A Gravity Model of Sovereign Lending: Trade, Default and Credit

Authors

Andrew K. Rose

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2002-09 | September 1, 2002

One reason why countries service their external debts is the fear that default might lead to shrinkage of international trade. If so, then creditors should systematically lend more to countries with which they share closer trade links. We develop a simple theoretical model to capture this intuition, then test and corroborate this idea.

Article Citation

Rose, Andrew K., and Mark M. Spiegel. 2002. “A Gravity Model of Sovereign Lending: Trade, Default and Credit,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2002-09. Available at https://doi.org/10.24148/wp2002-09

About the Author
Mark Spiegel
Mark Spiegel is a senior policy advisor in the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Learn more about Mark Spiegel