

Supplementary Appendix to
“The Quiet Revolution and the Decline of Routine Jobs”

LINDSEY UNIAT

S1 Robustness of Correlation between Social Norms and Occupation Tasks

Table S1 shows the results from a regression identical to that in equation (2) and presented in Table 3, but where the indicator for “Progressive” is instead based on whether respondents agree or disagree with the statement: “A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works.” Table S2 shows the results when the outcome is the occupation task percentile rather than the occupation task share. Table S3 restricts the sample of employed women to those who have never had a child, to mitigate concerns about ex post rationalization bias.

Table S1: Correlation between Alternate Social Norms and Occupation Task Share

	Abstract (1)	Routine (2)	Manual (3)	Abstract (4)	Routine (5)	Manual (6)
Panel A: Women						
Progressive	0.0539** (0.0263)	-0.0271 (0.0272)	-0.0268 (0.0170)	0.0443* (0.0249)	-0.0193 (0.0264)	-0.0250 (0.0167)
Education Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dep Var Mean	0.316	0.558	0.126	0.316	0.558	0.126
R-sq	0.0620	0.0331	0.0608	0.165	0.0952	0.0685
N	352	352	352	352	352	352
Panel B: Men						
Progressive	-0.0163 (0.0280)	0.00769 (0.0230)	0.00865 (0.0197)	-0.0225 (0.0243)	0.0108 (0.0220)	0.0118 (0.0185)
Education Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dep Var Mean	0.359	0.460	0.181	0.359	0.460	0.181
R-sq	0.0382	0.0291	0.0433	0.225	0.0987	0.150
N	436	436	436	436	436	436

Notes: This table presents results from a regression identical to that in equation (2), except uses a different measure of progressivity from the GSS. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at $p < 0.10$, ** indicates significance at $p < 0.05$, and *** indicates significance at $p < 0.01$.

Table S2: Correlation between Social Norms and Occupation Task Percentile

	Abstract (1)	Routine (2)	Manual (3)	Abstract (4)	Routine (5)	Manual (6)
Panel A: Women						
Progressive	0.109*** (0.0349)	-0.0755** (0.0362)	-0.0330 (0.0379)	0.0773** (0.0330)	-0.0520 (0.0362)	-0.0245 (0.0372)
Education Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dep Var Mean	0.505	0.566	0.435	0.505	0.566	0.435
R-sq	0.0674	0.0388	0.0448	0.178	0.0899	0.0521
N	353	353	353	353	353	353
Panel B: Men						
Progressive	0.0336 (0.0341)	-0.0281 (0.0273)	-0.0195 (0.0288)	-0.00525 (0.0299)	-0.00944 (0.0265)	0.00732 (0.0264)
Education Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dep Var Mean	0.523	0.426	0.562	0.523	0.426	0.562
R-sq	0.0354	0.0298	0.0418	0.230	0.0992	0.176
N	435	435	435	435	435	435

Notes: This table presents results from a regression identical to that in equation (2), except uses occupation task percentiles as the outcome. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at $p < 0.10$, ** indicates significance at $p < 0.05$, and *** indicates significance at $p < 0.01$.

Table S3: Correlation between Social Norms and Occupation Task Share for Childless Women

	Abstract (1)	Routine (2)	Manual (3)	Abstract (4)	Routine (5)	Manual (6)
Progressive	0.167*** (0.0598)	-0.187*** (0.0601)	0.0205 (0.0417)	0.151** (0.0610)	-0.155** (0.0595)	0.00425 (0.0425)
Education Controls	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dep Var Mean	0.389	0.510	0.101	0.389	0.510	0.101
R-sq	0.211	0.161	0.172	0.227	0.217	0.222
N	79	79	79	79	79	79

Notes: This table presents results from a regression identical to that in equation (2), except uses a restricted sample of women who do not have children. The mean age for this sample is 36, vs. 41 for the regression shown in Table 3. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at $p < 0.10$, ** indicates significance at $p < 0.05$, and *** indicates significance at $p < 0.01$.

S2 Changes in Women’s Part-Time Work Share

One concern with treating changes in conditional intermittency as distinct from technological change in my quantitative exercise would be if the task-biased technological change directly expanded access to flexible work arrangement, enabling women to work continuously. Table S4 provides evidence against this concern, using part-time work as one observable dimension of workplace flexibility. The part-time share among employed mothers with young children does not rise over the period and declines substantially among college-educated mothers. Among married mothers with young children, for example, the part-time share falls from 35 percent in 1968–1972 to 30 percent in 2006–2010, and from 43 percent to 27 percent among those with a college degree. Thus, rising maternal LFP does not appear to have been driven primarily by an expansion of part-time employment. This exercise does not rule out changes in other dimensions of workplace flexibility.

Table S4: Share of Employed Women Working Part-Time

	1968-1972	2006-2010
<i>Panel A: All Women</i>		
Young child	0.333	0.294
No young child	0.263	0.244
Never married	0.280	0.322
Married, young child	0.351	0.296
Married, no young child	0.277	0.226
<i>Panel B: College</i>		
Young child	0.423	0.261
No young child	0.178	0.172
Never married	0.120	0.144
Married, young child	0.428	0.272
Married, no young child	0.221	0.202
<i>Panel C: Non-College</i>		
Young child	0.324	0.312
No young child	0.273	0.277
Never married	0.303	0.389
Married, young child	0.342	0.315
Married, no young child	0.284	0.239

Notes: Data are from the CPS ASEC, 1968-1972 and 2006-2010. The sample is women aged 18 to 55 who were employed in the previous year, weighted by the ASEC person weight. Each cell reports the share of these women who worked part-time last year, based on the ASEC’s own full-time/part-time classification. Panel A includes all women, while Panel B restricts to women with four or more years of college and Panel C to those without. A young child is an own child under the age of 5, the same definition used to measure ρ . The first two rows of each panel cover all employed women, while the last three cover only married and never-married women; divorced, separated, and widowed women therefore appear in the first two rows only.

S3 Additional Calibration Details

S3.1 LFP by Age, Cohort, and Child Status for Women

Table S5 reports the data underlying the calibration of ρ in Table 6.

Table S5: LFP by Cohort, Age, and Presence of Children

Cohort	Panel A: No Child Under 5			Panel B: Child Under 5		
	23–32	33–42	43–52	23–32	33–42	43–52
1938–47	0.68	0.69	0.73	0.31	0.40	0.53
1948–57	0.80	0.79	0.78	0.47	0.58	0.63
1958–67	0.83	0.80	0.77	0.58	0.64	0.64
1968–77	0.83	0.78	0.77	0.63	0.65	0.66
1978–87	0.80	0.78	0.79	0.63	0.68	0.63

Notes: Data from CPS ASEC 1963–2024. The sample is women aged 23 to 52, Panel A reports LFP for women with no own child under age 5 and Panel B for women with an own child under age 5, averaged within each cohort and life period. Before 1968 the ASEC does not report a woman’s own children under 5, so those years use the presence of a child under 6 in the family instead; this affects only the earliest years of the 1938–47 cohort’s first life period. Conditional intermittency ρ_a^c in Table 6 is the difference between the two panels divided by Panel A. For the 1978–87 cohort, the 43–52 cells are observed only through age 46 in 2024.

S3.2 Calibrated Values of Technology Parameters

Table S6 reports the calibrated technology parameters over time. The real price of computers, defined as $\frac{p_C}{Z}$, falls by about 50%, consistent with the large decline in computing prices documented in the literature. However, computers in the model should not be interpreted literally; here they represent technologies that substitute specifically for routine labor.

Table S6: Calibrated Technology Parameters

Year	$p_{C,t}$	$Z_{M,t}$	Z_t
1970	0.830	0.166	1054
1980	1.340	0.208	1659
1990	0.816	0.172	1437
2000	0.595	0.155	1353
2010	0.468	0.135	1185

Notes: This table reports the calibrated technology parameters for each year. $p_{C,t}$ is the cost of computers in terms of final output, $Z_{M,t}$ is the productivity of manual relative to abstract labor, Z_t is total factor productivity.

S3.3 Calibrated Values of Wage Gap and Preference Parameters

Table S7 reports the calibrated values for the wage gaps and nonmonetary preferences. In calibrating the preference parameters, I impose the restriction that $b_{gH} + b_{gM} + b_{gR} + b_{gA} = 1$ for $g \in \{m, w\}$. This normalization is feasible because it is the relative preference parameters that matter, not the levels.

Table S7: Calibrated Wage Gap and Preference Parameters

Year/Cohort	Home	Manual	Routine	Abstract
<i>Panel A: Wage Gaps $\tau_{j,t}$</i>				
1970	0.000	0.685	0.326	0.430
1980	0.000	0.559	0.287	0.280
1990	0.000	0.494	0.158	0.220
2000	0.000	0.462	0.104	0.195
2010	0.000	0.352	0.016	0.165
<i>Panel B: Women's Preferences b_{wj}^c</i>				
1938–47	0.071	0.512	0.229	0.188
1948–57	0.101	0.411	0.283	0.205
1958–67	0.120	0.406	0.292	0.182
1968–77	0.135	0.391	0.303	0.172
1978–87	0.137	0.377	0.319	0.167
<i>Panel C: Men's Preferences b_{mj}^c</i>				
1938–47	0.074	0.394	0.332	0.200
1948–57	0.112	0.349	0.325	0.214
1958–67	0.130	0.349	0.342	0.179
1968–77	0.141	0.332	0.362	0.165
1978–87	0.136	0.336	0.380	0.148

Notes: This table reports the calibrated wage gap and occupation preference parameters. Panel A reports the wage gap $\tau_{j,t}$, the “tax” women pay on the wage per efficiency unit in occupation j at time t . Panels B and C report the nonmonetary preference terms b_{wj}^c and b_{mj}^c , which are normalized to sum to one across occupations within each row. Because the wage gap varies by calendar year while preferences are specific to a cohort’s entry date, the rows of Panel A are years and the rows of Panels B and C are birth cohorts.