Market Price Accounting and Depositor Discipline in Japanese Regional Banks


Nobuyoshi Yamori

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2004-27 | May 1, 2004

We examine the determinants of Japanese regional bank decisions concerning pricing unrealized losses or gains to market. We also examine the impact of these decisions on the intensity of depositor discipline, in the form of the sensitivity of deposit growth to bank financial conditions. To obtain consistent estimates of depositor discipline, we first model and estimate the bank pricing-to-market decision and then estimate the intensity of depositor discipline after conditioning for that decision. We find that banks were less likely to price to market the larger were their unrealized securities losses. We also find statistically significant evidence of depositor discipline among banks that elected to price their assets to market. Our results indicate that depositor discipline was more intense for the subset of banks that priced-to-market, suggesting that increased transparency may enhance depositor discipline.

Article Citation

Spiegel, Mark M., and Nobuyoshi Yamori. 2004. “Market Price Accounting and Depositor Discipline in Japanese Regional Banks,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2004-27. Available at

About the Author
Mark Spiegel
Mark Spiegel is a senior policy advisor in the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Learn more about Mark Spiegel