.669)	1.369 (0.914)	-0.973 (0.747)	-1.220* (0.653)
Noise ^R	9.309** (4.678)	5.044** (2.406)	8.393** (4.025)	5.126** (2.164)	0.917 (1.415)	-0.080 (1.329)
Age ^R	41.328*** (6.561)	19.635*** (3.480)	33.615*** (5.397)	16.811*** (3.110)	7.721*** (1.982)	2.831* (1.652)
RVol ^R	34.796 (23.661)	20.937* (12.259)	8.628 (20.723)	-2.494 (12.046)	26.160*** (6.123)	23.428*** (5.411)
No. of obs.	251	251	251	251	251	251
R ²	0.746	0.685	0.740	0.724	0.705	0.653
Adj. R ²	0.733	0.669	0.727	0.710	0.690	0.636

Table 8: **QE Program Impact on Standard Bond Risk Premia**

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of the nominal and real term premium and the inflation risk premium from the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, all measured in basis points. The QE bond holdings are normalized by Swedish nominal GDP. The ECB QE amounts are normalized by the nominal GDP in the euro area. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by Swedish nominal GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.

	Nominal Safety Premium	Real Safety Premium
Riksbank's QE	4.484*** (0.726)	0.716 (0.732)
ECB's QE	-1.679*** (0.282)	0.139 (0.276)
Int. rate (bps)	-0.452 (0.381)	-0.746** (0.349)
MPS (bps)	0.486 (0.484)	0.278 (0.544)
QES	-3.428 (2.387)	-3.131* (1.832)
D(News)	2.262 (4.861)	1.107 (2.946)
Noise ^N	4.367* (2.468)	2.666 (2.213)
Age ^N	8.272 (5.566)	-3.880 (6.287)
RVol ^N	0.557 (0.540)	-1.192* (0.619)
Noise ^R	-1.218 (1.299)	-2.313** (1.113)
Age ^R	-11.269*** (1.760)	-11.846*** (1.949)
RVol ^R	-15.468*** (5.518)	-2.325 (6.446)
No. of obs.	251	251
R^2	0.771	0.701
Adj. R^2	0.760	0.686

Table 9: QE Program Impact on the Average Nominal and Real Safety Premium

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of the average nominal and real safety premium from the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, both measured in basis points. The QE bond holdings are normalized by the Swedish GDP. The ECB QE amounts are normalized by the nominal GDP in the euro area. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by the Swedish GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.

	Deflation Risk Premium	
	5yr	10yr
Riksbank's QE	-3.911 (3.515)	-2.249 (8.100)
ECB's QE	-1.438 (1.379)	-5.020 (3.255)
Int. rate (bps)	-0.825 (0.827)	-0.708 (1.431)
MPS (bps)	-1.248 (1.409)	-2.551 (2.566)
QES	0.578 (5.184)	4.544 (12.479)
D(News)	-38.970*** (11.590)	-72.459** (28.397)
Noise ^N	-1.048 (7.946)	-4.535 (16.187)
Age ^N	1.167 (14.831)	57.109* (33.293)
RVol ^N	7.870*** (2.308)	14.064*** (4.925)
Noise ^R	2.700 (4.205)	7.618 (10.553)
Age ^R	2.579 (5.453)	13.193 (12.045)
RVol ^R	-122.758*** (28.012)	-208.442*** (51.351)
No. of obs.	251	251
R^2	0.781	0.715
Adj. R^2	0.770	0.701

Table 10: QE Program Impact on Deflation Risk Premia

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of deflation risk premium at the five- and ten-year maturities from the preferred G^{X^N, X^R} (6) model, both measured in basis points. The QE bond holdings are normalized by the Swedish GDP. The ECB QE amounts are normalized by the nominal GDP in the euro area. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by the Swedish GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.

E The Effects of the Riksbank's QE, ECB's QE, and the Exchange Rate

	Inflation Expectations (bps)		Short-Rate Expectations (bps)		r^*
	5yr	10yr	5yr	10yr	
Riksbank's QE	2.351*** (0.574)	1.301*** (0.331)	7.384*** (2.774)	2.917 (2.026)	-1.800 (1.762)
ECB's QE	0.926 (0.811)	0.479 (0.436)	8.427 (5.471)	6.593* (3.985)	4.730* (2.743)
ECB's QE $\times E_t$	-0.154** (0.072)	-0.081** (0.038)	-1.040** (0.520)	-0.729* (0.380)	-0.411 (0.255)
Int. rate (bps)	-0.240 (0.241)	-0.126 (0.132)	-2.133* (1.280)	-1.602* (0.828)	-1.060** (0.428)
MPS (bps)	0.213 (0.356)	0.116 (0.196)	1.104 (2.343)	0.696 (1.717)	0.268 (1.228)
QES	-1.792 (1.490)	-0.924 (0.832)	-12.433* (7.427)	-8.569* (4.934)	-4.650 (3.353)
D(News)	2.145 (2.698)	1.218 (1.522)	4.680 (12.452)	1.344 (8.313)	-2.283 (6.443)
Noise ^N	2.698* (1.395)	1.446* (0.766)	15.304* (9.118)	9.847 (6.728)	4.198 (4.923)
Age ^N	5.019 (3.515)	3.409* (1.927)	-24.616 (21.733)	-30.799** (15.605)	-38.782*** (10.823)
RVol ^N	-0.118 (0.401)	-0.071 (0.225)	-1.190 (2.496)	-1.046 (1.887)	-0.877 (1.515)
Noise ^R	-1.830** (0.779)	-1.009** (0.421)	-9.966 (6.169)	-6.475 (4.827)	-2.798 (3.838)
Age ^R	-4.736** (1.910)	-2.394** (1.025)	-37.920*** (13.152)	-27.133*** (9.517)	-16.298** (6.328)
RVol ^R	-3.991 (3.935)	-1.746 (2.126)	-39.340 (28.254)	-27.600 (21.297)	-16.359 (15.843)
No. of obs.	251	251	251	251	251
R^2	0.684	0.663	0.796	0.801	0.769
Adj. R^2	0.667	0.644	0.785	0.791	0.756

Table 11: QE Program Impact on Inflation Expectations, Short-Rate Expectations and the Natural Real Rate: Exchange Rate Effects

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of expected inflation, short-rate expectations, and the natural real rate from the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, all measured in basis points. The regression takes the form $\Phi_t = \alpha + \beta_1 Q_t + \beta_2 Q_t^* + \beta_3 Q_t^* \times E_t + \gamma X_t + \epsilon_t$. The QE bond holdings are normalized by Swedish nominal GDP. The ECB QE amounts are normalized by the nominal GDP in the euro area. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by Swedish nominal GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.

	Nominal Term Premium		Real Term Premium		Inflation Risk Premium	
	5yr	10yr	5yr	10yr	5yr	10yr
Riksbank's QE	-10.522*** (2.152)	-7.160*** (1.358)	-7.958*** (1.725)	-5.386*** (1.050)	-2.575** (1.026)	-1.780* (0.996)
ECB's QE	-3.607 (4.267)	-0.567 (2.207)	-5.635 (3.624)	-3.320 (2.044)	2.026* (1.225)	2.752** (1.070)
ECB's QE \times E_t	0.672 (0.411)	0.283 (0.206)	0.734** (0.350)	0.437** (0.194)	-0.062 (0.109)	-0.153* (0.093)
Int. rate (bps)	2.250** (1.103)	1.136* (0.614)	1.700* (0.884)	0.836 (0.507)	0.549** (0.261)	0.300* (0.179)
MPS (bps)	-1.202 (1.991)	-0.658 (1.053)	-1.104 (1.554)	-0.688 (0.817)	-0.099 (0.527)	0.029 (0.380)
QES	10.292 (6.622)	5.257 (3.948)	8.181* (4.756)	4.284* (2.565)	2.114 (2.337)	0.976 (1.945)
D(News)	-8.662 (12.231)	-5.081 (7.737)	-13.302 (8.317)	-10.695** (4.594)	4.620 (4.979)	5.603 (4.326)
Noise ^N	-10.519 (7.617)	-5.398 (4.369)	-8.843 (5.883)	-4.895 (3.363)	-1.681 (2.635)	-0.507 (2.254)
Age ^N	5.944 (20.284)	-6.826 (11.088)	10.851 (16.336)	0.854 (9.218)	-4.928 (5.693)	-7.691* (4.569)
RVol ^N	0.333 (2.066)	-0.198 (1.152)	1.231 (1.582)	0.835 (0.840)	-0.898 (0.740)	-1.033 (0.644)
Noise ^R	10.263** (4.658)	5.447** (2.386)	9.436** (3.957)	5.746*** (2.097)	0.830 (1.409)	-0.297 (1.299)
Age ^R	29.241*** (11.193)	14.537** (5.809)	20.410** (8.780)	8.954* (4.641)	8.830*** (3.169)	5.584** (2.393)
RVol ^R	35.119 (22.591)	21.073* (11.788)	8.980 (19.046)	-2.285 (10.791)	26.130*** (6.035)	23.354*** (5.033)
No. of obs.	251	251	251	251	251	251
R^2	0.758	0.694	0.763	0.748	0.705	0.661
Adj. R^2	0.745	0.677	0.750	0.734	0.689	0.642

Table 12: **QE Program Impact on Standard Bond Risk Premia: Exchange Rate Effects**

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of the nominal and real term premium and the inflation risk premium from the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, all measured in basis points. The regression takes the form $\Phi_t = \alpha + \beta_1 Q_t + \beta_2 Q_t^* + \beta_3 Q_t^* \times E_t + \gamma X_t + \epsilon_t$. The QE bond holdings are normalized by Swedish nominal GDP. The ECB QE amounts are normalized by the nominal GDP in the euro area. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by Swedish nominal GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.

	Nominal Safety Premium	Real Safety Premium
Riksbank's QE	4.009*** (0.732)	0.206 (0.658)
ECB's QE	0.412 (1.247)	2.384* (1.236)
ECB's QE \times E_t	-0.190* (0.111)	-0.204* (0.117)
Int. rate (bps)	-0.379 (0.320)	-0.667** (0.293)
MPS (bps)	0.469 (0.492)	0.260 (0.545)
QES	-2.846 (2.244)	-2.507 (1.669)
D(News)	1.411 (4.580)	0.194 (2.487)
Noise ^N	4.481* (2.520)	2.788 (2.165)
Age ^N	10.155** (4.943)	-1.859 (5.207)
RVol ^N	0.790 (0.510)	-0.943 (0.613)
Noise ^R	-1.488 (1.261)	-2.603** (1.112)
Age ^R	-7.849*** (2.660)	-8.175** (3.273)
RVol ^R	-15.560*** (5.491)	-2.422 (6.011)
No. of obs.	251	251
R^2	0.781	0.717
Adj. R^2	0.769	0.702

Table 13: QE Program Impact on the Average Nominal and Real Safety Premium: Exchange Rate Effects

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of the average nominal and real safety premium from the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, both measured in basis points. The regression takes the form $\Phi_t = \alpha + \beta_1 Q_t + \beta_2 Q_t^* + \beta_3 Q_t^* \times E_t + \gamma X_t + \epsilon_t$. The QE bond holdings are normalized by the Swedish GDP. The ECB QE amounts are normalized by the nominal GDP in the euro area. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by the Swedish GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.

	Deflation Risk Premium	
	5yr	10yr
Riksbank's QE	-1.127 (3.179)	3.171 (7.544)
ECB's QE	-13.713*** (3.682)	-28.914*** (8.387)
ECB's QE \times E_t	1.116*** (0.331)	2.173*** (0.740)
Int. rate (bps)	-1.255* (0.703)	-1.545 (1.298)
MPS (bps)	-1.149 (1.326)	-2.358 (2.690)
QES	-2.835 (5.182)	-2.101 (12.392)
D(News)	-33.973*** (11.707)	-62.732** (27.416)
Noise ^N	-1.713 (7.717)	-5.830 (16.282)
Age ^N	-9.883 (14.169)	35.599 (31.832)
RVol ^N	6.507*** (2.008)	11.410** (4.600)
Noise ^R	4.284 (4.011)	10.702 (10.100)
Age ^R	-17.493** (7.740)	-25.882 (16.341)
RVol ^R	-122.223*** (23.374)	-207.401*** (43.392)
No. of obs.	251	251
R^2	0.801	0.735
Adj. R^2	0.790	0.721

Table 14: QE Purchases Impact on Deflation Risk Premia: Exchange Rate Effects

The dependent variables represent weekly estimates of deflation risk premium at the five- and ten-year maturities from the preferred $G^{X^N, X^R}(6)$ model, both measured in basis points. The regression takes the form $\Phi_t = \alpha + \beta_1 Q_t + \beta_2 Q_t^* + \beta_3 Q_t^* \times E_t + \gamma X_t + \epsilon_t$. The QE bond holdings are normalized by the Swedish GDP. The ECB QE amounts are normalized by the nominal GDP in the euro area. Additional control variables include the repo interest rate changes (bps), the monetary policy surprises (bps), the QE surprises normalized by the Swedish GDP, the QE announcement dummy, the nominal and real bond market noise measure, the average nominal and real bond age, and the nominal and real bond realized volatility. We report the statistical significance using Newey West standard errors with four lags. Asterisks *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.